NATO 2027:
EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP WILL BE KEY TO DETERRENCE AGAINST RUSSIA
Scott Lee, Andrew Michta, PhD., Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Peter Jones, and Lisa Bembenick
© 2025 MITRE.
All Rights Reserved. Approved for Public Release. Distribution Unlimited 25-1575. 5-15-2025
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................................................1
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................2
THE STRATEGIC CONTENT ...................................................................................................3
The War in Ukraine.....................................................................................4
Defense Spending: Trends and Projections .......................................................................................5
THE VIEW WITHIN NATO: A 2027 OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE .......................................................7
Building an Effective NATO Force Design......................................................................................8
Establishing a NATO Multidomain
Operations Strategy ..................................................................................................8
ENVISIONING NATO’S FUTURE THROUGH MISSION ENGINEERING ..............................................10
THE NATO 2027 USE CASE: INSIGHTS AND PRIORITIES.................................................................12
RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................................................13
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................14
AUTHORS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..........................................................................................15
As part of their strategic partnership, the Atlantic Council and MITRE have conducted a NATO Force Mix Analysis, examining ways to harden the Alliance’s eastern flank, measure the value of multidomain operations, and deter Russian aggression.
This paper was jointly produced by the Atlantic Council and MITRE.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
NATO remains superior in numbers and technology to Russia on paper. However, it lacks the operational integration, logistics, and joint force capabilities needed to quickly counter Russian mass and tempo near its borders. How can the Alliance achieve overmatch in 2027 without overreliance on U.S. military might?
NATO faces a growing threat from a resurgent Russia capable of hybrid and kinetic aggression across the Northeast Corridor—from Finland, the Baltic region, and Poland to the Black Sea. Currently, NATO’s defense posture relies heavily on U.S. military support for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), strategic lift, command and control (C2), and the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. With the United States increasingly focused on the Indo-Pacific region and committed to burden sharing, and with growing calls for European strategic autonomy, NATO must be able to deter and respond to threats as a unified entity—one not effectively dependent on U.S. warfighting capability and capacity. Regardless of spending levels, NATO must shift from a national-centric approach to an Alliance-wide mindset. This requires a shared engineering and analytics methodology to optimize defense resource allocations with a focus on speed, precision, and collaboration.
To assess the transatlantic geostrategic environment and explore strategic options available to NATO, MITRE and the Atlantic Council have partnered to conduct a NATO Force Mix Analysis (NFMA). The findings of this analysis call for accelerated capability development, institutional reform, and operational integration under a forward leaning, data-driven, mission-engineering framework. This framework would enable NATO to make data-informed decisions to adaptively evolve its multi-domain warfare concepts, improve force design decision making, and optimize investments to deliver integrated capabilities that produce the best mission effects required for operational success. Specifically, the NFMA can support NATO in the following ways:
③ Adaptively evolve concepts, operational decision making, and assignment of authorities toward more effective strategic outcomes.
③ Optimize funding investments and deliver unified capabilities that produce the best mission effects required for operational success.
③ Effectively leverage technology to achieve mass.
By 2027, NATO must strengthen the Baltic Defense Line. Timely action is required to ensure credible deterrence, reassure frontline allies, and deny Russia any opportunity to test NATO’s resolve or readiness in a high-threat environment. To achieve this, the following actions are essential:
③ Prepare a warfighting burden-sharing roadmap.
③ Establish a unified NATO multidomain warfare doctrine.
③ Invest in multidomain C2 and ISR infrastructure.
③ Establish a NATO multidomain open system architecture.
③ Accelerate forward posture of heavy forces and integrated air and missile defense.
③ Enhance military mobility and industrial coordination.
③ Establish additional joint ISR fusion centers.
③ Develop a pan-European logistics control network.
③ Form multidomain operations (MDO) and cyber/influence task forces.
Together, these initiatives offer a blueprint for a more self-reliant, capable, and unified NATO in 2027— ready to meet emerging threats head-on.
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INTRODUCTION
NATO’s deterrence posture in the Baltic states is undermined by an overreliance on U.S. military capabilities. In a crisis where the United States were focused elsewhere, European NATO nations may therefore be unable to mobilize a timely, effective response. This overreliance creates both strategic and operational vulnerabilities that can be exploited by Russia to challenge the Alliance’s credibility and threaten national sovereignty.
