Center for the National Interest - Türkiye and the Problem of an 'America First' Foreign Policy - Joshua Yaphe, Ph,D, Senior Fellow, Center for the National Interest September 5, 2025

 

Center for the National Interest 

Türkiye and the Problem of an 'America First' Foreign Policy 

Joshua Yaphe, Ph,D, 

Senior Fellow, Center for the National Interest

September 5, 2025

 Contents

 • Getting Attention in Washington  3

 • Erdogan is Indispensable     4

 • Setting a New Agenda         5

 • The Opposition is Weak       6

• The Future of the AKP           7

 • ‘America First’ Foreign Policy 9

 Image: Mikolaj Niemczewski / Shutterstock.com

Executive Summary

President Erdogan is having a moment.  The political opposition is disorganized, militant Kurdish groups are offering to disarm, Syrian refugees are returning home, and everyone is looking to Türkiye to help provide regional stability.  Erdogan now has three years until the next election to burnish his legacy, and shore up the reputation of his political party, which has an uncertain future should Erdogan leave the scene. 

This would normally prompt a serious discussion in DC about the need for foreign assistance, joint exercises, and a strategic dialogue.  However, the only space available in the foreign policy debate in Washington right now is for countries that pose a critical national security threat or a massive economic investment opportunity. Türkiye is a perfect example of the many countries that do not fit easily into that America First agenda. Considering Türkiye’s strategic importance to the United States, this should prompt the administration to reconsider some of its basic assumptions about how America engages with the world.

 

Center for the National Interest

 2 01

 Getting Attention in Washington

For decades, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has 

reveled in grand-standing about his country’s leadership of the 

Muslim and Arab worlds.  This has routinely

 prompted commentators in Washington to remark 

about a neo-Ottoman revival, a strategic competition 

with Israel, and an emerging Islamist alliance against 

the West.  The policy recommendations have oscillated

wildly between condemnation for human rights 

abuses and proposals for a closer bilateral relation

ship, occasionally featuring a mix of both.  Much of 

this was unnecessary and overblown melodrama by 

both his supporters and his critics.  Strip away all the 

rhetoric and you find that Erdogan is simply a man 

with a gift for retail politics.  He is just as comfortable 

maneuvering within the party rivalries on the nation

al stage as he is giving his stump speech out in the 

countryside, which is rare.  It is to his credit that he 

has acted swiftly and decisively in response to a series

of crises that might otherwise have destabilized 

his country, including conflict in several neighboring 

states, massive flows of migrants into Europe, several 

earthquakes, and a pandemic. 

Türkiye’s star is now in the ascendance.  The last year 

has seen a dramatic shift in the structural factors that 

impact Turkish diplomacy and security throughout the 

Middle East, from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) 

voluntarily offering to lay down arms, to the roadmap 

for peace in Azerbaijan and Armenia, to the retreat 

of Iran’s malign influence in Syria.  It has created the 

conditions for Erdogan to finally achieve his ambitions

Namely, to become an indispensable partner 

and a proactive force for change in the region.  And it 

has led to something of a hushed silence in Washington

almost as though there is a tacit acceptance in 

the Trump Administration of Türkiye’s essential role, 

but also a cautious hesitation about venturing closer 

bilateral ties.  Rich Outzen has best expressed this 

growing awareness in Washington of Türkiye’s importance,

the nuanced understanding of its role in the 

region, and the uncertainty about how to proceed. 

The Trump Administration is focused on deal-making 

with tangible outcomes that benefit the American 

people.  In that regard, Türkiye cannot offer billions of 

dollars in high-tech investment in the United States 

or key skills needed for a multilateral Artificial Intelli

gence initiative.  The Administration seeks alliances 

that can help advance American interests in the strategic

competition with China.  But Erdogan is unlikely 

to abandon long-standing plans for Turkish-Chinese 

economic cooperation, including the middle corridor 

of the Belt-Road Initiative.  Ultimately, the next three 

years will likely be much as we see it now, with Türkiye

playing a key role in any U.S. engagement with the 

Middle East, but never assuming center stage.  That 

is to the detriment of the long-term relationship.  But 

there is no other way to discuss Türkiye, or so many 

other countries like it, as long as America First priori

ties dominate the policy debate in Washington. 

Türkiye and the Problem of an ‘America First’ Foreign Policy

 3  02

 Erdogan is Indispensable

For the United States, for China, and for Russia, 

Erdogan now fills in the gaps where the great powers 

lack the influence, the ability, or the desire to affect an 

outcome of peace and stability on their own.  Türkiye 

recently increased its armed presence in Mogadishu 

to backstop and train the Somali military, which is 

part of a long-term commitment that involves 

infrastructure investment, oil exploration, and diplomatic 

mediation with Somalia’s neighbors.  Ankara recently 

welcomed Saddam Haftar for discussions on military 

training, joint exercises, and support for Turkish 

claims to maritime exclusive economic zones, in a 

pragmatic move to diversify its relationships in Libya 

beyond the Government of National Accord.  Erdogan 

has welcomed outreach from Armenia as part 

of a larger settlement of the conflict with Azerbaijan, 

which helps expand Türkiye’s influence in the Cauca

sus.  Türkiye has spent over a decade building closer 

defense and security ties to Pakistan, with military 

training and equipment sales that have onward benefits 

for other Turkish allies, like Azerbaijan. 

