Foreign Policy Research Institute
khamenei vs Ahmadinejad (2011)
Sat 6/25/2011, 4:06 AM
Foreign Policy Research Institute
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~MIDDLE EAST MEDIA MONITOR~
AN ENEMY FROM WITHIN:
THE IRANIAN REGIME AND THE NEW POLITICAL CHALLENGE
June 24, 2011
Middle East Media Monitor is an FPRI E-Note series, desigto review once a month a current topic from the perspective
of the foreign language press in such countries asIran, Iraq, Israel, and Turkey. These articles will focus on
providing FPRI's readership with an inside view on hoof the most important countries in the Middle East are
covering issues of importance to the American foreign policy community.
Raz Zimmt is a Ph.D. candidate in the Graduate School of
Historical Studies and a research fellow at the Center for
Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University. He is the editor of
the weekly "Spotlight on Iran," published by the Meir Amit
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center,
www.terrorism-info.org.il/site/home/default.asp.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201106.zimmt.iran.html
~MIDDLE EAST MEDIA MONITOR~
AN ENEMY FROM WITHIN:
THE IRANIAN REGIME AND THE NEW POLITICAL CHALLENGE
By Raz Zimmt
On May 11, 2011 hardliner cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi
Mesbah-Yazdi, held a meeting with members of the
conservative Islamic Coalition Party. Mesbah-Yazdi warned
his audience against the strengthening of deviant religious
thought in Iranian society. He claimed that it jeopardizes
the concept of "the Guardianship of the Islamic jurist"
(Velayat-e Faqih), upon which the Iranian regime has been
based since the Islamic Revolution (1979). "If this current
continues and one day we will see another Seyyed Ali
Mohammad Bab[1]...we should not be surprised."[2] A few days
later, Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Sa'idi, the Friday prayer
leader in Qom, warned the "deviant currents" to stop their
conspiracies or the people will annihilate them, as they did
to [Abolhassan] Banisadr,[3] "the hypocrites" [a reference
to Iranian opposition organization, the Mojahedin-e Khalq[
and "the leaders of the sedition" [a reference to the
reformist opposition].[4]
The demonstrations led by the reformist opposition following
the 2009 presidential elections posed a serious threat to
the Iranian regime's stability. The warnings made by the
high-ranking clerics were not directed, however, at the
reformists but at elements within the conservative faction
associated with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his
controversial son-in-law and associate, Esfandiar Rahim
Masha'i. This essay will discuss the growing influence of a
new political current within the conservative faction in
Iran and the internal political struggle between this
current and the traditional-conservative ruling
establishment. While this internal struggle does not
directly affect Iran's foreign policy, it has significant
implications for the regime's stability.
THE SUPREME LEADER VS. THE PRESIDENT
The unprecedented attack by senior conservative officials
against the so-called "deviant current" was triggered by two
recent developments: President Ahmadinejad's decision to
dismiss his intelligence minister, Heydar Moslehi, and the
distribution of a documentary film called: "The Reappearance
[of the Twelfth Imam] is Imminent" (Zohur besyar nazdik
ast). The causes for the escalating debate within the
conservative faction are much broader, however, than these
recent issues.
On April 17, 2011, Iran's media reported that Ahmadinejad
had accepted his Intelligence Minister's resignation.
Shortly afterwards, however, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei, issued a statement supporting Moslehi and
instructing that he should be reinstated. A few days later,
Khamenei publicly rebuked the president and stated that he
does not usually intervene in the government's decisions or
day-to-day work unless national interests are disregarded.
He considered Ahmadinejad's decision to dismiss Moslehi such
a case.[5]
Protesting the Supreme Leader's instruction to revise his
decision, Ahmadinejad did not show up to his office for
several days. The disagreements between the two leaders soon
turned into a major political crisis. Top conservative
officials came forward in support of Khamenei, strongly
criticizing the president for his misconduct and demanding
that he obey the leader's instructions. Some of the
president's critics went so far as to warn him that he could
suffer the same fate as Abolhassan Banisadr.
