For decades, global integration—of trade, of politics, of technology—was seen as a natural law. Today, integration has been replaced by fragmentation. The post–Cold War institutions are teetering, industrial strategies are back in vogue, and competition with China is growing. These dynamics are creating geopolitical friction across global supply chains, for vehicles, minerals, computer chips, and more.
Against this backdrop, the clean energy transition remains the most important planetary challenge. It also presents the greatest economic opportunity: it will be the largest capital formation event in human history. And it presents the United States with a chance to lead. Thanks to its still unparalleled power and influence, Washington maintains a unique capacity—and a strategic imperative—to shape world outcomes.
In 2022, the United States recognized these opportunities when it passed the Inflation Reduction Act, the world’s largest-ever investment in clean energy technologies. This transformative industrial strategy was a crucial first step for the United States in positioning its economy for success by accelerating the clean energy transition at home. Now is the time to take this leadership to the global stage, in a way that promotes U.S. interests and supports aligned countries. But the United States need not create a new model for doing so.
Seventy-six years ago, also facing a fractured world order and an emerging superpower competitor, U.S. President Harry Truman and U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall launched an ambitious effort to rebuild European societies and economies. Although often associated with free-market neoliberalism, the 1948 Marshall Plan was hardly laissez-faire. It was, in fact, an industrial strategy that established the United States as a generous partner to European allies while promoting U.S. industries and interests. Generations later, the Marshall Plan is rightly understood as one of the great successes of the postwar era.
Although today’s challenges are undoubtedly different, the United States should draw lessons from that postwar period and launch a new Marshall Plan, this time for the global transition to clean energy. Just as the Marshall Plan assisted those countries most ravaged by World War II, the new Marshall Plan should aim to help countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change: the United States’ partners in the developing world. Developing countries and emerging markets will need access to cheap capital and technology to transition away from fossil fuels quickly enough to halt global warming.
The United States again has the chance to help others while helping itself. Putting its own burgeoning industries front and center in the energy transition will generate further innovation and growth. Clean energy investment in the United States reached about 7.4 percent of private fixed investment in structures and equipment in the first quarter of this year, at $40 billion, up from $16 billion in the first quarter of 2021. Investment in emerging energy technologies—such as hydrogen power and carbon capture and storage—jumped by 1,000 percent from 2022 to 2023. Manufacturing investment in the battery supply chain went up nearly 200 percent over the same period. By creating global markets for its own clean energy industries and innovators, the United States can scale these economic gains and strengthen domestic support for an energy shift that has not always been an easy sell to voters.
The fracturing world order and the ominous climate crisis lead some observers to focus on the potential tensions between those two developments. But they also provide an opening for the United States to deploy its innovation and capital in a generous, pragmatic, and unapologetically pro-American way—by launching a Clean Energy Marshall Plan.
THE SINCEREST FORM OF FLATTERY
Gauzy invocations of the Marshall Plan often induce eye rolling, and with good reason. In U.S. policy circles, commentators have called for a new Marshall Plan for everything from ending global poverty to rebuilding Ukraine. The term has become shorthand for a response to any problem that mobilizes public resources to achieve an ambitious end. But this overuse has blurred the substance of what the Marshall Plan really was—and was not.
The Marshall Plan was not, as many assume, born solely out of visionary ideals of international unity after the horrors of World War II. Instead, it reflected the pragmatic constraints of a fracturing, uncertain world order. In the spring of 1947, having returned from China after a failed attempt to head off a communist takeover there, Marshall was left to grapple with the newly emerged Iron Curtain in Europe. The shifting geopolitical reality forced Truman and Marshall to consider how to exert U.S. leadership to shape the world for good—to forge peace, rebuild cities, and promote American values in the face of communism. But they clearly recognized the limits of hard power and understood that economic stability could yield geopolitical stability.
