CT Critical Threats - Iran Crisis Updates - September 20, 2024

 

Iran Update, September 20, 2024       Israel appears to be exploiting disarray in Lebanese Hezbollah in order to inflict further damage upon the group. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike in southern Beirut on September 20,  killing several senior commanders in Hezbollah’s Radwan special operations forces unit. The targeted individuals included Ibrahim Aqil, who was the overall Radwan commander. He was also a member of the Hezbollah Jihad Council, which oversees the group’s military operations. That Israel detected and was able to target such a sensitive meeting suggests that Hezbollah is suffering from lapses in operational security—possibly caused by Israel detonating the pagers and personal radios used by Hezbollah members. These detonations compromised Hezbollah’s primary and secondary means of communication. CTP-ISW previously observed that Hezbollah could revert to less secure methods of communication, such as phones and radio relays, in order to rapidly restore communications. Doing so would leave Hezbollah vulnerable, given that Israel could intercept these signals. Hezbollah remains a capable fighting force that will overcome the disruption to its command-and-control and communications systems. Hezbollah has organized its forces in a conventional military structure that is designed to withstand and resolve these kinds of disruptions. The detonation of pagers and personal radios and the killing of senior Radwan commanders will thus generate only temporary effects on Hezbollah military effectiveness. Hezbollah will recover given sufficient time to do so. Hezbollah also has Iranian-backed allied militias in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen that have not suffered any disruption to their own command-and-control and communications systems. In the event of a major Israeli offensive into Lebanon, the IDF will have certain advantages that it did not in its war against Hezbollah in 2006 but will also face new challenges. The IDF is now more battle-tested and experienced from its time fighting Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The IDF has had time to practice complex maneuver operations against a deeply entrenched enemy force. The IDF 98th Division, for instance, has fought extensively in the Gaza Strip and is now deployed to the Israel-Lebanon border. On the other hand, Hezbollah has a significantly more competent force than it did in 2006. Hezbollah forces are more experienced given their participation in protracted campaigns fighting for Bashar al Assad in Syria. The Axis of Resistance is furthermore positioned to attack Israel from Iraq, Syria, and Yemen in a way that they were not in 2006. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have indicated that they would intervene in an Israel-Hezbollah war, which would risk intensifying the conflict across the Middle East. Kataib Hezbollah pledged on September 17 to send fighters and materiel to support Hezbollah against Israel. Kataib Sarkhat al Quds—formerly known as Ashab al Kahf—separately announced on September 19 that it will soon launch a “new phase” of operations against Israel. Abu Ala al Walai—the secretary general of Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada—lastly sent a message to Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on September 20, in which he suggested that Iranian-backed Iraqi forces could deploy to Lebanon and fight alongside Hezbollah. This public messaging is likely meant to deter Israel from launching a major military offensive into Lebanon, as CTP-ISW previously assessed, but could reflect the militias’ willingness to intervene as well. The IDF conducted an airstrike south of Damascus on September 20, killing a senior Kataib Hezbollah official, underscoring the military presence that the militia has near the Israel-Syria border. The United States does not expect Israel and Hamas to reach a ceasefire-hostage agreement in the coming months, according to the Wall Street Journal.  Anonymous US officials told the outlet that Hamas has made demands in the negotiations and then refused to accept a deal after the United States and Israel have accepted those demands. This behavior has led international negotiators to doubt that Hamas seriously wants a deal. Senior US officials, including Secretary of State Antony Blinken, have similarly questioned whether Hamas is sincerely looking to reach a deal. The officials also cited disagreement between Israel and Hamas about hostage-prisoner swaps as an obstacle in negotiations. The officials added that Israel detonating pagers and personal radios owned by Lebanese Hezbollah members has further complicated diplomatic engagement with Hamas. An anonymous Arab official similarly said that there was “no chance” a ceasefire-hostage agreement after the Israel detonated the pagers and personal radios.     Key Takeaways: 1. Lebanon: Israel appears to be exploiting disarray in Lebanese Hezbollah in order to inflict further damage upon Israel. The IDF conducted an airstrike in southern Beirut killing several senior commanders in Hezbollah’s Radwan SOF unit. 2. Lebanon: In the event of a major Israeli offensive into Lebanon, the IDF will have certain advantages that it did not in its war against Hezbollah in 2006 but will also face new challenges. The IDF and Hezbollah have both gained used combat experience since then. 3. Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have indicated that they would intervene in an Israel-Hezbollah war, which would risk intensifying the conflict across the Middle East. These militias are active near in Syria near the Israeli border. 4. Gaza Strip: The United States does not reportedly expect Israel and Hamas to reach a ceasefire-hostage agreement in the coming months. Hamas has made demands in the negotiations and then refused to accept a deal after the United States and Israel have accepted those demands.     SEE FULL UPDATE     The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War will provide regular updates, including daily updates, as the crisis warrants. If you are not already subscribed and want to receive email notifications when our updates are published, click here.