IRAN'S POLITICAL ELITES
Disagreements among the Iranian political elite are nothing
new. Since the Islamic Revolution, Iranian politics have
been characterized by constant tension between various
political institutions, as well as between the Supreme
Leader and the elected president. Although Khamenei has
emphasized his support for Ahmadinejad since his election in
2005, differences have emerged between them on several
issues. In April 2006, for instance, Ahmadinejad's decision
to allow women into football stadiums provoked outrage among
hardline clerics, eventually forcing him to revoke his
decision following Khamenei's ruling. In May 2009, tensions
between the two leaders erupted again over the president's
decision to merge the pilgrimage organization and the
tourist and cultural heritage organization headed by Rahim
Masha'i. Following a protest by the Supreme Leader's
representative on pilgrimage affairs, Khamenei issued a
statement ordering Ahmadinejad to reverse his decision.[6]
The major political crisis following the presidential
elections, in the summer of 2009, temporarily forced the
Iranian leadership to display public unity. The
disagreements between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad did not fade
away, however, and reached an unprecedented peak over
Moslehi's dismissal. This controversy between the two has
brought both the president and Masha'i under harsh
criticism. The president's critics have claimed that Masha'i
was behind the decision to remove Moslehi despite the
Supreme Leader's position and was, therefore, responsible
for the political crisis which followed. Mojtaba Zolnour,
the Supreme Leader's deputy representative in the
Revolutionary Guards, claimed that Masha'i was currently the
"real president." In a speech given in the city of Mashhad,
Zolnour criticized the president's close relationship with
his advisor and urged Ahmadinejad to cut himself off from
the influence of people like Masha'i.[7]
RAHIM MASHA'I, THE "DEVIANT CURRENT" AND THE "IRANIAN
SCHOOL"
This is not the first time Masha'i sparked such an uproar.
In the summer of 2008 he aroused a wave of protest by saying
that Iran was a friend of all nations in the world,
including the nation of Israel. In 2007, he caused another
scandal after he took part in a tourism convention in Turkey
which included a performance by female dancers dressed in
revealing clothing. In July 2009, Ahmadinejad was forced to
give in to Khamenei's demand and reverse his decision to
appoint Masha'i as his first vice president. Shortly
thereafter, however, he appointed Masha'i as his chief of
staff. Masha'i continued to make controversial remarks that
provoked the ire of the religious establishment. In August
2010, he declared that Iran should spread the "Iranian
school of thought" in place of the "Islamic school of
thought".[8] His statement was strongly criticized by senior
conservative officials, who accused him of promoting secular
nationalist views. Mashai's remarks were conceived as part
of a comprehensive governmental policy to promote Iranian
national pre-Islamic traditions. This policy was evidenced,
for example, in governmental efforts to borrow the Cyrus
cylinder[9] from the British Museum for an exhibition in
Tehran in September 2010[10] and in an invitation sent by
Ahmadinejad to several state leaders a few months later to
celebrate the Persian New Year, Nowrouz, in Iran.[11]
Iran's traditional-conservative wing understood the emphasis
on the cultural-national component of the Iranian national
identity as indicative of the threat represented by the
"deviant current" to the Islamic Republic's religious
values. In an interview given by Hojjat-ol-Islam Qassem
Ravanbakhsh, a student of Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, to "Ya
Lesarat ol-Hossein" weekly magazine affiliated with the
radical Iranian organization "Ansar-e Hezbollah," the
conservative cleric asserted that insistence on nationalism
is one of the basic principles of freemasonry which is
evident in Masha'i's thought.[12]
THE "DEVIANT CURRENT" AND MESSIANIC THOUGHT
Another event which provoked an unprecedented assault
against Ahmadinejad's associates was the distribution of the
documentary film "The Reappearance [of the Twelfth Imam] is
Imminent." This film suggested that recent events in the
Middle East should be considered as proof that the Mahdi[13]
will make his reappearance in the near future.[14] The film
has provoked strong criticism within the Shi'ite religious
establishment and among conservative officials. They have
argued that any attempt to predict the Imam's return based
on actual events is tantamount to deviation from the
principles of Shi'te religious law.[15]
The distribution of the documentary was considered by the
traditional conservatives as another sign of the dangerous
spread of messianic views encouraged by President
Ahmadinejad and his associates. These views pose a danger by
potentially threatening the status of Iran's clerics and
allowing religious commentary that does not rely on
religious institutions. They are, therefore, considered a
theological, ideological and political threat to the regime
and the concept of "Guardianship of the Islamic jurist." The
regime has consequently increased its suppression of any
expression of popular Islam and messianic beliefs.
The regime's concerns regarding the potential implications
of anti-clerical views on the clerical establishment were
clearly evident in its criticism of the "deviant current."
