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AVİM - KİTAP TANITIMI: İTALYAN KAYNAKLARINA GÖRE ANADOLU’DA YUNAN MEZALİMİ (1919-1922) - Mevlüt ÇELEBİ

 KİTAP TANITIMI: İTALYAN KAYNAKLARINA GÖRE ANADOLU’DA YUNAN MEZALİMİ (1919-1922) - Mevlüt ÇELEBİ

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19.09.2024


Yazar: Mevlüt ÇELEBİ

Başlık: İtalyan Kaynaklarına Göre Anadolu’da Yunan Mezalimi (1919-1922)

Yayınevi: Langen, Manzara Verlag

ISBN: 978-3-911130-01-1

Dil: Türkçe

Sayfa Sayısı: 286

Kitabın Tanımını Kaleme Alan: Hazel ÇAĞAN ELBİR, AVİM Analisti

 

Mevlüt Çelebi tarafından yazılan “İtalyan Kaynaklarına Göre Anadolu’da Yunan Mezalimi (1919-1922)” başlıklı çalışma konu üzerine yapılmış en değerli çalışmalardan birisi olarak yerini alacaktır. Kitap büyük bir çoğunluğunu İtalyan arşiv belgelerinin ve dönemin İtalyan gazetelerinin olaylar üzerinde yaptığı yayınların oluşturduğu oldukça zengin ve orijinal kaynaklar temel alınarak hazırlanmıştır ve bu konu ile ilgili literatürde mevcut olan çok önemli bir boşluğu doldurmaktadır.

Kitabın ana omurgasını oluşturan arşiv malzemeleri İtalyan Dışişleri Bakanlığı Diplomasi Tarihi Arşivi (İt. Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri) ile İtalyan Kara Kuvvetleri Kurmay Başkanlığı Tarih Arşivi’nden (İt. Archivio dell'Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito) elde edilmiştir. Bunlara ek olarak, 14 farklı İtalyan gazetesinin döneme ait yayınları da etraflı şekilde incelenmiş ve okuyuculara sunulmuştur. Arşiv belgeleri ile gazete haberlerine ek olarak, bazı İtalyan ressamların Yunan katliamlarını resmeden çizimleri de kitapta yer almaktadır. 

Kullanılan belge ve gazete haberlerinin neredeyse tamamı ilk defa bu çalışma kapsamında gün yüzüne çıkarılmıştır. Kitabın orijinalliği ve sunduğu yeni bilgilerden dolayı hem Kurtuluş Savaşı tarihi hem de Türk-Yunan ilişkileri ile Türk-İtalyan ilişkileri tarihi açısından son derece önemli bir eser olduğunun altı tekrar çizilmelidir.

Kitap, giriş ve sonuç bölümlerine ek olarak 4 ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölüm, “İzmir’in İşgalinde Yunan Katliamı;” ikinci bölüm, “1919’da Diğer Yunan Katliamları;” üçüncü bölüm, “1920 ve 1921 Yıllarında Yunan Mezalimi;” ve dördüncü bölüm ise “1922’de Yunan Mezalimi” başlığını taşımaktadır.

Birinci bölümde yazar Mevlüt Çelebi, Yunan ordusunun Mayıs 1919’da İzmir’e çıkarak başlattığı Batı Anadolu işgalinin başlangıcını anlatmaktadır. İzmir’in işgalinin hemen ilk saatlerinde Yunan Ordusu tarafından başlatılan ve yerel Rum ahalinin de katıldığı Türk katliamı detaylı bir şekilde resmedilmektedir. Kitabın bu bölümü, İtalyan diplomatların, İzmir limanında bulunan İtalyan savaş gemilerindeki subayların, İzmir’de bulunan istihbarat subayları gibi askerlerin ve basın mensuplarının konuya dair yazmış oldukları raporları etraflıca ele almaktadır. 

Bu doğrultuda, İtalya’nın İzmir’deki istihbarat dairesinde görevli subayı Giuseppe Fauda, konu üzerine kaleme aldığı raporunda şiddet olaylarının “ajan provokatörler” tarafından ateş açılması suretiyle başladığını belirtmekte, bunun hemen ardından da “Yunanlılar, Türk halkına ve kışlalara tüfek ateşi ve makineli tüfeklerle şiddetli bir şekilde karşılık verirken, Türkler tepki vermedi… Yunanlıların bugün hala sürdürmekte oldukları şiddet, yağma, toplu tutuklama ve sürgün eylemlerini meşrulaştırmak için bu kanlı olayları kışkırttıkları genel kanaattir” (s.40-41) diye yazmaktadır. 

İtalyan basınında çıkan haberlerde ise, yaşanan vahşette İtalyanların suçu olmadığı ve bu olayların sorumlusunun Yunanistan ve başta İngiltere olmak üzere diğer müttefik devletler olduğu vurgulanmaktaydı. İtalyan gazeteci Francesco Bianco, La Tribuna gazetesi için kaleme aldığı “İzmir’in Ölümü” başlıklı makalesinde “İtalyan milleti bu vahşete ve provokasyona suç ortağı olmadı” (s.62) demekteydi. Daha sonraları, İtalyan siyasetçi ve gazeteci Ernesto Vassalo da bölgeye gelerek yaşanan gelişmeler ve katliamlar hakkında detaylı yazılar yazmış ve Yunanlıların karaya çıkışından sonra yaşananları “Türk Avı” olarak nitelendirmiştir (s.68-75). 

Bu bölümde yine ayrıca annesi Yunan olan İtalyan ressam Vittorio Pisani’nin Yunan ordusunun yaptığı katliamları resmeden 6 adet tablosuna da yer verilmiştir. Bu tablolar sırasıyla şu başlıkları taşımaktadır:

I) Karaya çıkan Yunan askerinin sivil Türk halkına saldırısı.

II) Konak meydanında Yunan askerinin sivil Türklere saldırısı.

III) Bir Türk evinin yağmalanması.

IV) Bir Türk Köyünde Yunan vahşeti.

V) Yunan işgali nedeniyle göç etmek zorunda kalan Türkler.

VI) Hilaliahmer’in [Kızılay’ın] camii avlusuna sığınan göçmenlere yardımı (s.79-87).

İkinci bölümde yazar, Yunan işgali sonrasında 1919 senesinde İzmir dışında yaşanan katliam ve göçleri ele almaktadır. İzmir’dekine benzer şekilde Manisa, Aydın, Menemen ve diğer bölgelerde büyük çaplı katliamlar yaşanmıştır. Kuşkusuz bunların ardında katliamlar ve gerçekleşen toplu göçler yoluyla bölgedeki Türklerin nüfusunu azaltma amacı yatmaktaydı. Bu katliam ve baskıların sonucunda hem İtalyan işgâl bölgesi olan Akdeniz bölgesine hem de Yunan işgal bölgesinin ötesinde kalan diğer bölgelere toplu göçler yaşanmıştır. Yunanlılar tarafından gerçekleştirilen katliam ve etnik temizlik eylemlerinin duyulması ve yer yer dış basında yankılanması müttefik devletler nezdinde de mahcubiyet yaratmış ve İngiltere’nin itiraz ve ayak sürümelerine rağmen çeşitli tahkikat komisyonlarına konu olmuştur. Bu komisyonlar için hazırlanan raporlarda İtalyan ve Amerikan temsilcileri Yunan mezalimini doğrulayan ve bunlara ışık tutan raporlar yazmaya devam etmiştir. 