Fundamentally, the Marshall Plan was an industrial strategy that deployed public dollars to advance U.S. manufacturing and industrial capabilities in service of reconstructing Europe. Washington spent $13 billion—equivalent to $200 billion today—over four years, mostly in the form of grants to discount the European purchase of goods and services. Because U.S. companies were at the center of the program, 70 percent of European expenditures of Marshall Plan funds were used to buy products made in the United States. Italy, for example, used Marshall Plan funds to buy American drilling technology, pipes, and other industrial equipment to rebuild its energy sector—including the equipment needed to restart Europe’s first commercial geothermal plant, powered by steam from lava beds in Tuscany. By 1950, that region had more than doubled its geothermal capacity and remained a major contributor to Italy’s total power demand.
The structure of the Marshall Plan allowed it to meet Europe’s pressing needs while winning over a skeptical and war-weary American public. Because there was little appetite for providing foreign aid following World War II, Marshall and Truman centered their plan on Americans’ economic interests. The country’s industrial capabilities had grown considerably during the war, but after the war, the task was to find new markets for them. As the plan’s chief administrator, Paul Hoffman, explained, the goal was to turn Europe into a “consumer of American goods” at a time when postwar U.S. GDP had fallen precipitously and exports were imperiled by a moribund European economy. The Marshall Plan would thus help American companies and save American jobs.
To sell the plan to the public, its architects and supporters launched a public relations campaign, squarely anchoring their case in these core U.S. economic interests. In the ten months after Marshall’s June 1947 speech introducing the plan, it gained traction, securing a 75 percent public approval rating and winning over a majority of the U.S. Congress—in an election year and with a divided government to boot.
Yet even though the Marshall Plan was attuned to U.S. economic interests, its architects recognized that it was important for the United States to be a generous, reliable partner to U.S. allies. The plan helped Europe rise from the rubble, pay off its debts, refill its foreign exchange reserves, recover its industrial production and agricultural output, adopt new technologies, and build goodwill for the United States, all while reducing the appeal of communism. By filling a financing gap that no other power could, the United States cemented its transatlantic partnerships. And by supporting its own economy, it became a capable and reliable global partner.
THE CHEAPER, THE BETTER
Like the original Marshall Plan, a Clean Energy Marshall Plan should meet other countries’ development needs while advancing U.S. interests. In this case, the goal is to speed the adoption of low-cost, zero-carbon solutions, such as the manufacture of batteries, the deployment of nuclear and geothermal energy, and the processing of critical minerals. This approach reflects the basic intuition that, as useful as it can be to make carbon pollution more expensive by putting a price on it, the most credible way to accelerate the adoption of zero-carbon technologies is to make that technology cheap and widely available.
The Inflation Reduction Act embodies this theory: it created long-term public incentives that promote the innovation and deployment of a variety of clean energy technologies. This public investment is already transforming the U.S. energy industry, and it holds even more potential for global energy markets. By driving down the cost of clean energy technologies—particularly innovative technologies such as nuclear power and carbon capture—the IRA could generate up to $120 billion in global savings by 2030. The resulting uptake of clean energy technologies in emerging markets could ultimately yield emission reductions in the rest of the world that would be two to four times as large as those achieved in the United States.
But the adoption of low-cost clean energy technologies is not self-executing. Without U.S. leadership, the world will simply not do enough fast enough to limit the worst effects of global warming. Unfortunately, the United States has yet to offer a full-throated answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the $1 trillion infrastructure project Beijing designed to expand its influence across the globe. And now, some leaders in China are calling for Beijing to go even further and develop a Marshall Plan–style approach to drive clean energy adoption in developing countries. Meanwhile, other players are also stepping up where the United States has not. For all the controversy about the United Arab Emirates—a fossil fuel nation—hosting last year’s UN climate conference, it is notable that it was the UAE, and not the United States, that proposed a large funding effort aimed at scaling zero-carbon technology to appropriate levels for emerging markets.
Ceding this space is a failure of American leadership and a missed economic opportunity. Skepticism of the United States, exacerbated by its handling of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, is already high in Southeast Asia and across the developing world, where Washington cannot afford to see alliances fray. And when countries there look to China or the UAE for capital and technology, American innovators and workers lose ground.