Such criticism has recently expanded to include even hard-
line clerics, who were previously considered staunch
supporters of president Ahmadinejad. The most prominent
among them was Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi. Speaking at a
conference on Iran's cultural policy, held in April 2011,
the senior cleric, formerly considered the president's
spiritual mentor, warned about the influence of those
ideological factions taking a hostile position toward
clerics. Mesbah-Yazdi said that since the revolution, some
Iranian officials have come under the influence of secular,
liberal and anti-clerical factions. And alluding to the
president's coterie, added that the influence of anti-
clerical views was no longer restricted to the leaders of
the reformist opposition.[16]
TRADITIONAL CONSERVATIVES AND THE "DEVIANT CURRENT":
POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN ACTION
The traditional conservatives perceived the messianic and
anti-clerical views associated with Ahmadinejad and
Masha'i's political camp, their emphasis on Iranian
nationalism and their challenge the Supreme Leader as a
growing threat to the Supreme Leader's authority. As long as
the reformist opposition was considered the primary
challenge to the regime's stability, the conservative
establishment focused most of its efforts against it. Once
the regime succeeded in suppressing the reformists, it was
ready to deal with the growing political challenge within
the conservative faction itself.
The upcoming parliamentary elections scheduled for early
next year and the presidential elections due in 2013 made it
more urgent to deal with the "deviant current." The
possibility that this current might try to use the elections
to increase its political power did not escape the attention
of the Iranian political elite In fact, Masha'i's associates
suggested this possibility themselves. In April 2011,
Hojjat-ol-Islam Abbas Amiri-Far, the head of the Cultural
Council in the president's office, stated that if Masha'i
decides to run for president in the next election, he will
become the next president. Referring to the upcoming
parliamentary elections, he predicted that the president's
supporters will run against the conservative candidates and
defeat them.[17] A few weeks later, several Iranian websites
reported that Amiri-Far attempted suicide in the notorious
Evin prison after being arrested for his alleged involvement
in the distribution of "The Reappearance is Imminent"
documentary film.[18]
In May 2011, the growing concerns over the increased power
of Masha'i and his followers led to strong efforts to
suppress them. In mid-May, more than 20 of Masha'i
supporters were arrested.[19] Just like reformist leaders a
few months before, the leaders of the "deviant current" were
also accused of collaborating with the United States and
Israel, as well as being involved in economic
corruption.[20]
Top Revolutionary Guards officials joined the campaign
against Masha'i's associates, as well. Revolutionary Guards
chief, Mohammad-Ali Ja'fari, said in a seminar attended by
Basij student members that the "deviant current" was trying
to gain political support through paying money and rent so
that they could influence the upcoming elections.[21]
CONCLUSIONS
The political confrontation within the conservative faction
could have far reaching implications for the future of
Iran's political system. To a certain extent, conservatives'
internal debates could be viewed as evidence of the regime's
success in containing the popular protests and reformist
opposition in 2009. One can assume that if the ruling
political elite still regarded the reformists as a concrete
threat it would continue-at least publicly-to demonstrate a
greater degree of internal unity. This does not mean, of
course, that the reform movement has ceased. The
demonstrations held in early 2011 in major cities throughout
Iran indicate that the reformist opposition is still capable
of generating substantial support for its agenda.
Nevertheless, the violent suppression it suffered, the
continuous house arrest of its leaders, Mir-Hossein Mousavi
and Mehdi Karoubi, and its internal weakness have turned the
reformist opposition into an almost irrelevant player in the
Iranian political arena. These circumstances enable the
ruling elite to focus of its efforts against the competing
forces within the conservative faction itself. In this
respect, the internal political debate might be considered
as "good news" for the conservative elite, at least in the
short run.
The internal political struggle's long-term implications,
however, should cause the ruling establishment serious
concern. For the first time, the conservative elite was
forced to admit that challenging the Supreme Leader and the
clerical establishment is no longer confined to the
reformist opposition. Even if the clerics expected to
overcome any challenge to their political status in the near
term, the continuation of this popular religious trend may
present a challenge to the concept of "the Guardianship of
the Islamic jurist", especially in a major crisis, like the
death of the present Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
In addition, the traditional conservatives' efforts to act
against the president's associates and his advisor, Rahim
Masha'i, signal another phase in the gradual exclusion of
competing elements from the ruling political elite. As a
result of the political crisis in 2009, the reformist
leaders, once a part of the Iranian political elite
themselves, were denounced as traitors and seditionists and
excluded from the political consensus, defined by the
regime. During the last year, the political status of Ali-
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani-one of the most senior and
influential politicians in Iran since the Islamic
revolution-has also been deteriorating. In March 2011, he
was removed from his position as chairman of the Assembly of
Experts following a widening gap with the traditional
conservatives. They claimed that he had not expressed
unequivocal support for the regime against the reformist
opposition and that he even collaborated with reformist
leaders.