Üçüncü bölümde, Yunan ordusu ve yerel Rum ahali tarafından 1920 ve 1921 yıllarında yapılan insanlık dışı eylemler ele alınmaktadır. Bu dönemde Yunan işgal bölgesinin genişlemiş olmasının bir sonucu olarak, Yunanlılar tarafından yapılan mezalimler neredeyse bütün Batı Anadolu, Güney ve Doğu Marmara bölgelerini kapsamaktaydı. Bu nedenle Ege bölgesine ek olarak, artık Bursa, Gemlik, Yalova ve İzmit’teki Türk nüfusu da katliam ve etnik temizliğin hedefi haline gelmişti. Salihli’de bulunan İtalyan Binbaşı Carossini yazdığı bir raporda “…Yunan birliklerinin işgâl altındaki köylerde kadın ve çocukları katlettiği ve çok sayıda şekli bozulmuş cesedin dağda gömülmeden kaldığı anlaşılıyor” diye yazmaktaydı (s. 170). 

Yunan ordusu ayrıca askeri gerekçelerle ne zaman ilerleme ya da geri çekilme harekatları gerçekleştirse, güzergahlarında üzerinde bulunan Türk köylerini devamlı olarak yakmaktaydı. İtalyan subayı Yüzbaşı Salvatore Mauceri, Söke’deki Anadolu İtalyan Seferi Kuvvetler Komutanlığı’na hitaben Eylül 1921’de yazdığı bir raporda Yunan ordusu için “geri çekilirken her yeri harap etmesi Anadolu’daki Yunan ordusunun başkomutanlığının programıydı ve hala da öyle. Bu durum [Yunan] esirler tarafından da doğrulanıyor” (s. 191) demekteydi. İtalyan temsilcileri zaman zaman bizzat yaptıkları tahkikatlar ve zaman zaman da katliamlardan kaçıp kurtulmayı başaranlarla yaptıkları mülâkatlar neticesinde, katliamlara dair çok sayıda rapor hazırlamaktaydı. İtalyanları etkileyen bir başka önemli olay ise, işgal edilip yakılan bölgelerden kaçmak zorunda kalan köylülerin vahşete dair anlattıklarıdır. Dehşete içindeki kadın ve çocuklardan oluşan mülteciler, 15 köyün yakılıp yıkıldığını ve çocuklar diri diri yakılırken, Yunan askerlerinin güldüğünü anlatmışlardır. Bu vahim olay üzerine, İtalyan Dışişleri Bakanlığı Paris ve Londra’daki İtalyan temsilciliklerine bir yazı göndermiş ve yaşanan vahşeti engellemeye çalışmıştır (s.195-196). 

1922 yılındaki katliamların ele alındığı dördüncü bölümde yazar, özellikle Sakarya Meydan Muharebesi sonrasında artık Yunan ordusunun savunma pozisyonuna geçmesiyle yaşanan katliam ve yıkımın farklı bir boyut kazandığına dikkat çekmektedir. Artık, Yunanlılar için savaşı kaybetme ihtimaline karşı mümkün olduğunca çok tahribat yaratmak ve bölge nüfusunu azaltmak öncelikli bir hedef haline gelmiştir. İtalya’nın İzmir Konsolosu Carlo Senni, Mart 1922’de Roma’ya yazdığı bir raporda, “Güvenilir tanıklar, Yunan özel kuvvetlerinin iç kesimlerdeki Türk köylerinde gerçekleştirdiği sistematik yıkımı ve vahşi katliamları ortaya koyuyor. İki hafta önce, kadınlar ve çocuklar da dahil olmak üzere Karatepe köyünün tüm halkı bir camiye kapatılarak ateşe verilmişti” diye yazmıştır (s. 211).

Kitabın en önemli katkılarından biri de, Eylül 1922’de İzmir’in işgâlden kurtarılması sırasında gerçekleşen "İzmir Yangını" üzerine ortaya çıkarılan görüş ve bulgulardır. İtalyan Konsolosu Senni’nin 29 Eylül 1922’de konu üzerine yazdığı rapor, yangının sorumluları hakkında şüpheye yer vermeyecek derecede açıktır: “Yunanlıların İzmir’i Türklere bırakmadan önce ateşe vereceği tehdidi giderek ciddileşti ve kesinleşti. Polis karakollarında ve Rum kiliselerinde büyük miktarda yanıcı madde toplandı. Dolayısıyla şehrin yok edilmesi, [Yunan] yetkililer ve Mikro-Asya Savunma Komitesi liderleri tarafından önceden belirlenmiş bir plana yanıt vermiş gibi görünüyordu. Artık Ermenilerin kendilerini umutsuzluk ve nefret dolu bir eyleme yönelttiklerine ikna olmayan kimse kalmadı” (s. 250). Yangın sonrasında Amerikan misyonerleri hedef saptırıp Türkleri suçlamaya çalışsa da, İtalyan gazeteleri olayı çok boyutlu bir şekilde ele alarak olaylarda Yunan ajanların kışkırtmasına dikkat çekmiştir (s.251-54). 

Sonuç bölümünde Yunan işgâli döneminde yapılan katliamların ve yaşanan tahribatın genel bir bilançosu sunulmaktadır. Buradaki en ilginç belgelerden biri de İtalyanlar tarafından hazırlanan ve Türklerin uğradığı maddi zararları gösteren tablodur. Tablo’da zarara uğrayan yaklaşık 80 Türk’ün isimleri, memleketleri ve meslekleri ve uğradıkları kayıpların meblağı belirtilmektedir. Sadece bu 80 kişinin zararlarının toplamı 1 milyon liranın üzerindedir (s.264-268). Kuşkusuz, yaşanan olaylarda zarara uğrayanların sayısı 80 kişinin çok çok üstündeydi ancak oldukça dar bir bölgede yaşanan zarara ışık tutması bakımından bu belge yine de son derece önemlidir. 

Mevlüt Çelebi tarafından yazılan “İtalyan Kaynaklarına Göre Anadolu’da Yunan Mezalimi (1919-1922)” başlıklı çalışma, ortaya çıkardığı yeni bilgi ve belgelerden ötürü ve Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı tarihi ve Anadolu’da Yunanlılar tarafından gerçekleştirilen katliamlara dair daha önce hiç bilinmeyen kaynakları gün yüzüne çıkarması dolayısıyla son derece önemli bir çalışmadır. Çelebi’nin kitabı, Kurtuluş Savaşı, Türk-Yunan İlişkileri ve Türk-İtalyan ilişkileri tarihini ele alan çalışmalar için uzun yıllar temel referans noktası olarak kullanılabilecek değerde bir eserdir.

The Washington Post Breaking News - Sept. 20, 2024 - Death toll rises to 14 in Beirut airstrike

 

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BROOKINGS Commentary Will the ICC issue arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Sinwar? Warrants don’t always result in arrests but they still matter. Kelebogile Zvobgo September 9, 2024

BROOKINGS

Commentary

Will the ICC issue arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Sinwar?

Warrants don’t always result in arrests but they still matter.

Kelebogile Zvobgo

September 9, 2024


In May 20, International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan applied for arrest warrants for five atrocity crimes suspects in the Israel-Hamas war. They include Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant, and Hamas’s leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar. Israel reportedly killed two other Hamas leaders whom Khan had charged—Mohammed Deif, in an airstrike in Gaza, and Ismail Haniyeh, in a bombing in Iran, both in July. Hamas and Israel have denounced the request for warrants.


Khan’Is application is based on evidence collected since the October 7 terrorist attacks—when Hamas massacred about 1,200 Israelis and took 250 others hostage—and the start of Israel’s retaliatory military action in Gaza. More than 40,000 Palestinians have been killed since then, with hundreds of thousands of others displaced and facing starvation.


