Summary Netanyahu aimed to assassinate the head of Hamas’ political bureau, Ism‘ail Haniyyah, to secure a political and military achievement that would help him manage both internal and external pressures and deflect criticism for failing to meet the war's declared objectives. He also sought to destabilize the movement, complicate its organizational structure, and provoke a more rigid stance on negotiations, ultimately aiming to disrupt and derail the talks. However, Hamas’s response to the challenge posed by the assassination of Ism‘ail Haniyyah demonstrated the organization’s institutional consultations (thru its Shura (consultations) Council), unity, cohesion and independence in decision-making. It underscored its capability to make swift decisions during delicate and sensitive moments and highlighted its leadership capabilities. Contrary to Netanyahu’s expectations, the assassination of Ism‘ail Haniyyah did not weaken Hamas’s position or flexibility in managing the negotiation process, reaffirming that its decisions are institutional and not driven by emotions or reactions. The Israeli policy of targeting influential leaders of Hamas and other resistance factions whenever possible is expected to persist in the near future. Additionally, it is anticipated that Netanyahu may extend the war, prompting the resistance and its allies to adjust their strategies accordingly. Introduction The assassination of Hamas Political Bureau Chief Ism‘ail Haniyyah by the Israel in the Iranian capital, Tehran, on 31/7/2024, marked a significant development in the ongoing confrontation between Hamas, the Palestinian resistance factions and Israel during Operation al-Aqsa Flood, which has persisted for nearly 11 months. The assassination raised many questions about its potential repercussions on the leadership dynamics of Hamas and its ability to manage the absence of its political bureau head, Ism‘ail Haniyyah. Additionally, it casts uncertainty on the progress of negotiations for a truce and prisoner exchange deal —efforts that Benjamin Netanyahu clearly aimed to disrupt and undermine. The situation also heightens concerns about possible escalation, clashes in the region, and the risk of a broader regional confrontation. First: Timing, Motives and Objectives The assassination of Ism‘ail Haniyyah came one day after a similar operation in which Israeli forces assassinated Hizbullah military official Fuad Shukr in Beirut, and less than a week after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited the US and delivered an address to a joint meeting of US Congress on 24/7/2024. The crime also coincided with field and political conditions that put pressure internally and externally on Netanyahu and his far-right coalition. A range of motives can be identified that likely justified the assassination of Ism‘ail Haniyyah, with the most significant being: 1. Netanyahu’s political crisis has intensified due to the failure of his war against the Gaza Strip (GS) to meet its stated goals. Internally, there is growing pressure for him to shift his strategy and prioritize the release of prisoners, even if this requires a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from GS. 2. There is growing discontent within the Israeli army due to the prolonged war with no clear end in sight. Additionally, tensions are rising between Netanyahu and his government team, on one side, and the military and security officials, on the other, regarding the assessment of the war’s progress, the likelihood of achieving its goals, and the approach to the proposed prisoner exchange deal. 3. The growing discord between Netanyahu and the US administration over the truce deal and prisoner exchange, compounded by Kamala Harris’s alarming remarks on 26/7/2024, during her meeting with Netanyahu in the US, where she voiced serious concerns about the casualties in GS and declared that it was time to end the war. Given the challenges Netanyahu has faced both domestically and internationally, his need to reshape the situation in the region, take bold strategic actions, and establish new facts and realities has intensified. Among the primary objectives Netanyahu aimed to achieve through the assassination of Ism‘ail Haniyyah were the following: 1. Achieving a political and field success that addresses criticisms regarding Netanyahu and his government’s failure to meet the declared objectives of the GS war. 2. Mitigating both internal and external pressures to halt the war and secure a prisoner swap deal, while simultaneously providing an opportunity to extend the war and maintain military operations in GS. 3. Impacting Hamas’s organizational structure, creating confusion within the movement, and imposing significant challenges amidst the ongoing conflict, while also trying to incite internal disagreements and contradictions regarding the new leadership arrangements. 