Once wary of attempting to bring peace to the Middle East, the Biden administration is now considering a major diplomatic push in the region. The primary goal is not to revive the defunct Israeli-Palestinian peace process but to bridge the divide between two friends of the United States: to normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. U.S. President Joe Biden hinted in late July that an Israeli-Saudi rapprochement could be on the way. Twice in the past month, U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has visited Saudi Arabia. Last week, The Wall Street Journal reported that Washington and Riyadh had agreed on the broad contours of a normalization deal, although major obstacles to such an accord remain.

It is rare in the annals of Middle East peacemaking for three governments to openly pursue the same objective. And on its face, an Israeli-Saudi normalization deal would be a significant achievement. But Washington’s partners in this prospective arrangement are a repressive Saudi regime that seems increasingly to be working at cross purposes with the United States and an Israeli governing coalition composed of the most extreme right-wing parties and politicians in the country’s history. For that reason, not just any normalization agreement will advance U.S. interests in the region. The Biden administration must ensure that it does not give away too much to Riyadh without asking enough from Jerusalem, especially when it comes to the concerns of the Palestinians.

GOOD DEAL, BAD PARTNERS

In the 1980s or 1990s, an Israeli-Saudi normalization accord might have been worth almost any price. But times have changed. Under U.S. President Donald Trump, U.S. diplomacy helped break the ice between Israel and the Gulf states. The Abraham Accords formalized the normalization of ties between Israel and Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. The signing of these agreements stoked anticipation of an even more consequential deal with the Saudis. As it is, Jerusalem and Riyadh maintain intelligence and security relationships, albeit undeclared ones. And the two countries cooperate in other limited ways: Saudi Arabia allows Israeli commercial airlines to fly through its airspace on the way to Asia, Israel signed off on a deal in which Egypt returned two small Red Sea islands to Saudi Arabia, and an agreement is pending that would allow Muslim pilgrims from Israel to take direct flights to Saudi Arabia for the hajj. According to The Guardian, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has met in Saudi Arabia at least once with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS. Direct flights from Israel to Qatar during the World Cup in 2022 showed that it might be possible to further expand the circle of cooperation. Indeed, Israel and Saudi Arabia are increasingly becoming de facto strategic partners in the face of a rising challenge from Iran and threats from jihadi groups.

But the prospects for a slam-dunk normalization accord, which would involve major U.S. security guarantees, are tempered by the inconvenient fact that Saudi Arabia is an increasingly unreliable partner for Washington. Despite decades of close relations, it is a real stretch to describe Saudi Arabia as a U.S. ally. The Saudi government shares almost no values with that of the United States, least of all those related to democracy and freedom, and its interests clearly diverge from Washington’s on human rights, oil pricing, and relations with China and Russia. The Saudis have become independent actors, understandably following their own interests but often without taking the United States’ interests into account. They do not intend to end their long association with Washington, but they are looking to forge additional partnerships when it serves their interests. Against this backdrop, a rapprochement between Riyadh and Jerusalem could still have value, but only if the price is right. Washington must decide how much it is willing to pay the Saudis for a normalization deal and what it is willing to accept from Israel with respect to the Palestinians.

The Biden administration should be careful not to concede too much or accept too little. Riyadh is asking Washington to support a civilian nuclear program, reportedly including a right for Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium. Any export of U.S. nuclear technology to the kingdom must involve three ironclad Saudi commitments: to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement with Washington that includes strong nonproliferation requirements, to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that strengthens the verification capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and to allow onsite American inspection and electronic monitoring of their facilities.

Even if Riyadh agrees to these measures, the United States should draw the line at granting Saudi Arabia the right to enrich uranium and the ability to control the fuel cycle. According to the news website Semafor, Saudi officials have proposed setting up a “nuclear Aramco”—a joint U.S.-Saudi project that would give the United States oversight of the development of a Saudi civilian nuclear power program. But this would still mean allowing uranium enrichment to take place inside Saudi Arabia—something Washington has previously balked at and should not allow because of proliferation concerns and Riyadh’s unpredictability. Ultimately, U.S. global nonproliferation policy should outweigh other considerations, as it nearly always has. The fact that MBS has expressed interest in acquiring nuclear weapons only underscores the need for caution.

A critical part of any good deal with Saudi Arabia will be reciprocity. The United States should therefore press the Saudis hard to improve their human rights record, stabilize and improve the situation in Yemen, and take U.S. concerns into account when setting oil prices. Washington should also push Riyadh for greater transparency on its emerging relationship with Beijing and demand tight security safeguards for any arms or technology the United States transfers to Saudi Arabia.

The Saudis are also likely to ask for a binding commitment from the United States to defend the kingdom with force if it comes under attack. Under no circumstances should the Biden administration make such a commitment. The primary threat to Saudi Arabia is not a ground invasion but air and missile strikes and internal subversion. Surely, the United States and Saudi Arabia can work out security coordination, including advanced air and missile defense measures, that does not compel U.S. intervention under any and all circumstances. Rather, such coordination could obligate Washington to consult with Saudi Arabia on the best way to help it defend against an external threat. The United States can also offer Riyadh non–NATO ally status, which provides benefits in defense trade and security cooperation and is a powerful symbol of a close relationship.

