International Crisis Group Commentary / Latin America & Caribbean 09 January 2026 20+ minutes How the World Sees the U.S. Raid in Venezuela

International Crisis Group 

Commentary / Latin America & Caribbean 09 January 2026 20+ minutes

How the World Sees the U.S. Raid in Venezuela

The U.S. operation grabbing Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro caused disquiet in many capitals around the globe, not least due to subsequent talk of seizing Greenland. But several governments have tempered their responses. Crisis Group experts offer a 360-degree view of the reactions and their implications. 

Related Tags

Venezuela

United States

Global

The U.S. military intervention in Venezuela to capture President Nicolás Maduro and his wife over the first weekend of January left other governments scrambling for an appropriate response. Many are happy enough to see the back of Maduro, whose decade in power was characterised by repression and rigged elections. But the nature of the U.S. raid – widely seen as a violation of the UN Charter’s prohibition of the use of force – has caused considerable disquiet. So, too, have statements from U.S. President Donald Trump and his advisers in the aftermath, in which they have mused about further operations in Latin America and ramped up talk of coercively acquiring Greenland from Denmark as the next phase of what the administration calls the “Trump corollary” to the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine, through which the U.S. first asserted its primacy in the Western Hemisphere. The president has boasted that with such a new “Donroe Doctrine” in place, U.S. dominance in the region “will never be questioned again”.

U.S. officials have simultaneously underlined their disdain for international law, which makes non-defensive uses of force illegal unless authorised by the UN Security Council. Justifying the intervention, Trump’s influential deputy chief of staff Stephen Miller explained that the U.S. lives in a world that is “governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power”. In case anyone missed the point, Trump has told journalists, “I don’t need international law”. While the administration has belittled multilateralism since the president returned to office a year ago, the Venezuela raid presages a new stage in its efforts to refashion the international system. 

But if many states are rattled by U.S. behaviour, their responses have varied considerably and have often been shaped by factors unrelated to the situation in Venezuela itself. U.S. allies have had to balance their concerns about Washington’s new embrace of gunboat diplomacy against the dangers of offending the Trump administration. When the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting on the crisis two days after it broke, the British representative managed to get through his short statement without once referencing the U.S. by name. Officials in countries that have troubled relations with the U.S. have had to consider whether Washington – having demonstrated jaw-dropping intelligence and military capabilities in snatching Maduro – will go after them next. While Washington’s main geopolitical rivals, China and Russia, have condemned Maduro’s seizure, officials in Moscow and Beijing may see an opportunity in the Trump administration’s emphasis on a right to a hemispheric sphere of influence, both because this approach is a precedent for claiming regional spheres of their own and because the U.S. focus on its backyard may distract Washington from what they are doing in their own neighbourhoods. Neither power, however, can be sure how the unpredictable U.S. president’s stance may evolve.

To help gauge the global impact of the U.S. intervention in Venezuela, Crisis Group experts offer the following snapshots, capturing a range of responses in various countries and regions, based on public statements and Crisis Group conversations with officials and other observers.

Latin America

There has been no consistent response to the U.S. intervention in Venezuela from other Latin American states. The region’s leaders have tended to split along ideological lines. Left-leaning governments – including those in Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay, as well as the outgoing administration in Chile – have condemned Washington’s action. Chilean President Gabriel Boric, whose term in office will end in March, has accused President Trump of behaving like an “emperor”. By contrast, Argentina’s right-wing President Javier Milei – who turned to the U.S. for a bank bailout in 2025 – welcomed the raid in Caracas, framing it as a victory for good over evil. Ecuador’s pro-U.S. president, Daniel Noboa, likewise celebrated it as a defeat for “narco-chavista criminals”. With Brazil, Colombia and Peru all heading into elections in 2026, left-right disputes over Venezuela are liable to sharpen further.

In the wake of the Venezuela operation, President Trump and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio made a series of statements pointing to possible further military action in Cuba, Colombia and Mexico. Of these, Cuba – which has accused the U.S. of “state terrorism” – appears most vulnerable, as it is in the middle of a severe economic crisis. Rubio, who was the leading promoter of removing Maduro within the administration, is a long-time advocate of removing the communist government in Havana. But many analysts argue there is no clear path to regime change in the island nation, as decades of repression have extinguished political and civic opposition. Having relied heavily on Venezuela for its oil supply, Cuba will face deepening economic difficulties if Caracas cuts off that support. Washington seems to be banking on the possibility that further misery will bring masses into the streets, eventually leading to the regime’s collapse. But Cuba has a strong military, and it retains solid intelligence ties to both China and Russia. It did not hesitate to crush dissent after recent protests.

