Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
presented in partnership with the NEW REPUBLIC
Updating the ‘Atoms for Peace’ bargain
for the new nuclear age
By Richard Nephew, Matt Bowen | September 17, 2025
General Dynamics/Atoms for Peace poster by Erik Nitsche, 1955. (Cropped)
In 1953, President Eisenhower presented a vision to the world that came to be known as “Atoms for Peace.” His speech to the United Nations grappled with how to address the risks of nuclear weapons use, the proliferation of such weapons to additional countries, and how to avoid, as he put it, a hopeless future of nuclear-armed nations “doomed malevolently to eye each other indefinitely across a trembling world.” To promote these goals, Eisenhower set forward proposals that included expediting the development of peaceful nuclear energy technologies, creating a new international atomic agency, and finding a solution to the atomic armaments race that threatened world peace.
Eisenhower’s speech created the basis for the fundamental bargains that have steered nuclear technology development and deployment ever since: Countries could have access to nuclear power but not nuclear weapons; nuclear weapon states would cooperate with other countries to develop peaceful uses of nuclear technology but would be obligated to prevent proliferation; and the IAEA would monitor it all and provide assurance in implementing the bargain’s core principles.
Despite its faults, this bargain has delivered much to all sides. The number of nuclear-armed states has remained relatively low, and none have developed nuclear weapons while a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—a fact that Iran may be about to test. Civilian nuclear technology has led to unexpected advances in areas as far afield as fighting malaria to reducing malnutrition. And the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains a vital part of the international nuclear landscape, propelling forward research and collaboration despite myriad bumps along the way.
Perhaps ironically, it was the proliferation of nuclear power as an energy source that really did not match expectations. In the 1960s and 1970s, several hundred reactors were ordered, with plans for the construction of nuclear power plants the world over. But power reactors have proven expensive, and there have been several high-profile reactor accidents that have raised safety concerns with the public. Both factors have limited the perceived value of nuclear energy in helping countries address their energy and environmental challenges—and, by this, their willingness to continue accepting the bargain.
This has been especially acute concerning the US nuclear industry.
Once the leader in international nuclear commerce, the United States has fallen behind. There are many different reasons for this, not least being the issues of cost, public perceptions of safety, and security. One dynamic has been the amplification of security-related concerns after 9/11 and the revelations of the presence of the Abdul Qadeer Khan network in Pakistan in 2003, which played a huge role in the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology to Iran, North Korea, Libya, and others. These parallel developments led the United States to raise its guardrails around the trade of nuclear technology, and to agitate internationally for more stringent nuclear-related restrictions. While some countries—China and Russia, in particular—have not shared these concerns, US international nuclear policy remains bound to strictures that are symbolically important but may have little practical nonproliferation value.
This evolution invites a reexamination of the nature of current US nuclear commerce and recent developments, current US nonproliferation policies, and a description of the factors that may stymie US exports of nuclear technology. Only this work can help formulate recommendations for policy and legal fixes to the US nonproliferation regime and nuclear policies, which could make the United States a leader once again in the global nuclear industry without sacrificing core nonproliferation principles. But changes and investment are needed now to ensure that the US approach to nuclear nonproliferation continues to have a voice internationally.
The NPT bargain. Eisenhower’s speech in 1953 didn’t start nonproliferation efforts, as these were part of the immediate international conversation after World War II. But the speech did mark an attempt to design a system that allowed for what was considered the inevitable spread of nuclear technology, but that could harness it positively—if the weapons implications could be addressed. This approach constituted a step between the possible nuclear anarchy that could have persisted after the war and toward a more regulated and managed international nuclear industry. (While some have described the so-called “grand bargain” that laid the foundations for the building of the NPT as “incomplete,” it is a commonly used description, including by individuals[1] involved in the negotiation of the NPT, and we will use it here.)
Two elements would prove central to this bargain concept. The first was the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1956 and, more important, the adoption of its governing statute. The IAEA statute helped structure the Agency, but reading it thoroughly gives a clear sense of its complex and sometimes contradictory mandate. Its second article speaks to this tension:
“The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.”
But in the third article laying out the functions of the agency, the full breadth of the IAEA and the tasks of the broader international community become more evident. The very first task is to ensure that there is widespread availability and use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. (Developing and administering safeguards to ensure these peaceful purposes is explicitly listed in the third article.) Even if some adjustments of language are understandable to accommodate the political difficulties implicit in trying to write such a document, the preliminary weight was heavily tilted in favor of use, not control.
