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Syria’s parliamentary elections: A turning point or another top-down exercise?
The formation of a new legislative body will serve as a test for whether Syria’s government is ready to embrace pluralism and institutional reform.
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Published 9 September 2025 —
4 minute READ
Image — People wave Syrian flags during a rally in Idlib on 3 July 2025. OMAR ALBAW/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images.
Dr Haid Haid
Consulting Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme
Syria’s transitional authorities are set to form a new legislative body between 15–20 September, the first such initiative since the fall of Bashar Al Assad’s regime.
The process is not a popular vote or a general election. It instead adopts a hybrid model, with pre-selected electoral colleges voting to elect representatives for their respective districts, while other representatives are appointed directly by the president.
The elections come at a crucial time for President Ahmed al-Sharaa. He is set to address the United Nations General Assembly this month as he seeks to bolster his government’s legitimacy in the wake of deadly sectarian clashes in Sweida in July. Al-Sharaa faces a range of challenges, including tensions with Kurdish groups and others over integration, a collapsing economy, mounting humanitarian and financial needs, weakened state institutions and services, and ongoing destabilizing Israeli strikes on Syria.
Without genuine transparency and meaningful inclusion, the process risks becoming another top-down exercise that reinforces public cynicism.
On paper, the framework for the elections introduces incremental but notable improvements over the new Syrian government’s previous transitional efforts. It pledges wider representation, multiple consultation stages, and phased safeguards. Yet these promises are undermined by procedural concerns, weak oversight, and the risk of political manipulation.
Syria’s legislative reboot is more than an administrative milestone. It is a test of the transitional government’s willingness to embrace pluralism and institutional reform. Without genuine transparency and meaningful inclusion, the process risks becoming another top-down exercise that reinforces public cynicism over the government’s attempts to build a new, more pluralist Syria.
Blueprint for selection
One month after the fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024, interim president Ahmad al-Sharaa formally dissolved the People’s Assembly, which had served as a rubber-stamp body aimed at legitimizing Assad’s rule, without any real power to initiate or shape legislation.
Yet, the process of establishing a new legislature in the post-Assad era did not begin until 13 June, when al-Sharaa appointed an 11-member Supreme Committee to oversee its formation. This body is tasked with guiding an indirect electoral process, using electoral colleges rather than a popular vote.
Notably, the Supreme Committee reflects a broader political spectrum than the other transitional bodies established since Assad’s fall. These were largely dominated by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – the now-disbanded Islamist rebel group headed by al-Sharaa and the de facto leader of Syria’s transition.
The new assembly was initially planned to include 150 members but was later expanded to 210, following community consultations.
Two-thirds of the members will be selected through the committee-led process, while the remaining third will be appointed by the president. Seats are allocated by governorate, based on administrative divisions and population size according to 2010 census data.
The process is not a popular vote or a general election.
The process is set to unfold in several phases. First, the Supreme Committee establishes electoral subcommittees at the district level, each comprising at least three members. These subcommittees are then tasked with forming electoral colleges of up to 50 individuals in their respective districts.
Only members of these colleges may nominate themselves for a seat, and only they are eligible to vote. Voting must occur in person, with results announced on the same day. The list of successful candidates is then submitted to the president, who finalizes the assembly by appointing the remaining one-third of its members.
To bolster credibility, a series of legal safeguards has been introduced. Appeal committees are planned to review disputes at each phase regarding the composition of electoral bodies, candidate eligibility, and voting outcomes.
Risk of manipulation
Despite the intended safeguards, the framework leaves ample room for manipulation –particularly in the early stages. The formation of district-level subcommittees, which wield disproportionate power in selecting electoral college members, is opaque.
While these subcommittees are intended to be established in consultation with local communities, the process lacks transparency, and the eligibility criteria are broadly defined. Ultimately, the Supreme Committee retains extensive authority over appointments, raising concerns about impartiality.
Ultimately, the true measure of reform is not how it is designed, but who it empowers.
The risk is heightened by the small size of these subcommittees – typically three to five members – and their pivotal role in selecting electoral college members. If politically aligned individuals come to dominate these subcommittees, they can effectively gatekeep access to the legislative process. The Supreme Committee further compounds this risk by reserving the right to replace proposed candidates or demand alternative lists, increasing the vulnerability of the process to manipulation.
The credibility of the process is further weakened by the absence of rigorous independent monitoring. Although the Supreme Committee has pledged to allow observers, access appears to be limited to the final voting phase.
Allowing inspectors but with such restricted oversight would be inadequate and largely symbolic. The greatest risks of manipulation arise much earlier, during the selection of subcommittees and electoral colleges. Without robust, independent monitoring at every stage, the legitimacy of the process will be open to challenge.
A question of power
Beyond procedural concerns, the sweeping powers granted to the president under the constitutional declaration threaten to undermine the authority of the assembly. The interim charter gives the legislature the power to pass new laws, amend or repeal existing ones, and ratify international treaties.
However, these functions are sharply limited in practice. Ultimately, legislative power could remain in the hands of al-Sharaa if the makeup of the new legislature is engineered to his advantage.
A legislative assembly that merely mimics pluralism, without real shifts in decision-making, risks deepening public disengagement.
Presidential decrees carry the force of law and can only be overturned by a two-thirds majority. Since one-third of parliament is directly appointed by the president, he can select loyal individuals to ensure enough support to block any attempt to reverse his decrees. This imbalance weakens the assembly’s role and raises serious concerns, especially at a time when the country’s legal and institutional structure are being rebuilt from the ground up.
Topics
Democracy and political participation
Regions
Syria and the Levant
Departments
Middle East and North Africa Programme
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Article second half
The representation of territories outside Damascus’s control presents another challenge to the assembly’s legitimacy. Although the process was meant to be nationwide, the Supreme Committee announced on 23 August that elections would not be held in Sweida, which is under the de facto authority of the Druze, or Hasakah and Raqqa – both controlled by the Kurdish-led autonomous administration. The committee postponed voting in these areas indefinitely, citing insecurity and political gridlock – neither of which is likely to be resolved soon.
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In the meantime, the legislative council will be reduced to 191 members. To avoid excluding these regions entirely, the president may appoint representatives. However, without local support or recognition from de facto authorities, such appointments risk deepening mistrust and further entrenching political fragmentation.
A chance to break the pattern
For Syria’s transitional authorities, legitimacy will not come from technocratic performance but from how power is exercised and shared. A legislative assembly that merely mimics pluralism, without real shifts in decision-making, risks deepening public disengagement.
The coming weeks will reveal whether this moment lays the groundwork for accountable governance or becomes another missed opportunity to rebuild trust in the emerging state. If the goal is to reset the social contract, not just rearrange the seating chart, the process must earn its authority through action, not architecture.
Ultimately, the true measure of reform is not how it is designed, but who it empowers. If the government fails in delivering genuine pluralism, it could undermine its legitimacy and further cement Syria’s fragmentation – raising the risk of sliding back into conflict.
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