[Trump] has taken a strong personal dislike to Colombian President Gustavo Petro, whom he has accused of peddling cocaine and placed under personal sanctions.

As for Colombia, officials were deeply alarmed to hear Trump say an attack there “sounds good”. He has taken a strong personal dislike to Colombian President Gustavo Petro, whom he has accused of peddling cocaine and placed under personal sanctions. Petro has not minced words about the raid to grab Maduro, equating it to the 1937 Guernica massacre during the Spanish civil war. He has called on Colombians to take to the streets to protest Trump’s rhetoric. In part, Petro may be engaging in political theatre, as Colombia will hold elections in May, and the president – who cannot run again due to term limits – can use this opportunity to rouse support for his preferred left-wing successor, Iván Cepeda. The U.S. is likely to throw its weight behind a right-wing candidate, and risks of a confrontation would increase if Cepeda (who is leading in the polls) wins. Nonetheless, there are still guardrails against a complete collapse in relations, as U.S. officials continue to work closely with their Colombian counterparts on security and trade ties remain strong. U.S. Republican senators, in fact, orchestrated a call between Trump and Petro on the evening of 7 January, and the U.S. leader has suggested that they meet in person.

In Mexico, though President Trump has referred to the need to “do something” about drug cartels, the authorities feel less immediately exposed. President Claudia Sheinbaum has established a decent working relationship with Trump, and she has a good channel to Secretary Rubio, who has praised her government’s willingness to cooperate on security. Mexico has also imposed steep tariffs on Chinese imports to shore up its economic relations with the U.S. While “categorically” rejecting the seizure of Maduro, the Mexican government is likely to double down on this cooperation, hoping it will provide insurance against unilateral U.S. action on Mexican soil. Options could include launching joint Mexican-U.S. operations against high-value criminal targets.

Given the high level of left-right polarisation across Latin America, as well as the vulnerability of individual governments to U.S. pressure, the region is unlikely to reach a more cohesive approach to U.S. demands for a hemispheric sphere of influence. At the same time, for all the talk of further U.S. military action in Latin America, Washington’s most effective tools for shaping regional affairs remain its economic clout and its ability to influence politics by backing friendly parties. Following the success of right-wing candidates in the Honduran and Chilean elections in late 2025, the forthcoming polls in Brazil and Colombia will decide whether those key Latin American powers will continue to challenge Washington or align with it.

NATO and the EU

Outside Latin America, the raid on Venezuela has roiled Europe most profoundly. U.S. officials have drawn explicit connections between the show of force in the Caribbean and a potential takeover of Greenland from Denmark, which President Trump claims is necessary “from the standpoint of national security”. Absorbing Greenland has been a recurrent theme in Trump’s rhetoric since his first term in office (to Ottawa’s dismay, he also fixated on making NATO ally Canada part of the U.S. at the beginning of his second term). But U.S. officials have pressed the issue especially hard since the start of the new year, expressly keeping the option of military action on the table. 

U.S. words and deeds have also exacerbated broader dilemmas for European members of NATO and the European Union. Even though few have called out the U.S. directly and many loathed Maduro, Europeans generally see the U.S. operation to seize the Venezuelan president as a violation of the UN Charter, inconsistent with European governments’ attachment to international law as a matter of both values and their own security. Their alignment with Washington as it expands its sphere of influence in its near abroad coercively and without credible legal justification complicates their – already faltering – efforts to rally other countries to condemn Russia for international law violations in Ukraine. 

The Trump administration’s promotion of a “Donroe Doctrine” for the Western Hemisphere also raises twin concerns for European officials.

The Trump administration’s promotion of a “Donroe Doctrine” for the Western Hemisphere also raises twin concerns for European officials. One is that Washington will reduce not just its military footprint but also its commitments in Europe. The second is that the U.S. will recognise a Russian sphere of influence in Europe as a parallel to its own regional dominance. In a worst-case scenario, a U.S. land grab in Greenland could splinter or smash NATO – as Danish Prime Minister Mette Fredriksen warned on 5 January – and leave Europe more vulnerable to Russian designs without U.S. backing.

The Europeans’ space to voice these concerns is circumscribed by their overriding desire to keep Washington on board in resolving the Russian-Ukrainian war and underwriting a post-war peace, however weakened the value of U.S. guarantees may seem from outside the region. With a few exceptions including Spain – which joined left-leaning Latin American countries in criticising the Venezuela operation – most European governments have ducked confronting Washington over its behaviour. In a collective statement, 26 EU members (with Hungary the one absentee) noted that international law and UN Charter should be upheld “under all circumstances” and underlined the special responsibility of UN Security Council members. But they did not fault the U.S. in more explicit terms. 

As in Latin America, ideological factors have affected several individual governments’ positions: Hungary and Italy, both solid friends of the Trump administration, defended the intervention. Others, like France, tried to see both sides of the issue, with President Emmanuel Macron welcoming Maduro’s fall while Foreign Minister Jean-Nöel Barrot evinced regret at the breach of international law it involved. Türkiye, which had also enjoyed ties with Maduro’s Venezuela, generally voiced its opposition to violations of international law and warned of the dangers of instability.

While EU and NATO members have been stronger in backing Denmark over Washington’s bullying regarding Greenland, here, too, they have tended to do so in terms designed to contain blowback from Washington. European leaders are greatly distressed, of course, but they have been circumspect in expressing their worries. The foreign ministers of France, Poland and Germany have begun talks about a possible European effort to blunt Washington’s pressure, but it is not yet clear what concrete options they will consider. For the time being, at least, diplomacy will remain their focus. Not surprisingly, neighbouring Nordic and Baltic countries were quickest to express solidarity with Copenhagen, but even they avoided directly mentioning the U.S. In a joint statement on 6 January, France, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK noted that Arctic security should be “achieved collectively, in conjunction with NATO allies including the United States, by upholding the principles of the UN Charter” but made no direct reference to Washington’s threats to Denmark. 

These cautious responses to both the U.S. intervention in Venezuela and rhetoric about Greenland indicate that, for now at least, Europe’s overall approach seems likely to remain what some have called “strategic acquiescence”. European states will hold the U.S. as close as possible and preserve what can be salvaged in the transatlantic relationship, while building up their own defence capabilities. They will maintain support for Ukraine, while looking to strengthen their global political and economic relationships as a hedge against the spectre of either U.S. abandonment or outright confrontation. It is not clear at what point Washington’s allies in Europe might decide that the U.S. has become more dangerous than helpful, and that they are strong enough to shift their approach or simply have no other choice. At present, any U.S. move from talk to action on Greenland seems most likely to prove the proverbial bridge too far, with potentially huge repercussions.

Russia

Russia’s official reaction to events in Venezuela has remained muted. The Kremlin has yet to issue a statement on Maduro’s seizure, leaving the foreign ministry as the primary voice. Russian diplomats have characterised the U.S. operation as an act of armed aggression against a sovereign state and demanded the release of Maduro and his wife. Moscow has also suggested that the U.S. operation may have succeeded because someone in Maduro’s inner circle betrayed him and chose not to activate the Russian air defence systems in Venezuela’s arsenal. The foreign ministry had a measured reaction to the U.S. interdiction of the Russian-flagged tanker Marinera on 7 January. The vessel was seized on suspicion of violating Venezuela-related sanctions, notwithstanding Moscow’s appeals that the U.S. navy cease its pursuit. Russia voiced concern that Washington appears willing to stir up trouble and predicted further escalation of tensions in the Euro-Atlantic region.

Russia’s responses stand in stark contrast to its posture during the 2018-2019 Venezuelan electoral crisis. Then, roughly halfway through Trump’s first term, Moscow deployed about a hundred troops and two nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers to the country. Yet, by late 2025, amid intensifying U.S. pressure, Russia was limiting its support to supplying several air defence systems and re-registering shadow fleet tankers transporting Venezuelan oil under Russian jurisdiction. As with the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria in 2024, the Kremlin, mired in its fourth year of full-scale war in Ukraine, lacks the military and logistical capacity to prop up its friends in Caracas. Negotiations over Ukraine also influence the Kremlin’s calculations, as Russia does not want to complicate talks with Washington with symbolic actions in Latin America.

Russia sees Venezuela’s possible political shift as presenting both costs and benefits.

Russia sees Venezuela’s possible political shift as presenting both costs and benefits. On the downside, the fall of Maduro’s regime could cost Russia its principal friend in South America and reinforce perceptions of Moscow as too bogged down in its own near abroad to be a strong partner outside it. Having elevated bilateral relations to a strategic partnership, formalised in a 2025 treaty, Moscow has provided over $17 billion in economic support to Venezuela, including loans for Russian weapons purchases. In return, Russia gained stakes in oil projects, while Venezuela recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (statelets that Russia separated from Georgia in their 2008 war) and supported Russia’s operation in Ukraine. Venezuelan backing has helped maintain stability in Cuba and Nicaragua, other Russian-aligned states in Latin America. Russia also sees risks in the potential U.S. use of Venezuelan oil to lower prices. It certainly does not welcome Washington’s demands that Caracas expel Russian and Chinese advisers. 

As for possible upsides, Moscow sees Washington’s actions as a useful precedent for how it would like to assert itself in its own near abroad. For many in Russia, the U.S. raid in Caracas represents a model of rapid leadership decapitation, something Russian forces failed to achieve in Ukraine in February 2022. President Trump’s insistence on a U.S. sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere also dovetails with President Vladimir Putin’s vision of a Russian sphere of influence in former Soviet states. 

But just how much gain Russia will be able to reap from this episode remains to be seen. Just because Washington is working unabashedly to dominate its hemisphere does not mean that the U.S. will support Russia enjoying similar prerogatives in Ukraine or elsewhere on its periphery. Indeed, for Russia, the stalled Ukraine negotiations signal that Washington does not intend to give Moscow the right of way and remains committed to addressing European allies’ security concerns. Russians worry that the Caracas operation’s success will make Trump more confident about putting pressure on Putin in future negotiations. For Russian hardliners – who doubt that Washington’s desire to assert dominance is confined to its backyard – the Venezuela action additionally validates warnings about the dangers of having NATO forces near Russia’s borders and the risk that Ukraine might become a launching pad for operations against Russia. From this perspective, it becomes even more urgent for Moscow to send the U.S. a message by pushing forward on the Ukrainian battlefield. It hopes thereby to compel the U.S. and its allies to abandon support for Kyiv. 

Ukraine

The U.S. raid on Venezuela has generated mixed feelings in Ukraine. A former official plaintively asked Crisis Group, “Why can’t they do this to Russia?” President Volodymyr Zelenskyy echoed the sentiment, telling reporters, “How should we respond to this? Well, what can I say is, if you can do that with dictators, then the United States knows what to do next”. Other Ukrainians also expressed schadenfreude at the fall of a Putin client at U.S. hands, as well as the hope that it will lower the price of oil, to Russia’s economic detriment.

But Ukrainians also recognise the pitfalls of appearing to legitimise decapitation operations. They recall that Zelenskyy was similarly targeted, albeit unsuccessfully, in the early days of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion. They also understand that the breakdown of respect for international law, which they have pointed to repeatedly to rally opposition to Russia’s attack on their own country, will erode the strength of their entreaties for global support, and that Moscow may use Washington’s disregard for sovereignty to justify its own actions in Ukraine. That said, a former senior official suggested to Crisis Group that Putin has already shown he needs no such precedent, adding that Trump has merely demonstrated he is willing and able to use the same methods to which Russia has resorted. 

While it does not help Kyiv’s international profile to be aligned with a state that is doing to others at least some of what Russia is doing to Ukraine, Ukrainian officials are unlikely to distance themselves from Washington, whose support, however dwindling and uncertain, remains a lifeline for the Ukrainian war effort. This reality may explain Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha’s 3 January post on X, in which he not only refrained from criticising U.S. actions, but also emphasised Maduro’s human rights violations; underlined that Ukraine had never recognised his legitimacy; declared that Kyiv backs Venezuelans’ right to normality and security; and closed by thanking “everyone around the world who helps to protect life”.

China and Taiwan

Since the U.S. intervention in Caracas, several commentators have speculated that China could imitate the raid with a similar one on Taiwan. But Beijing is unlikely to take its cues from Washington on a matter it regards as such a core interest. 

Beijing is certainly keen to have the capacity to take Taiwan by force – it conducted military exercises simulating a blockade of Taiwan in December 2025 – but that does not mean it prefers a coercive approach to achieving its goals. Indeed, Chinese officials appear quietly confident that non-military factors are playing out in Beijing’s favour. These include political disputes in Taiwan over defence policy and the mixed signals that the U.S. government has sent through its policy toward Taiwan over the last year. On one hand, Washington snubbed Taipei a number of times, such as by reportedly denying President Lai Ching-te’s request to pass through New York on his planned trip to Latin America in August 2025. On the other hand, President Trump approved the largest-ever arms sale to Taiwan months later in December. His administration has largely supported the status quo in cross-strait dynamics, including in its National Security Strategy. While the tensions within Washington’s approach are not enough to suggest the U.S. is preparing for a “grand bargain” with China over Taiwan, they may create openings for Beijing to drive a wedge between Taipei and Washington. 