4. Providing an opportunity for the US to engage in a direct confrontation with Iran, thereby achieving Netanyahu’s longstanding objective of neutralizing what he considers a strategic Iranian threat. Second: Potential Repercussions of the Assassination The assassination of Ism‘ail Haniyyah could have several notable repercussions for Hamas, the truce deal and regional stability. The most significant of these are: 1. Repercussions on Hamas’s Organizational Structure: There is no doubt that the loss of a Palestinian figure of Ism‘ail Haniyyah’s size and stature constitutes a significant loss for Hamas and the Palestinian national scene. He held the top position in the Hamas leadership for about seven years. Before that, he led the movement’s leadership in GS and headed the Palestinian government after the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections, in which Hamas secured the majority of seats. For two decades, Haniyyah has emerged as a national consensus figure who enjoys broad political and popular acceptance, surpassing PA President Mahmud ‘Abbas in various opinion polls conducted by impartial research centers. The most recent opinion poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Survey and Policy Research in Ramallah, in collaboration with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, and published on 10/7/2024, indicated that Haniyyah would garner 76% of Palestinian voters’ support compared to 20% for ‘Abbas if presidential elections were held. It is likely that Netanyahu sought, through Haniyyah’s assassination and his absence from the Palestinian scene, to weaken Hamas, deal it a severe blow, affect its leadership structure, burden it with organizational challenges and divisions in the process of choosing Haniyyah’s successor, and confuse its management of its national, regional and international relations. Despite the significant challenges faced by Hamas during a politically sensitive period, it is evident that the movement understood the Israeli objectives behind the assassination attempt and aimed to counteract them. Several indicators, particularly those related to Hamas’ process of selecting Yahya Sinwar as Ism‘ail Haniyyah’s successor as head of the political bureau, can be identified, with the most important being: a. Highlighting the movement’s ability to respond to challenges, conduct political and organizational deliberations, and make quick decisions at delicate and sensitive moments. Its consultations to choose Sinwar as Haniyyah’s successor did not take a long time, as may happen in other parties. b. Demonstrating the movement’s unity and cohesion, Sinwar was chosen unanimously to complete the remaining period of Haniyyah’s term as head of the movement. No divisions, disparities or harmful organizational rivalries emerged during the selection process, which the movement says was conducted calmly, smoothly, with high responsibility and effective use of organizational consultation and deliberation mechanisms. c. Affirming the independence of the movement’s political, field, and organizational decisions, this was evident in the decision to carry out the operation on 7/10/2023. All parties recognized that this decision was made by the movement independently of the knowledge of the various regional parties. The movement also managed the negotiation processes to reach the ceasefire and prisoner exchange deal in a way that confirmed to the various parties the independence of its political decisions. The choice of Ism‘ail Haniyyah’s successor in the leadership of the movement further highlighted the independence of its organizational decisions, which are determined by its bylaws, institutions and organizational frameworks, independent of external interference and dictates. d. The process of selecting a successor to Haniyyah highlighted the abundance of qualified options available for the top leadership positions. It showed that the movement has a strong ability to replace its leaders and confirmed that targeting leaders at the highest political and organizational levels does not weaken the movement or affect its paths and political orientations, despite the importance of the roles played by these figures. It also demonstrated a high level of institutionalization in decision-making. e. The process of selecting a new head of the movement’s political bureau demonstrated an advanced level of consultative and democratic practice in leadership rotation and respect for electoral entitlements, distinct from the dominance and power of main leaders, as might occur in many political movements. The movement has been led by a succession of leaders over the past decades, starting with Musa Abu Marzuq, who headed the movement’s first political bureau (1993–1996), Khalid Mish‘al (1996–2017), Isma‘il Haniyyah (2017–2024), and Yahya Sinwar, who was chosen as the head of the movement’s political bureau to complete the current electoral cycle. It is noteworthy that the movement has consistently honored electoral deadlines, even under the most challenging conditions. This was evident recently with the timely selection of Ism‘ail Haniyyah's successor amidst the ongoing conflict, and similarly in 1996, when Khalid Mish‘al was elected as head of the movement’s political bureau on schedule despite Musa Abu Marzuq’s term expiring while he was detained in US prisons. 2. Repercussions on Hamas' Position on the Truce Deal and Prisoner Exchange Contrary to the wishes of Netanyahu and the far-right, Ism‘ail Haniyyah's assassination did not affect Hamas’s position and management of the negotiations for a ceasefire and prisoner exchange. The movement’s management of the exchange deal in the wake of Haniyyah’s assassination has shown important signs: a. The movement’s political decision is an institutional decision taken by the competent frameworks and is not linked to the position of the responsible leader, regardless of the importance of his organizational position. The movement possesses an advanced level of political maturity and makes its decisions based on accurate political calculations, away from reactions, emotions and impulsive positions. The movement continued to manage its position on the negotiations file after Ism‘ail Haniyyah’s assassination according to the same considerations and assessments as before. The same approach was followed after the assassination of the deputy head of the movement’s political bureau and its leader in the West Bank, Saleh al-‘Arouri, on 2/1/2024. b. The Movement’s political decision is primarily based on an assessment of the national interest and not on narrow factional calculations. The insistence on a complete ceasefire is aimed at halting the crimes of killing and destruction and ending the humanitarian suffering inflicted on the civilian population of GS by Israeli policies and genocidal crimes. c. Repeated massacres and the assassination of leaders fail to pressure the movement, coerce it or compel it to abandon its fundamental demands and agree to political concessions it had previously rejected. 