NATO’s ability to deter or respond rapidly to Russian aggression is limited by:
③ A lack of massed, ready combat forces in the theater
③ Insufficient integrated air and missile defense
③ Slow logistics and reinforcement timelines
③ A lack of organic strategic mobility with a reliance on U.S. air and sealift
③ A reliance on U.S. enablers for theater integrated
C2, ISR, and mission networks
Without the United States, NATO remains superior in numbers and technology on paper but lacks the operational integration, logistics, and joint force capabilities to rapidly match Russian mass and tempo near its borders. NATO must develop a force structure and a mix of capabilities that allow for the execution of regional defense plans with an emphasis on burden sharing. This modernization strategy must be objective, threat-based, and resource-informed.
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THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT
The next few years will be pivotal for Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community, as shifting U.S. geostrategic priorities toward the Indo-Pacific, persistent Russian threats, the rise of authoritarian powers, and a rapidly changing global order redefine the political landscape.
Alongside changing US and European Union (EU) defense priorities, the outcome of the war in Ukraine will be a critical factor in shaping NATO’s strategies.
As the devolution of the post–Cold War liberal international order accelerates, with increasingly fluid relations between states, a new geopolitical landscape
looms over the horizon, shaped by the bounded orders that the principal great powers, the United States and China, are forming around them. To address the challenges facing the United States in key theaters,
adaptability and robust multidomain capabilities will be paramount in ensuring both regional stability and the protection of democratic values. Nowhere is this more relevant than in the Euro-Atlantic theater, as resource requirements in the Indo-Pacific region will continue to divert US resources there, making technology a key multiplier for the US European Command (EUCOM) and NATO.
Russia’s aggressive regional actions show no sign of slowing, with Moscow targeting Europe through both direct and indirect methods. As General Christopher Cavoli, EUCOM commander and the supreme allied commander Europe, recently testified before the
RUSSIA’S AGGRESSIVE REGIONAL ACTIONS SHOW
NO SIGN OF SLOWING, WITH MOSCOW
TARGETING EUROPE THROUGH BOTH DIRECT AND INDIRECT
METHODS.
The growing Russia–China partnership poses a unique challenge to NATO, particularly as China expands its influence globally and engages in economic warfare. That country also benefits from its de facto alliance with Russia by gaining access to some of Russia’s modernized military technology, while China, in turn, provides a vital economic lifeline to Russia and a “moral legitimacy” for Russia’s actions in Europe, which align with China’s designs on Taiwan. This fusion of economic and military power, coupled with assertive moves in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait,
is reshaping global dynamics and testing NATO’s reach and resilience. The West faces a rapidly evolving challenge, requiring swift, strategic responses to counter the growing authoritarian alliance
that threatens global stability.
US Senate, Russia has been and will likely remain a chronic threat to NATO. From military threats to hybrid warfare tactics—such as cyber-attacks, information campaigns, and economic pressure—Russia is further consolidating its influence in countries like Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. As it rebuilds its military capabilities and doubles down on nuclear reliance, Russia is strengthening its ties with authoritarian regimes, creating an emerging “axis of dictatorships” alongside China, Iran, and North Korea.
As Europe confronts an increasingly precarious security environment and potential friction in relations with the United States, the European Union appears to be doubling down on its efforts to achieve strategic autonomy. In March 2025, the EU unveiled a bold white paper outlining plans to significantly boost defense spending, foster collaborative defense projects, and shift toward purchasing European-made arms. This move is designed to close critical capability gaps in missile defense, drones, and cyber warfare, while also pooling resources to create a more unified defense infrastructure. The proposal even includes borrowing up to €150 billion for defense loans,
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aiming to reduce fragmentation in Europe’s defense industry and enhancethe continent’s self-reliance. At the same time, recent elections in Germany have introduced new dynamics into that country’s defense policy. The newly elected leadership is reevaluating its defense priorities, a shift that could have significantimplications for Germany’s role within NATO and its contributions to collective defense. Friedrich Merz, the incoming chancellor, has successfully lobbied the Bundestag to lift the legal deficit spending restrictions on defense, while repeatedly underscoring that Europe must chart an independent course. How Germany navigates this shift will be crucial in shaping Europe’s defense future and the tenor of transatlantic relations.
NATO, meanwhile, remains focused on deterrence and collective regional defense. With an emphasis on burden sharing and joint procurement of critical systems, the Alliance is rapidly expanding its combat-ready, forward-deployed forces in Poland and the Baltics, underpinned by a robust training and sustainment hub in Germany. The outcome of an ongoing US defense-posturereview may drive additional modernization and deployment efforts, but this “fight tonight” readiness reflects NATO’s shared vow to defend European borders and ensure security.
