International Crisis Group - - Commentary / Europe & Central Asia 22 August 2025 15 minutes - Beyond the Ukraine Summits: Five Realities after Three Years of War

 International Crisis Group 

Commentary / Europe & Central Asia 22 August 2025 15 minutes

Beyond the Ukraine Summits: Five Realities after Three Years of War

As the dust settles on two whirlwind summits, it is clear only that diplomacy aimed at ending Russia’s war in Ukraine must meet a higher bar. Crisis Group experts offer observations about five realities that should guide efforts by negotiators to reach a sustainable peace.

When U.S. President Donald Trump campaigned in 2024 on promises to end Russia’s war in Ukraine in a single day, his rhetoric sparked fears that he would sell out Ukrainian sovereignty in the service of a broader U.S. rapprochement with the Kremlin. 

In practice, it has not worked out that way, at least not yet. Since his inauguration in January, Trump has blown hot and cold on support for the government in Kyiv. He has haltingly continued to send Ukraine previously pledged aid and inked a plan to contribute to resource extraction, while refusing to provide new material assistance. He has made clear that his paramount objective is to reach a negotiated settlement (or at least a ceasefire he can portray as such) and achieve warmer U.S.-Russia relations. At the same time, he has shown flashes of frustration with Russian President Vladimir Putin, whom he has criticised for targeting civilians. In July, he even threatened Putin with extra sanctions (emptily, it turns out) should the Kremlin fail to commit to a ceasefire by mid-August. Trump has additionally positioned the U.S. as a mediator between Moscow and Kyiv – an approach that, in principle, could be constructive given Russia’s lack of interest in talking to anyone other than the U.S., but one that has relied too heavily on overcommitted special envoy Steve Witkoff, whose Russian counterparts have vastly more diplomatic experience.  

The last weeks of whirlwind U.S. diplomacy brought these themes together in a nutshell. At Putin’s suggestion during a meeting with Witkoff, Trump hosted a bilateral summit in Anchorage, Alaska on 15 August, making him the first Western leader to receive the Russian president since Moscow launched its all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Going into the meeting, Trump was insisting on an immediate Russian ceasefire and direct negotiations between Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, while talking tough about the consequences should there be no truce. But as details emerged it became clear that those positions did not survive the summit intact. Brushing off demands for a ceasefire as a condition for talks, Putin instead proposed a comprehensive solution in which Russia would stop fighting and freeze battle lines if Ukraine turned over all the territory in its Donetsk and Luhansk regions that remains in Kyiv’s hands.  

Trump appeared to accept that an immediate ceasefire was not on the cards and dropped talk of punitive measures, but his reaction to the rest of Putin’s proffer was unclear. Seemingly to balance the proposed land grab, Trump and Witkoff said over the weekend following the summit that they had shared the notion of “Article 5-style” security guarantees for Ukraine from several countries, failing to define what that would mean. They said Putin was on board with this idea. But with the Kremlin declining to confirm as much (it later suggested that it wanted an arrangement in which Russia would enjoy veto power over other states acting on their guarantees to Ukraine), and given the confusing and incomplete information dribbling out, it was difficult to understand the full implications or seriousness of the Anchorage proposals. 

Nor did much become clearer when, three days after the Anchorage summit, Zelenskyy and seven of Europe’s most prominent leaders travelled to the White House to meet with Trump. The U.S. president allayed some of their worst fears, at least temporarily, by not pressing Zelenskyy to immediately accept Putin’s demands and withdraw from all of Donetsk and Luhansk. The U.S. also reiterated its pre-Anchorage position that there should be a meeting between Zelenskyy and Putin, crowned by a trilateral summit with Trump, though here, too, there was no sign that the Kremlin had agreed. 

Yet even if the combined impact of the Anchorage and Washington meetings was somewhere between minimally damaging and net neutral, diplomacy is going to have to meet a higher bar if it is to stand any chance of bringing about a durable peace between Russia and Ukraine. Whether or not this goal is achievable is unclear – a gulf remains between what Putin appears to want and what any Ukrainian leader could accept – but regardless of the odds, negotiators will have a better shot if they are guided by the following five realities as they consider how to approach additional talks. 

Five Realities

1. While Ukraine is losing ground, it shows no sign of quitting. 

On the battlefield, Ukraine is in a very difficult position, but with Ukrainians tending to see Moscow as bent on their subjugation, they feel they have no choice but to fight on, and Kyiv is poised to do so. 

As Russian troops gain ground in their 2025 “summer offensive”, extending the advances they have made in over more than a year of attritional fighting, it is hard to imagine how, absent miracles, Kyiv can do more than slow Russia’s grinding but steady progress. Ukrainian data indicates that the Russian army captured 2,396 sq km of territory between January and July, an area slightly larger than metropolitan Tokyo, compared to 931 over the same period in 2024. Nor does past experience suggest that Ukraine can soon take a breather just because summer is ending: in 2024, Russia’s biggest gains came in November, when it took 730 sq km of Ukrainian land.

Yet despite the Russian advance, the Kremlin does not appear to be on the verge of victory or even a major breakthrough. Kyiv has spent years struggling but managing, if sometimes only barely, to keep enough capable soldiers on the front line. Most Ukrainians continue to judge a protracted, brutal war preferable to Moscow’s dominance over their country. While they cannot go on in this fashion forever, their asymmetric capabilities and strong external partnerships suggest that they can keep going for some time, in the hope that rapidly shifting technology, Russian economic troubles or something else turns the tide in the war. 

Therefore, without some sort of ceasefire or deal, the best bet in Kyiv’s view is continued war, with Ukraine slowly losing land and both countries suffering near daily strikes on infrastructure deep behind the front lines. Whether that would last for months or years is anyone’s guess.

2. Even as it advances on the battlefield, Russia faces a choice. 

Russia’s approach to the war is predicated on the belief that it can win (or at least gain more than currently on offer) by continuing to wage war. It further judges that the costs to itself will be acceptable. Indeed, estimates by Russian military experts indicate that, at the offensive’s current pace, the Russian army will be able to take control of Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as the adjacent Zaporizhzhia region, by the fall of 2026, suffering additional losses of around 50,000 personnel.

Russian sources tell Crisis Group that Putin’s confidence in his strategy will be shaken only if the situation on the front lines shifts in Ukraine’s favour – or seems about to. Unless and until Ukraine shows it can stop the Russian offensive, hold the front line and repel Russian attempts to regain the strategic initiative, Putin will believe that he is on the path to victory, even if it is long and strewn with casualties.

But much as he thinks he is winning, the Anchorage and Washington summits underscored that Putin faces a choice. If Russia keeps fighting, even if it wins, he will be looking at a future in which many sanctions remain in place and European members of the trans-Atlantic bloc continue to bolster their military capabilities, weakening Russian security. While Trump may wish to bring Moscow in from the cold regardless of how it plays its hand on Ukraine, those plans will remain contingent on various political and practical obstacles and can most reliably be achieved if there is a negotiated peace. As a result, it is only if Putin makes a deal acceptable to Kyiv and its European backers that he can optimise his chances of bringing Russia out of its current isolation from Western capitals.  

The question is whether it is possible to convince Moscow that this outcome is, indeed, better than what it can attain through more war, more death and more suffering. 

3. U.S. participation is essential if there is to be a shot at negotiated peace – but Washington needs to reassess its approach. 

While the U.S. may lack the leverage to rapidly force Russia into action (or, in the case of fresh promises of large weapons deliveries to Ukraine, be unwilling to use the leverage it has), Washington has proven itself indispensable to diplomatic efforts to end the war. Kyiv and Moscow are unlikely to make peace on their own, and of all the states that have tried to mediate, the U.S. has made by far the most progress in pushing them toward a strategic conversation since Türkiye hosted talks at the start of the full-scale war in 2022. 

But if the U.S. hopes to succeed, it will need to step up its game. The issue is not so much Trump’s personal warmth toward Putin, though the latter hardly deserved whatever boost he received from appearing on a red carpet in Anchorage with the U.S. president after years of reported Russian atrocities amid Moscow’s war of aggression. It is more a function of how the Trump administration goes about its diplomacy, which is heavy on high-level political engagement and thin on regional and other expertise. To some extent, this approach reflects Trump’s personal qualities – his confidence in his own ability to talk his way to a deal with any counterpart and his impatience with details. But it is also a function of how the administration staffs its foreign policy efforts, placing huge portfolios in the hands of just a handful of trusted individuals, while tending to freeze out the seasoned diplomats and technical experts who are needed to run any sustained process. 

