Is Seoul cracking under intense US pressure to provide ammunition to Ukraine?
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PrintThe recent leak of Pentagon documents reveals the double jeopardy in which South Korea has found itself.
The government of President Yoon Suk Yeol came under pressure from the Biden administration to provide ammunition to help the U.S. in the Ukraine war. And its internal deliberations were being eavesdropped and reported to Washington by U.S. intelligence virtually in real time.
While the authenticity of the leaked documents has yet to be confirmed, the leak has already raised questions about the circumstances under which two top Korean national security officials recently resigned. It has also been followed by two media reports about Korea’s possible export of 155mm artillery shells, leading to speculation that the president has overridden internal concerns to supply the weapons before this week’s summit in Washington with President Biden.
Some of the leaked documents were particularly embarrassing to Seoul because they clearly showed that U.S. intelligence was privy to internal deliberations at the highest levels of the Korean government. Purportedly private discussions on a highly sensitive issue between the National Security Advisor and Presidential Secretary for Foreign Affairs were recorded in one of the documents, and a timeline for the transport of the munitions from Korea to Germany was charted in another.
The leak betrayed another quandary. The Yoon administration had been requested by the Biden administration to provide the munitions for Ukraine, but its hands were tied by Korea’s Foreign Trade Act that limits the export of “strategic materials” to the purpose of international peace. An executive regulation adopted pursuant to the Act stipulates that “the permission [to export] strategic materials is granted only when said materials are used for peaceful purposes.”
While the leak itself is being investigated by the U.S. authorities, Korean media have made two groundbreaking reports on the likely outcome of the internal deliberations of Korean officials under America’s watchful eyes.
The Dong-A Ilbo newspaper, a conservative mainstay, reported on April 12 that the Yoon administration had reached an agreement last month to “lend” the United States 500,000 rounds of 155mm artillery shells. The Biden administration, having bought 100,000 rounds last year, had requested more this year, but South Korea, a major producer of artillery ammunition, had maintained the policy principle that it could not provide lethal weapons to Ukraine. The “rental method” was reportedly a compromise.
According to the reported deal, the shells would be used by the U.S. military primarily to replenish its own stockpiles after shipping its munitions to Ukraine but could not be used directly in the Ukraine conflict. “We’ve opted to significantly increase the volume of shells but take the rental method, after exploring how to respond to the request of the blood ally in good faith while sticking to the government principle of not providing lethal weapons to Ukraine,” one source was quoted as saying.
The leak added political context to the mysterious departure of two top officials last month. According to one Pentagon document, Yoon’s top advisers had been torn between the U.S. request on the one hand and their government’s principle, as well as the trade law, on the other before the alleged “rental” compromise was reached.
Yi Mun-hui, the presidential secretary for foreign affairs, stated that the government “was mired in concerns that the U.S. would not be the end user” and that, since South Korea could not honor the U.S. request without violating its policy principle, “officially changing the policy would be the only option.” Because Im Ki-hun, the presidential secretary for national defense, had promised to determine “a final stance by March 2,” their boss, National Security Advisor Kim Sung-han, was worried about the optics. If an announcement of its changed stance on providing lethal aid to Ukraine coincided with the announcement of President Yoon’s summit meeting in Washington, “the public would think the two had been done as a trade.” Instead, Kim “suggested the possibility” of selling 330,000 rounds of artillery shells to Poland because “getting the ammunition to Ukraine quickly was the ultimate goal of the United States.”
On March 27, Yi resigned. As did Kim two days later. They did so amid wild media speculation that they were in fact sacked for having failed to report to the president in a timely manner about First Lady Jill Biden’s request that a popular K-pop group, Black Pink, perform on stage with Lady Gaga during Yoon’s visit, although none of those reports could be confirmed. The leaked documents instead indicate that their serial departures might have more to do with the internal dispute over the munitions than a procedural failure concerning Black Pink.
