THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY HTS TRUST DEFICIT, TRUMP ON SYRIA, ISRAEL’S NEW HEADACHES Featuring analysis by Matthew Levitt, Soner Cagaptay, and Assaf Orion December 13, 2024

 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

HTS TRUST DEFICIT, 

TRUMP ON SYRIA, 

ISRAEL’S NEW HEADACHES

Featuring analysis by Matthew Levitt, Soner Cagaptay, and Assaf Orion

December 13, 2024

New articles by three Washington Institute fellows highlight key U.S. and allied policy concerns amid Syria’s ongoing shake-up.

The U.S. Should Not (Yet) Trust Syria’s New Regime

By Matthew Levitt

Syrians have suffered terribly for many years, especially those tortured or disappeared by Assad’s henchmen, and the nation’s people need and deserve American support now. But the new rebel-led government in Damascus has a sordid history of its own, and U.S. officials must carefully assess how to interact with the new regime. This rebel alliance is led by Hayat Tahrir al Sham, a designated terrorist group that grew out of Al Qaeda. While HTS has fought both the Islamic State and an Al Qaeda splinter element in Syria, it remains a jihadist organization called out by the State Department. In 2020, the U.S. listed the group “for having engaged in particularly severe violations of religious freedom” in areas of Syria under its control. According to another State Department report, the group “committed a wide range of abuses, including killings, kidnappings, physical abuse, and recruitment or use of child soldiers”...

Read the full article on the Los Angeles Times website.

Trump Can’t Sit This One Out

By Soner Cagaptay

As Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship was collapsing, President-elect Donald Trump was tweeting that the United States has no dog in the Syrian fight. This is not true. Revolutionary Syria stands at a crossroads: If the country disintegrates, the chaos could overwhelm its neighbors, America’s European allies and even the United States. Trump also has an opportunity to undermine Iran and clip Russia’s wings—by ensuring the countries’ complete departure from Syria.

Both these goals run through Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the revolutionary group that helped seize Damascus as Assad fled. Rooted in al-Qaeda in Iraq, HTS has not been a force for democracy and inclusion. However, over the past decade, it has peacefully run local government in Syria’s Idlib province—collecting trash and training traffic cops.

Proximity to Turkey has played a role in moderating HTS. A conservative and populist figure, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is neither in bed with the Islamic State nor an al-Qaeda fan. Yet Syria’s future depends on what happens next. If HTS returns to its violent, sectarian roots, more conflict lies ahead.

Working with Turkey should not be hard for Trump. He and Erdogan cooperated well during Trump’s first term, especially on Syria.

And Trump has several carrots to offer HTS. First, the group wants to see itself delisted as a designated terrorist entity. HTS craves legitimacy and will want any government it participates in to be duly recognized by Washington. And it knows that the money for Syria’s reconstruction will come mainly from funds organized by the United States.

In exchange, HTS will have to share power with Syria’s other opposition groups and demonstrate inclusivity. It will also need to commit to keeping religion out of public education and the courts. Given Syria’s diversity, sharia law cannot be imposed. And HTS would have to promise to prevent Islamist militants from using Syrian territory to plan external attacks.

Most Syrians, especially HTS, despise Russia and Iran for supporting Assad’s brutal dictatorship. A stable, democratic, inclusive government would help ensure that neither power will have a strong foothold in the country ever again.

Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and director of its Turkish Research Program. This analysis was originally published as part of a Washington Post compilation.

For Israel, a Strategic Win and New Headaches

By Assaf Orion

The Assad regime’s fall dislodged a vital partner in Tehran’s “axis of resistance,” cutting strategic routes between Iran’s military industries and its proxies on Israel’s borders. Iran will now find it exceedingly difficult to rearm and rebuild Hezbollah. At the same time, the advanced arsenal that used to belong to the Syrian army is up for grabs as the power vacuum is filled by various rebel groups—among them radical Islamist terrorists.

Israel’s strategic challenge in Syria is to protect its border communities in the Golan Heights and prevent emerging threats by Islamist militants, including the Islamic State and Hamas. These goals reflect Israel’s post-Oct. 7, 2023, posture, which focuses on prevention and creating buffer zones.

As early as Sunday, Israel Defense Forces started seizing the “area of separation” in Syria in violation of the 1974 disengagement agreement, warning armed rebels to stay away. They also captured the Syrian outpost on Mount Hermon, a vital high ground that, when in hostile forces’ hands, has historically presented a challenge to the IDF. The IDF justified these steps as improving defense positions after armed rebels were seen advancing into the area.

Hezbollah-allied Lebanese media have claimed that IDF troops are advancing on the outskirts of Damascus. The IDF has denied these reports. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he had instructed the IDF to temporarily seize the area of separation, as the disengagement agreement had collapsed.

To prevent future threats, Israel has also been conducting a wide-ranging and intense air campaign across Syria since Monday, striking hundreds of military targets; decimating Syria’s army, air force and navy; and destroying ammunition and arms depots, air defenses, ballistic and anti-ship missiles, and production and development facilities, including for chemical weapons.

Aggressive prevention has not been cost-free. Israel drew regional rebukes against its violation of Syria’s sovereignty. And over time, its presence on Syrian soil might also draw attacks from various Syrian factions.

Beyond this initial phase, Israel will want to reestablish border security arrangements, fully dismantle or destroy all of Syria’s chemical weapons supply and infrastructure while preventing the reemergence of threats from Iran’s proxies or any Islamist factions. It will also want to bolster Jordan’s security and potential Syrian partners, including Kurdish, Druze and moderate Sunni communities. Most of these goals ought to overlap with those of any administration in Washington.

Brig. Gen. Assaf Orion (Res.) is the Rueven International Fellow with The Washington Institute and former head of the IDF Strategic Planning Division. This analysis was originally published as part of a Washington Post compilation.

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY