Why India needs to pay attention Russian military build-up in Ukraine

 Why India needs to pay attention Russian military build-up in Ukraine

🔴 Tanvi Madan writes: A Moscow that is more beholden to Beijing would be particularly problematic at this moment when India is dependent on Russian military supplies and Sino-Indian border tensions could flare up again

Written by Tanvi Madan |

Updated: January 21, 2022 10:06:24 am

A Ukrainian soldier walks in a trench at the line of separation from pro-Russian rebels, in the Donetsk region, Ukraine Jan 9, 2022. (AP)

It’s not surprising that with several other issues facing India, the Russian military build-up near Ukraine — one of its largest recent mobilisations — is not getting much attention. But it should. What happens in Europe will not stay in Europe. In 2014, the Russian annexation of Crimea created problems for India. And if Moscow again takes military action against Ukraine, it will significantly complicate India’s objectives vis-à-vis Russia, China, the US, Europe, and even Ukraine.

For one, it would hinder Delhi’s interest in preventing a further deepening of Russia’s ties with China. Potential Russian military action against Ukraine and western backlash would mean that Moscow will need Beijing’s diplomatic support even more. Beyond the strategic challenge that a close Sino-Russian partnership poses for India, a Moscow that is more beholden to Beijing would be particularly problematic at this moment when India is dependent on Russian military supplies and Sino-Indian border tensions could flare up again. If Beijing asks Moscow to take some steps (for instance, stall military supplies to India), what will Russia do at a time when its need for China is acute due to a crisis with Ukraine? It’s worth keeping in mind that in 1962, when Moscow needed Beijing’s backing during the Cuban missile crisis, it resulted in Soviet support for ally China versus friend India at a crucial moment in the China-India war.

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Russian military action against Ukraine would also impede Delhi’s suggested approach for stalling Sino-Russian ties or fuelling friction between them — that the West, particularly the US, stabilise relations with Russia. For this reason, Delhi welcomed last summer’s Biden-Putin meeting — it would also help if two of India’s key partners were not at loggerheads. But another Russian invasion of Ukraine would put paid to any near-term prospect of a rapprochement between the West and Russia. Some critics already argue that Vladimir Putin saw Joe Biden’s outreach as a sign of weakness to exploit. German and French efforts have received similar criticism. And Japanese attempts have already been stymied by the Russian military build-up on the disputed Kuril islands, and the Sino-Russian military exercises.

Further, Russian military action against Ukraine would complicate India’s efforts to maintain a delicate balance between its partnerships with the US, Europe, and Russia. Delhi could try its posture, post the Russian annexation of Crimea, of neither openly criticising nor endorsing Russian actions. However, its silence will be seen as an endorsement. Moreover, even as Moscow might seek support from Delhi, it will sell India’s silence as an endorsement, as it did in the case of Crimea, and recently when it unilaterally issued a joint statement on Afghanistan.

A worsening Russia-Ukraine conflict would also bring India-US and India-Europe contradictions on Russia to the fore. The western response will involve even more sanctions that will further hinder India’s ability to do business with Russia and diversify Russia-India ties. And all this could come at a time when Washington is considering a waiver for India from CAATSA sanctions. Even advocates of a waiver who are Russia hawks, such as Senators Ted Cruz and Mark Warner, could look askance at the seeming Indian support for Moscow.

Delhi and Washington might manage that problem but there will be others too. A deteriorating situation in Europe could draw US attention away from the Indo-Pacific theatre, as Afghanistan and Middle East crises did in previous administrations. It has already absorbed considerable American bandwidth at a time when Delhi wants Washington to be focused on the China challenge.

A Russia-Ukraine crisis could also create headwinds for India’s move to deepen security and economic ties with European partners. A crisis nearer home could reduce the latter’s increased attention to Asia, especially India. Moreover, in order to focus on the Russia challenge, European capitals could seek to stabilise ties with China, rather than act against its assertive actions. This, in turn, could negatively affect the coordinated approach that Delhi seeks among like-minded partners to balance China. Furthermore, whether or not Beijing seeks to use the opportunity of the West being distracted to take further military action against India or elsewhere, China would benefit from American and European attention focused on Russia-Ukraine rather than on Asia. It could potentially present itself as a useful interlocutor between the West and Moscow, or seek accommodation from a West that needs stability in Asia to focus on Europe, or try to deepen the cleavages between the US and Europe on itself.

There are other problematic aspects of a Russia-Ukraine crisis for Delhi. For instance, India has economic and defence trade ties with Ukraine, as well as 7,500-odd citizens residing there. There are precedent and principle-related concerns, though many in Delhi argue that power often trumps those. Nonetheless, Moscow’s justifications for its actions against Ukraine are similar to those Beijing makes versus India: Historical claims, ethnic linkages, and Indian steps that it says threaten China. And Russian military action would go against respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty that Delhi frequently advocates.

For all the reasons above, India will hope for a diplomatic solution and that Russia does not take military action against Ukraine. It is unclear if Delhi privately has expressed or will express its concerns to Moscow. Regardless, it is likely considering such a scenario, and will have to prepare for the potential fallout for India’s interests with Russia, the West and China.

This column first appeared in the print edition on January 21, 2022 under the title ‘At stake in Ukraine’. The writer is director of the India Project at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC