South Korea and the United States Renew their Vows
April 26, 2023
Last year marked 70 years of the American alliance with South Korea. Seven decades is a long time for any relationship; there is always a risk that two partners will grow apart as time passes. With this in mind, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol is in Washington this week to renew the allies’ vows and updating the alliance. This is a wise move, and a timely one.
The forthcoming declaration will recommit South Korea to the nuclear non-proliferation regime in exchange for four major actions by the United States. First, Washington will commit to take every effort to consult with Seoul before using nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. Second, the two countries will establish a nuclear consultative group, which will meet more frequently at senior levels than do existing dialogues on extended deterrence. Third, the United States will carry out visible deployments of strategic assets, including ballistic missile submarines, nuclear-capable bombers, and aircraft carriers. Finally, the allies will deepen training and exercises while integrating South Korean capabilities into US strategic planning.
This is a smart effort to proactively address a growing risk to the US-South Korea alliance: Seoul’s dalliance with the idea of acquiring its own independent nuclear capabilities. It is only natural that experts and the public in South Korea would want to bolster deterrence capabilities. After all, North Korea continues to expand and modernize its nuclear forces while Russia levies nuclear threats and China engages in a massive nuclear build-up. This reality would pose a challenge for any alliance. Indeed, back in the 1960s, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization struggled to respond to similar pressures when the Soviet Union acquired its own second strike capability. This eventually led Washington to take a series of steps to reassure NATO by deepening cooperation on a range of nuclear issues.
This reassurance initiative is just the latest in a string of Indo-Pacific deals that the Biden team has announced so far this year. In January, the administration agreed to several major initiatives with Japan and established a new technology partnership with India. In February, the Philippines permitted US access to four additional military bases, setting the state for a forthcoming visit by Philippine President Bongbong Marcos. In March, Biden hosted his Australian and British counterparts as they announced plans for AUKUS-class submarines while carefully managing transits by Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen. And next month, Biden will visit Japan for the G7 and Australia for a meeting of the Quad leaders. This is quite a list of accomplishment for just a handful of months.
This string of activities demonstrates that the United States is making real headway with its closest Indo-Pacific allies and partners. China’s unnecessarily confrontational actions are pushing many of its neighbors in Asia toward the United States, just as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is doing the same with Europe allies and partners. Beyond those countries that have active territorial disputes with China or have recently been targeted by China’s coercive economic campaigns, the results have been far more mixed. Much work remains to be done in the Global South. But in the meantime the Biden team is making real progress with key allies.
Some of these allies will no doubt seek similar assurances to those that South Korea is getting. Japan is likely next on the list (albeit not until well after the G7 meets in Hiroshima). This will probably jumpstart a debate about extended deterrence in Australia as well.
But the central question remains: will these steps be sufficient to reassure Seoul that Washington will have its back, even if Biden is not in power two years from now? During the Trump administration, South Korean leaders found themselves simultaneously worried about both abandonment at Seoul’s moment of greatest need and the possibility of entrapment due to America’s “fire and fury” approach to North Korea. Those concerns, and the nuclear modernization efforts of Seoul’s neighbors, will not go away overnight. There is a great deal of work left to be done, not just in terms of detailed deliberations with officials in Seoul, but also sustained outreach to convince the South Korean people that this is a lasting commitment.
But for now, observers should welcome this move. Rather than sitting by passively as these debates threaten to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington, allied leaders are addressing these issues head on. Just as in any relationship, the United States and South Korea are better off confronting their concerns today, rather than letting them undermine their alliance tomorrow. Much work remains to be done, of course, but this is a good start.
No comments:
Post a Comment