China may see opportunities arising from U.S. behaviour in Venezuela. Washington has traditionally framed its military activity ... as upholding international law.

In the longer term, China may see opportunities arising from U.S. behaviour in Venezuela. Washington has traditionally framed its military activity in the Indo-Pacific – such as freedom of navigation operations in the Taiwan Strait – as upholding international law. At a minimum, China can use the example of the Caracas operation to cast serious doubt on the U.S. commitment to a rules-based world order. Like their Russian counterparts, Chinese officials may also see it as a useful precedent as they assert the same privileges in their own neighbourhood that the U.S. claims in its own. There is also a question of resources, priorities and bandwidth: the Taiwanese opposition Kuomintang party – which favours better relations with Beijing – has argued that the U.S. focus on the Western Hemisphere means it will invest less in the Indo-Pacific, making rapprochement with the mainland authorities all the more necessary. Still, what matters most to Beijing is the actual policies that the U.S. pursues in the Indo-Pacific – and, so far, it has maintained a certain level of continuity with the past, despite increasing anxiety among its allies. 

The “Donroe Doctrine” also has downsides for China. Chinese experts are concerned that it will reduce Beijing’s economic and political influence in Latin America, which has grown to the point that China is now Brazil’s second-largest trading partner. Chinese analysts predict that Washington will use all manner of leverage – including economic tools, military pressure and information campaigns – to pressure Latin American countries to downgrade relations with China, end the use of Chinese technologies and even impose sanctions on Chinese firms operating in the region. If U.S. pressure topples Cuba’s government – even if that is something easier said than done – Beijing would lose a close intelligence partner in the Western Hemisphere. Facing such a concerted challenge, Beijing would then look for new friends among left-leaning Latin American governments, which could polarise that region even further.

The Middle East: Israel, Iran and the Gulf Arab States

Maduro’s fall is of particular significance to Israel and Iran. Venezuela has been a firm friend of Tehran, and Israel therefore sees it as an adversary. In addition to sharing an anti-U.S. posture, Caracas and Tehran have cooperated on energy issues and military technology. The U.S. and Israel have also accused Venezuela of providing a source of income to Hizbollah in Lebanon through drug smuggling and money laundering.

Israeli officials believe Trump’s willingness to act in Venezuela – and the few if any negative consequences he has faced to date – could bolster his will to act more aggressively on the Iranian front. Such hopes are widely shared: opposition leader Yair Lapid tweeted that Trump’s Venezuela move should be read by Iran’s leaders as an explicit warning to their regime. Reports in the Israeli press that Trump turned down a proposal from his negotiator Steve Witkoff for renewed talks with Tehran, in favour of raising pressure on it instead, was seen as another sign that the U.S. could again use force in Iran.

For officials in Iran, meanwhile, events in Venezuela only add to a list of headaches that has swollen since the twelve-day war with Israel and (briefly) the U.S. in June 2025. The Islamic Republic has sought to replenish its stocks of ballistic missiles as well as to bolster its non-state allies in the Middle East – which Israel has also struck. Efforts to negotiate a new nuclear agreement with the U.S. have gone nowhere. In recent weeks, a protest wave set off by a currency collapse has shaken Iranian cities and expanded into significant anti-regime unrest, with more than 60 Iranians killed since December as state forces try to contain it. Trump has warned of U.S. action if the repression intensifies. It may be bluster – and indeed, in the past this kind of interventionist talk was just the sort of thing that Trump might have disparaged, but after the Caracas operation all bets are off in trying to divine what he might do next.

The leaders in Tehran are thus in a quandary: they have long resorted to the iron first to quash nationwide unrest, most recently during the “women, life, freedom” protests of 2022. But the more they draw from that playbook, the more they will fuel the underlying political, social and economic grievances the government has repeatedly failed to address. A harder crackdown would also increase the possibility of creating a pretext for some sort of intervention from abroad – and Iranian decision-makers are likely at a loss to figure out what covert or overt options might be on the table, what the threshold for triggering them might be, and how targeted or sweeping they might be. News sources aligned with the government and Revolutionary Guards have listed reasons – from the loyalty of Iranian soldiers to the risks of Middle East conflagration – why such an effort would fail. The Islamic Republic’s Defence Council has threatened that it may “not confine itself solely to post-attack responses” if it detects signs of imminent external action. But after the U.S. airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities (which Trump repeatedly invoked in his meandering press conference following the Caracas raid) and Maduro’s seizure itself, Iranian officials can hardly be sure that Washington will not hit them again.