It was the 1960s that led to a real change in focus for the international nonproliferation system. In the time since the IAEA statute had been approved, France and China had tested their own nuclear devices, and the arms race was proceeding at full speed between Western and Eastern blocs. Perhaps more daunting, policy makers around the world were waking again to the extreme danger of nuclear weapons in many more national hands.
The Cuban Missile Crisis serves as a useful proxy for the emerging consciousness in the United States and the Soviet Union about the risks of nuclear weapons being spread around the world, but many other incidents—including the various Berlin crises, the contemplated use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam and other conflicts—were reinforcing the danger. Still, there was no appetite to quash the use of nuclear power or the peaceful application of nuclear technology. The bargain was still seen as fundamentally sensible, but its nonproliferation elements needed strengthening to make it sustainable. Negotiations therefore began in support of a treaty that would address this problem, and the NPT opened for countries’ signatures in 1968.
The NPT bargain[2] has similarities to what Eisenhower discussed.
Its first two articles deal with the problem of proliferation directly. In the first, nuclear-weapon states are prohibited from giving or selling nuclear weapons or their technology to other states. In the second, non-nuclear weapon states are prohibited from seeking nuclear weapons or their technology. Article three covers the creation of an enhanced system of safeguards to ensure that the second article has meaning, giving the IAEA the power to administer them. Article four covers the importance of sharing nuclear technology, making it a commitment that—subject to the other articles—countries will collaborate on nuclear projects. Article six covers the commitment all parties make to pursue first nuclear and, second, general and complete disarmament.
The vision, therefore, that Eisenhower set in motion in 1953 would form the cornerstones of the global nonproliferation architecture today. But, as nuclear technology became more accessible, the tension between nonproliferation and access did not disappear.
Nuclear science and research have benefited the world, including important contributions to the medical and agricultural sectors, as mentioned earlier. Trade of civilian nuclear energy technology was also enabled with the export control and safeguards provisions, and today nuclear power represents about 10 percent of the global electricity supply, with prospects of further expansion. Judging by the near-universal adherence to the NPT—with 191 member states—non-nuclear weapon states judged the bargain presented to them in an overall positive light. Every nation, as a result, renounced nuclear weapons and accepted international inspections on its civilian nuclear program. As some observers have noted, not as many nations ended up possessing nuclear weapons as were initially feared in the 1950s and 1960s, and some credit for this result should be given to Atoms for Peace, the IAEA, and the NPT.[3]
But some of those same observers would nonetheless also assign blame to Atoms for Peace for adverse outcomes. For example, the early and fast spread of nuclear technologies partly contributed to weapons proliferation. The NPT has a well-known loophole, in that enrichment and reprocessing technologies—key to getting fissile material for a nuclear weapon—are not universally banned, and a country can therefore get very close to possessing weapon-grade fissile material without actually violating the treaty. In another example, the IAEA later realized that the safeguards required by the NPT were not sufficient for the agency to be able to determine whether a nation’s declarations were correct and complete. To try solving this issue of verification, the IAEA developed its so-called “Additional Protocol,” which provides the agency with additional tools to determine if a state’s declarations about its nuclear program are complete, but not all countries have agreed to such a protocol.[4]
Though some countries have challenged the nonproliferation regime and, in their own ways, threatened the stability of the associated, precarious system, the overall NPT bargain continues to be sensible. Still, the question about how to maintain this bargain and the integrity of the nonproliferation regime remains an important one—especially over how to balance the various elements of nonproliferation.
Nuclear energy in a new era. Over 70 years after Eisenhower’s address to the UN on nuclear weapons, the world is now confronting a very different type of risk in the form of climate change—which adds up to the more conventional challenges of air pollution and energy security, among other risks. Despite concerns about the dangers of continued fossil fuel use, the percentage of world energy supply from coal, oil, and natural gas has remained stubbornly at above 80 percent since the beginning of the new century, and world energy demands have and will likely continue to grow.