The Saudis will also want assurances that they can purchase top-shelf advanced U.S. weapons systems. This request can be accommodated as long as it goes hand in hand with appropriate safeguards to ensure proper oversight and control. The U.S. Congress—whose support, coordination, and approval will be required for all of these measures—will serve as a helpful brake to ensure that the Biden administration does not go too far. Indeed, one of the objectives of Israeli-Saudi normalization and a peace treaty should be to reduce the need for more U.S. forces in the region, not amp it up. 

DON’T SAY NO

Israel will welcome the normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia, but it must do its part to make the deal work. The Biden administration should ask the Israeli government to halt its overhaul of the judiciary while negotiations over normalization with Saudi Arabia are ongoing. Biden is dealing with the most extreme and fundamentalist government in Israel’s history, one that is committed to undermining Israel’s democratic character and annexing the West Bank. A U.S. endorsement of any normalization accord between Israel and Saudi Arabia will by definition legitimize this Israeli government and boost Netanyahu’s political fortunes. This may be a price the Biden administration is prepared to pay, but it should at least use what leverage it has now to forestall the erosion of Israeli democracy.

Equally important, the administration must build into any Israeli-Saudi normalization agreement provisions that credibly address the concerns of the Palestinians and preserve the possibility of a two-state solution—however long the odds. The Saudis have been publicly adamant about the need to advance Palestinian interests but have offered no details. One would think that Saudi Arabia would be wary of tethering itself through normalization to the most extreme government in Israel’s history. MBS seems inclined to be flexible in what he demands on behalf of the Palestinians, but his father, King Salman, is more of a traditionalist, suggesting that his requirements will be tough—perhaps including recognition of Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif complex, also known as the Temple Mount, in Jerusalem.

It is possible that, in its eagerness to secure a normalization deal, the Biden administration will not push the Saudis to demand from Israel a big enough package for the Palestinians. It is also possible that MBS and Netanyahu could cut Washington out of the negotiations if they judge the American price to be too high, coming to their own understanding regarding the Palestinian issue. But the Biden administration still has leverage that it should not be reluctant to use. Democrats in Congress are already speaking out about the importance of tying any Israeli-Saudi deal to something credible for the Palestinians. And there can be no normalization of relations between Riyadh and Jerusalem without U.S. guarantees. The last thing the Biden administration should want for all its heavy lifting in the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship is to let Netanyahu and his coalition off the hook when it comes to the Palestinians.

This means that U.S. and Saudi demands must be big enough to stop Israel’s de facto annexation of the occupied territories and make it impossible for the Palestinians to balk at an agreement. Such demands should include a complete, verifiable, and monitored freeze on all settlement activity outside existing residential areas within Israeli-authorized settlements in the major blocs; a moratorium on new settlements or outposts; the dismantling of all outposts established after 2001 (consistent with the commitment made by the Israeli government in 2004); a halt to the legalization of existing outposts and the return of settlers to outposts or settlements evacuated in 2005; and a formal commitment by the government of Israel (not just the prime minister) to a two-state outcome that includes a Palestinian capital in east Jerusalem.

The current Israeli government will not accept these conditions. But demanding them as part of a triangular diplomatic process would put Netanyahu in the uncomfortable position of rejecting normalization with Saudi Arabia in order to placate his annexationist ministers. If MBS were to visit Jerusalem and make his pitch for peace directly to Israel’s Knesset, the pressure on Netanyahu would ramp up exponentially, more than likely forcing him to either reach out to the opposition to form a government of national unity to take advantage of the Saudi offer or call for new elections. Whether Israel’s opposition, led by its most likely candidate for prime minister, Benny Gantz, would be willing to throw Netanyahu a lifeline and agree to some kind of rotational arrangement to lead the government is by no means certain, and the political turmoil that would result from such an overture would likely delay the normalization initiative. But when it resumed, it would do so on a much sounder foundation, enabling the Israelis and Saudis to work out the terms and sequence of a normalization agreement and peace treaty.

The Palestinian component of this diplomatic minuet is simple: don’t say no. Palestinians should be willing to enhance security cooperation with Israel and to commit to holding democratic elections. In return, they could seek a long-term financial commitment from the Saudis and others to rebuild their infrastructure and set up the institutions of a putative state.

NO RISK, NO REWARD

How the Biden administration chooses to balance its demands with those of the other parties will likely reflect its motives in pushing this normalization agreement. A U.S.-brokered Israeli-Saudi normalization accord is clearly designed to address U.S. worries about Chinese influence in the Middle East, with the added benefit of reasserting U.S. leadership in the region. A normalization deal would also be a significant foreign policy achievement before the 2024 election, albeit one that is unlikely to register much in the minds of voters. And it would be a fitting capstone to decades of American efforts to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Thus, if Biden decides to move forward on this bold but complex initiative, he must resolve to keep the bar high—both in terms of limiting Saudi demands and advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace. Better to have no deal at all than to have one that gives the Saudis too much, fails to secure enough in return, and legitimizes the current Israeli government without stopping its effort to annex the West Bank. Washington must also bear in mind that the primary beneficiaries of any deal will be Israel and Saudi Arabia—not the United States.

A good deal would be both diplomatically ambitious and potentially transformational. It would seek to reconfigure the current regional landscape and enhance American leadership. If the Biden administration goes big, it has a chance to revive the broken Israeli-Palestinian peace process, put U.S.-Saudi relations on a mutually beneficial path, and keep alive the hope of a better future for Israelis and Palestinians alike. But if it goes small or makes a bad deal, the administration will miss a rare opportunity for progress toward peace and likely erode, rather than advance, U.S. interests in the Middle East.