The investigation spans a decade, beginning in 2015 when the State of Palestine accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction over atrocity crimes (e.g., war crimes and crimes against humanity) in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) from June 13, 2014, onward. The State of Palestine, officially represented by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), has been a “nonmember observer state” at the United Nations since 2012. This designation allows Palestine to join treaties like the ICC’s Rome Statute. There are two rival governments in Palestine: the Palestinian Authority (PA)—which speaks for the PLO, governs the West Bank, and initiated the ICC probe—and Hamas in Gaza. Hamas was briefly a part of the PA, after its 2006 general election win in Gaza and the West Bank, but splintered off when Fatah, a rival faction, refused to recognize the election results.


Because Hamas militants are ICC member nationals, they are liable for prosecution for atrocities committed in either Israel or Palestine; Israeli personnel, as nonmember nationals, are only liable for atrocities committed in Palestine.


Whether or not they ultimately lead to arrests, warrants matter, and Hamas’s and Israel’s allies shouldn’t attack the ICC for its findings. Doing so undermines international law and jeopardizes international justice for Israeli and Palestinian victims of atrocity crimes.


What are the allegations?

Khan’s filing asserts that Sinwar and Deif are criminally responsible for atrocities including murder, hostage taking, torture, and sexual violence since at least October 7, while Netanyahu and Gallant are criminally responsible for civilian targeting, wilful killing, and using the starvation of civilians as a weapon of war, among other crimes in Gaza since at least October 8. The “at least” language is important: Khan is focused on the current war, but he is also examining a broader range of abuses (potentially including genocide by Hamas and/or Israel) over a longer time frame. The U.S. Department of Justice has separately filed criminal charges against Hamas leaders.


Are the judges taking a long time?

There is no set time for ICC judges to deliberate, but they are taking longer in this case than they did with the last high-profile arrest warrants. In 2023, the judges took just three weeks to grant warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and one of his deputies for the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia.


The judges may be taking more time for several reasons, including the number of perpetrators and violations, and the many amicus curiae observations (or briefs filed by outside advocates) that states and other groups have submitted for consideration. The judges also may want to decide on all the warrants before making an announcement. Consider this hypothetical: if the judges issue warrants for Hamas leaders first and do so for Israeli leaders at a later date, they could face two types of backlash—first, for appearing to be biased against Palestinians and, second, for seeming to capitulate to pressure to include Israelis. There will be backlash no matter what, but backlash on one front seems better than backlash on two fronts.


Do arrest warrants matter?

Judges can take months to issue warrants but they almost always accept the prosecutor’s requests (at least those we know about—some requests are made under seal). Warrants don’t always result in arrests, to be sure—but they still matter. They hold symbolic value, marking the accused as international pariahs and acknowledging victims’ suffering. Just the possibility of warrants makes it harder for allies to continue lending military and diplomatic aid. Foreign governments, like the U.K., have in recent weeks withdrawn aid they think Israel could use to violate international law.


Warrants also mean ICC members—124 countries—have a legal obligation to arrest suspects who enter their territory (per Article 59 of the Rome Statute) and to cooperate with court proceedings (per Article 86). But countries don’t always comply.


For example, South Africa failed to arrest former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir during a 2015 African Union summit in Johannesburg. But in 2023, President Cyril Ramaphosa agreed to not have Putin attend a BRICS summit in Johannesburg. Putin had threatened to declare war if Ramaphosa’s government tried to arrest him, but ultimately, the two leaders avoided a standoff.


Putin has traveled little outside Russia since the arrest warrant and only to ICC nonmembers like China, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan—until recently. ICC member Mongolia has drawn global criticism, including from the United States, for welcoming Putin to Ulaanbaatar on September 3.


What happens after arrest warrants are issued?

If warrants are issued, Hamas and Israeli leaders could dodge the court, like 20 other current defendants. They could also be arrested if they visit an ICC member country. Alternatively, they could surrender themselves, as did Uganda’s Dominic Ongwen (now in prison for atrocities he committed as a brigade commander in the Lord’s Resistance Army) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Bosco Ntaganda (now in prison for atrocities he committed as a leader of the Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo).


At this point, remaining at large (scenario one) seems most likely. To be arrested by an ICC member country (scenario two), Israeli and Hamas leaders would first have to travel there. Only if the suspects were likely to face worse punishment at home would they consider voluntarily surrendering (scenario three).


The blowback 

Israeli officials, U.S. President Joe Biden, and others have challenged what they see as a false moral equivalence in the charges against both Hamas and Israeli leaders. But the prosecutor’s job isn’t to make moral judgments; it’s to apply the law. This isn’t to say that the prosecutor isn’t political or doesn’t act strategically. For instance, the prosecutor’s office has in the past been accused of targeting offenders in African countries, ostensibly because the prosecutions seemed easier to conduct. (These claims are contested, however, even in Africa.) What matters most is that, within each country investigation, the prosecutor is even-handed.


Hamas enacted unspeakable violence on October 7 and militants should be held criminally accountable. But this doesn’t give Israel a blank check to commit atrocities to secure itself and bring the hostages home. Israeli personnel should also be held accountable.


Some commentators assert that warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant will make peace harder to achieve but others challenge the “peace versus justice” assumption underlying such claims. The ICC can make negotiations more complicated, but it doesn’t necessarily make negotiations less productive. Other commentators have proposed that the arrest warrant request could help end the war and encourage Israelis to oust Netanyahu’s government, which is very unpopular.


However, the Israeli government isn’t going down without a fight and has threatened to punish Palestinians if the ICC issues warrants. The United States has similarly threatened to withhold aid to Palestinians. But as international law expert Mark Kersten argues,


“There is no moral, legal or political justification for Israel’s allies punishing civilians for an investigation by the only credible, impartial and independent court investigating atrocities against Palestinian and Israeli victims of atrocity crimes.”


During his announcement, Khan made an oblique reference to attempted interference in his investigation and threatened legal action under Article 70 of the Rome Statute, which provides for fines and up to five years imprisonment for individuals who obstruct justice.


A week later, The Guardian reported that Israel has “deployed its intelligence agencies to surveil, hack, pressure, smear and allegedly threaten senior ICC staff in an effort to derail the court’s inquiries”—likely the actions Khan was referencing, though an Israeli spokesperson denied the allegations.


This wouldn’t be the first—or likely the last—time the ICC has faced intimidation. During the Trump administration, the United States levied sanctions against court officials, and it could do so again. Some lawmakers have warned, “Target Israel and we will target you.” But others have spoken out against such threats, including the White House.


Still, Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken have called Khan’s actions “outrageous” and “shameful,” reinforcing the idea that the system is unfair. Israeli officials have gone a step further, accusing the ICC of antisemitic bias, echoing prior allegations of an anti-African bias.


These attacks are intended to undermine the ICC’s credibility and effectiveness—and they shouldn’t continue or be allowed to succeed. Opponents can instead offer legal arguments and evidence to challenge the court’s determinations. States that value the rule of law should make their case using the law—not ad hominem attacks, intimidation, or obstruction.


Author

Zvobgo

Kelebogile Zvobgo

Visiting Fellow - Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology


BROOKINGS - Commentary NATO is on the ballot in 2024 The treaty organization serves US interests, yet its fate hangs on the 2024 election. James Goldgeier and Elizabeth N. Saunders June 26, 2024

 BROOKINGS

Commentary

NATO is on the ballot in 2024

The treaty organization serves US interests, yet its fate hangs on the 2024 election.

James Goldgeier and Elizabeth N. Saunders

June 26, 2024


The second half of 2024 is shaping up to be an anxious time for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the U.S.-led alliance bloc that comprises 32 member states across North America and Europe and exists to help protect each other from external threats. The Russian military continues to ravage Ukraine and menace the alliance’s doorstep, while Russia is already fighting a kind of hybrid war against member states. Meanwhile, domestic political challenges are mounting on both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe, far-right parties appear to be gaining strength, so much so in France that President Emmanuel Macron called early parliamentary elections. Marine Le Pen, the leader of France’s far-right National Rally, has advocated for taking French troops out of the U.S.-led NATO integrated command and for a rapprochement between NATO and Russia, whose president, Vladimir Putin, she has openly praised in the past.


But it is the 2024 U.S. presidential election that poses a unique threat to NATO. While European member countries continue to play frontline roles in the alliance and are focused on increasing defense needs in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the unavoidable reality is that the United States remains the bedrock of NATO’s ability to deter external attacks. And in 2024, the two presidential candidates hold starkly different views about the alliance’s future.


The Republican Party’s presumptive nominee, former President Donald Trump, has consistently sent mixed signals about his commitment to collective defense and privately mused that he might withdraw the United States from the alliance. Such a move would be a total reversal after four years of President Joe Biden bolstering NATO, including its expansion to include Finland and Sweden in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.


In response to Trump’s threats, the U.S. House and Senate included a provision in last year’s National Defense Authorization Act that prohibits a president from withdrawing the United States from NATO without approval from a two-thirds majority in the Senate or a separate act of Congress.


However, the congressional move does not necessarily protect NATO from a potential second Trump term. Even if he is prevented by law from formally withdrawing the United States from NATO, Trump could use his presidential power to severely undermine the alliance and withdraw U.S. support for it in all but name. Although there has been significant debate over whether the United States should maintain its commitment to a Cold War-era alliance, it is natural for allies to expect any reduction or wind-down of the U.S. commitment to be congressionally sanctioned. Yet Trump’s long-standing and stark views on NATO and his history of abrupt action as president mean that a second Trump term could be a potential earthquake for the alliance.


What does a commitment to NATO mean?


After 75 years, NATO can seem like a piece of old furniture: For some, it feels like it has always been there, and getting rid of it would be unthinkable, while for others, it is hopelessly outdated. Founded in 1949, NATO was designed to prevent another European war in the shadow of the Soviet Union’s conquest of Eastern Europe after World War II. The first secretary general of NATO reportedly said that the alliance’s purpose was “to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.”


For member countries, NATO is a broad, substantial, and high-stakes commitment, as reflected in its two key provisions, Article 5 and Article 10. Article 5 proclaims that an “armed attack” against one member of the alliance will be treated as an attack on all of them. Given that a nuclear-armed Soviet Union was the motivating threat behind the alliance, Article 5 has always carried with it the risk of escalation to nuclear war. In practice, Article 5 has only been invoked once: On September 12, 2001, the North Atlantic Council met and announced that it would invoke Article 5 to demonstrate solidarity with the United States after the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil the day before.


Article 10 opens the NATO membership door to any European country that upholds the principles of the alliance and can contribute to its security. The open door allowed for NATO’s expansion to Greece and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. From 1999-2020, 14 Central and Eastern European nations joined NATO. And in the past two years, Finland and Sweden became NATO’s 31st and 32nd members.


These two provisions mean that if there is an attack on any of these countries, from Turkey and Estonia to France and Canada, the United States and all its other NATO allies are expected to fight as if they themselves had been attacked.


Figure 1

NATO member countries

Source: NATO

Note: The military expenditure percentage is calculated with the 2024 estimates of a country's GDP and defense expenditure in constant 2015 USD prices and exchange rates.

The Brookings Institution

NATO has faced political challenges since its founding

It is easy to forget that NATO faced political headwinds from its inception. Moscow’s backing for a communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, followed by a Soviet blockade of West Berlin, convinced President Harry Truman to form a tight bond across the Atlantic. Through NATO, Truman sought to prevent another European war that might draw in the United States, keep the North Atlantic community secure and prosperous through free trade, and maintain the emerging postwar international order (which ultimately reinforced U.S. dominance on the world stage).


But after decades at or on the brink of war in Europe, U.S. politicians and the broader U.S. public were decidedly lukewarm about an open-ended commitment to fight on behalf of other countries. Because NATO is a treaty-based organization, Truman could not constitutionally commit the United States to join the alliance without approval from two-thirds of the U.S. Senate. Truman needed help from the internationalist wing of a divided Republican Party to get the treaty ratified in 1949. Support for international institutions like the United Nations and NATO remained an issue within the GOP, however. It was an issue in the race for the 1952 Republican presidential nomination, between the alliance skepticism of the conservative Robert Taft and the internationalist outlook of NATO’s first supreme commander, Dwight Eisenhower. Eisenhower won the nomination and ultimately the presidency, cementing U.S. support for NATO as a bipartisan endeavor.


However, the victory of the internationalist U.S. political outlook did not end NATO’s internal challenges, which persisted throughout the Cold War. Given the United States’ dramatically larger military and logistical capabilities, the Article 5 collective defense provision has always depended in practice on the credibility of the U.S. commitment to NATO. But the outsized American role in NATO has also led to tensions. NATO members in Europe make indispensable and significant military contributions to the alliance—including troops, bases, infrastructure, specialized capabilities, and crucially, the acceptance of geopolitical risk given their proximity to the Soviet Union during the Cold War and Russia today. At times, European countries chafed under American dominance of NATO’s integrated command, wanting more control over the security capabilities that affect their populations so directly.


Even as they maintained this dominance, U.S. presidents have protested since NATO’s founding that European members do not spend enough for the collective defense. Eisenhower complained, and so did John F. Kennedy. Barack Obama criticized “free riders.” Donald Trump came into office in January 2017 believing that America’s allies had long taken advantage of the United States to keep them secure. In 2014, the NATO allies set a target of spending 2% of GDP on defense by 2024. While more and more members are meeting that goal (23 as of this year), a number of them still fall short. (Stoltenberg noted in February 2024 that for the first time, NATO’s European members will collectively spend 2% of their combined GDP on defense compared to just 1.47% of their combined GDP 10 years ago.)


Still, NATO not only survived its Cold War internal challenges but also the geopolitical challenge of the end of the Cold War itself. Despite the many subsequent changes in the international security and economic environments, presidents—including Trump—have maintained the U.S. commitment to NATO. And despite the Republican Party’s dramatically increased isolationism and warmer attitudes toward Russia—thanks largely to Trump—congressional support for NATO remains strong, as illustrated by the overwhelming vote to admit Finland and Sweden, with 95 senators voting in favor.


Why NATO endures


NATO’s staying power is a break with U.S. foreign policy tradition. In his Farewell Address in 1796, President George Washington urged his fellow Americans to avoid “permanent alliances.” Many commentators have argued that NATO has long outlived its usefulness and that Europeans are overly reliant on a United States that is itself too quick to reach for military tools in general.


Why has this commitment not only endured but also expanded? In the United States, NATO appeals to different groups for different reasons, giving it significant support in different corners of Congress. Some see NATO as part of the liberal international order that protects the norms and values of democracies—and indeed, Biden has framed NATO as an alliance of democracies confronting the authoritarian threat from Putin’s Russia and a rising China. Others take a more realist view, noting the substantial capabilities NATO member countries bring to the alliance (an argument Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell stressed in support of Finnish and Swedish accession). NATO supporters also point to the need to protect Europe as a major U.S. trading partner against Russia and China’s economic threats.


Election 2024: Why this time could be different


Given America’s pro-NATO constituency and Congress’ role in the alliance from the beginning, could the next president of the United States withdraw the country from NATO despite last year’s legislation requiring Congress to have a role in such a move?