The International Energy Agency has forecast that electricity demand could double by 2050, driven in part by the electrification of other sectors. Most models, such as those analyzed by the International Panel on Climate Change, show rising nuclear energy usage as part of a range of scenarios in which global energy supply is decarbonized by mid-century. In part for that reason, the US public and private sectors have been investing in new advanced fission reactor designs, and several projects are in the early stages of moving toward deployment of pilot projects. The results of those demonstrations will not be known for years, but the nuclear industry hopes they can lead to reactors that are affordable, more inherently safe, and can serve different missions (such as process heat) than previous designs.
However, like the past generation, new reactors will likely continue to rely on enriched uranium as a fuel, requiring enrichment capacity and producing used nuclear fuel that contains plutonium that can potentially be diverted for weapon use. The IAEA may apply existing safeguards in non-nuclear weapon states willing to develop advanced reactors, but in some cases very different safeguards approaches will likely be needed.
A more recent development has been the rise in electricity (and water) demand to feed the needs of data centers, driven in part by the needs of artificial intelligence. This has led to developments in the United States, for example, where so-called “hyperscalers”—large-scale cloud service providers—have signed agreements to re-open closed nuclear power plants (such as Three Mile Island Unit 1), invest in advanced reactor companies, and sign purchase agreements for future advanced reactor deployments. This has been driven by a projected need for new energy capacity, commitments on greenhouse gas emissions, and an assessment that renewables and storage will not be enough. The associated concern at a national level is that if new power isn’t available, countries will fall behind in the AI race, with potential national security implications.
Another development since the 1950s has been the advancement of fusion science and technology, with a few dozen companies in the United States now trying to commercialize different ways of making energy from fusion reactions. The US government has also invested in some of these private companies. Fusion power plants using deuterium-tritium fuel would still produce large numbers of energetic neutrons that could irradiate fertile material, producing fissile material. The manufacturing of and presence of significant amounts of tritium would be activities of interest to the nonproliferation regime; for example, the Nuclear Suppliers Group controls tritium, “target assemblies and components for the production of tritium,” and “tritium facilities” on its list of dual-use technologies (that is, technologies with both civil and military applications). Still, a fusion energy resource that does not involve uranium, uranium enrichment, and the production of plutonium would have advantages over fission-based reactors in terms of nonproliferation considerations. For those reasons, some have suggested a potential mission for the IAEA at future fusion power plants in non-nuclear weapon states—that is, treating them in the same way as fission plants, by using the complementary access provisions of the Additional Protocol.[5]
If successful, new civil nuclear energy options that are helpful to nations in meeting their energy and environmental challenges would support the civil nuclear energy component of the NPT bargain. New nuclear plants could help stabilize electricity grids with higher renewable energy content, where recent outages have highlighted grid reliability and interconnection challenges.
Both the underlying rationales for nuclear energy and the specific nuclear technologies (and their nonproliferation attributes) under consideration have changed considerably since the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, when laws such as the Atomic Energy Act and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act were passed. The existing nonproliferation model is dated and in need of a refresh.
Recent efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation regime.
Existing multilateral forums do not appear to be promising avenues for progress in limiting the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to more countries. Modifying the NPT itself has proven to be a nonstarter, and the international politics around doing so are harder than ever: There is a resonant, arguably justified sense among non-nuclear weapon states that a cartel is in place that governs their access to an important and lucrative technology base.
There was a possible moment to make such adaptations to the NPT in the 1990s. Revelations about the Iraqi and North Korean nuclear programs in the early years of the decade allowed the international community to look more closely at controls of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, and especially the problem of dual-use technology. The result was enhanced export controls at the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the adoption of the Additional Protocol. The unique political moment of the 1990s was also a factor—this was a time of global integration, the end of the Cold War, relative cooperation among the big powers, and a sense that global governance could be successful.
By the mid-2000s, the moment had passed, as seen by the lack of a sustained, global response to the discovery and disbanding of the Khan proliferation network in the years 2003 and 2004. The international community did briefly consider new restrictions based on proposals made by the then-US President George W. Bush in 2004, fed in large part by the Libyan decision to abandon nuclear weapons and disclosure of their work with Khan. Most important, among other things, his speech sought to make the adoption of the Additional Protocol a condition of nuclear supply and prohibit future transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology to countries without these capabilities.
