Thursday, September 19, 2024

CT Critical Threats - Iran update, September 18, 2040 - Israel continued to destroy Lebanese Hezbollah tactical communications devices on September 18. Israel detonated thousands of handheld two-way radios (or walkie talkies) across Lebanon.

 

 
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Israel continued to destroy Lebanese Hezbollah tactical communications devices on September 18. Israel detonated thousands of handheld two-way radios (or walkie talkies) across Lebanon.[i] The detonated devices killed at least 20 people and injured over 450.[ii] Israel simultaneously detonated thousands of pagers in a previous attack wave on September 17, injuring over 2800 people, including Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani.[iii] Social media videos of the most recent attack showed that some of the radios detonated at the funerals of Hezbollah members killed in the September 17 pager detonations.[iv] Unspecified US officials said that Israel conducted the first pager attack because of an imminent concern that Hezbollah might discover the rigged devices.[v] Israel reportedly decided to conduct the second attack due to the likelihood that Hezbollah would discover the remaining rigged devices after investigating the causes of the pager explosions, according to unspecified sources with knowledge of the operation.[vi]

About 5,000 pagers were brought into Lebanon about five months ago as part of a yearslong effort to replace older devices.[vii] Two sources with knowledge of the operation told Axios that Israel planted explosive materials in the devices in advance.[viii] US and other officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal assessed that Israel intercepted the pagers and two-way radios at some point in the supply chain.[ix] Western media reported that the walkie talkies may have contained more explosives than the pagers. The pagers contained one-to-two-ounces of explosive material.[x]

Israel’s multi-stage attack on Hezbollah communications will force Hezbollah to urgently reestablish reliable tactical communications in case of an Israeli offensive campaign into Lebanon. Hezbollah had recently ordered the pagers to communicate across its ranks after Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah warned group members in February 2024 to limit cellphone usage to avoid Israeli surveillance and detection.[xi] The walkie talkies were reportedly a back-up communication method intended to only be used during a war with Israel.[xii] Hezbollah has limited options to rapidly reestablish long-range communications to reestablish effective command and control over its members in Lebanon and neighboring countries. Some of these options are:

Hezbollah has relied on couriers in the past but usually in combination with modern communications devices, such as the pagers or the two-way radios that Israel has destroyed.[xiii] Relying solely on couriers would significantly slow the speed at which Hezbollah commanders could communicate orders to their subordinates to respond to Israeli operations, given the wide geographic distribution of Hezbollah fighters across Lebanon. Couriers could still remain effective within lower Hezbollah echelons operating within one relatively small sector.
  • Landlines phones. Hezbollah has reportedly relied upon an Iranian-financed, private telecommunications network that involves fiber optic cables running from Beirut to southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley.[xiv] Hezbollah may rely upon this network more heavily following Israel‘s attacks. Landlines can be relatively easily tapped or intercepted, however, and Israel has tapped Hezbollah landlines in the past.[xv] Hezbollah may no longer trust landlines following the recent massive security breaches into systems previously thought to be impervious to Israeli hacking. It is unlikely that the fiber optic cable network extends to every tactically significant site inhabited by Hezbollah fighters, making this communication method suboptimal.
  • Satellite phones. Hezbollah members, particularly high-level commanders, likely own satellite phones for use in an emergency. Satellite phone networks are not necessarily secure, however. Hezbollah fighters may be hesitant to use electronic devices such as satellite phones because of fears that Israel has compromised other supply chains outside of the pagers and radios. Satellite phones are also very expensive.
  • Tactical radio relay systems: Hezbollah could decide to revert to older tactical communications systems. These systems are relatively easy to set up and use compared to landlines and couriers, both of which require substantial infrastructure or personnel. These systems can be jammed or intercepted, however. The IDF’s ability to intercept these systems and listen in on Hezbollah communications would make using these radio systems substantially less desirable for Hezbollah.
  • Cell phones: Hezbollah previously advised its members to stop using cell phones to avoid Israeli detection and subsequent Israeli targeting, including by banning cell phone usage on the battlefield.[xvi] It is easy to track cell phone movements, which can be used to target Hezbollah fighters.[xvii] However, the lack of more accessible and rapid options to re-establish communications could force Hezbollah to return to cell phone use, even briefly, in order to effectively respond to a potential Israeli campaign. Hezbollah would risk Israeli surveillance and hacking in this scenario, therefore putting Hezbollah fighters at greater risk of targeted strikes or advertising Hezbollah movements. Hezbollah may calculate this is an acceptable risk to assume given the circumstances.
Hezbollah vowed to retaliate against the Israeli attacks in a statement on September 17.[xviii] The speed with which Hezbollah can bring up and organize these communication systems will determine how effectively and orderly it can respond to the Israeli attacks or a potential Israeli campaign.