3. Repercussions on Regional Stability and the Possibility of a Wide Confrontation The assassination of Ism‘ail Haniyyah in the Iranian capital provoked a strong reaction from Iran, which quickly blamed Israel for violating its sovereignty and threatened severe retaliation. This response was reminiscent of Iran’s reaction to the attack on its consulate in Damascus on 1/4/2024. On 13/4/2024, Iran fired over 300 missiles and drones at Israel, most of which were intercepted and destroyed by US and Western forces stationed in the region before they could reach their targets. After Iran threatened to take harsher measures against Israel in response to the assassination of Ism‘ail Haniyyah, concerns about a broad regional conflict grew. This led to a surge in diplomatic efforts and military preparations in the region, with the US deploying multiple aircraft carriers and a nuclear submarine while promising to protect Israel from potential Iranian strikes. It has been observed that Iranian threats in response to the assassination of Ism‘ail Haniyyah in Tehran have diminished over time. However, Iran continues to stress that a response is planned and will occur at the appropriate time and place. Meanwhile, the US administration, in collaboration with Egypt and Qatar, has stepped up efforts to negotiate a truce and prisoner exchange between Israel and Hamas, aiming to stabilize the situation and prevent further escalation in the region. On the morning of 25/8/2024, the frontline between Hizbullah and Israel experienced significant military escalation. Hizbullah launched an assault comprising approximately 340 rockets and several drones. According to Hizbullah Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah, this attack was in retaliation for the assassination of Fuad Shukr. In turn, Israeli aircraft carried out numerous air strikes targeting the locations from which the rockets were fired. Third: Prospects In light of the current data and indicators regarding the repercussions of Ism‘ail Haniyyah's assassination, the following prospects emerge: 1. It is likely that Hamas will succeed in overcoming the repercussions of Ism‘ail Haniyyah’s absence from its leadership scene, and that it will complete the interim leadership arrangements, including the selection of a deputy for its new bureau chief, Yahya Sinwar. It is also likely that the movement will hold the electoral elections scheduled for about a year from now, as planned, to elect its central leadership and the leaders of the various geographical regions. 2. Hamas is expected to remain flexible in the coming period when responding to proposals from the US and the Qatari and Egyptian mediators to achieve a ceasefire and prisoner exchange. This flexibility will be guided by the key points outlined in US President Joe Biden’s proposal dated 2/7/2024, particularly concerning the Israeli withdrawal from the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphi Corridor. This stance led Hamas to reject the amendments to Biden’s proposal made by the US administration on 24/8/2024, following opposition from Netanyahu. 3. Although Iran has delayed its response to the assassination of Ism‘ail Haniyyah and aims to allow political efforts toward a ceasefire in GS to succeed, it is unlikely to abandon its threat to retaliate. The need to maintain its image and uphold the deterrence equation, which was previously established and breached by the assassination on Iranian soil, makes a response almost certain. However, it is anticipated that Iran’s response will follow engagement rules designed to avoid escalating into a regional conflict, which neither Iran nor the US wants, similar to Hizbullah’s approach. The response may involve intelligence operations, as some Iranian sources have suggested that Haniyyah’s assassination was part of an intelligence strategy and that any retaliation could follow a similar pattern. 4. In the near future, Israel is expected to persist in its strategy of targeting influential political and military leaders within the resistance factions and their allied fronts whenever possible. This approach leverages the current assessment that the involved parties are unlikely to engage in extensive bilateral or regional conflicts, while the US stands ready to support Israel and provide a necessary safeguard against severe repercussions for its crimes. As a result, this situation poses significant challenges for the Palestinian resistance factions and their supporters.
Al-Zaytouna Centre thanks Mr. ‘Atef al-Joulani for authoring the original text upon which this strategic assessment was based.
The Arabic version of this Assessment was published on 30/8/2024
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