Friday, September 19, 2025

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY - WILL SAUDI ARABIA’S NEW DEFENSE AGREEMENT WITH PAKISTAN HAVE PROLIFERATION CONSEQUENCES? by Simon Henderson Policy Alert September 19, 2025

 WILL SAUDI ARABIA’S NEW DEFENSE AGREEMENT WITH PAKISTAN HAVE PROLIFERATION CONSEQUENCES?

by Simon Henderson

Policy Alert
September 19, 2025

The deal seems mostly symbolic given that Riyadh is a major trading partner with India—Pakistan’s main adversary—but the implications may nevertheless be significant for regional proliferation concerns, nuclear energy ambitions, and related U.S. diplomacy.

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During a state visit to Riyadh on September 17, Pakistani 

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif joined Saudi Crown Prince 

Muhammad bin Salman in signing a “strategic mutual 

defense agreement,” which states that “any aggression 

against either country shall be considered an aggression 

against both.” Diplomatically, this move appears to express 

regional frustration with Washington, accentuated in recent 

days by the Trump administration’s handling of Israel’s 

attack on Hamas leaders inside Qatar. Yet the agreement has 

probably been long in gestation. In November 2024, Pakistani 

army chief Asim Munir traveled to Riyadh for talks on “ways 

to further strengthen defense cooperation,” then visited again 

this June accompanied by Prime Minister Sharif, and a third 

time this week for the agreement’s signing.


Some have speculated that the Saudis will now have access to

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. When asked whether Pakistan 

would be obliged to provide the kingdom with a nuclear 

umbrella, a senior Saudi official told Reuters, “This is a 

comprehensive defensive agreement that encompasses all 

military means.” Since 1998, Pakistan has produced an 

estimated 170 nuclear warheads deliverable by ballistic 

missiles, aircraft, or cruise missiles. 


Riyadh’s own nuclear weapons ambitions have become 

increasingly explicit over the years. In 2018, Crown Prince 

Muhammad told 60 Minutes, “Saudi Arabia does not want to 

acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt if Iran 

developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as 

possible.” And in 2022, the kingdom’s foreign minister told a 

conference in Dubai, “If Iran gets an operational nuclear 

weapon, all bets are off.” Although Iran’s nuclear program 

took a heavy hit from the U.S. and Israeli bombing campaigns 

in June, concerns persist about the whereabouts of its stocks 

of uranium, much of which had been enriched to near 

weapons grade.


Saudi Arabia is thought to have plans for a centrifuge 

enrichment plant, and the kingdom currently limits the access 

of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA). Well-placed Western officials also concede that the 

kingdom was the fourth, unpublicized customer of A. Q. 

Khan, the late Pakistani nuclear scientist and proliferator who 

sold centrifuge equipment to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. In 

1999, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan, a full brother to 

the current king, visited Pakistan’s main enrichment plant at 

Kahuta.


Concerns about Saudi Arabia’s nuclear weapons plans date 

back further, to 1988, when the kingdom acquired nuclear-

capable, long-range Dong Feng–3 missiles from China. U.S. 

officials learned of this deal only when the missiles were 

spotted on trucks being transported to their launch sites in the 

Saudi desert.


On September 15, IAEA director-general Rafael Grossi 

outlined the broader challenge: “Even within some countries 

in good standing with their obligation under the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty, there are now open discussions 

about whether or not to acquire nuclear weapons. Think for a 

minute about a world where instead of a few, we would have 

twenty or twenty-five countries armed with nuclear weapons.”



The Pakistan-Saudi agreement will also concern Washington 

because of the hoped-for nuclear arrangement with the 

United States that would likely complement Israel-Saudi 

normalization should it once again become viable. And it 

would hinder the India–Middle East–Europe Economic 

Corridor (IMEC), which is designed to establish a sea and 

land trade route connecting India and Israel via Saudi Arabia 

and Jordan. The details and meaning of the Riyadh accord 

may well become clearer when the Pakistani prime minister 

soon arrives in New York to attend the session of the UN 

General Assembly.


Simon Henderson is the Baker Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and director of its Bernstein Program on Gulf and Energy Policy.



THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

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