Iran Update, December 12, 2024 - Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is trying to retain control over the forces that it leads to maintain its moderate image and prevent sectarian conflict.

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Iran Update, December 12, 2024

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is trying to retain control over the forces that it leads to maintain its moderate image and prevent sectarian conflict. HTS stated on December 12 that it would hold accountable any fighters who fail to comply with orders. HTS also stated that any individuals violating orders do not represent HTS-led forces or the transitional government. This statement comes after HTS announced that interfering in women’s choice of clothing or demanding that women dress modestly is ”strictly forbidden.” HTS has also ordered its fighters to protect public and private property, respect public institutions, and treat former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) soldiers well. HTS is trying to present itself as a moderate force with these orders.

The most recent statement threatening to punish fighters is likely in response to reports of HTS-led fighters conducting religion-based harassment and revenge killings. Some reports, for instance, claimed that HTS-led fighters “forcefully” entered the Sayyidah Zeynab shrine in Damascus, which is a holy Shia shrine. The reports claimed that the fighters chanted “provocative slogans” while in the shrine. Several reports claimed that the fighters were affiliated with HTS, which reportedly made an informal agreement with Iran to protect Shia sites and minorities in Syria. CTP-ISW cannot verify the details of the event or the accuracy of the reports. But their prevalence in the information space could nevertheless stoke sectarian tensions. CTP-ISW similarly reported on December 11 that an HTS-led fighter questioned a Christian journalist about her religious background, asking specifically whether she was “Christian, Alawi, Shiite, or Druze.“

These incidents and the traction they gain in the information space creates opportunities for extreme and sectarian groups to incite further religious-based violence and destabilize the government formation process in Syria. These incidents remain isolated and relatively independent of each other at this time. But HTS is comprised of numerous Islamist groups formed with varying degrees of representation in the broader HTS leadership structure. It is unclear which factions of HTS are involved in these instances of sectarian tensions or whether they are coordinated activities amongst several factions. CTP-ISW will continue to report revenge killings and religion-based incidents and violence due to the risk that these events can rapidly destabilize the situation in Syria.

The SDF is factionalizing under internal and external pressure. Local footage posted on December 12 showed the SDF try to suppress demonstrators in Raqqa who demanded that the city be brought under the HTS-led transitional government. Citizens have long standing grievances against the SDF in Raqqa, which include limited reconstruction in Arab areas, repeated SDF abuses of the local populations, and a lack of representative Arab leadership. The head of the al Kasra Military Council--a membe”r of the SDF-- defected from the SDF, citing SDF “violations” against civilians in Deir ez Zor and Raqqa. Arab contingents of the SDF have rapidly begun to defect in recent days. A Syrian journalist reported that approximately 220 members of the Deir ez Zor Military Council have defected from the SDF over the past 48 hours.

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) confirmed on December 12 that it reached a ceasefire agreement with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Manbij, northern Syria. The four-day ceasefire will last from December 12 to 16 in order to allow humanitarian aid to enter and unspecified security agreements. Under the agreement, the SNA will transfer control of the Sultan Suleiman Tomb and its surrounding hills to the SDF. In exchange, the SDF and SDF families will also withdraw from Manbij and the surrounding countryside. The ceasefire agreement also established the Tishreen Dam as a demilitarized zone to permit the electrical plant to continue its regular functions. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi confirmed on December 11 that his forces withdrew from Manbij after reaching a settlement with the SNA. The SDF disputed territorial control over Manbij after the SNA seized control on December 8.

The HTS-led interim government is trying to portray itself as the legitimate Syrian state. The transitional government posted a statement on December 12, thanking Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia for resuming their diplomatic missions in Damascus. The statement also noted that Qatar and Turkey would reopen their respective embassies. HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani and caretaker Prime Minister Mohammad al Bashir separately met with the Turkish foreign affairs minister and intelligence chief as well as the Qatari State Security Agency chief in Damascus on December 12. The publication of these events portrays the HTS-led transitional government as the legitimate Syrian state despite no countries having yet formally recognized it as such.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to operate on the ground in southwestern Syria, according to Syrian sources. One outlet reported that the IDF entered towns in and around the disengagement zone in Quneitra Province and seized arms from residents on December 12. Another source reported that the IDF detonated explosives at a former SAA site around Umm Batnah.

Syrian media separately reported that the IDF plans to enter Marbah in western Daraa Province in order to disrupt the movement of arms there. The IDF previously paved a road leading from the disengagement zone to Marbah on December 11. Syrian media stated that the IDF announced on December 12 via loudspeaker to residents that it plans to enter the town. IDF officers met with tribal leaders at a nearby military site to discuss these plans as well. Marbah residents have requested that the HTS-led opposition forces intervene against the IDF.

The IDF has likely conducted three airstrikes in Syria since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 11. Local Syrian media reported two IDF airstrikes targeting Latakia port on December 11. The outlet also reported an IDF airstrike on the outskirts of Damascus on December 12. The IDF air campaign into Syria on December 9 and 10 destroyed approximately 70-80 percent of the Bashar al Assad regime’s military capabilities to prevent "terrorist elements” from seizing weapons, including dozens of anti-ship missiles at al Bayda and Latakia ports. The IDF has given no comment on the latest reported airstrikes at the time of this writing.

The E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) sent a letter to the UN Security Council on December 6, announcing its readiness to impose international “snapback” sanctions on Iran. The E3 would invoke the snapback mechanism of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action if Iran continues to expand its nuclear program and decline to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The E3 letter comes after Iran dramatically increased its enrichment of uranium to 60 percent. Iran announced on November 27 that it had activated “thousands of advanced centrifuges.” Iran was retaliating for an earlier censure resolution passed by the IAEA Board of Governors, criticizing the lack of Iranian cooperation with the IAEA.

Reuters reported on December 12 that Iran agreed with the IAEA to increase the “frequency and intensity” of international monitoring of activities at the Fordow nuclear site. Iran is likely responding to the threat from the E3 to impose snapback sanctions. It is notable, however, that greater international monitoring has no effect on Iran’s accelerated rate of uranium enrichment.

Key Takeaways:

1. Syria: HTS is trying to retain control over the forces that it leads to maintain its moderate image and prevent sectarian conflict. HTS likely recognizes the risk of revenge killings and sectarian violence, which could destabilize Syria further.

2. Syria: The US-backed SDF is facing intense external and internal pressure. The SDF did, however, reach a four-day ceasefire agreement with the Turkish-backed SNA around Manbij in northern Syria. 

3. Syria: The HTS-led transitional government is trying to portray itself as the legitimate Syrian state by publicizing its engagement with foreign actors. No foreign countries have yet recognized the transitional government as the legitimate state, however.

4. Iran: The E3 sent a letter to the UN Security Council, threatening to impose “snapback” sanctions on Iran. The E3 is responding to the dramatic expansion of the Iranian nuclear program and Iranian non-cooperation with the IAEA.