As NATO defense ministers have pointed out, these efforts demonstrate
Europe’s increasing commitment to sharing the transatlantic defense load.
However, to truly succeed in its mission, NATO’s efforts must be underpinned by a data-driven approach.
Modernization planning for its MDO strategy must integrate cutting-edge data analytics to ensure that defense initiatives are not only effective but responsiveto the emerging threats of today and tomorrow. This strategy must be backed by a comprehensive Alliancewide effort and a coordinated whole-of-government response to address NATO’s most pressing security challenges with agility and precision.
Europe stands at a critical juncture. There is potential tension inherent in Europe’s evolving commitment to strategic autonomy and strengthening NATO’s collectivedefense, as both ultimately rest on the ability to generate relevant, usable integrated capabilities.
This demands a warfighting mindset, and an understanding of the acquisition, integration, and training required to be successful.
As Europe grapples with the challenges of anincreasingly unpredictable world, the key question for NATO and collective defense will be what capabilities Europe can contribute to offer credible options to NATO. Success will hinge on how swiftly and effectively these efforts are coordinated and implemented, as they will significantly shape political decisions in the years ahead.
The War in Ukraine
Russia’s war on Ukraine has redrawn the European security map.
It is a system-transforming conflict with asymmetric technology offsets, notably the emergence of drones and drone warfare. Regardless of the preexisting assumptions about transatlantic security and power distributionin Europe no longer hold. It is a litmus test for both NATO’s unity and the EU’s ability to sustain its support for Ukraine— especially as US militarypriorities shift toward Asia.
The coming months will be pivotal in determining how both institutions adapt to these pressures. NATO must reconcile the diverging prioritiesamong its members, while the EU needs to strengthen its defense industrial base (DIB) to supply Ukraine, advance its own rearmament, and contributeto regional stability. As the crisis unfolds, the world will be watching how NATO and the EU respond—and whether they can navigate their internal divisions to confront the broader challenges ahead. Most of all, as the Trump
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AGAINST RUSSIA
administration endeavors to broker a ceasefire deal between Russia and Ukraine, the outcome of that process will likely be a defining factor in how the conflict unfolds in the coming months.
NATO’s cohesion is being put to the test, as the Trump administration’s pressureon allies to rearm generates a positive but uneven response. While some memberstates have stepped up defense spending, others remain hesitant, citing economic pressures and varying threat perceptions. The countries in the Baltic area and the
Northeast Corridor have significantly increased their defense spending, while countries farther away from NATO’s eastern frontier have been less forthcoming.
This divergence risks weakening unity and effectiveness. NATO must address internal tensions to remain a credible force.
The EU’s push to rearm is also being challenged.
Economic strains, particularly in major European economies, threaten the EU’s ability to sustain a unified defense approach. The EU’s ambition to reduce dependency on the United States and bolster its defense capabilities is at risk unless it can harmonize the defense priorities of its member states.
It also fails to address the most fundamental question of which country—absent a U.S. nuclear umbrella— would provide a nuclear deterrent and in what fashion.
This highlights the critical need for the EU to present a cohesive yet realistic program to address a dynamic regional and global security environment. While NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defense and deterrence in Europe, the EU can and must play a complementary role by strengthening defense industrial capacity, improving military mobility, and reinforcing political cohesion across the continent. The EU must use the financial and regulatory levers at its disposal to enable member states to meet their key capability requirements, as defined by NATO planning.
With the Ukraine conflict exposing vulnerabilities, NATO’s reinforced presence in the Baltic area and Poland has never been more essential. These regions are key to deterring further aggression and ensuring that European borders remain secure. At the same time, the war’s impact on energy security and global supply chains has pushed Europe to rethink its transition to green energy. No longer willing to rely on Russian energy, European nations are diversifying their sources and debating the future of clean energy initiatives. Some EU members have mooted the idea of reopening the Nord Stream pipelines and at least partially normalizing economic relations with Russia once a ceasefire in Ukraine has been put in place.
But Europe’s challenges go beyond energy: NATO and the EU face the rise of hybrid warfare, autonomous systems and drone warfare, cyber threats, and false information campaigns—all of which undermine stability and test the Alliance’s adaptability.
Defense Spending: Trends and Projections
As global security challenges intensify, both U.S. and
European DIBs are grappling with serious capacity and
scalability issues. The US DIB, now only 30 percent of
its Cold War size, is strained by contractor consolidation
and growing supply-chain vulnerabilities. Europe’s
defense sector remains fragmented, hampered by
disconnected industrial policies that stifle cross-border
collaboration and scalability, with lead times from
orders to delivery still unacceptably long.