It appears that the traditional-conservatives are now ready
to deal with the president's followers. Since the late
1990s, a new generation of conservatives has entered the
political arena. This younger generation, many of them
veterans from the Iran-Iraq war, aspired to revive the
values of the Islamic revolution. They believe those values
were eroded during the presidencies of Rafsanjani and
Mohammad Khatami, while emphasizing the need for economic
and social reform. They presented themselves as an
alternative both to the old guard of conservatives, who were
conceived as being irrelevant by the younger generation, as
well as to the reformists, who were considered a threat to
the revolutionary principles. Ahmadinejad, Masha'i and their
supporters represent these new conservatives, who aim to
reinvigorate the conservative faction. Their suppression by
the traditional conservatives and their denunciation as a
"deviant current" mean a further narrowing of the elite's
political base. While excluding this new political and
ideological current may enable the traditional conservatives
to maintain their exclusive status within the political
elite in the short term. In the long term, however, the
traditional conservatives may discover that their intolerant
suppression of political rivals has narrowed the Iranian
elite to such an extent that it will not be able to cope
with future challenges.
This essay has focused on the growing internal political
struggle between the conservative-traditional religious
establishment and the new political current affiliated with
President Ahmadinejad and his associates. The internal
disagreements among the conservatives in Iran do not
directly affect its national foreign policy. This policy is
decided almost exclusively by the Supreme Leader and rarely
reflects major differences of opinion regarding important
international and regional issues facing Iran. These major
concerns would include the nuclear issue or the country's
involvement in the region. However, the internal political
struggle has major implications for the future stability of
the regime. The United States should consider the growing
tension within Iranian political elite, especially when
considering its policy concerning regime change in Iran.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] The founder of Babism and one of the central figures of
Baha'i faith.
[2] Fars News Agency, May 13, 2011,
http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9002230057
[3] Former Iranian president, Abolhassan Banisadr, who was
impeached in June 1981.
[4] Mehr News Agency, May 20, 2011,
http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=1316275
[5] Fars News Agency, April 23, 2011,
http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=9002030860
[6] http://www.iranina.org/political/20-2009-05-04-07-29-30.html
[7] Farda, April 30, 2011,
http://www.fardanews.com/fa/news/145923
[8] Jahan News, August 4, 2010,
http://www.jahannews.com/vdchzqnzz23ni6d.tft2.html
[9] The Cyrus Cylinder is an ancient Persian clay cylinder
dated from the 6th century BC, which was discovered in in
1879. It was created following the Persian conquest of
Babylon in 539 BC, when the Persian army under Cyrus the
Great invaded and conquered the Neo-Babylonian Empire,
bringing it under the control of the Persian Empire.
[10] Fars News Agency, September 12, 2010,
http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8906211447
[11] Radio Zamaneh, 22 March, 2011,
http://www.radiozamaneh.com/english/content/irans-revolutionary-guards-condemn-norooz-celebrations-persepolis
[12] Ya Lesarat, 18 May, 2011,
http://www.yalesarat.com/vdcb.gbaurhb0giupr.html
[13] For Twelver Shia Muslims, the Mahdi is the Twelfth
Imam, who has been in occultation and awaits God's decree to
return and prevail over evil.
[14] The 75-minute Persian language documentary can be
viewed at:
http://www.shiatv.net/view_video.php?viewkey=14974e7fd34f975ced5b
[15] http://mahdi313.org/page.php?page=showarticles&cat=1&id=292&office=markaz
[16] Sadegh News, April 22, 2011,
http://sadeghnews.blogfa.com/post-59.aspx
[17] Fars News Agency, April 22, 2011,
http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=9002010196
[18] Jaras, May 22, 2011,
http://www.rahesabz.net/story/37279
[19] Alef, May 18, 2011,
http://alef.ir/1388/content/view/104496
[20] Javan News, May 16, 2011,
http://www.javanonline.ir/Nsite/FullStory/?Id=352926;
Mehr News Agency, May 18, 2011,
http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=1314814;
Mehr News Agency, May 11, 2011,
http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/newsdetail.aspx?NewsID=1309769
[21] Mehr News Agency, May 28, 2011,
http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=1322564
Over 50 Years of Ideas in Service to Our Nation
www.fpri.org
You can now follow FPRI on Facebook and FPRINews on Twitter
E-Notes
Distributed Exclusively via Email
~MIDDLE EAST MEDIA MONITOR~
AN ENEMY FROM WITHIN:
THE IRANIAN REGIME AND THE NEW POLITICAL CHALLENGE
June 24, 2011
Middle East Media Monitor is an FPRI E-Note series, desigto review once a month a current topic from the perspective
of the foreign language press in such countries asIran, Iraq, Israel, and Turkey. These articles will focus on
providing FPRI's readership with an inside view on hoof the most important countries in the Middle East are
covering issues of importance to the American foreign policy community.
