Peace talks began slowly at first, then all at once. But a durable peace will require changing Russia’s calculus, not Ukraine’s.
A year ago, Kyiv was awash with hope that Russia’s war might finally be brought to an end. This year, the mood is more sober. Almost nothing has changed, and that is the problem. Ukraine wants peace. Russia wants Ukraine. And beyond the battlefield, too little pressure is being applied to shift the calculus.
Ukraine is now preparing for two futures: a diplomatic end to the war and a more active, long-term defence. What happens next will depend on whether diplomacy is backed by credible deterrence.
Plan A (diplomacy) turns on security guarantees. Ukraine can’t agree to concessions without insurance against another war. Boots on the ground is a good example. A group of states including Britain, France and Germany, has agreed to field a US-supported reassurance force in Ukraine. The public details remain hazy, but Russia’s sensitivity to the plan suggests it has teeth.
Yet because Russia must consent to any ceasefire, it effectively holds a veto over the terms. The plan for a reassurance force, for instance, would apply only after a ceasefire, which means Russia can keep fighting until it likes the deal on offer.
This is a catch-22: any credible deterrent is unlikely to stick, and anything that sticks is unlikely to be credible. Either way, Ukraine would be left relying on Russia’s word after two invasions in a decade.
Plan B (doubled-down defence) is more straightforward. It centres on Ukraine’s own capabilities, with help from its partners. The idea is to turn Ukraine into a steel porcupine: prickly enough to deter Russia by denial, making an attack overly costly, without over-relying on allies. It includes scaling conventional weapons and new technologies, while improving recruitment and retention.
This could work as its own security guarantee that doesn’t first need a ceasefire (though it will be harder without one). It’s also why both plans are happening simultaneously, and why they are almost the same plan.
Even after a peace agreement, Ukraine’s defence posture can’t soften. If Russia’s belligerence is baked in, this war’s end could mark the start of a colder, longer confrontation. Ukraine—and Europe, for that matter—will need a force to deter a potentially decades-long threat from the east.
In the meantime, Ukraine is doing everything possible to seize a US-brokered peace. That might mean agreeing to painful concessions in the short-term, but any deal must still be sold to the Ukrainian public. There’s no guarantee Ukrainians will accept a bad peace just because the government agrees to one.
It’s also vital to get this right the first time around. Ukrainians are fatigued but still possess stunning unity. That could change after negotiations. Potential concessions and an election would likely divide the country and make Ukraine weaker. At the same time, Russia would have time to rearm and undo the damage to its military and economy.
If the United States wants Russia’s war to end, it must increase pressure on Moscow. That means following through on sanctions and enabling Europe to better help Ukraine, including by ensuring the flow of intelligence and off-the-shelf weapons purchases.
Europe also has work to do. Part of the West’s deterrence woes have stemmed from fear of escalation. Yet good deterrence sometimes means looking threats in the eye from higher up on the escalation ladder. For example, deploying a reassurance force before a ceasefire would shift risk onto Moscow. True, it would be expensive, difficult and dangerous. But lending Russia a veto over Ukraine’s security carries its own dangers.
That’s not to say coalition boots must be in Ukraine to win the war or the peace. But it underscores that Europe has the tools to coerce Russia and do more for the country providing its security. It must continue supplying more of what Ukraine can’t yet produce, such as air-defence systems, and investing more in what it can, such as unmanned systems. Turning cash into kit gives Ukraine greater leverage to shape the war’s end.
Peace talks began slowly at first, then all at once. But a durable peace will require changing Russia’s calculus, not Ukraine’s.
A year ago, Kyiv was awash with hope that Russia’s war might finally be brought to an end. This year, the mood is more sober. Almost nothing has changed, and that is the problem. Ukraine wants peace. Russia wants Ukraine. And beyond the battlefield, too little pressure is being applied to shift the calculus.
Ukraine is now preparing for two futures: a diplomatic end to the war and a more active, long-term defence. What happens next will depend on whether diplomacy is backed by credible deterrence.
Plan A (diplomacy) turns on security guarantees. Ukraine can’t agree to concessions without insurance against another war. Boots on the ground is a good example. A group of states including Britain, France and Germany, has agreed to field a US-supported reassurance force in Ukraine. The public details remain hazy, but Russia’s sensitivity to the plan suggests it has teeth.
Yet because Russia must consent to any ceasefire, it effectively holds a veto over the terms. The plan for a reassurance force, for instance, would apply only after a ceasefire, which means Russia can keep fighting until it likes the deal on offer.
This is a catch-22: any credible deterrent is unlikely to stick, and anything that sticks is unlikely to be credible. Either way, Ukraine would be left relying on Russia’s word after two invasions in a decade.
Plan B (doubled-down defence) is more straightforward. It centres on Ukraine’s own capabilities, with help from its partners. The idea is to turn Ukraine into a steel porcupine: prickly enough to deter Russia by denial, making an attack overly costly, without over-relying on allies. It includes scaling conventional weapons and new technologies, while improving recruitment and retention.
This could work as its own security guarantee that doesn’t first need a ceasefire (though it will be harder without one). It’s also why both plans are happening simultaneously, and why they are almost the same plan.
Even after a peace agreement, Ukraine’s defence posture can’t soften. If Russia’s belligerence is baked in, this war’s end could mark the start of a colder, longer confrontation. Ukraine—and Europe, for that matter—will need a force to deter a potentially decades-long threat from the east.
In the meantime, Ukraine is doing everything possible to seize a US-brokered peace. That might mean agreeing to painful concessions in the short-term, but any deal must still be sold to the Ukrainian public. There’s no guarantee Ukrainians will accept a bad peace just because the government agrees to one.
It’s also vital to get this right the first time around. Ukrainians are fatigued but still possess stunning unity. That could change after negotiations. Potential concessions and an election would likely divide the country and make Ukraine weaker. At the same time, Russia would have time to rearm and undo the damage to its military and economy.
If the United States wants Russia’s war to end, it must increase pressure on Moscow. That means following through on sanctions and enabling Europe to better help Ukraine, including by ensuring the flow of intelligence and off-the-shelf weapons purchases.
Europe also has work to do. Part of the West’s deterrence woes have stemmed from fear of escalation. Yet good deterrence sometimes means looking threats in the eye from higher up on the escalation ladder. For example, deploying a reassurance force before a ceasefire would shift risk onto Moscow. True, it would be expensive, difficult and dangerous. But lending Russia a veto over Ukraine’s security carries its own dangers.
That’s not to say coalition boots must be in Ukraine to win the war or the peace. But it underscores that Europe has the tools to coerce Russia and do more for the country providing its security. It must continue supplying more of what Ukraine can’t yet produce, such as air-defence systems, and investing more in what it can, such as unmanned systems. Turning cash into kit gives Ukraine greater leverage to shape the war’s end.
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