To maintain strategic readiness and counter growing
threats, both the United States and Europe must
urgently come up with bold solutions:
③ Modular, scalable production facilities and additive
manufacturing must be prioritized to rapidly adapt to
shifting demands.
③ A significant boost in munition manufacturing
capacity is needed to sustain large-scale conflict
operations.
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③ Cybersecurity enhancements across industrial and
critical infrastructure networks are paramount to
safeguard against emerging digital threats.
③ The integration of artificial intelligence (AI),
robotics, and autonomous systems will empower
defense forces to deliver rapid effects with minimal
manpower.
③ Improved NATO coordination and interoperability are
essential to ensure defense production is optimized,
maximizing collective industrial capacity.
In President Donald Trump’s second term, the United
States faces a critical defense spending dilemma
exacerbated by fiscal constraints, military recruitment
challenges, and the demands of potential simultaneous
conflicts in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters.
These factors present significant risks to NATO,
transatlantic relations, and global security. To address
these challenges, NATO must move from the perennial
talk about burden sharing to burden shifting and focus
on transferring conventional combat capabilities from
the United States to Europe. This shift will require
deeper military integration and force modernization
to maintain NATO’s effectiveness against growing
threats from Russia and China. The United States
must capitalize on its technological advantages while
strengthening cooperation with European and Indo
Pacific allies. This approach will ensure the United
States can balance its global commitments and
continue to take the lead in maintaining international
security. As a result, NATO’s collective defense efforts
will remain robust amid evolving geopolitical pressures.
In a nutshell, technology must be a critical force
multiplier for the Alliance, helping to offset at least
some of Russia’s advantage in mass.
Since its founding, NATO has depended on US
leadership and military power. With the United States
less able to provide the same level of conventional
forces and infrastructure in Europe as it did during
the Cold War and the 2000s, key NATO members—
particularly Germany, France, and the United
Kingdom—will have to significantly ramp up defense
spending and military readiness. The key challenge will
be to ensure that the EU doesn’t veer into a full-blown
“strategic autonomy” project, as that would inevitably
drain real resources from NATO. Instead, efforts at
deeper European defense industrial integration should
allow Europe to take greater responsibility for its security
by resourcing core conventional deterrence capabilities
within NATO, while still benefiting from US strategic
support. In this new landscape, NATO’s collective
defense would benefit, as regional defense plans would
be backed by real, exercised capabilities—ensuring
NATO is once again up to the task. Should the opposite
happen—i.e., if Germany decides to push the EU to
chart an independent course from the United States—
the ensuing stresses in transatlantic relations would
further fracture European politics and likely make the
continent more vulnerable to Russian blackmail or all
out aggression down the line.
European NATO nations have pledged to increase
defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic
product, and many exceed that benchmark. Yet
current European force posture in the Baltic states and
elsewhere in the Northeast Corridor is insufficient to
deter or respond to a rapid Russian incursion without
significant external reinforcement. NATO needs to:
③ Approach European rearmament in a way that builds
credible, multidomain, combat-ready formations
while keeping the United States engaged.
③ Conduct a comprehensive review of capabilities and
gaps (where the United States is engaged) to inform
future force design and new operational concepts
and doctrine to underpin collective defense.
③ Develop a capability roadmap that enables burden
sharing across the Alliance.
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THE VIEW WITHIN NATO: A 2027 OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
In response to Russia’s expanding capabilities, NATO
has embraced a deterrence-by-denial posture,
focusing on MDO to counteract aggression. This
includes deploying forward forces, pre-positioning
critical equipment, and developing operational
concepts that prioritize holding the line and achieving
rapid victory. Success will depend on massed effects
and orchestrated battlefield efforts, with the unique
strengths of each NATO member synchronized to
support one another.
To counter emerging threats, NATO must urgently
strengthen its logistical networks and mobility,
ensuring rapid reinforcement of its eastern borders.
Investment in key north-south road and rail corridors
to enhance mobility along the eastern flank—from
Scandinavia to the Baltic and Black seas—is essential
for seamless troop and resource movement. Equally
critical are interoperable C2 systems, designed with
a data-centric, on-demand capability approach.