Raz Zimmt is a Ph.D. candidate in the Graduate School of
Historical Studies and a research fellow at the Center for
Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University. He is the editor of
the weekly "Spotlight on Iran," published by the Meir Amit
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center,
www.terrorism-info.org.il/site/home/default.asp.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201106.zimmt.iran.html
~MIDDLE EAST MEDIA MONITOR~
AN ENEMY FROM WITHIN:
THE IRANIAN REGIME AND THE NEW POLITICAL CHALLENGE
By Raz Zimmt
On May 11, 2011 hardliner cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi
Mesbah-Yazdi, held a meeting with members of the
conservative Islamic Coalition Party. Mesbah-Yazdi warned
his audience against the strengthening of deviant religious
thought in Iranian society. He claimed that it jeopardizes
the concept of "the Guardianship of the Islamic jurist"
(Velayat-e Faqih), upon which the Iranian regime has been
based since the Islamic Revolution (1979). "If this current
continues and one day we will see another Seyyed Ali
Mohammad Bab[1]...we should not be surprised."[2] A few days
later, Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Sa'idi, the Friday prayer
leader in Qom, warned the "deviant currents" to stop their
conspiracies or the people will annihilate them, as they did
to [Abolhassan] Banisadr,[3] "the hypocrites" [a reference
to Iranian opposition organization, the Mojahedin-e Khalq[
and "the leaders of the sedition" [a reference to the
reformist opposition].[4]
The demonstrations led by the reformist opposition following
the 2009 presidential elections posed a serious threat to
the Iranian regime's stability. The warnings made by the
high-ranking clerics were not directed, however, at the
reformists but at elements within the conservative faction
associated with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his
controversial son-in-law and associate, Esfandiar Rahim
Masha'i. This essay will discuss the growing influence of a
new political current within the conservative faction in
Iran and the internal political struggle between this
current and the traditional-conservative ruling
establishment. While this internal struggle does not
directly affect Iran's foreign policy, it has significant
implications for the regime's stability.
THE SUPREME LEADER VS. THE PRESIDENT
The unprecedented attack by senior conservative officials
against the so-called "deviant current" was triggered by two
recent developments: President Ahmadinejad's decision to
dismiss his intelligence minister, Heydar Moslehi, and the
distribution of a documentary film called: "The Reappearance
[of the Twelfth Imam] is Imminent" (Zohur besyar nazdik
ast). The causes for the escalating debate within the
conservative faction are much broader, however, than these
recent issues.
On April 17, 2011, Iran's media reported that Ahmadinejad
had accepted his Intelligence Minister's resignation.
Shortly afterwards, however, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei, issued a statement supporting Moslehi and
instructing that he should be reinstated. A few days later,
Khamenei publicly rebuked the president and stated that he
does not usually intervene in the government's decisions or
day-to-day work unless national interests are disregarded.
He considered Ahmadinejad's decision to dismiss Moslehi such
a case.[5]
Protesting the Supreme Leader's instruction to revise his
decision, Ahmadinejad did not show up to his office for
several days. The disagreements between the two leaders soon
turned into a major political crisis. Top conservative
officials came forward in support of Khamenei, strongly
criticizing the president for his misconduct and demanding
that he obey the leader's instructions. Some of the
president's critics went so far as to warn him that he could
suffer the same fate as Abolhassan Banisadr.
