CHATHAM HOUSE With Trump’s inauguration, the EU and Turkey must finally get serious about security cooperation Trump’s commitment to NATO is questionable. The EU cannot hope to deter Russia effectively without closer cooperation with Ankara. Expert comment Published 6 January 2025 4 minute READ Galip Dalay

CHATHAM  HOUSE 

With Trump’s inauguration, the EU and Turkey must finally get serious about security cooperation

Trump’s commitment to NATO is questionable. The EU cannot hope to deter Russia effectively without closer cooperation with Ankara.

Expert comment

Published 6 January 2025 4 minute READ

Galip Dalay

Senior Consulting Fellow, Turkey Initiative, Middle East and North Africa Programme

With Donald Trump’s forthcoming inauguration, the question of the future of the European security order has become more pressing – and so has the need for clarity about Turkey’s place and role within that order. In this respect, Trump’s return might provide much needed impetus for the European Union (EU) and Turkey to finally engage in more serious dialogues on European security and on broader foreign and security policy cooperation.

Europe’s security environment has undergone a radical transformation in recent years. After the Ukraine war, the once prevalent idea of a security order that included Russia has been replaced by one that places Moscow firmly in the adversary camp. Similarly, the Gaza war, and the downfall of Syria’s Assad regime have fundamentally changed the geopolitics of the European neighbourhood, both in the East and South. 

Such changes necessitate a fresh approach that treats European security in the broader sense, bridging the gap between EU and non-EU European NATO member states. A structured foreign and security dialogue between Turkey, the UK, Norway and the EU is essential. Going forward, this dialogue should also aim to include non-EU and non-NATO European states such as Ukraine.

For European security, Russia remains the most immediate threat, and Europe cannot afford to have a security order that is set against Moscow and excludes Turkey simultaneously. The Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and Middle East are not separate zones in Russian-Western confrontation. Rather, they are largely a single space. And Turkey straddles all these regions.

Positive steps

At the strategic level, there have recently been some positive steps in Turkey–European relations. In October, Berlin approved a large-scale package of arms exports to Ankara, including materials for the modernization of Turkish submarines and frigates. 

In August the EU invited Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to the Gymnich meeting…illustrating an atmospheric change in relations.

In November, after a long delay, Berlin also finally removed its veto against the sale of Eurofighter jets to Turkey. Likewise, de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean and recent improvements in Turkish–Greek relations have provided a more conducive environment for foreign and security policy dialogue.

The Eastern Mediterranean crisis had become arguably the thorniest foreign policy issue between the EU and Turkey, pitting Ankara against Athens, Nicosia and Paris. But relations have steadily improved, and in August the EU invited Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to the Gymnich meeting – an informal gathering of the EU foreign ministers held every six months – illustrating an atmospheric change in relations.

Russia relations

Despite these relatively positive developments, major issues remain that might test and potentially prevent any meaningful foreign and security policy dialogue. 

First is how the EU and Turkey approach great power competition, not least Russia and China. For Europe, Russia is a more immediate and pressing concern, not least when it comes to the Ukraine war.

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In recent years, Ankara and Moscow have simultaneously forged closer relations and competed intensely. The two have recently been on opposing sides in four geopolitical contests – in Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine. In Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey gained the upper hand. It has done so again in Syria following the downfall of Assad, whose main backers were Russia and Iran.

When Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Turkey closed its straits to warships, reducing Russia’s ability to rotate assets between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. 

Turkey was also among the first countries to provide military equipment to Kyiv, including armed drones. Later it delivered two corvettes for the Ukrainian navy. In contrast, many European states (setting aside countries such as Poland) were initially hesitant to provide heavy weapons to Ukraine.

At the same time, Ankara has not joined Western sanctions on Russia and advocated for a diplomatic solution to the war early on (though its efforts to broker a peace have not borne results). European countries are far more critical of a deal with Russia. 

The essence of Turkish–Russian relations is, therefore, competitive, if not adversarial, which does not exclude cooperation.

But at a time when there is a real prospect for a divergence between the US and Europe towards Russia and the Ukraine war, dialogue and cooperation between Turkey, Europe, and the UK is more vital than ever.

Turkey is a major player in almost all main theatres where Russia challenges European security, be it in the Black Sea, Western Balkans, or the Eastern Mediterranean. The fall of Assad has thrown the future of Russia’s Tartus Syrian naval base into question. That, combined with Turkey’s restrictions on Straits traffic, means Russia’s Eastern Mediterranean position looks more precarious. Now would therefore seem the moment for greater cooperation with Turkey to improve Europe’s security on its southeastern flank.

Other security issues

On China, Turkey and European policies are not fundamentally dissimilar. Division within the EU has prevented the formulation of a unified policy and many European states do not see China as posing a direct threat to their interests. Both the EU and Turkey are likely to experience troubles with the Trump administration, as neither is willing to be on confrontational terms with China as much as Trump would like them to be. The China issue is therefore unlikely to drive a wedge between Ankara and Europe anytime soon. 

Another important question is whether Turkey and Europe will cooperate or compete in their shared neighbourhood. Over the last decade, both sides saw each other more as rivals than partners, largely due to tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. With improving relations and now the imperative of an orderly political transition in Syria, both sides need to explore ways to be more collaborative in their shared neighbourhood.

When Turkey, the EU or UK talk about…the neighbourhood, they should have a broader view of the term that includes the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and Middle East, but also the South Caucasus, Central Asia and Africa.

However, the idea of the neighbourhood should not be solely informed by geographic proximity. Rather, it should be informed by the logic of great power rivalry. This means that when Turkey, the EU or UK talk about dialogue and security cooperation in the neighbourhood, they should have a broader view of the term that includes the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and Middle East, but also the South Caucasus, Central Asia and Africa.

These are areas where Turkey plays a major role. But they are also regions with implications for European security and where both Russia and China have a significant presence. How the EU, or the West in general, position themselves in the regional politics of the non-Western world will have major implications. Regional powers’ understanding of the global competition is informed by their regional realities. For them, the regional unit represents the microcosm of the global-level contest. 

Fidan’s participation in the latest Gymnich meeting should gain a more regular character, to create a better dialogue between the EU and Turkey on foreign and security policy. Turkey is unlikely to align itself with the EU’s foreign policy choices if it is not in the room when these choices are made.

Being in the room does not guarantee alignment – both sides have different geopolitical priorities and interests. But attendance at the Gymnich meetings should be the first step towards a more structured foreign and security policy dialogue – providing reassurance for both parties as the Trump administration begins, bringing with it considerable uncertainties.