But ultimately, these proposals were not adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group or many countries individually. By and large, there was support among many nuclear technology holders for some kind of restriction, but there was significant debate over its scope and how prohibitions would be applied. Moreover, other issues made it harder to accommodate. Some states refused to abide by any new restrictions until others—Israel in particular—joined the NPT. Other states argued that the core nuclear bargain of technology access was already implemented unfairly by the United States and its partners at the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In the 2000s, global solutions ended up being beyond the capacity of the international community, and national approaches became the default.
The United States tried to advance a global nonproliferation approach that would restrict access to the most sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, opting for a unilateral set of conditions that provide access to US nuclear technology in exchange for voluntary renunciation of sensitive dual-use capabilities. The problem with this approach is that, despite some successes, very few states addressed the requirement for enhanced IAEA monitoring and limitation on weapons-relevant fuel cycle capabilities.
Some successes are notable. Every “123 Agreement”—named after a section of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act—for cooperation between the United States and other states signed since 2009 has included the IAEA’s Additional Protocol as a condition of supply of US nuclear materials. The two agreements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Taiwan went even further.
In 2009, the Obama administration built on the previous Bush administration’s negotiations with the UAE to establish what became known as the “gold standard” for nonproliferation commitments in a 123 Agreement. In it, Abu Dhabi agreed to adhere to the Additional Protocol as a condition of nuclear supply and to renounce enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. The UAE was motivated in large part by a desire to demonstrate that a country could have a large, modern civilian nuclear power program without these two technologies. Even still, the UAE made clear that this commitment was conditional on the non-recognition of similar capabilities in the hands of other states in the region, which the nuclear agreements with Iran reached in 2013 and 2015 tested.
Taiwan later accepted a similar set of constraints as the UAE, probably for reasons having as much to do with the imperative of maintaining good relations with the United States to face an increasingly adversarial China. The list of existing 123 Agreements currently in force (see Table 1) shows the difficulty of the United States to leverage access to its technology for nonproliferation commitments and the special nature of the UAE and Taiwan documents.
Other reasons why the United States lacks leverage.
A central challenge facing US efforts to gain national commitments on nonproliferation through the commerce of civilian nuclear technology is that it is working from a place of weakness on multiple fronts.
Compared with Russia and China, the United States has not been consistently building reactors at home. The only two new reactors issued a construction permit and built since the 1970s—Westinghouse’s AP1000 pressurized water reactors at the Vogtle plant in Georgia—went very badly, and almost didn’t make it to the finish line. The two AP1000 units were finally connected to the grid in April 2023 and March 2024, at more than double the cost and schedule originally planned. Two more AP1000s at the V.C. Summer plant in neighboring South Carolina were stopped after $9 billion had already been spent. That one data point does not show potential customers abroad that the United States is proficient at building reactors.
Private companies from the United States are also more challenging for nations to work with, for multiple reasons. The federal government has a maze of export control regulations administered by several different federal agencies (e.g., Energy Department, NRC, and Commerce Department) that nations must navigate. These agencies are also distinct from the ones that supply government finance in support of exports, such as the US Export-Import Bank and the Development Finance Corporation. By contrast, customer nations can sit across the table from Russia and Chinese state-owned entities and negotiate the terms of reactor supply and financing in a much more simplified manner.
Even if the US government decided to supply financing in support of reactor exports, the offers that the United States makes do not appear to be as generous as the ones Russia and China make. The loans that China and Russia have issued in support of their reactor exports have been, by several metrics, more generous than US Export-Import Bank loans would nominally be, and the equity offers made by Russia in particular are greater than what private companies or even the US government are capable of.
Several of these advantages also apply to other US competitors in civilian nuclear technology exports that are military allies, including France and South Korea. All told, the United States’ existing competitive disadvantages and weaknesses make it harder to ask other countries for more nonproliferation commitments than what alternative suppliers are asking for.
Recommendations. In addition to large investments in reactor development, the US government has also initiated efforts to modernize and update regulatory policies at the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission,[6] made investments into the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle,[7] and may even be re-thinking its approach to the back end of the fuel cycle, as well. At the same time that the United States is redirecting its nuclear energy policy, it should also reinvigorate its nonproliferation policy to address some emerging as well as longstanding challenges.
