Wednesday, September 18, 2024

Brookings - Sept. 18, 2024 - Meloni’s tough choice: Merkel, Thatcher, or Mussolini? and more...

 

September 18, 2024

Dear colleagues and friends,

 

Remember “the end of history”? In his eponymous essay of 1989, the Stanford academic Frank Fukuyama warned that—I’m paraphrasing here—the worst thing that could happen to us after the coming of global democratic entropy would be that we would all die of ennui. We here at the Center on the United States and Europe, whose remit includes Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey, disagree (peaceably) on many things, but I am confident that I speak for all of us when I say we’d be very interested in experiencing some of this boredom.

 

Our latest newsletter features an incisive essay by Carlo Bastasin on Italy’s prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, who will be in New York next week to receive a global citizenship award at the hands of none other than Elon Musk. (Is there such a thing as populist nuclear fusion?) In another thorough analysis, Dan Hamilton rates Europe’s efforts to “de-risk” from China and suggests some improvements. And Tara Varma explains how the U.S. and Europe could strengthen ties with Indo-Pacific nations to counter the growing alliance between Russia and China.

 

Finally, we are delighted to announce that Georgetown University’s Charles King will give the inaugural Tony Judt Lecture on recovering liberalism for the 21st century at 10 a.m. EDT on Friday morning, followed by conversation with E.J. Dionne, Oren Cass, Maria Snegovaya, and yours truly. Do tune in!

 

You will find more detail on all that and more below—rounded off by a Q&A in which I attempt to explain current Goings-On in Germany, where history, alas, is definitely not ending.

 

Yours firmly,

 

Constanze Stelzenmüller

Director, Center on the United States and Europe

The Brookings Institution

 

Meloni’s tough choice: Merkel, Thatcher, or Mussolini?

 

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has not yet succeeded at her goal to become the “centerpiece of Atlantic conservatism,” Carlo Bastasin writes. He argues that for Meloni to secure her position she must focus on rebuilding relations with Europe, strengthening the Italian economy, and finding consensus within Italian domestic politics.

 

Read more 

The EU has a playbook to de-risk from China. Is it working?

 

Much like the United States, the European Union is working to “de-risk” its relationship with China. Daniel S. Hamilton discusses the significant measures already taken to protect European interests and effect new and deeper partnerships—but identifies a need to improve competitiveness and better leverage the trans-Atlantic relationship.

 

Read more

Connecting alliances in Asia and Europe 

 

Between the NATO summit this July and the U.S. elections this November, America and the EU are rethinking their relationships with Asian allies. Tara Varma argues that NATO and the EU should strengthen ties with the Indo-Pacific 4 to safeguard against a change in U.S. leadership and to counter the growing alliance between Russia and China. 

 

Read more

 

Join us for an event 

 

The inaugural Tony Judt Lecture on Europe: Charles King on political ideas in the 21st century 

Friday, September 20, 2024, 10:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. EDT  

 

This Friday, the Brookings Institution will convene its inaugural Tony Judt Lecture on Europe with a keynote address by Charles King on political ideas in an era of global turmoil and uncertainty.

 

Register to attend or watch 

 

US public opinion on Ukraine

null

New polling from Shibley Telhami and the University of Maryland shows that despite waning confidence in Ukraine’s ability to win the war, American support to continue U.S. aid to Ukraine has increased since October 2023 with a marked uptick in bipartisan support.

 

Read more

 

Q&A with Constanze Stelzenmüller

 

Germany is holding regional elections in three eastern states this month—Saxony and Thuringia voted on September 1 and Brandenburg will vote on September 22—and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party has or is expected to make significant gains in all three. Expanding on her analysis in the Financial Times from before and after the September 1 elections, Constanze Stelzenmüller talks to us about how these elections are playing out in German politics.  

 

What did the results in Saxony and Thuringia tell us about the power of anti-establishment parties, particularly the AfD and the far-left Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW), across Germany? Is this trend likely to continue in the September 22 elections in Brandenburg? 

