International Crisis Group A Promising Route to Peace in Türkiye's PKK Conflict Ankara and the PKK have a golden opportunity to end their decades long confrontation. In this Q and A, Crisis Group explains how it arose and what may lie ahead.

 International Crisis Group 

A Promising Route to Peace in Türkiye's PKK Conflict 

Ankara and the PKK have a golden opportunity to end their decades long confrontation. In this Q and A, Crisis Group explains how it arose and what may lie ahead.  

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What is happening?

In an historic move on 27 February, Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – which has long been designated as a terrorist organisation by Türkiye, the U.S. and the EU – called on the group to disarm and dissolve. Two days later, the PKK leadership headquartered in northern Iraq’s Qandil mountains responded by declaring a unilateral ceasefire in the group’s decades-long struggle with Ankara, which has killed tens of thousands since 1984. These developments, which come subsequent to an initiative launched by the Turkish authorities, have strengthened prospects that one of the world’s longest-running conflicts may finally be resolved. 

Since the last ceasefire in Türkiye’s PKK conflict broke down in July 2015, the associated violence has increasingly spread across borders, into northern Iraq and northern Syria, and embroiled new groups along the way. An end to the confrontation between the Turkish state and the PKK would not only open space for debate about the long-time demands of Türkiye’s Kurds, but also help mitigate the risk of further clashes outside the country. While the signs are encouraging, challenges to a lasting resolution may still lie ahead. 

What is the significance of Öcalan’s statement?

Öcalan’s call upon the PKK to lay down its arms after decades of low-intensity warfare with the Turkish security forces is a watershed moment for the militant group. In a written statement, Öcalan described the PKK’s commitment to an armed campaign for “a separate nation-state, a federation or administrative autonomy” as obsolete, saying the group had therefore lost its raison d’être. Among other things, he argued, Ankara’s efforts to recognise Kurdish identity had eroded the ideological foundations that once justified the group’s existence. There is now an alternative to armed struggle, he said, namely “the emergence of a democratic society and political space”, which will make possible “respect for identities, free self-expression and democratic self-organisation of each segment of society based on its own socio-economic and political structures”. He called on the PKK to convene a congress to take a decision about the group’s future.

Behind [Öcalan’s] declaration stands a process that Ankara has carefully curated and discreetly executed.

Behind the declaration stands a process that Ankara has carefully curated and discreetly executed. While the Turkish authorities have made other attempts to get the PKK to disarm, this latest effort stands out for how it involved Turkish nationalists, who have previously mounted stalwart opposition to pursuing a non-violent end to the conflict. Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and a partner in the ruling coalition led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, gave the first public sign that something new was afoot, shaking hands in October 2024 with pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) members during a parliamentary session. It was an unprecedented show of cordiality for two parties between whom there has long been deep-seated animosity. A few weeks later, Bahçeli proposed that Öcalan be allowed out of jail to address the DEM Party’s parliamentary representatives and announce the PKK’s dissolution. Subsequently, after more than a decade, the government permitted first Öcalan’s nephew and then a DEM Party delegation to visit him in prison, laying the groundwork for his 27 February statement.

During its previous efforts to push the PKK to lay down its arms, the government had allowed Öcalan to make similar statements. But his latest call – explicitly urging the group’s dissolution and setting aside aspirations for independence or autonomy – is the clearest yet, leaving little room for interpretation. The PKK leadership’s prompt announcement of a unilateral ceasefire and decision to convene a congress in response to the statement indicates that, even after more than 26 years in prison, Öcalan’s voice still carries significant weight, not only with the group’s upper echelons and members in Iraq but also in Syria, where he is revered by the Kurdish armed wing leading the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the body that controls the country’s north east. 

In public, Turkish officials maintain that they envisage no bargain, but instead the PKK’s “unconditional” disarmament. Yet media reports suggest that if the process advances, it may entail amnesties for PKK members; release of imprisoned members and DEM Party politicians; and conditional release (house arrest) of Öcalan, or, short of that, improved visiting rights for him in prison. Other items could include softening the crackdown on DEM Party municipalities and introducing constitutional amendments to expand long-sought rights for Türkiye’s Kurds, such as Kurdish-language education. 

How has the conflict evolved over the last decade?

The end of the ceasefire between Ankara and the PKK in mid-2015 inaugurated the fourth decade of a conflict that has so far caused at least 7,152 deaths, among them over 4,780 militants, 1,490 security personnel and 640 civilians, according to Crisis Group’s open-source conflict tracker. After the truce broke down, clashes erupted in several cities in Türkiye’s Kurdish-majority south-eastern provinces, where the PKK had declared Kurdish self-rule, prompting a forceful response from the Turkish military. The urban combat lasted until early 2017. After two more years of fighting, mostly in rural Türkiye, by 2019 the military had largely pushed PKK militants out of the country. The battlefield shifted to northern Syria and the steep mountains of northern Iraq. 