Presidents have become less and less constrained over time in the conduct of foreign policy. From World War II to the 1990s, Congress was a significant repository of foreign policy expertise; it is dramatically less so today. While congressional oversight and position-taking on foreign policy has always had a healthy dose of partisan and electoral politics, polarization has meant that opposition members of Congress reflexively oppose the White House. As a result, Congress conducts less oversight, bargains less frequently over policy, and is much less effective as a check on presidential authority.


A president disposed to undermine NATO could take many diplomatic and military actions unilaterally that would harm—perhaps even paralyze—the alliance. At the diplomatic level, for example, the president could decide not to appoint an ambassador to NATO. Additionally, the president could decide not to send his secretaries of state and defense and other officials to meetings of NATO defense ministers and foreign ministers or working-level meetings where much of NATO’s business gets done. Congress could haul administration officials in for questioning, but it has lost much of its inclination and capacity to conduct oversight of foreign policy in recent decades.


The president could take even more significant actions as commander in chief. For example, the president could withdraw U.S. military assets and military personnel, defanging the U.S. commitment even if it remained on the books. The president could decide not to appoint the supreme allied commander of NATO, who is based in Europe but historically has always been an American. And the president could determine (and declare) that if a NATO member state were attacked, the United States would not necessarily invoke or abide by its commitment to Article 5 to come to that country’s aid. Indeed, Trump has already said as much on several occasions. Most recently, he said at a 2024 campaign rally that he would encourage the Russians to “do whatever the hell they want” to NATO countries that do not meet their spending commitments.


This is not an exhaustive list. And even if an anti-NATO presidential effort is not entirely successful, such efforts might stir more intra-European uncertainty or antagonism, at a time when many European governments are facing domestic challenges from the far right.


In short, a president doesn’t have to formally withdraw from NATO to undermine the alliance.


NATO is on the ballot


Since February 24, 2022, Biden has led the NATO response to support Ukraine in the face of Russia’s full-scale invasion and the largest land war in Europe since 1945. Although Trump-allied GOP members in the House of Representatives delayed funding for Ukraine in 2024, ultimately, bipartisan support for Ukraine prevailed. But there are serious doubts about whether Trump would continue that response if elected president, based on his past statements supporting Putin and questioning NATO.


Additionally, many internationalist Republican members of Congress are retiring or stepping down from leadership positions—including McConnell, who is stepping down this fall as the Senate Republican leader. NATO does not seem at risk of losing significant congressional support, but the delayed Ukraine aid illustrated how few members it takes to hold up congressional action. Politically, NATO’s path will not be smooth sailing even if Biden wins reelection.


So, while congressional legislation is an important sign of bipartisan support for NATO, if the president decides that American involvement in NATO no longer serves the country’s interests, the alliance would have to somehow forge ahead without being able to rely on its most important member state. The current war in Ukraine has highlighted how dependent Europe still is on the United States for its national security. Even if the Europeans devoted more of their resources and energy to building stronger defense capabilities—as presidents from both parties have long exhorted them to do—it will take years if not decades to develop sufficient capacity.


NATO’s relevance and the degree and manner of burden-sharing remain worthy topics of debate. But the Trump-Biden 2024 rematch represents a distinct threat to the alliance given how much power the winner will have and how much Trump has learned about implementing his preferred policies since his first term. Although Congress has clearly expressed its view that the best way to keep the Russians out is to keep the Americans in, there may be little Congress can do if Trump opts for an abrupt, de facto U.S. exit from NATO.


Authors

James Goldgeier

Visiting Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe

@JimGoldgeier


Elizabeth N. Saunders

Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology

@ProfSaunders











BROOKINGS Commentary What does the 2024 election mean for human rights? Kelebogile Zvobgo September 18, 2024

 BROOKINGS

Commentary

What does the 2024 election mean for human rights?

Kamala Harris and Donald Trump offer different visions for the country and the world, including about people’s fundamental freedoms and human rights.

Kelebogile Zvobgo

September 18, 2024


The issue of “freedom”—an American promise that has not been realized for all people—is evidently on the ballot in the 2024 U.S. presidential election. The Democratic and Republican parties’ candidates for president, Kamala Harris and Donald Trump, are advocating for very different policies regarding women’s reproductive rights, people of color’s voting rights, children’s right to be safe at school, and many other pressing issues that matter to Americans.


Who Americans elect in November will affect not only them and their rights but will also affect multitudes around the world. As with her domestic policy agenda, Vice President Harris’s vision for U.S. foreign policy presents a sharp contrast to the one former President Trump is offering the world, especially with respect to human rights. Three issue areas illustrate this difference: immigration, international law institutions, and Israel-Palestine.


The 2020 election and a change in U.S. foreign policy

When then-Senator Harris and former Vice President Joe Biden ran for office in 2020, they promised to restore U.S. leadership in the world. Many international affairs experts agreed that the United States was worse off than it had been four years earlier because of Trump’s foreign policy. Trump had withdrawn U.S. membership in multilateral agreements like the Paris climate accord and the Iran nuclear deal and snubbed international institutions such as NATO, the World Health Organization, and the World Trade Organization. These and other “America First” moves resulted in the United States being less respected around the world, less safe, and weaker economically.


Biden and Harris’s return to international cooperation—which included rejoining international agreements and reassuring allies of U.S. support—garnered high approvals from international affairs experts, the public, and world leaders in their first days in office and in the months and years following. Echoing leaders from around the globe, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared, “The United States is back.”


In addition to strengthening international ties, Biden and Harris pledged to “revitalize our national commitment to advancing human rights and democracy around the world”—a commitment that Trump did not share. Indeed, Trump’s government violated the human rights of many people across the world, including through discriminatory, and sometimes violent, travel, immigration, and asylum policies.


Immigration

Immigration is often considered a domestic policy issue, but it is also part of foreign policy, especially when political leaders like Trump frame immigrants as threats to national security. Immigration policy also impacts people’s human rights, which are protected by international and domestic law.


The Trump administration discriminated against people from Muslim-majority countries and African countries, banning travel from several; separated undocumented migrant children from their parents at the U.S. southern border as part of a “zero tolerance” policy; and failed to intervene as migrant women were forcibly sterilized in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention centers.


These policies violated, among others, the right to non-discrimination and equal protection, which is codified in international human rights agreements that the United States has ratified, including the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 26 of the treaty prohibits discrimination and requires countries to “guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights also upholds the human right to freedom of movement (Article 13) and the human right to seek and find asylum from persecution in other countries (Article 14).


The Biden-Harris White House ended Trump’s travel bans; created an interagency task force to reunify migrant families; ended family separations; and agreed to a settlement allowing reunified families to stay and work in the United States and receive social services while their asylum claims were processed. The administration also closed some ICE facilities where detainees had been abused.


If Trump wins in November, he is likely to revisit the policies that Biden reversed. Already, Trump has committed to bringing back and expanding the travel ban. Though the public opposed the travel ban (and the family separation policy), the public sees Biden, and thus Harris, as weak on immigration and border security issues compared to Trump.


Trump’s and Harris’s stances on immigration have different foundations. Trump appears to be more interested in addressing symptoms, as seen with his “Remain in Mexico” policy. Meanwhile, Harris is interested in addressing root causes, such as political instability, drug trafficking, gang violence, and a lack of economic opportunity in different countries around the world, including in Mexico and Central America—problems that, if addressed, would likely decrease the number of people who feel they must leave their home countries. For undocumented immigrants already in the United States, Harris has promoted an “earned pathway to citizenship,” but she has not said precisely what this would look like or entail.


