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European Power
Trump’s culture war on Europe is far from over
While unpopular in Europe, Trump’s new penchant for waging war could still help his ideological allies across the continent
Pawel Zerka @pawelzerka.bsky.social on Bluesky
Senior policy fellow
Commentary 23 January 2026 3 minute read
US President Trump at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 22, 2026Image bypicture alliance/KEYSTONE | LAURENT GILLIERON ©
In the last year, Trumpists have waged a culture war across Europe. From J.D. Vance’s Munich speech to the America’s 2025 National Security Strategy, Trump and his team have promoted a narrative according to which Europe has departed from a common transatlantic cultural heritage and is at a risk of “civilisational erasure”. They have not shied away from overtly supporting the far-right—including Alternative for Germany (AfD), France’s National Rally, and presidential candidates in Poland and Romania. They have also used every possible occasion (which European leaders generously provided) to humiliate the EU, further undermining the bloc’s allure and self-confidence.
But in the past month, the US president has developed a gusto for waging wars: striking Islamic State militants in northwest Nigeria; abducting the Venezuelan autocrat, Nicolas Maduro; threatening Iran with air strikes; and, for a time, implying that America could invade and occupy Greenland, a Danish territory.
For all this flirtation with real war, Trump has no intention of laying down arms in the culture war. America’s military revival will not harm his ideological charm offensive; it is more likely to reinforce it.
The threat of annexing Greenland no doubt proved unpopular in Europe. This emboldened mainstream leaders (see Polish prime minister Donald Tusk or German chancellor Friedrich Merz) to be more assertive vis-à-vis the US president than they previously had dared.
It also put Trump’s ideological allies in a hard place. Several of them chose to evade the matter altogether. Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni said she did not believe the US would attack Greenland; and Poland’s president Karol Nawrocki limited himself to acknowledging that Greenland was a strategically important location, requiring “extensive discussions within the framework of a partnership”.
But some far-right leaders could not domestically afford to look as if they approved of such an overt violation of national—and European—sovereignty. Jordan Bardella, the leader of National Rally, first slammed Trump’s “imperial ambitions” in Greenland and Venezuela. Then, when Washington threatened France with tariffs over its support of Denmark, the French politician pressured the EU to push back against America in a flamboyant speech that could just as well be delivered by his rival, President Emmanuel Macron.
Meanwhile, Alice Weidel, one of AfD’s co-leaders, said “Donald Trump has violated a fundamental campaign promise—namely, not to interfere in other countries”. Trump’s threats over Greenland were also criticised by Nigel Farage, leader of the far-right Reform UK party.
Even if the events of January 2026 were to add to Trump’s unpopularity across Europe, his warmongering could still help his ideological allies. A successful culture war does not require Trump sycophancy
And yet, even if the events of January 2026 were to add to Trump’s unpopularity across Europe, his warmongering could still help his ideological allies. A successful culture war does not require Trump sycophancy. And, whatever the big global events of the moment, American and European MAGA are closing ranks at the operational level.
First, a joint enemy of the American and European culture warriors is a more united EU and its political mainstream. On that front, the past few days and weeks likely reinforced the public impression of the EU’s vulnerability and its leaders’ meekness. Just ahead of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Macron and Marc Rutte, the NATO secretary general, approached Trump with humiliating submissiveness—which the US president eagerly exposed on social media. (This even drove Gavin Newsom, the Democrat Governor of California, to joke that he “should’ve brought knee pads for world leaders”).
The jury is still out as to how the Greenland debacle will be remembered by the European public. Trump currently seems to have backtracked, but who knows for how long. Still, far-right leaders in France, Germany and Britain are unlikely to lose points because of January’s events. They demonstrated a timely criticism of the US president while most mainstream leaders, and the EU itself, generally failed to display an image of strength, unity and assertiveness. They risk lowering their guard if they convince themselves it was solely their support for Denmark—rather than the markets, US domestic politics or Trump’s own confusing tactics—that has caused the US president to back down.
And then comes the question of Venezuela. The political future of the country remains highly uncertain; for the moment, Maduro has simply been replaced by his deputy from within the Chavist regime. But should there be any sort of a democratic transition in Caracas in the months to come—and should the side-lining of Maduro help Washington bring about the collapse of the communist regime in Cuba (as appears to be Marco Rubio’s plan)—Trumpists would surely celebrate it as a victory against the communist Internationale. It would delight many right-wingers not just in the Americas but also in Europe (especially Spain) who have already reacted gleefully to the capture of Maduro.
Besides, with Maduro in American jail, Trump might be able to strengthen the position of his favourites in Latin America, including in Brazil and Colombia where presidential elections are due later this year. That could temporarily shift the front of Washington’s culture war from Europe to Latin America. (Not fully, though, because in April there’s a vital election in Hungary, MAGA’s European bastion, which Trumpists will not neglect.) But then, should Brazil and Colombia move to the radical right, as has already happened in Chile and Argentina, that would start to look like an unstoppable global wind of change, which the European far-right would also benefit from. Many of its pivotal elections (including in France, Italy, Poland and Spain) are scheduled for next year. Even if this, in the times of Trump, sounds like light years ahead, it is dangerously close.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
Author
Pawel Zerka @pawelzerka.bsky.social on Bluesky
Senior policy fellow
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