 

In turn, Ankara is demonstrating a willingness to 

collaborate more closely with the Great Powers, in ways 

that can reduce friction in the international order.  The 

deal with Rosatom to build the Akkuyu nuclear power 

plant leaves the Russians responsible for construction, 

fuel delivery and waste management, while 

granting Russia a long-term concession for owning 

and operating the facility and the Turks locked in to 

fixed purchasing rates for 15 years.  Türkiye has been 

a key player in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, brokering a 

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Image: Alessia Pierdomenico / Shutterstock.com

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 2021

 

series of dialogues and prisoner swaps, yet receding 

into the background whenever the United States or 

other Europeans prefer to assume the lead.  It is far 

from the situation in 2019, when Erdogan attempted 

to purchase both the Russian S-400 missile defense 

system and the American F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 

aircraft, though Erdogan is now indicating he may yet 

again try to have it both ways.

With the fall of the Asad family in Syria and Israel’s 

thrashing of Iran and its proxies over the last year, 

Türkiye is now an essential partner for everyone 

interested in establishing a new regional order.  The 

12 Day War between Israel and Iran left an uncertain 

situation in which Iran still affirms its right to nuclear 

enrichment, the international community is hinting 

at a snapback of full sanctions, and cyber attacks 

continue apace under threat of a resumption of 

hostilities.  The transitional government in Damascus

 

4   03

appears eager for international recognition and willing 

to assert its independence from Iran, but unable to 

extend full sovereign control over its own territory in a 

peaceful reconciliation with the country’s diverse 

population.  The multiple rounds of Turkish-Israeli talks 

hosted in Baku earlier this year were probably just 

the start of what will be a long process of direct and 

indirect attempts by many different players to broker 

side agreements between the two sides.  Türkiye is 

the bulwark helping to prevent Syria’s fragmentation – 

a situation that would probably be in no one’s inte

– and Israel’s guarantor that Damascus does not 

return to being a state-sponsor of terrorism.

 

Image: Sebastian Castelier / Shutterstock.com

Kurdish Village of Cizre in 2015, after the Last PKK Ceasefire Broke Down

Setting a New Agenda

Erdogan has the freedom to maneuver at will in this 

evolving regional landscape, because he is rapidly 

removing a series of long-standing domestic challenges 

to the state and his personalized style of rule.  After 

months of political delegations visiting the prison on 

Imrali Island, Abdullah Öcalan publicly called for the 

PKK to lay down arms, and a group of PKK fighters 

held a press event in northern Iraq on July 11 where 

they destroyed their weapons.  The mainline Kurdish 

political party has been instrumental in welcoming 

the process.  Even Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the 

far-right party and a key supporter of the negotiations, 

has proposed the idea of appointing a Kurdish Vice 

President as a means for national reconciliation.  

On the face of it, this appears to be a far different 

affair from previous reconciliation attempts over the 

last quarter century, which critics often held up as 

cynical ploys for Erdogan to crack down on the 

opposition and extend his rule.  It may end up in a new 

constitution to replace the current document that was 

the product of the 1980 coup, which is something all 

political parties have called for, even if each has a 

slightly different idea of what it would entail.  

And Erdogan is the fortunate beneficiary of other 

prevailing winds.  The Turkish Ministry of Interior has 

announced that 411,649 Syrians out of an approx

imate total of 2.5 million living in Türkiye have 

returned home to date, with the numbers accelerating in 

recent weeks.  Next year, Erdogan’s Justice and Development 

Party will celebrate its 25th anniversary, and 

Türkiye and the Problem of an ‘America First’ Foreign Policy

 5   04

he is ushering in the celebrations with an outline for a 

new “Century of Türkiye” reform agenda.  In addition 

to such broad but vague calls for a green and digital 

transformation, the program includes populist propos

als for taxing the rich and rent stabilization, attracting 

Turks abroad to repatriate their skills homeward, and 

getting Turkish soccer into the Champion’s League. 

 

Image: Tolga Ildun / Shutterstock.com

 Republican People’s Party (CHP) Rally, 2023

 Center for the National Interest

The Opposition is Weak

Above all, Erdogan is blessed with a divided and disoriented 

opposition, a situation that appears likely to 

persist for the foreseeable future.  Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, 

leader of the opposition in 2023, chose to compete 

for the presidency despite polls showing that he was 

the least likely of the three leading candidates to beat 

Erdogan.  He ended up losing four ballots in a year, 

including the leadership of his own party, resulting in 

a disillusioned base of opposition support and a new 

party leadership struggling to emerge from his shadow.  

