CHATHAM HOUSE Will Germany rearm quickly enough? ‘Zeitenwende’ has transformed German attitudes to defence. But it will take more than increased spending to deliver a more effective military. - Published 26 August 2025

 CHATHAM HOUSE 

Will Germany rearm quickly enough?

‘Zeitenwende’ has transformed German attitudes to defence. But it will take more than increased spending to deliver a more effective military.

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Published 26 August 2025 —

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Image — Passers-by climb on a Bundeswehr self-propelled howitzer during the inauguration ceremony of German brigade at Cathedral Square, Vilnius, Lithuania in May 2025. (Photo by Yauhen Yerchak/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)

Dr Marion Messmer

Senior Research Fellow, International Security Programme

Germany is participating in a series of military exercises during August and September – training to defend NATO’s eastern flank. That follows May’s activation of a Bundeswehr armoured brigade that will be stationed long term in Lithuania as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. 

That deployment is perhaps the earliest visible manifestation of ‘Zeitenwende’ – loosely translated as ‘turning point’ – the security policy shift announced by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in 2022. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine that year was a wake-up call for all European NATO members. But for Germany, the invasion meant much more. Zeitenwende represents a transformational cultural and political shift for a country that was rebuilt on a pacifist and demilitarized legacy after the Second World War. 

The attitude of other European countries towards Germany has also changed significantly following the invasion. Only 30 years ago other European governments worried about German reunification, concerned it might create an over-powerful nation. Now, in the context of US disengagement from European defence, the same countries are eager for Berlin to expand its armed forces.

Germany has made unprecedented strides in the three years following Scholz’s speech. But significant challenges lie ahead to make its rearmament effort efficient, effective, and enduring.

Initial success 

Over the past three years, defence and security policy reform has been extensive. The consistent nature of these changes suggests that they are permanent and lasting. 

€108.2bn

Germany’s planned defence budget for 2026.

There have been early successes. Berlin has committed to much higher investment in domestic production of defence equipment. Reform of the purposefully slow military procurement system is underway – with legislation also planned to speed up construction on military bases. 

And greater cooperation between the armed forces and local communities is being encouraged to increase civil resilience. The Operational Plan for Germany is seeking to introduce a ‘whole of society’ approach to defence akin to that practiced in countries like Estonia. These are significant successes achieved in a relatively short time, suggesting that Germany is on its way to become a much stronger military power.

However, German defence still faces significant issues. The armed forces have frequently made headlines over the last decade for the poor shape of their equipment. Those deficiencies will need to be addressed. And many other challenges lie ahead.

Spending money well

Like many other European countries, Germany has agreed to massively boost its defence spending. According to the German Ministry of Defence, a budget of €108.2 billion is planned for 2026 – up from €86 billion in 2025. But how well it will spend that money is open to question. The German procurement process prior to the reforms was famously cumbersome. The German parliament was embroiled in a debate over the procurement of armed Heron drones for over a decade, from 2008–22. 

Germany has also struggled with procuring exquisite bespoke systems that then ended up more costly and less reliable than expected. Examples include the Puma infantry fighting vehicle and famously, the spare parts shortage for the Eurofighter Typhoon: only four of 128 aircraft were operational for a time.

Traditional German foreign policy values are clearly visible in some of the country’s new defence projects. That includes a big emphasis on working in partnership with other countries. This has found its expression in cross-European defence projects, such as the European Sky Shield Initiative or the European Long-Range Strike Approach. 

One of the biggest challenges Germany faces is that many procurement timelines are not ambitious enough.

These two programmes exemplify the procurement dilemma that Germany and its European NATO allies face. Europe undoubtedly needs air defence and long-range strike capabilities. But European governments also have to strike a balance between maintaining a diversity of systems that is resilient to supply interruptions – and the need to benefit from economies of scale. 

Across Europe there remains a philosophy that defence industry investments must benefit local economies. That risks duplication of effort within NATO, where groups of governments invest in rival weapons systems. Efforts to design a next generation fighter (GCAP and SCAF) and long-range missile strike capability (ELSA and updated Storm Shadow) represent such internal European competition. Considering the threat posed by Russia and the uncertainty over US security ties, it would often make more sense for European countries to focus on single projects. That should increase the number of units produced, and lead to cost benefits.

It could also help address the defence industry’s repeatedly stated need for full order books and long-term contracts – which they say is required in order to expand production. At the very least, the German government should use its power and influence to ensure that defence projects across Europe are distinctive enough so as not to duplicate.

Questions of timing

One of the biggest challenges Germany faces is that many procurement timelines are not ambitious enough. 

Danish intelligence estimates that Russia might be ready to attempt an attack on NATO in five years. So too did Mark Rutte in his Chatham House speech. Yet ELSA is not expected to be operational until 2035. It is crucial that Berlin also places orders for equipment that can be produced more quickly, ideally without introducing additional supply line complications.

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Looking to purchase off-the-shelf equipment could help. Sourcing from non-NATO partners can ensure that equipment is available sooner. But it can also introduce challenges to NATO’s Interoperability. Even if defence companies produce to NATO standards, it can be tricky connecting equipment that needs to perform the same function but comes from different manufacturers. Armed forces personnel may be trained on one system but not familiar with others. And multiple systems complicate supply of spare parts to the front line.  

The procurement challenge is incredibly complex. Wrong decisions will remain with the German armed forces and by extension with NATO for decades. The German government needs to ensure that decisions are balanced between systems and equipment that urgently need boosting now – such as air defence and munitions – and longer-term projects such as long-range strike capabilities that cannot be produced quickly. 

Challenges to civil defence

Another significant challenge Germany faces is in the arena of military recruitment and public threat awareness. Public attitudes towards military careers, and awareness of the threat Russia poses, have changed significantly due to the Ukraine war. 

Yet the growing popularity of the right-wing Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party is cause for concern. The AfD has been accused of amplifying Russian government narratives and has a very different perception of the potential threat emanating from Moscow. 

Many voters are likely drawn to the party’s domestic policy proposals, more than its Russia policy. But were the AfD to play a bigger role in a future government it would unquestioningly endanger German commitment to Ukrainian security and deterrence of Russia. The German government could do more now to highlight Russian disinformation to the public and to debunk it.

Regardless of the difficulties, Germany has an unprecedented opportunity. Reform of military systems and procurement processes has long been needed. And as the largest European economy, with a rejuvenated sense of purpose in Europe, Germany is uniquely placed to drive the swift rearmament NATO badly needs. So long as its government can prioritize the ultimate goal of stronger European security, Europe may prove able to face the challenge of an aggressive Russia – and a disengaging US. If Germany falters, the future looks far more uncertain.