IRAN'S POLITICAL ELITES
Disagreements among the Iranian political elite are nothing
new. Since the Islamic Revolution, Iranian politics have
been characterized by constant tension between various
political institutions, as well as between the Supreme
Leader and the elected president. Although Khamenei has
emphasized his support for Ahmadinejad since his election in
2005, differences have emerged between them on several
issues. In April 2006, for instance, Ahmadinejad's decision
to allow women into football stadiums provoked outrage among
hardline clerics, eventually forcing him to revoke his
decision following Khamenei's ruling. In May 2009, tensions
between the two leaders erupted again over the president's
decision to merge the pilgrimage organization and the
tourist and cultural heritage organization headed by Rahim
Masha'i. Following a protest by the Supreme Leader's
representative on pilgrimage affairs, Khamenei issued a
statement ordering Ahmadinejad to reverse his decision.[6]
The major political crisis following the presidential
elections, in the summer of 2009, temporarily forced the
Iranian leadership to display public unity. The
disagreements between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad did not fade
away, however, and reached an unprecedented peak over
Moslehi's dismissal. This controversy between the two has
brought both the president and Masha'i under harsh
criticism. The president's critics have claimed that Masha'i
was behind the decision to remove Moslehi despite the
Supreme Leader's position and was, therefore, responsible
for the political crisis which followed. Mojtaba Zolnour,
the Supreme Leader's deputy representative in the
Revolutionary Guards, claimed that Masha'i was currently the
"real president." In a speech given in the city of Mashhad,
Zolnour criticized the president's close relationship with
his advisor and urged Ahmadinejad to cut himself off from
the influence of people like Masha'i.[7]
RAHIM MASHA'I, THE "DEVIANT CURRENT" AND THE "IRANIAN
SCHOOL"
This is not the first time Masha'i sparked such an uproar.
In the summer of 2008 he aroused a wave of protest by saying
that Iran was a friend of all nations in the world,
including the nation of Israel. In 2007, he caused another
scandal after he took part in a tourism convention in Turkey
which included a performance by female dancers dressed in
revealing clothing. In July 2009, Ahmadinejad was forced to
give in to Khamenei's demand and reverse his decision to
appoint Masha'i as his first vice president. Shortly
thereafter, however, he appointed Masha'i as his chief of
staff. Masha'i continued to make controversial remarks that
provoked the ire of the religious establishment. In August
2010, he declared that Iran should spread the "Iranian
school of thought" in place of the "Islamic school of
thought".[8] His statement was strongly criticized by senior
conservative officials, who accused him of promoting secular
nationalist views. Mashai's remarks were conceived as part
of a comprehensive governmental policy to promote Iranian
national pre-Islamic traditions. This policy was evidenced,
for example, in governmental efforts to borrow the Cyrus
cylinder[9] from the British Museum for an exhibition in
Tehran in September 2010[10] and in an invitation sent by
Ahmadinejad to several state leaders a few months later to
celebrate the Persian New Year, Nowrouz, in Iran.[11]
Iran's traditional-conservative wing understood the emphasis
on the cultural-national component of the Iranian national
identity as indicative of the threat represented by the
"deviant current" to the Islamic Republic's religious
values. In an interview given by Hojjat-ol-Islam Qassem
Ravanbakhsh, a student of Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, to "Ya
Lesarat ol-Hossein" weekly magazine affiliated with the
radical Iranian organization "Ansar-e Hezbollah," the
conservative cleric asserted that insistence on nationalism
is one of the basic principles of freemasonry which is
evident in Masha'i's thought.[12]
THE "DEVIANT CURRENT" AND MESSIANIC THOUGHT
Another event which provoked an unprecedented assault
against Ahmadinejad's associates was the distribution of the
documentary film "The Reappearance [of the Twelfth Imam] is
Imminent." This film suggested that recent events in the
Middle East should be considered as proof that the Mahdi[13]
will make his reappearance in the near future.[14] The film
has provoked strong criticism within the Shi'ite religious
establishment and among conservative officials. They have
argued that any attempt to predict the Imam's return based
on actual events is tantamount to deviation from the
principles of Shi'te religious law.[15]
The distribution of the documentary was considered by the
traditional conservatives as another sign of the dangerous
spread of messianic views encouraged by President
Ahmadinejad and his associates. These views pose a danger by
potentially threatening the status of Iran's clerics and
allowing religious commentary that does not rely on
religious institutions. They are, therefore, considered a
theological, ideological and political threat to the regime
and the concept of "Guardianship of the Islamic jurist." The
regime has consequently increased its suppression of any
expression of popular Islam and messianic beliefs.
The regime's concerns regarding the potential implications
of anti-clerical views on the clerical establishment were
clearly evident in its criticism of the "deviant current."