The comments on X in response to his poetic 

musings on political affairs are scathing, and even if 

many of them are simply pro-government trolls, there 

is an underlying feeling throughout that the opposition 

under Kılıçdaroğlu’s leadership inadvertently 

extended Erdogan’s tenure in office. 

 

Ahmet Davutoğlu, the former Prime Minister and AKP 

chairman who resigned government in protest over 

Erdogan’s assumption of presidential powers, was 

once considered a credible rival taking a principled 

stance against his former boss, but he has since 

receded into the background.  The most likely opposition 

candidate to challenge Erdogan, Istanbul Mayor 

Ekrem İmamoğlu, is on trial and facing jail time for 

several offenses, meaning he can really only endorse 

future candidates for president.  

For what it’s worth, the current chairman of the main 

opposition party, Özgür Özel, has almost the exact 

same approval (41.5) and disapproval ratings (53.4) 

as Erdogan (43.9 and 53.9), according to Metropoll 

6    05

 surveys conducted in April 2025. And there are polls 

that show a large majority of the public is fed up with 

the Erdogan era, in part because of the prevailing 

sentiment that the government has no viable plan 

for solving the country’s economic woes.   But the 

real issue, as Mehmet Ali Kulat and other Turkish 

commentators have noted, is that most disillusioned 

Turks would rather stay home than go to the effort of 

showing up on election day and pull the lever for an 

opposition in which they have no confidence.  

Image: paparazzza / Shutterstock.com

 Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, 2025

The Future of the AKP

 Perhaps the new Century of Türkiye reform agenda 

will usher in a new era of jobs, skills, and hope for 

the entire country, as Erdogan parlays his regional 

influence and international partnerships into foreign 

investment at home.  It seems far more likely, however, 

that he will continue to trade in his political capital 

for a chance to go after the opposition and entrench 

the AKP in single-party rule for yet another generation.

Almost every day there is a new round of arrests 

with conspiracy charges for treason, opposition politicians 

switching parties (with rumors of threats and 

coercion), or ever-expanding corruption probes that 

ensnare high-rising young opposition politicians.

 Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan is the most 

obvious beneficiary, as he meets with world leaders 

and basks in the glow of Türkiye’s regional power and 

international influence.  His background in the Nation

al Intelligence Organization (MIT) puts him in good 

stead with the security services.  There are lots of 

rumors circulating online that he could be Erdogan’s 

anointed successor, and there is now a full-length 

book on Fidan’s mindset and formative years by 

veteran journalist Caner Taşpınar.  Of course, a lot can 

happen between now and 2028. 

But there are problems for the AKP as a whole, which 

cannot simply be solved by rejuvenating its leadership 

andpromoting Millennials like Ahmet Büyükgümüş 

and Ahmet Mucahit Arinç.  The AKP’s stewardship of 

the economy is one.  According to a Metropoll survey 

from April, 71.8 percent of respondents felt that the 

national economy has been managed badly, including 

Türkiye and the Problem of an ‘America First’ Foreign Policy

 7   06

 43.5 percent of respondents who voted for AKP in the 

2023 election cycle.  The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung’s 

Turkish Youth Study 2023 found that 80.6 percent of 

respondents felt the country’s economic policies were 

unsuccessful, and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung’s Youth 

Study Türkiye 2024 found that 58.7 percent of respondents 

had a moderate to very strong desire to move 

to another country for more than six months.  

Another problem is that of nostalgia.  As columnist 

and author Osman Ulagay has noted, in the early 

days of the AKP the party was able to turn out dedicated 

volunteers who sought nothing more than the 

chance to help bring about a more just and prosper

ous society.  İsmail Kılıçarslan goes one step further, 

writing that Erdogan’s most ardent supporters have 

no interest in planning for a post-Erdogan era and no 

desire to see the younger ranks of the AKP become 

part of that future.  Nostalgia is a powerful thing.  It 

can sustain a person through many hardships.  But it 

is like an overdraft account that the owner keeps writing 

checks against, despite the lack of funds.  People 

will withhold their criticism out of respect for the past 

and their memories of it, but at some point a line is 

crossed and then there is no restraining what follows. 

If the institutions themselves – not just the AKP but 

the government as a whole – cannot find a way to 

adapt and transform to meet the challenges of today, 

they will face a hard reckoning.  For example, the fertility 

rate now hovers around 1.5, which has prompted 

the government to declare this the Year of the Family, 

though the types of cash incentives for having more 

babies that the Turkish Government now allows 

haven’t led to long-term improvements in other countries. 