These systems must integrate multidomain forces
across nations, services, and echelons to maintain
cohesion and operational effectiveness. To meet these
challenges, NATO must modernize its infrastructure
and adopt a wartime mindset, focusing on resilience,
readiness, and strategic investments in critical
capabilities. The Alliance must establish the necessary
authorities to institutionally act with specific member
states working in tandem with the EU to invest in
critical infrastructure upgrades that support NATO
operational requirements
Russia’s military modernization efforts include
enhancing unmanned systems for ISR and attack
operations, networked fires, advanced weapons like
hypersonic missiles, and robust cyber capabilities.
Coupled with hybrid tactics such as false information
campaigns, cyber-attacks, and sabotage, Russia
poses an increasingly complex threat—especially with
its use of “gray zone” strategies designed to blur the
lines between conventional and irregular warfare. To counter these
threats, NATO must be able to rapidly mobilize and deploy forces,
emphasizing massed effects and MDO to blunt Russia’s initial momentum.
The first seventy-two hours are critical, as Russia would aim to
quickly seize territory and key infrastructure. Denying Russia
these early operational gains could provide a critical off-ramp
to avoid a protracted conflict.
The following operational needs are key to NATO’s success:
③ Track and target key Russian units by using advanced C2
and ISR capabilities, holding them at risk before conflict
escalates.
NATO MUST MODERNIZE ITS INFRASTRUCTURE
AND ADOPT A WARTIME MINDSET, FOCUSING ON
RESILIENCE, READINESS, AND STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS
IN CRITICAL CAPABILITIES.
③ Surge reinforcements to hot spots through enhanced rapid deployment mechanisms as tensions rise.
③ Deploy highly lethal forces, supported by unmanned
systems, to halt Russian advances at the point of
contact, using well-coordinated defensive positions
and preplaced forces.
③ Counterattack through multidomain orchestration
and converged effects, targeting Russian C2 and
employing anti-armor and long-range precision fires
systems to disrupt rapid advances.
③ Build integrated, trained formations capable of
maneuvering and attacking Russian forces, logistics,
and C2 systems to reclaim territory and reestablish
international boundaries.
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NATO must continue to strengthen its forward
combat-ready presence with balanced rotational and
permanently stationed forces, while investing in fires
and defensive capabilities that provide a reinforcement
window from the United States and other NATO
nations. Critical to ensuring deterrence by denial
is the top-down commitment from member states
to operationalize multidomain C2, NATO’s unified
networking and digital infrastructure.
Building an Effective NATO Force Design
The Alliance must ensure that procured systems are
the right systems based on regional plans, capability
targets, and desired mission effects and work together
seamlessly to create an integrated and interoperable
multidomain force. To that end, NATO must:
③ Deploy multinational MDO groups with shared
ISR, C2, and kinetic/nonkinetic fires to overwhelm
Russian forces and halt their advance.
③ Expand integrated air and missile defense systems
to counter advanced threats, including drones.
③ Enhance rapid deployment and mobility through
improved multimodal transport corridors and
strategic airlift capabilities.
③ Implement layered force protection and counter
mobility measures along NATO’s borders, buying
time for multidomain forces to strike Russian
formations deep inside their territory.
③ Pre-position critical supplies (ammunition, fuel,
heavy equipment) along the eastern flank.
③ Invest in pooled and shared resources across
member states, particularly in high-tech areas
like satellite communications, drones, AI, and
surveillance platforms.
③ Invest in integrated training and experimentation to
create strategic deterrence.
Establishing a NATO Multidomain Operations Strategy
NATO’s ability to conduct effective MDO has never
been more crucial. To counter Russia’s expanding
military capabilities, NATO must integrate and leverage
all domains—land, air, sea, cyber, and space—into a
unified, cohesive strategy. MDO allow NATO to rapidly
respond, disrupt enemy operations, and maintain
strategic advantage. By improving interoperability,
developing common standards, and building a
seamless digital ecosystem, NATO can enhance its
operational effectiveness and ensure rapid, coordinated
action across all member nations. To counter Russia’s
aggression and to reinforce its role as the cornerstone
of global security, NATO must put forward an MDO
strategy focused on a range of critical capabilities:
③ A next-generation multidomain C2 system: This
system must integrate all operational domains—
land, sea, air, space, and cyber—into a single,
unified interface for commanders. It should be fully
interoperable across NATO member states and their
national C2 architectures, enabling seamless cross
domain integration and battlefield orchestration,
regardless of time, geography, or mission requirements.
③ Integrated multidomain C2 operations centers:
Within NATO’s multinational divisions, corps, and
joint force commands, these centers can help to
integrate situational awareness of national forces.
Progress must continue to enable them to be
networked to orchestrate operations across all
domains, ensuring quick, coordinated action.