Following the leak of a “Top Secret” bulletin that said Seoul in early March “grappled with the U.S. request to provide artillery ammunition to Ukraine” came another Korean report that pallets of 155mm shells were transported from ammunition depots to a military port, presumably for export.
MBC, one of the leading South Korean television stations, broadcast video of 20 tractor-trailer trucks transporting 15-ton containers marked “EXPLOSIVES 1.3C 1,” that allegedly contained 155mm artillery shells. In interviews, drivers said they had carried such cargoes from three ammunition depots to the military port in Chinhae. They stated further that the containers they had unloaded in Chinhae were gone by the time they returned for another delivery. MBC estimated that at least 300,000 rounds could have been delivered overseas, although their final destination could not be verified.
The shipping document, “DOD Multimodal Dangerous Goods Declaration,” that was shown to the broadcaster, revealed that the cargoes were to be loaded at UDA, Chinhae Pier and to be discharged at “JF6, NORDENHEIM PORT,” according to MBC. The details were consistent with those on one of the leaked documents, titled “ROK 155 Delivery Timeline (330K)” and stamped “SECRET.” It included a schedule for transporting 330,000 shells from Chinhae to Nordenheim Port in Germany, raising the likelihood that the Yoon government had already shipped the ammunition in accordance with the plan. The revelation offers another possible explanation for the departure of the two senior officials: they had reservations about the munitions transfer as opposed to another faction that advocated a speedy delivery unimpeded by domestic concerns, political or legal.
The Korean Ministry of National Defense refused to confirm either report. Jun Ha-kyu, KNMD spokesperson, told a press briefing on April 18 that he “could not confirm the content of the media report and had nothing to confirm. …However, the U.S. and South Korean governments have been discussing ways to support the defense of Ukraine’s freedom.” He added “our government has been actively pursuing this, including the provision of military supplies.”
The presidential office was more blatant in confronting the double quandary created by the leaked documents. It said that it discussed the leaked papers with the United States, and that the defense ministers of the two governments agreed that “a considerable number” of the documents were fabricated, without specifying which ones. Kim Tae-hyo, the Deputy National Security Adviser, defended U.S. eavesdropping by arguing that Washington likely had “no malicious intent.”
There was a sense of disbelief or even betrayal among the Korean public that an ally like the United States spied on Korea’s National Security Office. A concern was also widely shared that if Seoul provided lethal weapons to Ukraine, as requested by the Biden administration, it would run the risk of antagonizing Russia, with serious economic and security repercussions for Korea. The public’s lukewarm support for Yoon turned noticeably cold amid the concerns.
Indeed, in the second week of April, the president’s approval rating fell to 27 percent, four percentage points down from the previous week according to Gallup Korea’s poll. “Diplomacy” was cited as the decisive factor for the rating’s drop, having been cited by 28 percent of respondents. Given that “relations with Japan” fell to third place with 9 percent even if the issue together with diplomacy had been the top factor in the previous polls, Gallup Korea surmised that the U.S. eavesdropping and the Yoon government’s inept response were the main contributors to the approval rating drop.
Nevertheless, it was clear that President Yoon was eager to put the episode in the rearview mirror and fast forward to next week’s summit. “Korea and the U.S. are the allies of shared values that has the resiliency and sufficient ability to manage conflicting interests or problems,” he declared on April 18. He clarified what he meant the following day in an interview with Reuters, justifying post facto South Korea’s shipment of the munitions. “If there is a situation the international community cannot condone, such as any large-scale attack on civilians, massacre or serious violation of the laws of war,” Yoon said, “it might be difficult for us to insist only on humanitarian or financial support.”
President Yoon is scheduled to meet President Biden on a state visit on April 26 and to address a joint session of Congress the following day. In the meantime, his American hosts are confronted with tough questions raised by Korea’s double jeopardy. What is the extent to which American security depends on spying on allies? How far is the Biden administration prepared to go to continue the war in Ukraine, even at the risk of alienating a close democratic ally?
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