The US Election and Its Impact on the Middle East
The outcome will also have implications beyond U.S. domestic policy.
As the U.S. presidential election draws near, the United States faces several economic, social and political challenges that will play a decisive role in determining whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump will be the next president of the United States. Inflation remains high, the gap between the haves and the have-nots is growing, and views on immigration and the border continue to polarize the public. But the election’s outcome will also have implications beyond U.S. domestic policy.
The overriding foreign policy matter at issue in this election concerns economic competition with China and the associated tensions in the South China Sea, through which one-third of global trade passes. Other foreign policy priorities include the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Hamas conflict and its regional repercussions. Though the divide between the Republicans and the Democrats on the Ukraine war might be irreconcilable, their differences on the Middle East, including the war in Gaza, are mostly minor. Apart from safeguarding the vital interests of the U.S., both presidential contenders will eschew deep involvement in Middle East affairs.
Determinants of U.S. Policy
Five constants drive the direction of U.S. policy toward the Middle East. The first is Israel’s security and the U.S. commitment to maintaining Israel’s military superiority in the region, which is apparent from the state-of-the-art military hardware that Israel receives from the U.S. compared to the less advanced equipment delivered to other countries. The second constant relates to U.S. control of the region’s oil and ensuring its passage through the straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb in order to reach international markets. U.S. commitment to this cause undermines any Iranian threats to block navigation through the Persian Gulf and Houthi threats to block access to the Red Sea. The third constant is the U.S. commitment to preventing Russia or China from dominating the region’s politics, a fact understood well by Middle Eastern countries. The fourth constant is ensuring the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. And the fifth focuses on combating terrorism.
The U.S. understands that given the complexity of Middle East politics, it cannot transform the region. It learned this lesson from the failures of its 2003 invasion of Iraq despite its heavy investment in democratization and reconstruction efforts. Its limited interest in the Middle East has driven its increasing desire to restrict its involvement there. This started when the U.S. intensified its pivot to Asia, an effort that began during Barack Obama’s presidency.
Moreover, U.S. voters (with the exception of Arab and Muslim Americans) are preoccupied with problems that have nothing to do with the Middle East. The enormous interest of activists and the media in the Gaza war does not reflect the priorities of voters themselves.
Straightforward Republican Approach
If Trump wins the presidency, he will pursue a foreign policy based on “America First” principles, including by signing trade deals, displaying a reluctance to engage in military interventions abroad and reducing international commitments, including to NATO.
In the Middle East, Trump has shown little interest in the crises in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen, preferring to focus on domestic challenges instead. On the Israel-Palestinian conflict, he has shown little enthusiasm for a two-state solution and prefers to impose quick solutions without focusing on their feasibility.
Trump will likely seek direct normalization deals between Israel and its neighbors (especially Saudi Arabia), similar to those he concluded between the Israeli government and other Gulf states in 2020. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman is eager to sign a peace treaty with Israel, even without an Israeli commitment to establishing a Palestinian state – though he and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seem to have put the project on hold pending the outcome of the U.S. election, preferring to give credit to Trump rather than Harris for its success. Trump could also consider signing a formal defense treaty with Saudi Arabia to prod it to make peace with Israel, but this would be challenging considering that getting the support of two-thirds of the Senate seems unlikely. After making peace between Israel and Saudi Arabia, Trump will likely pressure Qatar, Kuwait and Oman to conclude similar deals.
As for relations with Iran, Trump will adopt a more hostile policy, but he is unlikely to resort to military action, relying instead on sanctions and economic pressure. He has hinted at the possibility of a deal with Tehran, but only on his terms. It’s unclear if the Iranians can afford another four years of austere sanctions under a second Trump term, so they could be amenable to striking a deal, facilitated by the recent election of a reformist Iranian president. Despite the apparent different approaches between the Republicans and the Democrats on Iran’s nuclear program and regional proxies, the core U.S. perspective on Iran cuts across the two political parties. Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, and although Biden pledged to restore it if he won the presidency, lengthy negotiations in Vienna did not yield results, and the Trump-era sanctions remain in effect.
Nuanced Democratic Approach
Most Republican congressional candidates who won their primary races support Israel unconditionally. In contrast, Democratic congressional candidates adopted a more nuanced approach. They invariably voiced their commitment to Israel’s security and well-being but with specific qualifications about human rights, the suffering of Gaza’s civilian population and a two-state solution. Still, Democratic candidates avoid extreme criticism of Israel based on the fact that results in the primary elections demonstrate that anti-Israel views are still unpopular among mainstream Democratic supporters. Protests at college campuses against Israel’s conduct in Gaza neither shape public opinion nor determine the Democratic Party’s policy choices.