International law institutions

In 2020, the Trump administration levied sanctions—a combination of asset freezes and travel restrictions—to punish and obstruct the work of officials at the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC is the world’s only international court that can hold individuals criminally accountable for atrocity crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is a defining feature of the international system that builds on the legacy of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II and the tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia after the Rwandan genocide and the Balkans conflict.


Trump’s sanctions came after the ICC’s chief prosecutor at the time, Fatou Bensouda, elevated probes in Afghanistan and Palestine from preliminary examinations to full investigations—investigations in which U.S. and Israeli personnel are respectively included, alongside the Taliban, Hamas, and other armed groups. The Afghanistan probe dates back to 2003, while the Palestine probe dates back to 2014. Because both Afghanistan and Palestine are court members, alleged atrocities committed on their territories are within ICC jurisdiction—regardless of the perpetrators’ nationalities. Nonetheless, Trump (and later Biden) rejected the court’s jurisdiction over U.S. and Israeli forces because the United States and Israel are not ICC members. Over the years, and especially in recent months, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has joined Trump’s and Biden’s condemnations of the court for what they perceive as a false moral equivalence between Israeli and Hamas actions.


While objecting to the court’s investigations in Afghanistan and Palestine, Biden rescinded Trump’s sanctions on ICC officials a few months into his term, in response to pressure from allies. Biden also decided to assist the court in its investigation into alleged Russian atrocities in Ukraine, though Russia, like the United States and Israel, is not an ICC member.


Similar to Trump, Biden has seemed to want it both ways—immunity for the United States and its friends and scrutiny for its foes. While broadly consistent with a decades-long practice of selective cooperation with and opposition to the ICC, this policy ran its course long ago. To lead the world, the United States must follow the rules it applies to others—and survey research suggests that the U.S. public recognizes this. Most Americans support the United States joining the ICC.


Harris has emphasized her commitment to the rule of law—the idea that laws should apply to everyone, equally. But it is not clear if she would apply rule of law principles on the world stage. It is very unlikely that as president she would accept ICC jurisdiction over Americans, discarding the playbook that Republican and Democratic presidents have used for more than 20 years. But Harris could accept ICC jurisdiction over Israel, partly depending on whether her party supports it. Congressional Democrats have been split on whether to support the ICC, whose current chief prosecutor, Karim Khan, has applied for arrest warrants for Hamas and Israeli leaders for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Congressional Republicans, by contrast, oppose the court’s probe into Israelis and they want to revisit sanctions.


In the spring, a bipartisan group of senators and House representatives passed an appropriations bill—which President Biden signed into law—that stipulated a hold on aid to Palestine if the Palestinian Authority cooperates with the ICC’s investigation as it relates to Israel. Attempting to impede an international court’s investigations in this way would seem contrary to the rule of law but it is not clear if Harris would veto a similar bill in the future. Especially when bundled with the broader U.S. federal budget, Harris might see vetoing congressional action against Palestine and the ICC as too costly.


A Harris presidency could, nonetheless, mean stronger action in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—a human rights and foreign policy arena where Harris seems to differ from both Trump and Biden.


Israel-Palestine

The same year Biden rescinded the ICC sanctions, the administration ran for a seat on the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), a body the Trump administration had exited in 2018. The UNHRC is “an intergovernmental body within the United Nations system responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe and for addressing situations of human rights violations and making recommendations on them.” The United States won the bid and took up its seat on the council in 2022 for a three-year term that ends this year.


As a UNHRC member, the United States has supported important resolutions addressing human rights crises in Ukraine, Syria, Myanmar, South Sudan, Nicaragua, and many other countries. But the Biden-Harris administration’s record at the UNHRC is checkered. For instance, the administration has voted against resolutions that criticize and demand accountability for suspected illegal conduct by Israeli forces in Palestinian territory.


Similarly, at the U.N. Security Council, the United States has vetoed or abstained from resolutions calling for a cease-fire in the Israel-Hamas war. Moreover, at the International Court of Justice, the U.N.’s judicial body, the United States has denied allegations that Israel is committing genocide against Palestinians, even as the court itself said Israel has plausibly violated its obligations under the 1948 Genocide Convention.


Though broadly consistent with the decades-long U.S. policy to defend Israel (even when Washington and Jerusalem disagree with each other), these recent moves at the U.N. (and continued U.S. military aid to Israel) seem to ignore the U.S. public’s growing opposition to the war in Gaza. Since the October 7 terrorist attack, when Hamas fighters killed about 1,200 Israelis and took an estimated 250 hostages, Israeli forces have killed tens of thousands of Palestinians in Gaza, where famine is now spreading.


While maintaining Israel’s right to self-defense, Harris has drawn attention to the suffering of Palestinians and applied pressure on Israeli officials, notably Netanyahu, to “finalize the [cease-fire] deal as soon as possible.” Some Israeli leaders have criticized her for this and accused her of putting the cease-fire talks in jeopardy, but Harris empathizes with Palestinians and Israelis (compared to Biden who seems more empathetic to Israelis) and she insists on acknowledging both sides’ pain.


It is noteworthy that it is Harris who suggested that Biden denounce Islamophobia, in addition to antisemitism, shortly after October 7. And it is Harris who connected what happens abroad with what happens at home, bringing up the crisis in Gaza in a speech commemorating the 59th anniversary of Bloody Sunday, when U.S. Civil Rights Movement activists were attacked by law enforcement on the Edmund Pettus Bridge in Selma, Alabama. Senior administration officials have reportedly held Harris back, diluting if not muting her views. But she has continued to speak out.


For example, after Netanyahu’s visit to Washington in July, Harris said, “We cannot allow ourselves to become numb to the suffering, and I will not be silent.” Moreover, in her acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention, Harris advocated both for Israel’s security and “dignity, security, freedom, and self-determination” for Palestinians—all fundamental principles of human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.


Trump has distorted Harris’s position, however, claiming the vice president hates Israel (and Arabs). An avowedly staunch supporter of Israel, he views criticism of the country as anti-Jewish. In addition, his policy proposals have historically favored Israel at Palestinians’ expense. What’s more, Trump has advocated for crackdowns on pro-Palestinian protests in the United States, including the deportations of demonstrators.


Looking forward

Harris hasn’t yet said how exactly she would resolve the many foreign policy problems the United States faces, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Though she opposes an arms embargo on Israel, she has not indicated if as president she would maintain all of Biden’s policies. Neither has she suggested what concessions Israel should make if and after hostages are repatriated and a cease-fire agreement is reached. U.S. presidents have long advocated for a two-state solution but to no avail. It is hard to predict how transformative a Harris presidency would be, for this part of the world and elsewhere. But it could mark the beginning of a change in Washington and U.S. human rights and foreign policy. In using the language of human rights, Harris has signaled to a greater degree than Trump that she would uphold human rights principles and institutions, at home and abroad.


Author


Zvobgo

Kelebogile Zvobgo

Visiting Fellow - Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology

@kelly_zvobgo


Project Syndicate The Climate Stakes of the US Election Sep 9, 2024 Joseph E. Stiglitz

 Project Syndicate

The Climate Stakes of the US Election

Sep 9, 2024

Joseph E. Stiglitz


Just as Donald Trump’s overall economic strategy is based on nostalgia for a bygone era, his fossil-fuel-centered energy policies would represent a quixotic attempt to reverse history. He would ultimately fail, but not before doing a great deal of damage to US competitiveness and security.


NEW YORK – The outcome of the US presidential election in November will have an enormous impact on both the country and the world, and not least on efforts to combat climate change. While Donald Trump lacks a coherent platform, he clearly stands far apart from Vice President Kamala Harris on the issue.