③ Integrated ISR fusion centers: These centers
must break down information-sharing barriers
and integrate intelligence from multiple domains
to provide real-time, actionable insights that are
essential for swift decision making that enables
expanded maneuver and cross-domain fires.
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③ AI (algorithmic warfare): AI will be pivotal in
predictive analytics, persistent targeting, effects
planning, and operational decision support. These
algorithms can enhance decision making by
providing commanders with insights on potential
outcomes and courses of action.
③ Cyber-resilient digital architectures: The zero
trust model secures critical systems and data
by minimizing attack surfaces, enforcing least
privilege access, and enabling resilient, segmented
networks. NATO’s digital infrastructure must
employ this cybersecurity model to be protected
from adversarial attacks that could disrupt or
manipulate critical data, AI algorithms, and
operational capabilities, ensuring system integrity
and operational continuity.
③ Autonomous systems: Leveraging low cost,
expendable systems for reconnaissance, targeting,
maneuver, lethal and nonlethal fires, and logistical
support will significantly increase operational
efficiency and reduce risks to personnel in
contested environments.
③ Unified networking and digital infrastructure: A data
centric approach will enable plug-and-play software
development tailored to mission needs, ensuring
NATO’s digital systems remain agile and responsive
to emerging threats.
NATO must prioritize systems thinking, integration,
and data interoperability within a unified, multidomain
digital architecture. This approach is vital to ensuring
that collective defense and deterrence capabilities are
effective and adaptable to the complexities of modern
warfare. These measures can significantly enhance
NATO’s deterrence posture by leveraging technology
to achieve mass and counter emerging threats.
Success hinges on developing common standards,
fostering interoperability across national systems, and
creating a robust digital ecosystem that facilitates
seamless data flow and decision making.
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ENVISIONING NATO’S FUTURE THROUGH MISSION ENGINEERING
The United States and NATO must make smarter,
faster decisions about what capabilities to acquire
and how to integrate them within an multidomain
force design. Every acquisition and force-development
decision should be driven by a clear understanding
of why it’s needed, when it’s needed, where it will be
deployed, and what mission outcomes are expected.
Only by focusing on these key factors can NATO build
the warfighting capability and capacity needed for
future success within the urgent timelines required.
NATO force modernization is not just about increasing
defense spending—it is about spending smarter and
optimizing the resources in hand more effectively.
Regardless of spending levels, NATO must shift from a
national-centric approach to an Alliance-wide mindset.
This requires a shared engineering and analytics
methodology to optimize defense resource allocations
with a focus on speed, precision, and collaboration.
By investing in forward-deployed forces, integrated
air and missile defense, multidomain warfare enabled
by integrated C2 and ISR, autonomous systems,
and resilient logistics, European NATO nations can
strengthen deterrence and response capabilities—
without relying on immediate U.S. military intervention.
NATO, especially NATO European nations, must
rapidly transform warfighting concepts and capabilities
to counter a resurgent Russian threat by 2027. This
demands agile decision making and investment in
technological innovation, seamless integration, and
interoperability—all essential to generate combat mass
and achieve dominance in multidomain warfare.
MITRE’s data-driven, systems-thinking approach
coupled with the Atlantic Council’s Euro-Atlantic
strategic knowledge revolutionizes multidomain
force design by combining scenario-based mission
engineering and operational analysis. Known as the
NATO Force Mix Analysis, this powerful methodology
assesses and optimizes military force structures, C2,
ISR, and fires architectures, all aligned with strategic
capability options in a threat-driven context to help
inform coordinated, future-ready investment strategies
across the Alliance.
If broadly adopted, the NFMA can help NATO—
especially European members—accelerate capability
development, respond more effectively to current
and emerging threats, and validate new technologies
through continuous, real-world analysis and
experimentation. This, in turn, would enable faster
deployment of critical systems and smarter operational
decisions. Specifically, the NFMA could support
NATO in the following ways:
③ Inform early deployment of experimental platforms
and operational concepts. Prototypes will be
evaluated in both live exercises and fielded
operational environments to test performance,
uncover capability gaps, and refine tactics. This
would enable NATO to assess the real-world
effectiveness of emerging technologies and
operational concepts before full-scale integration.
③ Provide the foundation for continuous testing and
evaluation of tactics, techniques, and procedures
in varied operational scenarios. Through persistent
experimentation, NATO will remain adaptable,
learning and evolving in response to new threats
and opportunities for innovation.
③ Enable rapid development and procurement of
new capabilities to ensure NATO can meet evolving
defense needs. Employing open architectures and
agile acquisition for fielding critical capabilities
will reduce time to implementation and enhance
operational flexibility.