On the Arab side of the Gulf, reactions to the news from Venezuela were carefully measured. Much as Gulf monarchies cherish their friendship with the U.S. and are on the opposite side of the ideological spectrum from Maduro’s brand of populist socialism, Venezuela happens to be a fellow OPEC member. Bald statements by U.S. officials about targeting a petro-state to take its oil do not go down well in the Gulf. While countries such as Saudi Arabia have relied on U.S. military protection, they also rely on the maintenance of a rules-based international order that the U.S. now appears to be subverting. They appear to be holding back criticism as a nod to the former, but it is surely not a comfortable posture. One state that might have a role to play is Qatar, which has mediated between the U.S. and Venezuela in the past and is keeping its channels open to both countries now.

Africa

In Africa, the U.S. use of force in Venezuela and – perhaps even more so – its rhetoric about Greenland may further weaken respect for a post-colonial convention that binds states to oppose unilateral military intervention. It was already looking frail. Ethiopia has threatened to gain access to the Red Sea by seizing territory lost following Eritrea’s 1993 independence, while Rwanda has sponsored militias – and sent some 4,000 of its own troops – to grab control of swathes of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. If the U.S. were to succeed in acquiring Greenland by military or other coercive means, it would be a signal to African governments that the international legal prohibition of such land grabs is more or less null and void. More conflict on the continent could ensue.

African governments’ public responses to events in Venezuela have been broadly negative. South Africa, widely seen as Africa’s most prominent proponent of Global South solidarity, condemned the raid and demanded that President Maduro and his wife be released. Pretoria’s swift denunciation came despite its efforts to improve its strained trade and diplomatic ties with Washington. Ghana, which has had good relations with the U.S. for decades, issued a similar call

Both the African Union and the West African organisation ECOWAS released statements immediately after the intervention calling for restraint and respect for Venezuela’s territorial integrity. As in Europe, the groups did not call out the U.S. directly, but after a period in which African leaders have been generally wary of confronting the U.S. on issues such as tariffs, this message was relatively strong. 

By contrast, Nigeria, while aligning itself with the ECOWAS position, did not issue a statement in the days after the raid. Abuja’s caution likely reflects its desire to maintain good relations with Washington after the Trump administration, with less than enthusiastic cooperation from the Nigerian government, launched a volley of missiles at jihadists in the north of the country in December 2025. The U.S. said the strikes were intended to protect Christians it says are being systematically targeted by Islamist militants. (In reality, both Muslims and Christians have fallen victim to decades of militant violence in Nigeria’s north.) The government’s low-key stance on the Caracas operation was vocally criticised by the opposition and Nigerians on social media. But Abuja is probably loath to draw attention to itself with outspoken criticism, hoping that the U.S. will refrain from further intervention in Nigeria.

Many African opinion-makers outside government have condemned the U.S. action – with a former Nigerian foreign minister portraying it as “piracy” – and a wave of anti-U.S. commentary has washed over African social media. A video in which a Kenyan professor said events in Venezuela signalled the advent of an updated form of colonisation and sounded the death knell for international law drew tens of thousands of views.

Conclusion

While the U.S. has faced no shortage of criticism for its action in Venezuela, this brief global survey also shows that many countries have pulled their punches – or offset their condemnations of Washington by signalling desire to maintain diplomatic ties and avoid upsetting critical security and economic partnerships. At first blush, the Trump administration may view the mealy-mouthed international reaction to its intervention as proving its thesis that the U.S. has the raw power to ignore international law and norms at no real political price. 

But sometimes costs only become clear over time. In this case, the U.S. risks overreaching by sending signals that it is an unpredictable partner. While its tactical success in capturing Maduro is undeniable, previous U.S. foreign interventions have started favourably to Washington and turned sour over subsequent months and years, to the detriment of U.S. credibility. Already, it is evident that the Caracas operation has done further damage to the creaky structures of international law and diplomacy. That is of no concern to an administration that sees these things as useless encumbrances on U.S. power. But the more harm it does to ordering principles other than deference to force and strength, the more Washington may find that it is on a path to chaos, not security.