Such criticism has recently expanded to include even hard-
line clerics, who were previously considered staunch
supporters of president Ahmadinejad. The most prominent
among them was Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi. Speaking at a
conference on Iran's cultural policy, held in April 2011,
the senior cleric, formerly considered the president's
spiritual mentor, warned about the influence of those
ideological factions taking a hostile position toward
clerics. Mesbah-Yazdi said that since the revolution, some
Iranian officials have come under the influence of secular,
liberal and anti-clerical factions. And alluding to the
president's coterie, added that the influence of anti-
clerical views was no longer restricted to the leaders of
the reformist opposition.[16]
TRADITIONAL CONSERVATIVES AND THE "DEVIANT CURRENT":
POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN ACTION
The traditional conservatives perceived the messianic and
anti-clerical views associated with Ahmadinejad and
Masha'i's political camp, their emphasis on Iranian
nationalism and their challenge the Supreme Leader as a
growing threat to the Supreme Leader's authority. As long as
the reformist opposition was considered the primary
challenge to the regime's stability, the conservative
establishment focused most of its efforts against it. Once
the regime succeeded in suppressing the reformists, it was
ready to deal with the growing political challenge within
the conservative faction itself.
The upcoming parliamentary elections scheduled for early
next year and the presidential elections due in 2013 made it
more urgent to deal with the "deviant current." The
possibility that this current might try to use the elections
to increase its political power did not escape the attention
of the Iranian political elite In fact, Masha'i's associates
suggested this possibility themselves. In April 2011,
Hojjat-ol-Islam Abbas Amiri-Far, the head of the Cultural
Council in the president's office, stated that if Masha'i
decides to run for president in the next election, he will
become the next president. Referring to the upcoming
parliamentary elections, he predicted that the president's
supporters will run against the conservative candidates and
defeat them.[17] A few weeks later, several Iranian websites
reported that Amiri-Far attempted suicide in the notorious
Evin prison after being arrested for his alleged involvement
in the distribution of "The Reappearance is Imminent"
documentary film.[18]
In May 2011, the growing concerns over the increased power
of Masha'i and his followers led to strong efforts to
suppress them. In mid-May, more than 20 of Masha'i
supporters were arrested.[19] Just like reformist leaders a
few months before, the leaders of the "deviant current" were
also accused of collaborating with the United States and
Israel, as well as being involved in economic
corruption.[20]
Top Revolutionary Guards officials joined the campaign
against Masha'i's associates, as well. Revolutionary Guards
chief, Mohammad-Ali Ja'fari, said in a seminar attended by
Basij student members that the "deviant current" was trying
to gain political support through paying money and rent so
that they could influence the upcoming elections.[21]
CONCLUSIONS
The political confrontation within the conservative faction
could have far reaching implications for the future of
Iran's political system. To a certain extent, conservatives'
internal debates could be viewed as evidence of the regime's
success in containing the popular protests and reformist
opposition in 2009. One can assume that if the ruling
political elite still regarded the reformists as a concrete
threat it would continue-at least publicly-to demonstrate a
greater degree of internal unity. This does not mean, of
course, that the reform movement has ceased. The
demonstrations held in early 2011 in major cities throughout
Iran indicate that the reformist opposition is still capable
of generating substantial support for its agenda.
Nevertheless, the violent suppression it suffered, the
continuous house arrest of its leaders, Mir-Hossein Mousavi
and Mehdi Karoubi, and its internal weakness have turned the
reformist opposition into an almost irrelevant player in the
Iranian political arena. These circumstances enable the
ruling elite to focus of its efforts against the competing
forces within the conservative faction itself. In this
respect, the internal political debate might be considered
as "good news" for the conservative elite, at least in the
short run.
The internal political struggle's long-term implications,
however, should cause the ruling establishment serious
concern. For the first time, the conservative elite was
forced to admit that challenging the Supreme Leader and the
clerical establishment is no longer confined to the
reformist opposition. Even if the clerics expected to
overcome any challenge to their political status in the near
term, the continuation of this popular religious trend may
present a challenge to the concept of "the Guardianship of
the Islamic jurist", especially in a major crisis, like the
death of the present Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
In addition, the traditional conservatives' efforts to act
against the president's associates and his advisor, Rahim
Masha'i, signal another phase in the gradual exclusion of
competing elements from the ruling political elite. As a
result of the political crisis in 2009, the reformist
leaders, once a part of the Iranian political elite
themselves, were denounced as traitors and seditionists and
excluded from the political consensus, defined by the
regime. During the last year, the political status of Ali-
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani-one of the most senior and
influential politicians in Iran since the Islamic
revolution-has also been deteriorating. In March 2011, he
was removed from his position as chairman of the Assembly of
Experts following a widening gap with the traditional
conservatives. They claimed that he had not expressed
unequivocal support for the regime against the reformist
opposition and that he even collaborated with reformist
leaders.