Iran and its Axis of Resistance may decide to defend Hezbollah or help it reestablish deterrence vis-a-vis Israel during Hezbollah’s short period of vulnerability created by the communications crisis. Iran, and its proxies by extension, rely on Hezbollah to establish deterrence vis-a-vis Israel and to project force and influence throughout the region. Hezbollah has also adopted an increasingly prominent role in helping Iran manage the Axis of Resistance in recent years. Iran and its Axis of Resistance may seek to defend Hezbollah against any potential Israeli operation in Lebanon while Hezbollah lacks the tactical communications required to effectively coordinate its own defenses. Iranian-backed groups could attempt to restore deterrence with Israel by increasing attacks against Israeli targets or moving personnel and arms along the Iranian ground line of communication to support Hezbollah in Lebanon. CTP-ISW has not independently observed confirmation of any of these indicators. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah pledged on September 17 to send fighters, arms and equipment to defend Hezbollah, however.[xix] Iran and Iranian-backed groups are likely to attempt to establish deterrence with Israel within the next few days if they choose this course of action, given that the pager attack only generates a temporary effect against Hezbollah’s communications and therefore a relatively short period in which Hezbollah is at highest risk.

Iranian officials condemned Israel for the pager attack that blew up Lebanese Hezbollah fighters’ pagers’ batteries in Lebanon on September 17. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian condemned the attack and called for unity among Islamic countries in a government cabinet meeting on September 18.[xx]The Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon, who was wounded in the attack, said on X (Twitter) that it was a “matter of pride that my blood is mixed with the blood of the wounded people of the honorable Lebanese nation.”[xxi] The Iranian Embassy in Lebanon also dismissed rumors that Amani was seriously injured in the pager attack.[xxii] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) spokesperson Ali Mohammad Naini claimed that the pager attack in Lebanon killed no IRGC personnel.[xxiii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi condemned the attack and stated that Iran would be ready to provide assistance in a phone call with his Lebanese counterpart Abdullah Bouhabib on September 17.[xxiv] Iranian Parliamentary National Security Committee member Alladin Boroujerdi said that Lebanon and Iran should respond firmly as soon as possible.[xxv] The Red Crescent Society confirmed that some of the more seriously injured in Lebanon have been sent to Tehran for treatment and that 12 doctors and 12 nurses have been sent from Iran to Lebanon to help.[xxvi]

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad on September 17 to meet with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders, according to Iraqi media.[xxvii] Ghaani met with Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali, Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri, and Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi, among other militia leaders.[xxviii] Iraqi media did not provide details about what Ghaani and the militia leaders discussed, although Ghaani typically travels to Baghdad to coordinate or mediate among Iraqi militias or to give the militias new orders and instructions. Ghaani’s visit comes shortly after Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada leader Abu Ala al Walai claimed on September 13 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will soon launch a new phase of military operations against Israel.[xxix] Walai claimed that the new phase will include joint military operations and coordinated actions between Iranian-backed Iraqi groups and other Axis of Resistance members across multiple fronts. Ghaani’s visit also follows an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack targeting a US diplomatic compound near Baghdad International Airport on September 10.[xxx] CTP–ISW previously noted that Iranian-backed Iraqi militants seem to have conducted the attack against the wishes of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxxi] Ghaani may thus have traveled to Baghdad to ensure that Iraqi militias do not conduct attacks without informing and receiving approval from Iran.

The Egyptian foreign minister said that Egypt would not accept an Israeli military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor on September 18.[xxxii] Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty said during a press conference with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken that Egypt would reject any changes to the security arrangements along the corridor that were in place before the Israel-Hamas war began. Blinken traveled to Cairo on September 17 to meet with Egyptian officials and discuss an Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage deal.[xxxiii] An anonymous official in the region told Western media that the trip is meant to assuage Israeli concerns that Hamas can smuggle weapons and other military materials through the Philadelphi Corridor into the Gaza Strip.[xxxiv]





 
 
Key Takeaways:

  • Lebanon: Israel continued to destroy Lebanese Hezbollah tactical communications devices on September 18. Israel’s multi-stage attack on Hezbollah communications will force Hezbollah to urgently reestablish reliable tactical communications, particularly in the event of an Israeli offensive campaign into Lebanon. Iran and its Axis of Resistance may decide to defend Hezbollah or help it reestablish deterrence vis-a-vis Israel during Hezbollah’s short period of vulnerability created by the communications crisis.
  • Iranian Response to the Pager Attack: Iranian officials condemned Israel for the pager attack that blew up Lebanese Hezbollah fighters’ pagers’ batteries in Lebanon on September 17.
  • Iraq: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad on September 17 to meet with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders, according to Iraqi media. Ghaani met with Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali, Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri, and Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi, among other militia leaders. Iraqi media did not provide details about what Ghaani and the militia leaders discussed, although Ghaani typically travels to Baghdad to coordinate or mediate among Iraqi militias or to give the militias new orders and instructions.
  • Gaza Strip: The Egyptian foreign minister said that Egypt would not accept an Israeli military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor on September 18. An anonymous official in the region told Western media that the trip is meant to assuage Israeli concerns that Hamas can smuggle weapons and other military materials through the Philadelphi Corridor into the Gaza Strip.
 
 
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The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War will provide regular updates, including daily updates, as the crisis warrants.

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