 

AfD and BSW are not just anti-establishment. They are ethno-nationalist, anti-system parties: against NATO and the EU; pro-Russian (Chinese support has also been documented); and opposed to foundational elements of Germany’s constitutional order, such as judicial independence, protection of minorities, and freedom of the press.

 

Saxony and Thuringia together only provide about a tenth of Germany’s roughly 60 million voters; and the surge of the extremists there is rooted in the persistent singularities of eastern German politics, which have resulted in weak political institutionalization and a culture of street protest (and violence). At current estimates, the outcome of the Brandenburg elections might be slightly more stable; and in nationwide polls less than 20 and 10% favor the AfD and BSW, respectively.

 

But all that only makes the ability of especially the BSW to set national issue agendas—e.g. on migration—all the more extraordinary. And it speaks to the profound insecurity and disorientation of the democratic parties ahead of the national election on September 28, 2025.

 

What will the success of the AfD and BSW in these state votes mean for the governing coalition in Berlin and the opposition Christian Democrats ahead of next fall’s national elections? 

 

The AfD remains excluded from government by common consensus of the democratic parties. But there is no way past cooperation with the BSW in Thuringia, and possibly in Saxony as well; and that might show whether the leftwing nationalists are willing to constructively engage in co-governance. Currently, however, its fiery ex-communist leader Sahra Wagenknecht appears to be much more focused on polarizing national politics by insisting that she will not work with any party that supports military aid for Ukraine or the stationing of U.S. medium-range missiles in Germany—knowing full well that there is cross-party consensus on both issues in Berlin, but real divides in the electorate.

 

Much, therefore, depends on the governing traffic light coalition resolving its deep differences. As of now, that is by no means assured. The opposition conservatives of the CDU have just nominated their leader Friedrich Merz as chancellor candidate for the national vote next September—but he will also be measured by how his party handles extremist challenges in the eastern states.

 

The German government severely tightened its domestic security and migration policies following a knife attack in Solingen by an immigrant in late August which left three dead. How has the imposition of stronger border controls affected German politics, as well as relations with Germany’s neighbors?

 

It is one thing to acknowledge that Germany has a problem with uncontrolled immigration, and another to note that it is currently undermining the EU’s immigration regime in response to the ruthless instrumentalization of a migrant-committed crime by the domestic hard right and extreme left. The governments of Poland, Greece, and Austria have criticized Berlin sharply and said they would not take back migrants refused entry at the German border, while the Dutch hard right leader Geert Wilders and Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orbàn were delighted.

 

Meanwhile, Chancellor Olaf Scholz has just been to Uzbekistan to conclude the latest in a series of “migration and mobility agreements,” which would permit Germany to send back illegal immigrants from these countries in exchange for offering visas to more qualified immigrants. This, he said in Samarkand, was another “small stone in a very large wall.” For the leader of a country that annually celebrates the fall of its own dividing wall on November 9, 1989 (the event that sparked the downfall of communist rule in all of Europe and the idea that history was at an end), that message is terribly sad.

 
More research and commentary
 

The imperial presidency. In the wake of the July U.S. Supreme Court decision granting Donald Trump immunity from criminal prosecution, Sarah Binder, James Goldgeier, and Elizabeth N. Saunders write in Foreign Affairs that the ruling leaves executive power fundamentally unchecked.

  

Digital disinformation. Valerie Wirtschafter argues that while international fears of AI-driven election interference may have been overblown, the threat of Russian disinformation campaigns remains.

 

The swamp chronicles. On a new podcast with the European Council on Foreign Relations, Aslı Aydıntaşbaş joins co-host Jeremy Shapiro to discuss the policies and politics behind the U.S. presidential campaign and what’s at stake for the trans-Atlantic alliance.

 
 

About the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings

 

The Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) offers independent research and recommendations for policymakers, fosters high-level dialogue on developments in Europe and global challenges that affect trans-Atlantic relations, and convenes roundtables, workshops, and public forums on policy-relevant issues.

No comments:

Post a Comment