It appears that the traditional-conservatives are now ready
to deal with the president's followers. Since the late
1990s, a new generation of conservatives has entered the
political arena. This younger generation, many of them
veterans from the Iran-Iraq war, aspired to revive the
values of the Islamic revolution. They believe those values
were eroded during the presidencies of Rafsanjani and
Mohammad Khatami, while emphasizing the need for economic
and social reform. They presented themselves as an
alternative both to the old guard of conservatives, who were
conceived as being irrelevant by the younger generation, as
well as to the reformists, who were considered a threat to
the revolutionary principles. Ahmadinejad, Masha'i and their
supporters represent these new conservatives, who aim to
reinvigorate the conservative faction. Their suppression by
the traditional conservatives and their denunciation as a
"deviant current" mean a further narrowing of the elite's
political base. While excluding this new political and
ideological current may enable the traditional conservatives
to maintain their exclusive status within the political
elite in the short term. In the long term, however, the
traditional conservatives may discover that their intolerant
suppression of political rivals has narrowed the Iranian
elite to such an extent that it will not be able to cope
with future challenges.
This essay has focused on the growing internal political
struggle between the conservative-traditional religious
establishment and the new political current affiliated with
President Ahmadinejad and his associates. The internal
disagreements among the conservatives in Iran do not
directly affect its national foreign policy. This policy is
decided almost exclusively by the Supreme Leader and rarely
reflects major differences of opinion regarding important
international and regional issues facing Iran. These major
concerns would include the nuclear issue or the country's
involvement in the region. However, the internal political
struggle has major implications for the future stability of
the regime. The United States should consider the growing
tension within Iranian political elite, especially when
considering its policy concerning regime change in Iran.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] The founder of Babism and one of the central figures of
Baha'i faith.
[2] Fars News Agency, May 13, 2011,
http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9002230057
[3] Former Iranian president, Abolhassan Banisadr, who was
impeached in June 1981.
[4] Mehr News Agency, May 20, 2011,
http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=1316275
[5] Fars News Agency, April 23, 2011,
http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=9002030860
[6] http://www.iranina.org/political/20-2009-05-04-07-29-30.html
[7] Farda, April 30, 2011,
http://www.fardanews.com/fa/news/145923
[8] Jahan News, August 4, 2010,
http://www.jahannews.com/vdchzqnzz23ni6d.tft2.html
[9] The Cyrus Cylinder is an ancient Persian clay cylinder
dated from the 6th century BC, which was discovered in in
1879. It was created following the Persian conquest of
Babylon in 539 BC, when the Persian army under Cyrus the
Great invaded and conquered the Neo-Babylonian Empire,
bringing it under the control of the Persian Empire.
[10] Fars News Agency, September 12, 2010,
http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8906211447
[11] Radio Zamaneh, 22 March, 2011,
http://www.radiozamaneh.com/english/content/irans-revolutionary-guards-condemn-norooz-celebrations-persepolis
[12] Ya Lesarat, 18 May, 2011,
http://www.yalesarat.com/vdcb.gbaurhb0giupr.html
[13] For Twelver Shia Muslims, the Mahdi is the Twelfth
Imam, who has been in occultation and awaits God's decree to
return and prevail over evil.
[14] The 75-minute Persian language documentary can be
viewed at:
http://www.shiatv.net/view_video.php?viewkey=14974e7fd34f975ced5b
[15] http://mahdi313.org/page.php?page=showarticles&cat=1&id=292&office=markaz
[16] Sadegh News, April 22, 2011,
http://sadeghnews.blogfa.com/post-59.aspx
[17] Fars News Agency, April 22, 2011,
http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=9002010196
[18] Jaras, May 22, 2011,
http://www.rahesabz.net/story/37279
[19] Alef, May 18, 2011,
http://alef.ir/1388/content/view/104496
[20] Javan News, May 16, 2011,
http://www.javanonline.ir/Nsite/FullStory/?Id=352926;
Mehr News Agency, May 18, 2011,
http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=1314814;
Mehr News Agency, May 11, 2011,
http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/newsdetail.aspx?NewsID=1309769
[21] Mehr News Agency, May 28, 2011,
http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=1322564
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