The current approach of ad hoc individual meetings, whether between Witkoff and Putin, between Trump and Putin or even among Trump, Putin and Zelenskyy, seems very unlikely to succeed, especially given its record of producing misunderstandings. Even a rapid deal that papers over the fundamental differences between the parties to get a ceasefire has proven impossible to attain by these means, and there is little reason to see the pattern changing. In any case, the goal should be a well-constructed agreement that stands a chance of durably preventing further fighting, which will require much more patient and painstaking diplomacy than the U.S. has mustered to date. The Trump administration has access to talented diplomats and experts who can support this effort, but it will need to bring them onto the delegation and give them the authority to do their jobs. Trump may not want to hear such advice, but perhaps interlocutors who have gained his trust – like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who himself usefully appears to be taking on a bigger role, or Senator Lindsey Graham, a long-time Republican foreign policy hand – can help him to see the merits of a new approach. 

4.  The most important consideration for any deal will be whether it leaves Ukraine able to defend itself. 

Under any reasonable view of sovereignty, the minimal size and shape of Ukraine’s armed forces should be a matter for the country’s generals and leaders to define. But given Moscow’s longstanding demands for Ukraine’s “demilitarisation”, it is difficult to imagine Russia not insisting on a vote. Here, Kyiv, whose army has grown rapidly but not very efficiently to meet the needs of mobilising rapidly for war, can make a virtue of trimming its forces down to a reasonable size, while also insisting that Russia agree to limitations on its own deployments that will create difficulties for its very large army in mounting a new attack. Moscow did not expect the degree of resistance it faced in Ukraine when it invaded in 2022. Had it known what it was in for, it may very well not have tried. The job of Ukraine’s future military – and the backers who take on responsibility for arming Ukrainian soldiers – will be to make sure that Moscow knows exactly what it will face and judges the prospective costs unacceptable. 

As for security guarantees, the 18 August meeting in Washington once again underlined that while some of Ukraine’s backers are willing to truly offer a mutual defence pledge to Ukraine – ie, a credible promise of direct military support if Ukraine is attacked – it will be hard to come up with a formula that Kyiv can fully rely on. While Witkoff suggested that the U.S. could support a security guarantee worded like NATO’s Article 5, Trump later hedged on how far the U.S. would be prepared to go – and stated flatly that the U.S. would not entertain putting boots on the ground in Ukraine. This stance is par for the course: in the eleven years since war began with Russia’s seizure of Crimea, the debates within NATO about Ukraine’s possible membership have evidenced the continued unwillingness of the U.S. and many of its allies to go to war with Russia over Ukraine, which given the risk of nuclear escalation is understandable. Thus, while some formulation of commitment to Kyiv’s defence could be valuable, Ukraine’s own capable and already proven army will be the most credible deterrent to a renewed Russian attack. 

The UK and France have also suggested they could lead a coalition that will send a contingent of troops from their own and other European countries to help preserve the peace in Ukraine. Such a force would provide a different sort of security guarantee – one created by the fact that Russian troops would have to go through NATO member state forces if they again attack Ukraine. But coalition leaders have indicated such a deployment is only possible after a truce, meaning that Moscow would need to agree to the arrangement, which at present it does not. This scheme would also almost certainly require U.S. “backstopping”, meaning, at a minimum, airlift support to get troops into Ukraine. Given U.S. risk aversion throughout the war, and Trump’s mercurial posture toward Kyiv, it is difficult to imagine Washington reliably committing to play the role required of it, much less agreeing that its Article 5 commitment would extend to the protection of NATO troops deployed in Ukraine as part of a European force. Still, the prospect is useful to keep in the mix as talks move forward, as some formula may yet be found that makes all involved feel more secure.

5. Having played their cards well to date, Ukraine’s European backers will be central to any lasting deal.

Kyiv’s European backers have played a savvy game in supporting President Zelenskyy’s diplomacy with Washington – helping rehabilitate the Ukrainian leader after his disastrous February meeting in the Oval Office, underscoring to Trump that he should not make deals on Kyiv’s or their behalf and, when he has deviated from that path (as seemed to happen at Anchorage), helping walk him back. Their efforts have surely been aided by Washington’s own talks with Moscow, which have made a mockery of Trump’s commitment to reach a quick deal and generated frustration when White House requests for humanitarian forbearance were answered with Russian attacks on civilian targets. These successes also reflect solid statecraft and an encouraging capacity for cohesion among the continent’s most powerful players when the stakes are high enough. 