Earlier this year, Trump reportedly “requested $1 billion in campaign contributions from fossil-fuel industry executives, promising in turn to roll back environmental regulations, hasten permitting and leasing approvals, and preserve or enhance tax benefits that the oil and gas industry enjoys.” Even if Trump is not an outright climate-change denier, he belongs to a broader school of politicians and commentators who do not think that we need to worry about it. His vision for “Making America Great Again” is to make the United States an even larger polluter, an even larger producer of fossil fuels, and an even bigger laggard behind Europe and much of the rest of the world.


Both science and technology are working against the fossil-fuel industry. The cost of renewables has plummeted, and under normal circumstances, this would have driven down the price of fossil fuels. But because Russia is such a large supplier of petrochemicals, the war in Ukraine has distorted the market.


If elected, Trump would probably sell out Ukraine, or at least arrange a temporary ceasefire, thus facilitating a greater flow of oil and gas. He also wants to reverse the US Inflation Reduction Act and increase hostilities with China, which produces many of the world’s solar panels and other critical inputs for decarbonization. A major slowdown of the green transition in the US is thus a real risk, even before considering the possibility that Trump would further increase the already massive US subsidies for fossil fuels.


Just as Trump’s overall economic strategy is based on nostalgia for a bygone era, his energy policies would represent a quixotic attempt to reverse time. He would ultimately fail, but not before doing a great deal of damage to US competitiveness and security.


Trump’s first term already offered a preview of what an overtly fossil fuel-friendly America would mean for the rest of the world. He endorsed climate-change deniers in Brazil and a host of other countries, and the US withdrew from the Paris climate agreement. In the years thereafter, progress on global climate cooperation clearly slowed.


But eight years after he first assumed office, the economic and security implications of climate change have become even clearer. Europe and Japan seem resolute in their commitments to tax imports from major carbon polluters, and though Trump would probably retaliate for these policies, US allies can take some comfort in the fact that he would have imposed tariffs on them in any case.


Ironically, often-vilified multinationals might play a crucial role in sustaining the green transition. The leaders of these companies recognize the realities of climate change, and they know that they must operate in multiple jurisdictions. If they do not join in the broader green transition, they will lose out now, and even more so in the future.


Even within America, the largest and most important states have already passed legislation pushing firms to decarbonize their operations and reduce their carbon footprints. That means large companies operating in multiple states are already pursuing and adopting green technologies and business practices – and for the same reasons that multinationals will.


Yes, there will be aggressive attempts by some fossil-fuel companies to roll back these regulations. But there will also be stronger civil-society efforts, including through the courts, to hold companies accountable for the damage they have wrought. Smart business leaders will recognize the folly of resisting the inevitable. Even in the oil and gas industry, some companies are already changing their business model to phase down fossil fuels and invest in renewable energy.


Thus, global politics, science, technology, sound corporate management, and the climate itself all weigh against Trump’s love of fossil fuels. Four decades ago, many assumed that tropical countries would bear the brunt of the costs, owing to their already high temperatures. They indeed are affected, with some facing desertification and others poised to become uninhabitable. But they are hardly alone. The US has already suffered enormous damage, and by the end of the century those losses are estimated to be between 1-4% of GDP annually.


It makes far more sense to do what we can now to limit this damage than to make the same kinds of repairs year after year. Four decades ago, we thought the cost of combating climate change would be very high. But low-cost renewables and the emergence of other new technologies have changed everything. The cost of renewable energy is low and falling, and it would be even lower and falling faster with a greater public commitment to the green transition and the investments it requires.


Make no mistake: there will be a green transition. The only questions are how fast it will proceed, and how much damage we will incur if it is delayed. Trump will attempt to throw a wrench in the process. He wants the fossil-fuel industry’s support, and the industry will view its campaign contributions as a high-return investment. A Republican-controlled Congress would, of course, do whatever Trump says.


The resulting pro-fossil-fuel environment would facilitate fossil-fuel investments, but since these have long time horizons, many would become stranded assets. American taxpayers thus may wind up paying thrice for the blunder. In addition to the direct and hidden subsidies during the Trump administration and the direct and hidden compensation for stranded assets sometime in the future, they also will have to deal with the resulting lack of energy and climate security.


Elections always matter, but this one matters more than most.


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Joseph E. Stiglitz

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Writing for PS since 2001

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Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate in economics and University Professor at Columbia University, is a former chief economist of the World Bank (1997-2000), chair of the US President’s Council of Economic Advisers, and co-chair of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices. He is Co-Chair of the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation and was lead author of the 1995 IPCC Climate Assessment. He is the author, most recently, of The Road to Freedom: Economics and the Good Society (W. W. Norton & Company, Allen Lane, 2024).

BROOKINGS Commentary The US-Philippines alliance and the 2024 US elections Lynn Kuok September 16, 2024

 BROOKINGS

Commentary

The US-Philippines alliance and the 2024 US elections

Lynn Kuok

September 16, 2024



The U.S.-Philippines alliance, rooted in the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), is a cornerstone of U.S. alliances and partnerships in Southeast Asia, a sub-region at the heart of the Indo-Pacific, America’s “priority theater.” The Philippines is important to U.S. interests. It sits at the crossroads of major sea lanes in the Indo-Pacific and is located close to Taiwan, which will make it particularly important in the event of a Taiwan contingency. The Luzon Strait, lying between Taiwan and Luzon, the northern portion of the Philippine archipelago, provides entrance to and exit from the South China Sea; its depth gives nuclear submarines a better chance of passing through undetected.


Of all the Southeast Asian countries, America’s strategic position is the strongest in the Philippines. Manila offers Washington the use of nine military facilities, which could be used in a fight against China. Minilaterals that include the Philippines, such as enhanced Japan-Philippines-U.S. security ties, and stronger bilateral ties between the Philippines and other U.S. allies, as exemplified by Japan and the Philippines’ Reciprocal Access Agreement in July, help create a latticework of “strong, resilient, and mutually reinforcing relationships,” an important U.S. National Security Strategy goal. Furthermore, the Philippines’ high-profile legal and physical clashes with China best showcase the U.S. narrative that China is flouting international law and that there is regional demand for the United States to counter this.


The alliance’s future will be shaped by the 2024 U.S. presidential election and the incoming administration’s foreign policy, especially toward Southeast Asia. A Harris administration is expected to reinforce alliances and emphasize human rights and democratic values. Insofar as reinforcing alliances includes that with the Philippines, bilateral ties will be strengthened; a focus on human rights could complicate relations given ongoing human rights concerns. A Trump administration might adopt a transactional approach, which could revisit past criticisms of allies “free-riding,” casting doubt on the U.S. commitment under the MDT and straining relations. But a hawkish Republican administration could also double down on defending the Philippines. Regardless of the election’s outcome, the U.S.-Philippines alliance will impact regional dynamics and great power competition.


The state of relations

U.S.-Philippines relations have generally been robust. The MDT was concluded five years after the United States granted the Philippines independence and is supplemented by the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement and the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). Since May 2023, the two countries have entered into further security and non-security arrangements and initiatives.


The Philippines’ security establishment and Filipino public opinion have facilitated strong ties. The Philippines is the largest country recipient of U.S. military assistance in the Indo-Pacific and relies on American support for various security issues, including countering separatist movements in the southern Philippines and addressing concerns in the South China Sea. In an annual survey of Southeast Asia this year, China, for the first time, edged past the United States as the region’s choice in the event that hedging was not possible, but the Philippines bucked the trend: 83.3% of Filipinos selected the United States, an increase of 4.5 percentage points over the preceding year.