Center for the National Interest

 ‘America First’ Foreign Policy

That being said, what is this strange thing we call the 

U.S.-Türkiye bilateral relationship?  Under any other 

administration, we would talk about forming a stra

tegic dialogue, offering foreign assistance, creating 

new visitor exchange programs, and encouraging 

Turkish participation in more multilateral forums, not 

to mention the usual joint military exercises, defense 

sales, and intelligence sharing.  This is a key ally, a 

member of NATO, on the cusp of what could be an 

important period of peace and stability for itself and 

its neighbors, if given a little help from its friends. 

But this administration is different.  And rightfully so.  

There are so many reasons why the current White 

House would not want to move beyond a transactional 

relationship with Ankara, and each one is perfectly valid:

 1) We cannot want a better future for Türkiye than 

then Turks want for themselves.  The government 

has to make a serious investment in programs 

that will help build an economy for the 21st century

before the United States can join in with its own 

form of economic and technical support.  

2) We cannot push for democratic reforms thinking 

that all cultures and societies want to be like 

America.  Some Turks genuinely want change, 

but many of them also appreciate that Turk

ish politics can be rough and they expect their 

parties to engage in some rather mean and ugly 

tactics in order to win.  

 

8    3) 

We cannot expect that American outreach will 

produce different Turkish foreign policy outcomes.  

Erdogan will surely welcome American 

military sales and other forms of assistance, 

but neither he nor any successor government 

is likely to abandon China or engage with the 

region any differently as a result of U.S. incentives

or conditionalities.   

 

4) We cannot be in the lead engaging on Turkish 

policies that primarily impact others.  Ultimately, 

it is the Europeans, the Israelis, and the Arab Gulf 

states that have to work with Türkiye to protect 

and promote their own interests.

Accordingly, the next three years will probably proceed 

apace, with a quiet respect for Turkish influence 

and power in the region, a sincere effort to consult 

Türkiye on any policy move that might require Turkish 

support, and a push for others to cooperate with 

Türkiye so that America does not have to be directly 

involved in every regional crisis.  The administration 

wants to expand the Abraham Accords to Azerbaijan and 

the Central Asian states, and surely that will 

require Ankara’s assistance in convincing its regional 

neighbors to participate.  

For isolationists or “restrainers,” it is enough.  And 

for interventionists, there is little to argue in favor of 

immediate dividends that might pay out from boost

ing the relationship.  There will be a new President 

in the White House in 2028.  It is possible that there 

may even be a new President in the White Palace (the 

Ak Saray).  When that happens, both sides may wake 

up and realize that there are a lot of lingering issues 

that need to be addressed. But for now, America First 

reigns supreme.  

And yet, this presents a question, not just for Türkiye 

but also for the many other countries in the world 

that do not pose a critical national security threat or 

a massive economic investment opportunity.  It was 

one thing during the election campaign for the Republican 

candidates to have a debate about funding 

Ukraine, and another thing during the run-up to the 

12 Day War to feud over support for Israel.  Those, 

too, were litmus tests within the GOP for a person’s 

commitment to the America First agenda, eventually 

leading to a brief and bitter fight over what American 

First means and who gets to define it.  But in both 

instances, the issues at stake involved billions of dollars 

in military equipment for conflicts that have the 

potential to drag the United States into war.  

Rather, Türkiye is a matter of long-term, strategic 

planning.  Small, cost-effective forms of U.S. engagement 

today could have a major impact on the 

country’s future and the attitude of a new generation 

toward America and the West.  There are dozens 

of countries around the world in that situation, but 

Türkiye’s situation right now presents a unique set of 

circumstances.  Somewhere within the Trump 

Administration there must be someone willing to make 

the case for that type of active engagement with the 

world.  Even if it means re-considering some basic 

assumptions about the utility of foreign assistance, 

civil society programming, and public diplomacy.  And 

even if it is treated only as a rare exception to the rule 

of an overall America First foreign policy. 

Türkiye and the Problem of an ‘America First’ Foreign Policy

 

9

About the Author

 Joshua Yaphe is a Senior Fellow at the Center for 

the National Interest and was a Senior Analyst for 

the Arabian Peninsula at the U.S. State Department’s 

Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He has a PhD in 

History from American University in Washington, DC, 

and is the author of Saudi Arabia and Iraq as Friends 

and Enemies: Borders, Tribes and a History Shared, 

currently out in paperback through the University of 

Liverpool Press. In 2020, he was a Visiting Fellow at 

the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, and from 

2022 to 2024 he served as a visiting faculty member

at the National Intelligence University. His latest 

book, Time and Narrative in Intelligence Analysis: A 

New Framework for the Production of Meaning (Routledge

2025), is available for free in an Open Access 

online edition.

 The opinions and characterizations in this piece are 

those of the author and do not necessarily represent 

those of the U.S. Government.