But even if for the moment the White House seems to understand the value of robust European participation in any peace process, it bears repeating just how essential it will continue to be for the success of any deal. There are three primary reasons why that is true. For any sustainable deal to include easing of sanctions on Moscow, the countries Russia wants to trade with must decide what trade is acceptable. The U.S. may be able to relax some sanctions unilaterally, but the prize lies in Europe. Russia is interested in the countries backing Ukraine both as trade logistics hubs and as direct importers for its goods. Until 2022, EU member states collectively were Russia’s principal trading partners, and Moscow would like to resume selling energy to countries like Germany to reverse growing dependence on India and China. 

Secondly, if one of the Trump administration’s goals is a stable European security architecture in which Washington’s regional allies are more capable of deterring Russian threats with less U.S. involvement, then it needs to be mindful of those allies’ threat perceptions and what will be required to address them. Much as Russia prefers to deal directly with the U.S., it, too, will eventually also need to engage with them directly, whether bilaterally or in various combinations, to refine that architecture in a way that would ideally reduce risks and costs for both sides. 

[The countries backing Ukraine] will have to be the main source of funding for Ukraine’s military and other needs for years if not decades to come.

Finally, the countries backing Ukraine are taking on an enormous long-term financial burden in committing to its sovereignty, which also gives them a big say in how the money will be spent – particular given that leaders will need to answer to their own constituents on this score. These countries will have to be the main source of funding for Ukraine’s military and other needs for years if not decades to come, given the unwillingness of the U.S. to keep financing Ukraine. Not only does the Trump administration clearly see doing so as anathema, no administration that follows this one will be likely to restore significant support for a country that other states were aiding under its predecessor.

The price tag will be significant. Ukraine’s war-torn and demographically devastated economy will need to be rebuilt, and it will not be able to support a large, well-armed military without external help. Even the confiscation of approximately 200 billion euros in Russian sovereign assets held in other European countries (which raises multiple legal, political, and strategic dilemmas) would fail to cover even half of Ukraine’s economic recovery needs. Nor are Russian reparations payments plausible under any settlement that does not presume Moscow’s defeat. 

The Contours of a Plausible Deal?

As of now, Washington may still be hoping that a meeting between Presidents Zelenskyy and Putin may yet be both possible and adequate to get to some sort of deal. But while hopes for the choreography to come together in the near future may be farfetched, the notion that there is a plausible deal out there is not. 

Indeed, the potential contours of such a deal have been evident for some time. It would likely see Ukraine at least de facto accepting the loss of some territory while retaining a combat-capable army, with continued support from its partners, which is to some degree codified in formal commitments discussed with Russia amid negotiations over a peace agreement. Kyiv would need to give up, as it in effect has already done, on near-term dreams of joining NATO, however, and perhaps do so in writing. The parties would also need to agree to some form of monitoring of their lengthy line of contact, most likely under a UN mandate. As a concession to address Russian claims of discrimination against Russian speakers living in Ukraine, Kyiv might also relax its laws restricting the use of the Russian language and the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church. Enough sanctions on Russia would need to be lifted so that it can enjoy a measure of trade with other European states, though the latter will understandably try to avoid relief that facilitates military buildup. 

Finally, though both Russia and the trans-Atlantic countries would continue to invest in defence, a sustainable deal in Ukraine would make it far more likely, and indeed perhaps necessary, that they together define ways to make those investments both less destabilising and less expensive. Such discussions would bring about a new era of arms limitation between Moscow and Western counterparts, whether that implies formal agreements, unilateral pledges, other arrangements or some combination.

Having the points above in mind can only help negotiators as they try to guide the parties toward agreement. At the same time, if the Trump administration heeds the lessons of its own experience of the last eight months, it will recognise that in this war, the devil has never been in the details of defining a settlement, but in convincing the parties that they are better off with a peace deal than without it. Whether or not Putin will ever again accept a sovereign Ukraine is unclear, but at present, active U.S. involvement stands the best chance of making a sustainable peace more likely. It will almost certainly take time. If the U.S. is to be a peacemaker, it will have to be a patient one.

Contributors  :

Oleg Ignatov

Lucıan Kim