Implementing a Clean Energy Marshall Plan won’t be easy, but the process must begin now. As after World War II, the United States can be generous as well as pro-American in its approach. It can promote U.S. interests by scaling its industries to meet global needs while winning greater influence in this new geopolitical landscape. And it can meet developing countries where they are—supplying them with the energy they need to expand their economies and the innovation they need to decarbonize efficiently.
To accomplish these aims, however, Washington needs a clear mandate, adequate resources, and flexible tools. And it will need to enact a strategy that does three things: finances foreign deployment of U.S. clean energy technology, secures more resilient supply chains, and creates a new, more balanced trade regime that encourages the development and implementation of clean energy technology.
HOMEGROWN ADVANTAGES
The United States should begin with a focused investment and commercial diplomacy effort, akin to that of the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan had a straightforward aim: subsidize European demand for U.S. products and services needed to rebuild Europe. Today, the United States should establish a Clean Energy Finance Authority with an updated mission: subsidize foreign demand for clean energy technology and put American innovation and industry at the front of the line.
This new body would enable the United States to participate in foreign deals that promote U.S. innovation and production while reducing emissions. The purpose would be to reduce the premium that emerging-market economies must pay to meet their energy needs in a low-carbon way. To receive U.S. investments, governments and private sectors in these countries would themselves need to invest in clean energy. The promise of reliable U.S. support would prompt reform.
The good news is that most of the technologies necessary, from solar power to battery storage to wind turbines, are already commercially scalable. Other technologies are now scaling up rapidly, thanks to U.S. investment. For example, the United States has used its existing drilling capacity to become the world’s leading producer of advanced geothermal energy. It is well positioned to leverage its homegrown advantages to export geothermal components to geopolitically important markets in Southeast Asia and Africa and beyond, where sources of reliable power are needed. And the more these technologies are deployed, the more costs will come down, as processes become more efficient with scale. With patient capital, the dividends will be manifold: steady, clean power; faster-growing markets; diversified supply chains; and support for hundreds of thousands of U.S. jobs. Similar opportunities exist for advanced nuclear and hydrogen power and carbon capture.
To be effective, the Clean Energy Finance Authority would need to be big yet nimble. Not only has the United States lagged other countries in offering public capital to lead the energy transition, but its financial support is also unnecessarily inflexible. Officials in foreign capitals joke that the United States shows up with a 100-page list of conditions, whereas China shows up with a blank check. The United States’ current financing authorities are constrained by byzantine rules that block U.S. investment that could advance its national interests.
For example, the U.S. Development Finance Corporation, which invests in projects in lower- and middle-income countries, cannot invest in lithium processing projects in Chile because it is considered a high-income country, yet companies in the low-income Democratic Republic of the Congo often find it impossible to meet the DFC’s stringent labor standards. Meanwhile, Chinese companies invested over $200 million in a Chilean lithium plant in 2023 and gained rights to explore Congolese lithium mines the same year. Of course, U.S. finance must continue to reflect American values, but there is still room for far greater flexibility in the name of national interest and the energy transition.
Promising models for a Clean Energy Finance Authority also exist. Domestically, the Department of Energy’s Loan Program Office rapidly expanded its capabilities, approving 11 investment commitments to companies totaling $18 billion in the past two fiscal years (versus just two commitments in the three years before that). Internationally, the DFC expanded its climate lending from less than $500 million to nearly $4 billion over the last three years. And the United States has supported creative financial partnerships with several countries. In Egypt, for example, the United States and Germany committed $250 million to stimulate $10 billion of private capital to accelerate the Egyptian energy transition.
The most effective aspects of these examples should be harnessed together under the Clean Energy Finance Authority, which should have a versatile financial toolkit, including the ability to issue debt and equity. It should be able to deploy this capital in creative arrangements, such as by blending it with foreign capital and lowering risk premiums with insurance and guarantees. It should draw on, not re-create, the Department of Energy’s expertise in assessing the risks and benefits of emerging technologies, such as advanced nuclear energy, hydrogen power, and carbon capture and storage. The Clean Energy Finance Authority could be managed by the U.S. Treasury Department, in light of the latter’s experience in risk underwriting and financial diligence, and given the mandate to coordinate closely across agencies.
