FOREİGN AFFAİRS Response Ely Ratner September/October 2025 Published on August 19, 2025 Should Asia Make It Official? The Prospect of an “Asian NATO” Ken Jimbo; Ely Ratner September/October 2025 Published on August 19, 2025

FOREİGN  AFFAİRS 

Response

Ely Ratner

September/October 2025 Published on August 19, 2025 Should Asia Make It Official?

The Prospect of an “Asian NATO”

Ken Jimbo; Ely Ratner

September/October 2025 Published on August 19, 2025

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A joint military exercise between U.S. and Philippine troops, in Aparri, Philippines, May 2025

A joint military exercise between U.S. and Philippine troops, in Aparri, Philippines, May 2025 

Lisa Marie David / Reuters

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Responses

 Ken Jimbo

 Ratner Replies

In Response To

The Case for a Pacific Defense Pact

America Needs a New Asian Alliance to Counter China

By Ely Ratner

If It Ain’t Broke . . .

Ken Jimbo

Ely Ratner’s article, “The Case for a Pacific Defense Pact” (July/August 2025), reflects an appropriate sense of urgency about deterring Chinese aggression among Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States. Yet his central argument—that these countries should codify mutual defense obligations—overlooks crucial realities that make what others have termed an “Asian NATO” counterproductive.

Relative political homogeneity and a degree of institutional trust have made NATO possible in Europe. No such consensus on the threat posed by China has emerged in the Indo-­Pacific, even among Ratner’s “core four” countries. Japan’s security strategy prioritizes defense cooperation with like-minded neighbors but not mutual defense commitments. Australia’s geographic distance from potential conflict zones in East Asia and shifting defense posture—from expeditionary peacekeeping to deterrence by denial and regional force projection—set it apart from other countries in the region. The Philippines is not yet capable of meaningful joint military operations with treaty allies such as Japan or the United States.

Thanks in part to the policies Ratner himself helped put in place as a senior official in the Biden administration, the region’s security architecture is already evolving organically, through a flexible network of bilateral and trilateral agreements that makes the most of these diverse (and ambiguous) postures. Elevating these arrangements into a treaty-based mutual defense pact could disrupt an already effective system, create a commitment hazard that China would certainly test, and alienate partners not yet ready—or willing—to formalize security commitments, such as India and South Korea. Attempting to institutionalize collective defense without the support of these key actors could fracture the very trust and coordination Ratner seeks to enhance.

Ratner is right to call attention to the growing sense of shared purpose among U.S. allies in Asia. But this commonality is better advanced by deepening existing mechanisms, not rushing toward formal alliance structures. The challenge in Asia is not a lack of cooperation, but a temptation to institutionalize cooperation faster than the region can support. It should be resisted.

KEN JIMBO is Managing Director of Programs at the International House of Japan, Professor of International Relations at Keio University, and former Senior Adviser to Japan’s National Security Secretariat.

Ratner Replies

Ken Jimbo rightly underscores recent progress in networking U.S. alliances. ​But although the resulting mechanisms are important and even unprecedented, they remain too informal to deliver true and lasting combat-credible deterrence. Deeper institutionalization, especially in areas such as force posture, operational planning, and command and control, will be necessary if U.S. allies are serious about working together to keep the peace in the Indo-Pacific. The preparedness made possible by a formal pact would give presidents and prime ministers real-time options for collective defense during crises. A lack of preparedness and coordination would greatly diminish the potential deterrent power that alliances could otherwise confer. It would instead invite greater instability and increase the risk of undeterred Chinese aggression.

Topics & Regions: China Japan Australia Philippines Diplomacy Geopolitics Foreign Policy International Institutions U.S. Foreign Policy U.S.-Chinese Relations

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