Türkiye attained a number of advantages as the fighting went on. Its expanding fleet of armed drones bolstered intelligence gathering and enabled more precise strikes on previously hard-to-penetrate PKK strongholds in the mountains. Ankara also enlarged its footprint on the ground, establishing over 100 outposts housing a total of 2,000-3,000 troops in northern Iraq. Ensuing clashes led to the evacuation of some 200 villages in the area, exacting a toll on civilians. Under sustained military pressure, the PKK suffered a streak of major setbacks, particularly in Türkiye, and in response resorted to a number of attention-grabbing one-off attacks, mainly on Turkish security forces. Meanwhile, inside Türkiye, DEM Party representatives and Kurdish movement sympathisers have faced an intense government crackdown on the grounds of alleged links to the PKK, leading to the imprisonment of many parliamentarians and the ouster of many DEM Party mayors from their posts. 

Ankara saw unconditional U.S. support for the YPG in Syria as emboldening the PKK.

One area where the PKK, working through its affiliates, has appeared to hold its own is north-eastern Syria. Since 2012, this region has been a stronghold of the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the backbone of the SDF. The YPG maintains ties to the PKK and includes in its ranks Qandil-trained non-Syrian cadres from the organisation. After partnering with the U.S. anti-ISIS mission in 2015, the SDF consolidated its control of the north east. Ankara saw unconditional U.S. support for the YPG in Syria as emboldening the PKK, while dampening efforts to end the conflict in Türkiye. By 2017, the SDF had established a self-proclaimed “autonomous administration”, while U.S. military backing enabled the group to govern the north east and stay in charge of its security.

The more entrenched the group became in this resource-rich part of Syria, the more Ankara perceived it as a threat to Turkish national security and the more the Turkish army and allied Syrian rebel groups intensified operations against it. As other Syrian rebels mounted a lightning offensive to overthrow the Assad regime in December 2024, the Turkish-backed groups forced the SDF out of several towns north of Aleppo. Since then, however, Ankara has scaled down its incursions into north-eastern Syria, seemingly to allow space for the interim government in Damascus to pursue direct negotiations with the SDF over how the region might be reintegrated into the new Syrian state. (Damascus did pursue such talks, which yielded an agreement on 10 March.) Ankara also appears to recognise that a military confrontation with the YPG in Syria would likely disrupt the process it launched to end its conflict with PKK. It seems keen to avoid such a scenario.

Why is Ankara recalibrating its approach toward the PKK?

Ankara has never disavowed the possibility of a political process with the PKK. Since 2015, when the last ceasefire ended, Turkish officials have privately maintained that such a process would eventually resolve the conflict, albeit on Ankara’s terms, once the PKK had been sufficiently weakened on the battlefield. That said, the Turkish authorities have always been ready to resort to coercive tactics if circumstances require – and they still are. “In case the hand we have extended is left hanging, or gets bitten, we are keeping our iron fist ready”, Erdoğan said on 1 March.

Several considerations appear to lie behind the current pivot toward resolving the conflict. With PKK militants largely forced out of Türkiye, Ankara’s security cooperation with Baghdad in good health and the new Damascus government a close Turkish ally, Türkiye’s regional position is strong enough to convince the PKK that it has no alternative but to abandon the fight. 

The conflict [with the PKK] has become an impediment to boosting Ankara’s political and economic standing in the neighbourhood.

Shifting geopolitical sands also mean that many senior Turkish officials have increasingly come to view the PKK conflict as a liability. From Ankara’s perspective, the conflict is a drain on the country’s resources, a source of strain on its ties with Washington and European capitals, and a vulnerability that its regional competitors – like Iran, Russia and Israel – can exploit to curb Türkiye’s ambitions. The conflict has become an impediment to boosting Ankara’s political and economic standing in the neighbourhood, above all in Iraq and Syria. Resolving the conflict would open the way to an eventual Turkish military withdrawal from Iraqi territory, helping improve Ankara’s overall relations with Baghdad and enabling the two to move forward with the Development Road project, which aims to connect the Grand Faw port on the Gulf in southern Iraq to Türkiye by road, rail and, eventually, oil pipeline. It could also ease further Damascus-SDF talks as they work out details of their 10 March agreement on the future of Syria’s north east, which they have pledged to do by the end of the year.

A third dimension is domestic politics. Achieving a decisive end to this conflict – especially without making highly controversial concessions such as devolution of regional power – would represent a major political victory for any Turkish leader. If a settlement is reached, Erdoğan will be celebrated as the president who got rid of what many in Türkiye see as the country’s top security threat. During what might be his last term in office, Erdoğan is in all likelihood keen to boost his and his Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) popularity, including among Kurds, whose support has ebbed in recent years. 