With nimble, market-oriented financing capacities, the Clean Energy Finance Authority would be able to accelerate and initiate, not impede, financial transactions. Whereas the Marshall Plan was 90 percent financed with U.S. grants, a Clean Energy Marshall Plan could easily be the inverse, with less than ten percent of its expenditures in the form of grants and the rest of the capital being deployed as equity, debt, export credit, and other forms of financing. And whereas the Chinese Belt and Road model relies on government-dominated financing, an American approach would be market-based and therefore more efficient because it enables competition and encourages large investments of private capital.
The Clean Energy Finance Authority should be capitalized with a significant upfront commitment of money—enough to generate market momentum that tips the balance of clean energy investment toward the private sector; ultimately the private sector, not the public sector, will need to provide the majority of the financing the energy transition needs over the coming decades. If this new authority is set up and deployed properly, U.S. companies and innovators would gain more foreign demand, on favorably negotiated terms, and new market share. Foreign consumers, for their part, would gain access to new channels of cheap clean energy technology. For emerging-market countries and major emitters—such as Brazil, India, and Indonesia—the United States could act with both generosity and its own interests in mind.
THE DANGER OF DEPENDENCE
The United States should also establish a Clean Energy Resilience Authority, whose goal would be to create more resilient supply chains for the clean energy transition. To support burgeoning manufacturing production in developing countries, and to expand that of the United States, the world needs diversified supply chains that are not dominated by individual states and do not have exploitable chokepoints. Today, China controls 60 percent of the world’s rare-earth mining production and approximately 90 percent of its processing and refining capability.
The United States should lead a coalition of partners to build access to processed critical minerals such that the energy transition does not substitute dependence on foreign oil for dependence on Chinese critical minerals. Thankfully, the term “rare-earth minerals” is a misnomer: these elements are abundant and geographically dispersed. Eighty percent of the world’s lithium reserves, 66 percent of its nickel reserves, and 50 percent of its copper reserves are in democracies. Eighty percent of oil reserves, by contrast, are in OPEC countries, nearly all of which are autocracies.
In today’s energy market, the most important tool the United States wields is the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, a stockpile of oil created 50 years ago as a response to the 1973 oil crisis. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in 2022, the U.S. government used this reserve to ensure adequate supply by selling 180 million barrels of oil. When prices fell, the administration began refilling the reserve, securing a profit for U.S. taxpayers of close to $600 million as of May 2024. This mechanism has reduced the volatility of oil prices while advancing U.S. strategic interests.
The United States should create a strategic reserve capability for critical minerals, as well. A body similar to the U.S. Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund, a reserve fund used to prevent fluctuations in the value of the U.S. dollar, but for critical minerals would enable the United States to stabilize the market for these resources. The Clean Energy Resilience Authority could offer various forms of financial insurance that would steady prices, protect consumers from price spikes, and generate stable revenue for producers during low-price periods. And it should have the ability to build up physical stockpiles of key minerals, such as graphite and cobalt, whether on U.S. soil or in allied territory.
Support for this type of reserve capability already exists. The bipartisan House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party recommended just such a body. The United States’ allies are also on board: in May, South Korea allocated an additional nearly $200 million to build up domestic lithium reserves. Indeed, the original Marshall Plan also recognized the need to improve access to strategically important materials, funding domestic stockpiles for goods such as industrial equipment and medical supplies.
With the Clean Energy Resilience Authority, the United States would be better able to craft multilateral agreements to diversify critical minerals processing. As part of that effort, it could organize a critical minerals club among leading producers and consumers, wherein members could offer and receive purchase commitments. Such an arrangement would give countries that produce and process minerals reliable access to the United States and other developed markets—assuming they meet high standards for sustainable and ethical mining practices. The outcome would be more minerals processed in a more diverse supply chain, sold into a more stable market.
TRADING PLACES
The Marshall Plan underscored the importance of using trade policy to advance U.S. interests: it required European countries to integrate their economies and to remove trade barriers as a means of expanding U.S. exports, promoting capitalism, and warding off communism. A Clean Energy Marshall Plan should help lead a coalition to elicit a more balanced global trading system.