The divide among Democrats on this issue results from profound differences in the views of the demographic groups that make up the party’s base, with younger, non-white voters being more sympathetic to the Palestinians and more critical of Israel, while older whites are more pro-Israel. Republican support for Israel, meanwhile, has increased with the surging influence of right-wing Christian groups within the party.
Since the inception of the Gaza war, Democratic members of Congress have been pressing to end the war and provide aid to Palestinians trapped in Gaza. However, Democrats’ criticism of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu antedate the Gaza war. President Joe Biden and Democratic members of Congress opposed Netanyahu’s judicial overhaul and the appointment of two radical lawmakers to Cabinet.
Arguably sympathetic to the case presented by Palestinian rights activists, Harris has been unable to reconcile the demands of the pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli sides of the party. Pro-Palestinian activists felt that the Democratic Party failed to address their demands for primetime speaking slots during the 2024 Democratic National Convention, further exacerbating their feelings of marginalization.
If Harris wins the election, her foreign policy will adhere to the broad lines of the Democratic Party, such as defending democratic principles and human rights, strengthening international alliances, confronting global challenges such as climate change and nuclear proliferation, cooperating with allies, especially in NATO, and paying particular attention to confronting Russia in Ukraine and curtailing Chinese influence in the Pacific region.
As vice president, Harris avoided talking about strategic policies and initiatives in the Middle East. But if she wins the presidency, she will be forced to deal with the region’s intractable issues. It’s unlikely that U.S. support for Israel will witness a dramatic shift if Harris wins office. Still, in recent months, she has taken steps to distinguish herself slightly from Biden. She was the first senior U.S. official to call for a cease-fire in Gaza, opposing the idea that a deal can be reached only after Hamas is destroyed. She stressed Israel’s right to defend itself but chose to boycott Netanyahu’s speech before Congress in July.
Harris did not want the Gaza war to be one of the main issues in her election campaign. She chose Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz, who has limited foreign policy experience, as her running mate to sway uncommitted Democrats to vote for her. (Nearly 19 percent of voters in the Minnesota Democratic primary for president voted “uncommitted.”) Walz has recognized Israel’s right to defend itself and distinguished between Hamas, which he condemned for the Oct. 7 attack, and the civilians who have been caught in the crossfire in Gaza.
Ultimately, Harris’ position on ongoing tensions in the Middle East will be uncertain. During her tenure in the Senate, Harris consistently voted against arms deals with Saudi Arabia and U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. In 2020, she stated that the United States must reevaluate its relationship with the Saudis to defend U.S. values and interests, though she did not specify which values and interests she was referring to. Harris’ policies will likely mirror Biden’s. Her goals will include strengthening security relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia and cooperating in technology and the green energy transition. In the context of the ongoing escalation between Iran and Israel following the assassination of senior Hezbollah and Hamas leaders, Harris is likely to adopt a balanced approach toward Iran and stress the need to renegotiate the Iran nuclear deal, pending the outcome of the fighting between Israel and Hamas and Hezbollah.
Limits of U.S. Foreign Policy
Many in the Middle East understand the limits of U.S. policy in their region. They support U.S. engagement when it comes to combating terrorism and keeping sea lanes open for trade. They also accept, though grudgingly, the unpopular constants of U.S. policy, especially Israeli exceptionalism and regional supremacy.
They also recognize the United States’ reluctance to engage militarily in the region on matters that do not directly intersect with its own interests. In 2012, Syrian President Bashar Assad admitted to having chemical weapons but said they were meant for use only against foreign aggression. Obama warned him against using them against his people, saying he would be crossing a red line. But before the year’s end, Assad’s forces used sarin gas in rebel-held areas near Damascus, killing 1,400 people. The U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations supported punishing Assad’s army for committing the massacre, but failing to secure authorization from either chamber, Obama opted against using force against the Syrian regime.
In September 2019, the Houthis targeted Saudi oil installations. They expected the Trump administration to defend the kingdom, but it did not. The Saudis viewed the Houthi attacks as a threat to international oil supplies, a view that Washington did not share because the incident had little impact on U.S. oil imports. That such attacks disrupted the flow of Saudi oil to Europe, China and India did not bother Washington.
The United Arab Emirates says it does not expect to resume talks with the U.S. over a multibillion-dollar deal to buy F-35 fighter jets regardless of who wins the election. Trump had signed an agreement to supply the UAE with the advanced aircraft, which no other country in the Middle East has besides Israel, before the end of his presidency in early 2021. The Emiratis now say the same factors that caused the suspension of the talks when Biden took office still exist, so they do not plan to reopen negotiations.
Apart from achieving vital national interests, the Middle East is of little interest to the United States and U.S. policymakers. The region accounts for less than 5 percent of the world’s economy, much of which comes from hydrocarbon exports. This lack of interest gives the region’s authoritarian leaders impunity to violate human rights and oppress their people.
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