③ Help NATO collectively identify and field the right
combination of force structures, technologies, and
operational strategies to strengthen its deterrence
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posture while maintaining agility and readiness.
Through mission engineering, operational
prototyping, persistent experimentation, and agile
acquisition, NATO can test new capabilities and
refine operational strategies to ensure sustained
deterrence and rapid response in the Baltic region.
The Alliance must assess and adapt its force mix to
operate in a contested, multidomain environment.
The following analytic questions are critical to
guiding NATO’s posture, readiness, and resilience
amid evolving threats and uncertain U.S. force
commitments.
③ How can NATO combat readiness and forward
presence be improved?
③ How can NATO establish a resilient, multidomain
C2 and ISR architecture and how does NATO
Mission Engineering Approach for Decision Making
best offset a reduction in U.S. commitment of its
capability and capacity? – How resilient is European
C3 and ISR under cyber and kinetic attack? – What data
integration and decision processes enable NATO unity
and speed?
③ How can NATO improve persistent targeting and
lethality? – How can NATO establish a joint fires network? –
What is the role of AI and autonomous systems
in targeting and lethality?
③ What is required for integrated air and missile
defense (including counter-unmanned aircraft
systems) to hold the line?
Mission Engineering Approach for Decision-Making
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NATO 2027: EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP WILL BE KEY TO
DETERRENCE AGAINST RUSSIA
THE NATO 2027 USE CASE: INSIGHTS AND PRIORITIES
Initial insights from the NFMA underscore several
operational priorities critical to NATO Europe’s ability
to independently deter or defeat a Russian offensive
in the Baltic region by 2027, particularly in scenarios
with limited or delayed U.S. engagement. These
insights highlight the importance of integrating
advanced fires, mobility, survivability, and C2
capabilities into a cohesive, MDO concept.
Key findings and operational priorities include:
③ Countering Russian mass and tempo with
integrated fires: NATO must pair long-range
precision fires with close-combat drone swarms to
disrupt and degrade Russian force concentration
and tempo. This layered approach enhances
survivability while enabling rapid effects across the
depth of the battlespace.
③ Persistent targeting via multidomain fires and C2
networks: Success in a high-threat environment
requires a persistent, integrated “kill chain” linking
ISR, C2, and fires across all domains. NATO must
be capable of delivering operational-level fires from
standoff range to neutralize Russian anti-access/
area-denial systems, command nodes, and massed
maneuver forces within key mobility corridors.
③ Overmatch in mobility, countermobility, and
survivability: NATO forces must dominate the
terrain through superior mobility and countermobility
operations, creating choke points and engagement
zones that slow Russian advances and funnel them
into preplanned kill boxes. Critical targeting priorities
include Russian combat engineering units that
enable cross-country movement and breaching
operations, in addition to traditional C2 and logistics
nodes.
③ Integrated, layered force protection and terrain
shaping: A combination of physical border
fortifications, camouflaged forward positions, and
active defense systems is required to delay Russian
momentum and generate tactical opportunities—
creating conditions for NATO forces to strike with
precision anti-armor fires, loitering munitions, and
coordinated drone swarms, especially at choke
points and terrain seams.
These insights reinforce the need for NATO to invest
in operational prototyping, joint experimentation,
and rapid fielding of advanced fires and survivability
capabilities. Implementing these priorities through a
data-driven, mission-engineering approach will ensure
NATO Europe is postured for success in a contested,
near-peer conflict environment.
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MAY 2025
NATO 2027: EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP WILL BE KEY TO
DETERRENCE AGAINST RUSSIA
RECOMMENDATIONS
Building on the operational insights from the NFMA,
the following recommendations are aimed at enabling
NATO Europe to independently deter, respond to, and
potentially defeat Russian aggression in the Baltic states
by 2027. These measures are designed to accelerate
capability development, institutional reforms, and
operational integration in line with a forward-leaning,
data-informed, mission-engineering framework.
③ Prepare a warfighting burden-sharing roadmap:
NATO must develop a capability roadmap that
enables burden sharing and, where appropriate,
burden transfer from the United States to Europe
for critical warfighting capabilities while addressing
gaps to achieve threat overmatch.
③ Establish a unified NATO multidomain warfare
doctrine: Develop and implement a multidomain
operational concept, aligning land, air, maritime,
cyber, and space operations across regional defense
plans and force structures.
