National Security Journal The Treaty - The Big Mistake the West Is Making About Russia, China, and Iran - ByAnna Borshchevskaya Published2 days ago (July 31, 2025)

 National  Security Journal 

The Treaty

The Big Mistake the West Is Making About Russia, China, and Iran

ByAnna Borshchevskaya

Published2 days ago (July 31, 2025) 

Neither Russia nor China came to Iran’s rescue in June this year during the US-Israel-Iran crisis. Moscow and Beijing condemned the Israeli military campaign and targeted US airstrikes against the Iranian nuclear facilities, but did little to help Iran in any meaningful way.

Many commentators concluded that the crisis highlighted the limits of the so-called “axis of upheaval” between Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea. Some went further to suggest Russia’s and China’s policies are failing in the Middle East, and that this axis falls apart when it matters.

The Russia-Iran-China Axis Isn’t Dead

It is undeniably true that Tehran couldn’t count on its professed strategic partners in this crisis, especially when the United States demonstrated it was willing to use force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.

But the consensus is wrong: the Russia-Iran-China axis hasn’t fallen apart. To the contrary, these countries appear to be willing to work together even more closely now than before the 12-day war to undermine US interests.

Axis of Space Collaboration

Russia and Iran continue to expand their cooperation outside the conventional military realm. Earlier this month, Moscow’s Soyuz rocket launched an Iranian communications satellite into orbit from Russia’s Far East.

This launch is not a one-off event. Three years ago, Russia launched Iran’s Khayyam satellite into orbit from Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. Moscow, for its part, has been quietly expanding space collaboration across the Middle East in previous years, and China has been doing the same. Moreover, Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea all cooperate in space.

Space collaboration entails the sharing of surveillance, communication, and navigation. Analysts increasingly see space as the future of military operations because it enables modern warfare across multiple domains. And at a time when the West is looking to establish norms of responsible state behavior in space, its top adversaries are signaling they will challenge these efforts.

Axis of Upheaval

The West should not write off military collaboration between its top adversaries. Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea all remain focused on building advanced drones—at a rate faster than in the West, as some experts note. This July, Russia began its first commercial flights in decades between Moscow and Pyongyang, which will create more opportunities for Russia and Korea to collaborate and deepen ties. Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov visited North Korea earlier this July in another example of deepening ties that go beyond the military realm alone. Meanwhile, Chinese-made engines, covertly shipped via front companies to Russia, are helping Moscow produce Garpiya-A1 attack drones, circumventing Western sanctions designed to disrupt these supply chains.

The Kremlin has been dragging its feet in delivering warplanes to Tehran, especially the Su-35. But Iran is pivoting to China, another member of the “axis of upheaval,” for advanced weaponry such as J-20 stealth fighters and HQ-9B air defense systems as Tehran seeks to project power, re-establish deterrence, and restore its degraded air defenses.

Yes, Moscow’s failure to help Iran in June drew criticism within the Islamic Republic. But Tehran now seeks Moscow’s (and Beijing’s) diplomatic support on the nuclear issue. “We are in constant consultation with [Russia and China] to prevent activation of the snapback or to mitigate its consequences,” Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said recently. Prior to the 12-day war, Russia reportedly aimed to build eight more nuclear reactors in Iran. There are no signs at the time of this writing that Moscow and Tehran have abandoned these plans.

The “axis of upheaval” undoubtedly has its limits. But that is by design. Vladimir Putin’s approach to the Middle East for over two decades was predicated on flexibility to prioritize Russia’s own needs and avoid over-commitment to any one partner.

Moscow’s strategic partnership agreement with Tehran had no mutual defense clause, while China’s defense commitments to Tehran are even weaker. The fact of the matter is, Moscow and Beijing could afford to stay out of the US-Israel-Iran crisis. In its aftermath, Iran has no one else to turn to.

What Happens Next? 

Analysts who expected Moscow to do more to help Iran looked at the nature of alliances and partnerships through the lens of liberal democracies, which tend to provide deeper commitments to their partners.

This expectation stems from precisely the values that underpin the liberal world order—the same values that the “axis of upheaval” aims to dismantle. If its members succeed, they will create a far more dangerous and unstable world.

This is a long game, and the liberal free world needs to focus on deterrence of these adversaries.

About the Author:

Anna Borshchevskaya is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and author of Putin’s War in Syria: Russian Foreign Policy and the Price of America’s Absence.

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