Right now, China is the central actor in global supply chains for clean energy technologies. Facing a stalling domestic economy, China is pursuing a state-led strategy of investing in domestic manufacturing capacity rather than in greater domestic demand or a stronger social safety net. For some goods, such as electric vehicles, batteries, and solar panels, China explicitly aims to dominate global manufacturing. That strategy is fundamentally unsustainable for the global economy. For one thing, it creates acute supply chain vulnerabilities; because the world relies so heavily on China for processing rare-earth minerals, a natural disaster or geopolitical tensions could threaten the entire global supply. For another thing, the strategy erodes industrial capacity across the world, including in the United States. By flooding global markets with artificially cheap goods without a commensurate increase in imports, China forces the cost of its subsidies onto its trade partners—undercutting employment, innovation, and industrial capacity elsewhere. Indeed, this strategy even harms China’s own industrial sector and fails to address the root causes of its domestic economic challenges.
As part of the Clean Energy Marshall Plan, Washington must level the global playing field through the active yet measured use of trade tools such as tariffs. Doing nothing and being resigned to China’s statist approach is neither economically nor politically sustainable. And using blunt tools to effectuate what amounts to a unilateral retreat is dangerous. Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s call to essentially end all imports from China within four years is a cynical fantasy playing on populist fears. In 2022, U.S. goods and services trade with China amounted to over $750 billion. It is not practicable to decouple from any major economy, let alone the United States’ third-largest trading partner. Global trade delivers important benefits, whereas unilateral, asymmetric escalation would leave the United States isolated and vulnerable.
The right approach is to harmonize more active trade policies with like-minded countries. Indeed, Brazil, Chile, India, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam, among others, are all investigating or imposing tariffs on Chinese dumping practices. China is now the object of twice as many retaliatory measures as it was four years ago. This growing pushback represents a chance for the United States to address the Chinese-driven global trade imbalance by crafting a global coalition to galvanize a coordinated response while creating more global trade in clean energy goods and services.
To accomplish this, the United States must use expanded, stronger, and smarter trade authorities. For example, Washington should build into its tariffs on imported goods an assessment of how much carbon was used to produce them. Tariffs should be determined by the emission intensity of the trading partner’s entire industry, rather than company by company, to avoid “resource reshuffling,” whereby countries try to dodge penalties by limiting their exports to only products manufactured with clean energy instead of reducing their emissions overall. These tariffs should be aimed at all countries, but given its current production practices, China would be hit the hardest.
This form of tariff regime could be coordinated with what other countries are doing on the same front. The effort should begin with the steel sector. Chinese-made steel is two to five times as carbon-intensive as U.S.-made steel and is being dumped in markets around the world. The United States has been working on an arrangement with the European Union to harmonize tariffs on steel and aluminum. But the EU need not be the United States’ first or only partner in this initiative. There is a global appetite to enact a common external tariff regime on China to respond to its overproduction and carbon-intensive practices. Washington should work to pull this group together through the G-7 and G-20.
There is also a domestic appetite for this approach, in both the U.S. Congress and the private sector. For example, Dow Chemical has advocated the use of carbon policies to favor environmentally responsible industries that make heavily traded goods. Several bipartisan bills now in Congress propose similar policies. The United States could develop an industrial competitiveness program for heavy industries, such as those producing cement, steel, and chemicals, that bolsters domestic industry and makes trade more fair by charging a carbon-based fee on both domestic industries and imports at the border. This program would incentivize domestic innovation and efficiency, and it would advantage environmentally responsible U.S. companies that compete with heavy-carbon-emitting foreign producers. The revenue from the fee could be rebated to the U.S. private sector by rewarding the cleanest domestic producers and investing in research and development.
A carbon-based tariff, or a carbon border adjustment, should further motivate climate action by exempting countries that are hitting their nationally determined goals under the 2016 Paris climate agreement or those that fall below certain income and emission thresholds. To complement the Clean Energy Finance Authority, the tariff could be lowered in exchange for foreign procurement of clean energy technologies or of clean products made in the United States. For many developing countries, the tariff would act as a powerful accelerant to their energy development plans.