That said, U.S.-Philippines relations have also seen low points, most notably in the early 1990s when Manila decided to close Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base, which were among the largest and most strategically important U.S. military installations during the Cold War, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. Relations were also poor during the presidency of Rodrigo Duterte when the president’s war on drugs and the Obama administration’s focus on human rights put Manila and Washington at loggerheads. The Duterte administration also initially sought closer ties with China at the expense of relations with America.


The Marcos administration has drawn a line under rocky relations. In February 2023, Manila added four EDCA sites to the five America already enjoys—of these, three are Taiwan-facing and the last faces the South China Sea. High-level meetings have also increased. Presidents Ferdinand Marcos and Joe Biden met in Washington in May 2023. In April 2024, the leaders of Japan, the Philippines, and the United States gathered in Washington for a historic summit. At the end of July, the Philippines and the United States held a 2+2 meeting of their foreign and defense ministers in Manila.


The Philippines’ security environment  

Manila takes a dim view of its security environment. Relations with China deteriorated sharply after Beijing moved to take control of Scarborough Shoal in 2012, leading Manila to pursue an international arbitral case against China in 2013 for its maritime claims and actions in the South China Sea. Although Duterte attempted a rapprochement in pursuit of economic deals, and Marcos similarly sought better relations for stronger economic ties, relations with China remain fraught. Beijing has endeavored, though increasingly aggressive moves, to block Philippines resupply missions to Sierra Madre, a naval vessel Manila deliberately grounded in 1999 on Second Thomas Shoal.


On July 21, China and the Philippines reached a “provisional arrangement” on Manila’s resupply of daily necessities and rotation missions to Sierra Madre in Second Thomas Shoal. Neither side has released the text of this agreement so its details are unknown. Disagreement over its terms emerged soon after its announcement. Nevertheless, the Philippines carried out a “rotation and reprovisioning (RORE) mission” on July 27 without incident, though Manila on July 28 complained that Beijing had “mischaracterized” its RORE mission.


Whether the agreement holds will depend on whether it is premised on Manila’s intention to eventually tow away the Sierra Madre; whether Manila must inform Beijing prior to its resupply missions; whether Beijing has a right to inspect and monitor the resupply process; and whether Manila may send “construction materials to the warship and attempt to build fixed facilities or permanent outpost.” But the agreement’s longevity will ultimately depend on political will.


Manila is not just worried about physical clashes and the loss of territory or sovereign rights. At the Shangri-La Dialogue, an Asia-focused defense summit, Marcos highlighted concerns about the erosion of international law undermining countries’ agency, U.S.-China competition exacerbating flashpoints and constraining regional states’ strategic choices, and threats to the unity and centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).


The U.S. role in addressing the Philippines’ concerns

The Duterte administration showed disdain for the Philippines’ alliance with the United States and was wary of the MDT dragging Manilla into a war with China.


The Marcos administration, in contrast, has sought to bolster defense ties and lean on the MDT as a bulwark against aggressive Chinese actions in the South China Sea. In so doing, it is reverting to the Philippines’ traditional reliance on America as a security partner, which had been strained by Washington’s failure to respond after Beijing reneged on a deal the United States allegedly brokered for Chinese and Philippines vessels to withdraw from Scarborough Shoal in 2012. The Philippines withdrew its vessels in June 2012; China did not and instead established control of Scarborough Shoal.


Since then, America has taken important steps to demonstrate commitment. The Trump administration clarified that the MDT applies to the South China Sea; the Biden administration further clarified that it extends to an armed attack on the Philippine Coast Guard. But Washington will (rightly) not be drawn into identifying or confirming specific instances when the MDT might be triggered.


Issues to watch

In the run-up to the U.S. presidential election and into the new administration, China might further test the U.S. commitment under the MDT. Key questions include:


First, whether a willful act resulting in a (single) death would necessarily trigger the MDT. Second, whether a civilian death might trigger it, despite the MDT making no mention of civilians. When Marcos was asked whether a red line would be crossed if Chinese coast guard water cannons killed a Filipino sailor, and whether this would trigger Manila’s request to Washington to invoke the MDT, he appeared to respond affirmatively to both of these questions.


Third, whether Second Thomas Shoal constitutes island territory such that a Chinese move against it without an armed attack against Philippines (or U.S.) “armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft”—such as if the Sierra Madre became dislodged—would nonetheless trigger the MDT. The 2016 international tribunal ruling in the Philippines’ case against China held that Second Thomas Shoal is a “low-tide elevation” within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and therefore under its sovereign rights and jurisdiction; Second Thomas Shoal is thus not Filipino territory as such.


Fourth, given that the Sierra Madre might not last much longer, how might Manila continue to assert its sovereign rights over Second Thomas Shoal while being afforded potential MDT cover? A creative solution might be to (surreptitiously) drive a public drone boat aground on it. Finally, it must be asked whether a Chinese cyberattack against the Philippines would constitute an “armed attack.”


Even if the MDT is not technically triggered, failing to respond to egregious Chinese actions in the South China Sea could undermine the United States’ credibility with its allies and partners. Beijing’s escalation vis-à-vis the Philippines in the South China Sea is not simply a response to perceived unacceptable Filipino behavior, or even to test the boundaries of U.S. commitment to allies and partners, but also to chip away at American credibility.


Recommendations for the next administration

For the next administration to take strategic competition with China seriously, it must:


First, maintain strong U.S.-Philippines ties and prioritize this over any (specious) concerns about the Philippines “free-riding” under the MDT. Manila provides access to EDCA sites “without rental or similar costs” given the “mutuality of benefits” the agreement recognizes. The United States could, under the EDCA framework and in close coordination with Manila, potentially establish a resupply and re-arm facility for ships and submarines in the Philippines, which would provide a critical logistics hub for the U.S. Navy, allowing for quicker response times in the event of a conflict or crisis.


Second, restate that the MDT covers the South China Sea and an armed attack against the Philippine Coast Guard.


Third, ensure enhanced economic ties result in concrete outcomes. Beijing could still modulate Manila’s response by behaving better in the South China Sea, meeting its obligations under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—China had repeatedly failed to act on funding requests under BRI deals with the Philippines—or offering up other investments.


Fourth, lower tensions around Second Thomas Shoal. As Brookings scholar Ryan Hass argues, America’s goals here must be “upholding the credibility of its alliance commitments, avoiding conflict with China, and preventing Chinese occupation of Second Thomas Shoal.” It is in America’s interest for the provisional deal around Second Thomas Shoal to hold.


Fifth, Washington might consider quietly signaling some of the MDT’s limits to Manila and concerned parties through non-official (Track II) channels. This would help preempt attempts to erode confidence in the United States’ reliability as an ally.


Sixth, privately but clearly communicate to Beijing, as the Obama administration is said to have done, that America will respond if Beijing builds infrastructure on Scarborough Shoal. Although Second Thomas Shoal has been the subject of international attention in the past year, escalation might also take place over other features. Beijing could build on Scarborough Shoal, a “rock” capable of an independent sovereignty claim, without triggering the MDT.1 Yet, as in the case of Second Thomas Shoal, a failure to respond would undermine U.S. credibility.


Finally, the Philippines is part of a wider ASEAN community and America must not neglect engagement with ASEAN and its member states, who are generally anxious about how Manila has gone head-to-head with China. Strong U.S. relations with ASEAN and its member states are important in and of themselves, but also for how they could factor into the Philippines’ considerations on positioning, even if they have not thus far been decisive. Given the uncertainty over U.S. foreign policy under a new administration, Manila may seek to avoid getting too far ahead of the ASEAN pack lest this leaves it entirely exposed to China.


Author

Lynn Kuok

Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asia Studies, Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Asia Policy Studies

@LynnKuok

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Footnotes