③ Invest in multidomain C2 and ISR infrastructure:
Build a resilient, interoperable digital architecture to
support real-time C2, dynamic targeting, and cross
domain ISR sharing among allies.
③ Establish a NATO multidomain open system
architecture: Create an open system test
and experimentation architecture to drive C2
interoperability and rapid deployment based on
mission and user need.
③ Accelerate forward posture of heavy forces and
IAMD: Pre-position armored units and layered air
and missile defenses in key forward areas to enable
rapid combat mass and early crisis response.
③ Enhance military mobility and industrial
coordination: Improve cross-border military transit
and align defense industrial base efforts for surge
production of critical systems and munitions.
③ Establish additional joint ISR fusion centers:
Set up additional ISR hubs in Germany, Poland,
and Finland that build on existing Baltic centers
to provide persistent battlespace awareness and
theater-level targeting.
③ Develop a pan-European logistics control network:
Create a secure, integrated logistics system to
sustain operations under contested conditions,
incorporating civilian and military infrastructure.
③ Form MDO and cyber/influence task forces: Deploy
specialized units to coordinate cross-domain fires
and information operations, supported by integration
cells at corps and division levels.
③ Conduct no-notice Article 5 rehearsal war games
(without U.S. surge forces): Routinely execute
unscripted, short-notice multinational exercises to
test NATO’s ability to respond to aggression under
Article 5. Use outcomes to inform force posture and
capability investments.
③ Build a NATO integrated training and validation
program: The joint training architecture, in
coordination with Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe, will validate unit readiness and
interoperability in line with the 2027 vision. This
program should emphasize realistic, threat-informed
scenarios and integration of new technologies and
concepts.
13
MAY 2025
NATO 2027: EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP WILL BE KEY TO
DETERRENCE AGAINST RUSSIA
CONCLUSION
To maintain NATO’s deterrence credibility and defend
national sovereignty in the face of a reconstituted
Russian threat, Europe must assume greater
responsibility and operational capability. Achieving this
NATO Europe 2027 vision requires more than policy
alignment—it demands a mission-driven, technically
grounded approach to force design, readiness, and
modernization. In support of operationalizing this
vision, the MITRE–Atlantic Council collaboration on the
NATO Force Mix Analysis offers a reusable, scalable
technical framework to guide strategic defense
decisions through 2027 and beyond.
This framework integrates advanced digital
engineering tools, mission-level modeling, and
decision analytics to continuously evaluate NATO’s
defense needs, mission requirements, and acquisition
priorities in a dynamic threat environment. It provides
a rigorous, evidence-based foundation for aligning
strategy with capability development—supporting
faster, smarter, and more resilient force planning
across European allies.
Key enablers of the NATO 2027 vision include:
③ Mission-driven analysis: NFMA supports an
ongoing assessment of force mix options aligned
with strategic objectives, enabling nations to
prioritize investments that close capability gaps and
build operational mass.
③ Digital engineering and modeling: High-fidelity
simulation and modeling environments allow
planners to visualize and evaluate operational
concepts, logistics, and reinforcement timelines
under contested conditions—before investments
are made.
③ Operational prototyping and experimentation:
The NFMA approach enables early testing of
new operational concepts and technologies
through simulation, live exercises, and real-world
experimentation—de-risking decisions and
informing doctrine.
③ Agile acquisition support: Insights from the
NFMA can guide iterative acquisition decisions,
accelerating the deployment of high-impact
capabilities such as ISR, integrated air defense,
mobility assets, and interoperable C2 systems.
By institutionalizing this framework across NATO
stakeholders, the Alliance can move beyond static
planning cycles and toward a dynamic, data-informed
approach to force design and strategic posture. This
is essential for fielding a lethal, agile, and independent
NATO Europe—capable of deterring and, if necessary,
defeating threats in the Baltic region and beyond, even
in the absence of immediate U.S. intervention.
14
MAY 2025
NATO 2027: EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP WILL BE KEY TO
DETERRENCE AGAINST RUSSIA
AUTHORS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Authors: Scott Lee, Andrew Michta, PhD., Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Peter Jones, and Lisa Bembenick.
MITRE and the Atlantic Council gratefully acknowledge Meg Adams, Greg Crawford, PhD., LeAnne Howard, PhD.,
Jackson Ludwig, and Matt McKaig for their valuable contributions to the publication of this paper.
The authors would also like to thank Phillippe Dickinson, Sheila Gagen, Bailey Galicia, and Sydney Sherry for their editorial assistance.
For questions/comments, please contact Scott Lee, MITRE, rslee@mitre.org
15
MAY 2025
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