Notwithstanding the many different complexities involved in nuclear commerce, US nonproliferation requirements are currently neither preventing states that refuse to comply with Washington’s demands from exploring nuclear power projects with the Russians, Chinese, or others, nor are they ensuring that US prerogatives are dictating the form and pace of this market. Only by making modifications to the broader edifice of the United States’ foreign nuclear industry activities can these dynamics shift. But a different US nonproliferation approach may contribute to a more effective approach, especially if US officials and lawmakers are prepared to offer more significant incentives to foreign countries. For example, some experts suggested in the past that the United States shift toward a strategy of “buying out” an ally’s ambition for sensitive nuclear technology. This approach, however, might only work before a country builds capabilities that would be difficult or expensive to relinquish.
To that end, several leverage options exist for the United States that deserve further consideration:
Authorize the Energy Department’s Loan Programs Office to provide financing to cover a limited amount of reactor exports when a country agrees not to host enrichment and reprocessing facilities in a 123 agreement. One item of substantial value to countries embarking on new nuclear programs and looking to buy reactors from supplier nations is financing. The US government has two existing export financing entities—the Export-Import Bank and the Development Finance Corporation—though neither reports to the negotiators of 123 agreements, which are the Secretary of State and Secretary of Energy. Having an office with financing capability reporting to either secretary would make the negotiations easier and more credible. On the other hand, it is possible that both export financing entities could be modified in this respect. Future 123 agreements could then have as provisions financing of, say, up to 85 percent of the cost for some limited amount of new reactors (e.g., 2,000 to 5,000 megawatts). That could be a substantial enticement for some nations. The OECD export credit understanding might need to be updated for OECD countries, such as the United States, to exceed the limits contained therein.
Update the World Bank policy to allow support for safeguarded reactor projects if a country has an Additional Protocol in force. The World Bank has recently overturned its policy against supporting nuclear power projects. One useful nonproliferation criterion that could be included in a new policy is that the World Bank will only support fission-powered projects that are under IAEA safeguards and in nations that have an Additional Protocol in place (with fusion power projects requiring the latter). An additional policy measure that could be considered is the country’s commitment to using the international market for enrichment and reprocessing services, as opposed to hosting such facilities. Both would make sense as part of a risk assessment for any loan, given that a country doing some proliferation activities could lead to sanctions and, therefore, potentially a difficulty in paying back the loan.
Negotiate a trilateral agreement with the United Kingdom and France in which all parties agree to supply enrichment and reprocessing services at market rates to any country that agrees in legally-binding form not to host enrichment and reprocessing facilities. All three countries host commercial-scale enrichment facilities (though the US and UK facilities are both URENCO facilities that are also owned by Germany and the Netherlands), and France operates a commercial-scale reprocessing facility with a decades-long demonstrated capability to provide spent nuclear fuel reprocessing services to foreign countries.
The three countries have relatively similar nonproliferation perspectives, and the combined capabilities would present a redundant, credible offer to other countries if they agree not to host enrichment facilities. France is presently the only country of the three that can offer reprocessing services to foreign customers, though the United States could investigate building such a capability. Apart from cost, the challenge to doing so, however, is likely to stem from finding a state willing to host a facility that receives foreign commercial spent nuclear fuel.
Another option that could be considered is to potentially add Japan as a technology holder to get out of a US-Europe-centric dynamic. But, here too, challenges are not hard to conceive of. For example, Japan’s long-delayed Rokkasho reprocessing plant is still not operational, and Japan may want to prioritize serving domestic needs ahead of international ones, to say nothing of whether it has the legal and political will to import and manage foreign spent nuclear fuel.
Offer long-term programmatic fuel export licenses in 123 agreements to countries that agree not to host enrichment or reprocessing facilities. After 123 agreements with other countries enter into force, the licensing of fuel exports from the United States to those countries still runs through NRC export controls for each new refueling. To reduce bureaucratic overhead and associated financial costs, and show a long-term commitment to fuel supply, the Energy Department and the State Department’s negotiators could give programmatic approval to all future fuel orders exported under the agreement. It is not without precedent for the US government to approve fuel exports for long periods of time (that is, decades). For example, in 2019, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved an application from the Louisiana Energy Services company (which operates a URENCO enrichment facility in New Mexico) to export enriched uranium to the Republic of Korea for a period stretching out to 2040.
The Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) could study each of these four incentives, as well as others, to assess their potential efficacy. In particular, the NNSA might fund a study to gauge the interest of various countries that have expressed potential interest in a civil nuclear energy program to the IAEA. That could help determine whether a set of incentives would be valuable enough to other countries that a greater number would agree not to host enrichment and reprocessing facilities.
