THE
SYRIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE IS NOT ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION
by Charles Thepaut
by Charles Thepaut
PolicyWatch 3320
May 27, 2020
May 27, 2020
The UN committee’s chances of success are limited but
still worth pursuing to a prompt conclusion, in part to prevent Russia from
draping its window dressing over an illegitimate process.
Last week, UN Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen
announced that the Syrian constitutional committee launched in September 2019
can hold its next meeting as soon as the coronavirus pandemic allows. This
narrow mechanism was not designed to resolve the years-long conflict via legal
solutions, but rather to start a political discussion among Syrians. Yet
despite the committee’s limitations, the United States and its allies should
invest more effort in it—otherwise, Russia will be free to exploit the
constitutional process as a way of normalizing the Assad regime without
addressing any of the war’s root causes.
THE CONSTITUTION AS A TOOL TO ENGAGE RUSSIA
For years, UN envoys have tried to bring Syrian
parties to a political settlement but found themselves paralyzed by Moscow,
which has steadfastly protected the regime from the consequence of refusing to
negotiate with the opposition. The United States, regional actors, and Europe
declined to challenge this protection by escalating militarily with Russia once
it intervened on the ground, instead limiting their pressure to economic
sanctions and diplomatic engagement.
Hence, constitutional reform gained traction because
it was one of the few topics in which Russian diplomats evinced interest.
Working toward a new constitution was at the center of U.S.-Russian discussions
in March 2015. Two months later, Moscow presented a first draft that was
roundly rejected by all Syrian opposition elements; a second draft in January 2017
met with a similar response. Nevertheless, in May 2017, Russian officials
proposed a “national reconciliation conference” in Sochi, then helped the
regime hand-pick the Syrian factions that would be invited to discuss a new
constitution there. By year’s end, constitutional reform featured as one
of the core components of the Da Nang memorandum jointly issued by President
Vladimir Putin and President Trump.
Then as now, Moscow seemed to view constitutional
reform as a flexible framework for launching an international diplomatic
process and muting Western critics while preserving its policy approach and
limiting the scope of what “change” in Syria might ultimately encompass.
Although UN Security Council Resolution 2254 called for a political
process consisting of three essential elements—a transitional government, free
and fair elections, and a new constitution—Russia has gradually diluted the
discussion to the latter element alone.
THE CONSTITUTION AS A “CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY”
In urging Syrians to take up issues such as
constitutional principles, state reform, and power-sharing arrangements,
international actors are well aware that there are different understandings of
these matters in Washington, Moscow, Ankara, Berlin, and Paris. Yet foreign
officials have deemed it useful to maintain this ambiguity for the time being
as a waystation on the road to more detailed discussions.
Thus, when Russia, Turkey, and Iran proposed a
constitutional committee during the January 2018 Sochi conference, the idea was
later accepted by the “small group” (i.e., Britain, Egypt, France, Germany,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States) on condition that it remains under
full UN auspices. The group was amenable to this process in large part because
the Assad regime accepted it as well, making it the only instance of Damascus
engaging in a negotiation on anything since 2011.
The proposal also gave the regime and its backers time
to reconquer territories across Syria (the same dynamic seen
today in Idlib) while deflecting pressure ahead of the country’s
2021 presidential election. For their part, Europe, Turkey, the UN, and
the United States saw the committee as a “door opener,” allowing them to put
the Syrian opposition back on track and build confidence without discussing the
individual fate of Bashar al-Assad.
OPAQUE SETUP AND UNCLEAR GOALS
Although the constitutional committee was based on a
tacit understanding that it would refresh the Syrian political process framed
by Resolution 2254, Assad, Iran, Russia, and Turkey took eighteen months to
agree on its composition. An opaque compromise was reached around three
categories of representatives: fifty from the regime, fifty from the
opposition, and fifty from Syrian civil society, the latter ostensibly
nominated by the UN but in practice largely imposed by Moscow and Ankara.