This approach would allow the United States to transition from its current indiscriminate, broad-based tariff regime to a more comprehensive carbon-based system that more accurately targets Chinese overcapacity and trade imbalance concerns. And the United States should leave the door open to cooperating with China in this context, as well.
Policymakers will have to reimagine existing trade rules—and be willing to lead the World Trade Organization and other international institutions in thinking about how trade can accelerate the clean energy transition. The WTO’s objective was never just to promote free trade for free trade’s sake; its founding document includes a vision for sustainable development. The WTO must reform if it is to deliver on that vision, but in the meantime, the United States shouldn’t cling to old trade conventions when more targeted and effective approaches exist.
BANKING ON THE FUTURE
Finally, as the United States upgrades its tools of economic statecraft, it should also increase its expectations of the world’s multilateral development banks, especially the World Bank. Like its predecessor, the Clean Energy Marshall Plan would be temporary, designed to unlock a wave of innovation investment to address a global need. The multilateral development banks are a necessary complement to active U.S. leadership today, just as they were in the postwar era. But the banks need to deploy their capital with the urgency that the energy transition and economic development demand. Although there has been a welcome recent focus on this reform agenda—including by the Biden administration, the G-20, and even the banks themselves—progress has been tepid, and conventional proposals lack ambition and creativity. Incremental change is not enough.
Some avenues already exist to spur the proper level of ambition. For example, donor countries can increase the stakes for the banks by fostering competition among them to make tangible progress on reforms that increase lending for climate-related projects and leverage their investments more effectively. Washington can already provide capital in the form of guarantees to multilateral development banks; this authority could be expanded such that U.S. capital is allocated to these banks based on which ones deserve it most. This “play to get paid” structure would challenge the banks to come forward with legitimate plans to improve their lending practices for clean energy projects. And the guarantee structure offers a great bang for the buck: the World Bank can spend $6 for every $1 of guarantee provided.
The Green Climate Fund, the sole multilateral public financial institution devoted to addressing climate change, could follow this approach, too. Almost 15 years after it was founded, the GCF has disbursed only 20 percent of the funding it has received. To speed up its progress and increase its leverage, the GCF should allocate a portion of its funds to the multilateral development banks, building on its existing practice of lending to these institutions, based on a similar “play to get paid” principle. Instead of submitting individual project applications, the banks would submit proposals for leveraging hybrid capital to scale climate lending in support of the GCF’s mission, including the even split between those projects that prevent climate change and those that respond to its current impacts. In other words, the banks that can best attack the problem would receive flexible GCF capital to scale those efforts. Such a change would be merely one part of a multilateral system that maintains the momentum created by a Clean Energy Marshall Plan.
WIN-WIN-WIN
A Clean Energy Marshall Plan has the makings of a compelling pitch to U.S. domestic audiences: investing in the clean energy transition abroad will benefit businesses and workers at home. Evidence of that effect is already easy to find. The clean investment boom is turning novel technologies into market mainstays: emerging technologies such as hydrogen power and carbon capture now each receive more investment than wind. Billions of dollars are flowing to areas of the United States left behind by previous economic booms, bringing new jobs with them. But to further this momentum, the country needs to turn to foreign markets to boost demand for U.S. products.
The United States should seize the occasion to lead on its own terms. The Clean Energy Marshall Plan would be good for U.S. workers and businesses, unlocking billions of dollars of market opportunities; good for the United States’ developing country partners, by delivering low-cost decarbonization solutions; and good for the world order, by building more resilient supply chains and a more balanced and sustainable trading system.
Such a plan requires political focus and money, but it is not impossible. The United States can spend far less than it did on the Marshall Plan, thanks to the better financial tools available today and falling clean technology costs. And it could recycle the proceeds from a carbon-based border adjustment tariff into the finance and resilience authorities, thus setting up a system that pays for itself.
In this moment of domestic economic strength—stark against the backdrop of heightened competition, a fracturing world, and a raging climate crisis—the United States can do something generous for people across the globe in a way that benefits Americans. It should take that leap, not just because it is the morally right thing to do but also because it is the strategically necessary thing to do.
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