Review the export control and safeguards regime for fusion. If the IAEA decides to use the complementary access provisions in the Additional Protocol at future fusion power plants, it would make sense to condition the supply of fusion power plants to another country on whether or not it has an Additional Protocol in force. Currently, there is no export control provision in the US regulatory regime that requires this condition.
The US government could consider this policy, as well as a broader review of US export control provisions related to fusion, to see whether the current regime is adequate. The US government could undertake to publish studies on how the IAEA might access fusion plants using the provisions in the Additional Protocol, just like the NNSA did with some of the safeguards-by-design on how safeguards might work for a private fission-based reactor which shows how the IAEA might safeguard such facilities.
Revisit Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. The governing statute for 123 agreements has played an important role in US nonproliferation policy, but attempts to over-leverage it may have compromised some of its value. When faced with the herculean requirements to secure congressional support for such agreements—especially in the context of the broader debates around nuclear energy—both the US government and industry have shied away from steps that would require 123 Agreement coverage. Embarking on such an agreement is often a long negotiation process with an uncertain outcome, forcing countries to offer to relinquish sovereign capabilities without a real understanding of the benefits that might accrue as a result. Industry groups, especially those in the cutting-edge advanced reactor and fusion sectors, see 123 Agreements as more hindrance than anything else.
A multi-track approach to 123 Agreement development and negotiation may be smarter, with some parts of the 123 Agreement package modifiable based upon the negotiations with the country on the other side of the table. As one of us (Richard Nephew) wrote already, this could include a sliding scale approach to inspector access requirements and acceptable nuclear commerce, and a readiness to accept “black box” technology transfers as not requiring the same obligations as the maximalist, “gold standard” approach that has framed other 123 Agreements.
The United States could also look for options to expedite 123 Agreement consideration in the event of a commitment to abandon enrichment and reprocessing, as well as any underlying licenses. Congress could also affirm that there is no need for 123 Agreements to govern transfers of nuclear technology that are associated with fusion reactor projects. Such ideas would have the two salutary benefits of moving forward on nuclear commerce and US product innovation, while shifting towards nuclear energy systems with better nonproliferation attributes.
Redefining the US role in the new nuclear era.
As the United States reworks and revises its nuclear policies related to reactor development, regulation, and spent nuclear fuel management, the time is ripe for a rethinking of its approach to nonproliferation. Current bipartisan support for nuclear energy could make it easier to reach a consensus on a new approach to international nuclear energy cooperation that is premised on offering other countries incentives to entice them to agree not to host enrichment and reprocessing facilities.
If countries are seriously willing to greatly increase the use of nuclear energy throughout the 21st century, US policymakers should see devising a new long-term nonproliferation strategy as a worthy investment of their time.
Notes
[1] E.g., US Ambassador Tom Graham, who led negotiations to extend the NPT indefinitely in 1995, describes the NPT as a “political and strategic bargain” on page 186 of his book, “Unending Crisis: National Security Policy After 9/11,” (University of Washington Press, 2012).
[2] See, e.g., remarks on December 9, 2003, by Mitchell Reis, director of policy planning at the US Department of State at the “Atoms for Peace: A Future After Fifty Years?” conference. https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/p/rem/2003/27035.htm
[3] E.g., see former Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger’s comments in Chapter 2 of “Atoms for Peace: A Future at Fifty?” https://www.wilsoncenter.org/book/atoms-for-peace-future-after-fifty-years
[4] Most, but not all, non-nuclear weapon states have agreed to the Additional Protocol; As of March 2023, 141 nations had one in force.
[5] Princeton workshop, “Fusion Energy and Nonproliferation Workshop: Summary Report – Revision 1 (Apr 7, 2023)” March 2023.
[6] The ADVANCE Act text can be found at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/870, and NRC’s webpage that explains its responses to the act can be found here: https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/governing-laws/advance-act.html
[7] For example, DOE announced awards to support low-enriched uranium and high-assay low enriched uranium: https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/biden-harris-administration-announces-contracts-buy-us-sourced-low-enriched-uranium and https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/biden-harris-administration-announces-6-contracts-spur-americas-domestic-haleu-supply
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