Another major problem was the exclusion of northeast
Syria, which stemmed from the open conflict between Turkey and the People’s
Defense Units (YPG), the Kurdish militia that dominates the area. Ankara barred
any members of the YPG-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria
from participating in the committee—a missed opportunity to deescalate tensions
between the two sides and clarify the YPG’s goals regarding decentralization
versus separatism.
Also unclear is the committee’s overarching goal: does
it aim to produce a new constitution or just amend the current one? And what
mode will it use to ratify the new charter: a public referendum or a
parliamentary vote? If the latter, will a new parliament be chosen before that
vote?
REGIME OBSTRUCTION CONTINUES, AND MOSCOW PLAYS ALONG
Although constructive ambiguity can sometimes
facilitate progress on the less sensitive elements of a political process, the
parties eventually have to tackle the conflict’s core elements, however
intractable they may seem. Yet by November 2019, after two meetings of the
constitutional committee, the regime once again blocked discussion of the core
issues and centered the discussion on fighting “terrorism.” Far from being a
constitutional matter, this issue has more often been the regime’s tool for
conflating Syria’s political opposition and armed
jihadist groups. Damascus also refused to discuss any issue related
to army oversight, deeming this a “redline”—even though civilian authority over
military forces is a core constitutional issue in countries all over the world.
Recently, the UN special envoy suggested that a new arrangement had been found
to restart substantive talks, but the pandemic has prevented the parties from
scheduling a new meeting.
The regime’s goal is clear: to delay the committee
long enough for Assad to hold (and win) the 2021 presidential election under
the current constitution. It remains unclear how much Russia is willing to
use carrots and sticks to convince Damascus that it should engage in legitimate
talks. This is exactly the situation that has blocked UN negotiations
in Geneva for years—with Moscow’s blessing, Damascus tries to slowly strangle
the process while Assad
reigns over a country in ruins, temporarily allowing that some parts
of it will
stay under Turkish influence.
INVESTING IN THE COMMITTEE—OR ENDING IT IF NECESSARY
There is no magical solution to the current stalemate,
especially if Washington decides to continue the military withdrawal it began
amid Turkey’s October 2019 incursion in the northeast. Not engaging more
assertively on the constitutional committee and other political issues would
further weaken the U.S. and allied position. Meanwhile, the regime and Russia
are using
every opportunity to increase their leverage over the
international community, as the Security Council’s January negotiations over
cross-border humanitarian access amply demonstrated.
It is therefore urgent that Washington and its allies
take decisive action on the constitutional committee—first to support it and
give it a real chance to succeed, and then to terminate it if it does not
deliver within the next couple months. This includes linking additional
sanctions to each instance of regime obstruction, and offering technical and
financial support to committee representatives from the opposition and civil
society. Some form of wider consultation with the diaspora is also
necessary to compensate for the lack of transparency in the committee
appointment process—in particular, Europe, Turkey, and the United States should
provide platforms for Syrians outside Syria to express their views on
constitutional reform.
These steps would place the ball firmly in Russia’s
court, compelling it to push the regime on contributing to a serious
constitutional draft. And if the committee does not finalize its work well
before the 2021 election season, U.S. and European officials should be ready to
call for its termination.
BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION
Of course, even a new, legitimately brokered
constitution would represent only the first step in a long process—on its own,
the charter will neither end the people’s agony nor enable hundreds of
thousands of refugees to return home. The UN should therefore prepare the steps
that could potentially follow a successful constitutional committee, such as
designing a robust monitoring mechanism for the presidential election and
preparing safe, neutral voting options for the diaspora.
Hopes are not high for a transparent constitutional
and electoral process in Syria. Nevertheless, a carefully tailored effort from
the United States and Europe would increase this possibility—or at least
prevent Russia from draping its window dressing over an illegitimate process.
Charles Thepaut is a resident visiting fellow at The
Washington Institute.
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