Though Erdoğan is barred from running for president again according to current legal limits, he might also be angling for a constitutional amendment or a parliamentary vote to end his term prematurely, which would enable him to stand once more. In either case, support from the DEM Party could come in handy. Following the AKP’s defeat by the opposition Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) in 2024 local elections, some opinion surveys show the CHP leading nationwide, with two potential presidential contenders – the mayor of metropolitan Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu, and the mayor of metropolitan Ankara, Mansur Yavaş – polling ahead of Erdoğan. So, whether Erdoğan wants to boost his party’s electoral chances or run for president again in 2028 or before, securing the Kurdish vote – which makes up 18-20 per cent of the total – may bring additional payoffs. 

What next?

With Öcalan’s call for disarmament and the PKK’s unilateral ceasefire in place, the big question now is how the peace process may unfold. At this stage, there are more questions than answers about what could lie ahead. 

The PKK is set to hold its congress to discuss Öcalan’s announcement in the next month or two. The group’s voluntary dissolution could offer a chance for a bloodless final chapter to the conflict: Ankara could claim victory, while the PKK could avoid outright surrender or military defeat. As mentioned above, it could also open the door to greater participation by the DEM Party in national and local politics and an easing of the Turkish crackdown on the party and affiliated activists.

If the group disbands, a crucial issue will be the fate of PKK members based in Qandil, including the group’s leadership. Some pro-government Turkish news outlets have reported that Ankara may grant amnesties, letting at least some PKK members who have not participated in armed struggle to return to Türkiye. The Turkish government reportedly has a list of individuals whom it might allow to come home. If amnesty proves a bridge too far, Ankara may permit some PKK members back into Türkiye to face prosecution, perhaps with reduced sentences. As for PKK figures whom Türkiye will not allow to return, including the group’s upper echelons, there are signs they may not be left out in the cold. Iraqi Kurdish parties – both the Erbil-based Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Suleimaniya-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) – may be willing to take a lead role in hosting these cadres, including those based in north-eastern Syria, in Iraqi Kurdistan. PKK leaders may also be able to seek asylum in third countries. Meanwhile, the government could release thousands of PKK members and those accused of PKK-linked crimes held in Turkish prisons. 

Other, more technical questions revolve around the logistics of disarmament and demobilisation. These include the return, registration and disposal of weapons, to ensure that they do not re-enter circulation. Monitoring (possibly with support from third parties) and verification mechanisms would also have to be put in place to oversee compliance and build trust in the process.

Israel and Iran appear uneasy about the prospect of Türkiye resolving its conflict with the PKK and seizing the opportunity to enlarge its footprint in the Levant.

A critical piece of the puzzle is the SDF-controlled north east of Syria. If PKK demobilisation moves forward, Ankara’s expectation will be that non-Syrian cadres who are linked to the group will leave the SDF’s ranks. In return, Ankara may consider giving the SDF assurances that it will not be targeted. A broader thaw between the two, which would likely require progress in a separate track of talks, could in turn bolster SDF-Damascus negotiations aimed at fleshing out their 10 March agreement on folding the north east into the central state. But nothing is set in stone. For different reasons, both Israel and Iran appear uneasy about the prospect of Türkiye resolving its conflict with the PKK and seizing the opportunity to enlarge its footprint in the Levant. Israel seems to fear the reintegration of Syria’s resource-rich north east into the Syrian state, a possible U.S. withdrawal and a potential future security threat from a strengthened Damascus. Iran, for its part, has occasionally provided support or cover to the PKK and its affiliates, with the goal of undermining Türkiye’s ambitions in the region. Yet it has carefully avoided empowering the group too much, given its delicate ties with Ankara and its own conflict with the PKK’s Iranian affiliate, the Kurdistan Free Life Party, or PJAK.

Within Türkiye, meanwhile, the government may still face a rising tide of criticism as the process unfolds. The last peace process in 2013-2015 stirred fierce opposition. Heated debate has already erupted on this occasion, with grievances aired over suspected concessions in return for the PKK’s dissolution, including fears that militants might walk free or that the constitutional article describing a Turkish citizen as a “Turk” will be changed, to mollify ethnic Kurds who perceive this wording as denying their identity. Many in the opposition have yet to be convinced that this initiative is a genuine attempt to resolve the Kurdish issue, rather than simply a political manoeuvre by Erdoğan to remain in and further centralise power. In the government’s favour, most political parties – aside from two on the far-right fringe – appear on board with the process, including the main opposition CHP, which supports the initiative while calling for more transparency and parliamentary involvement. The government’s ability to manage these disparate responses will be vital to nurturing public buy-in. The ruling coalition and the DEM Party are due to launch separate campaigns to generate more popular support for the process in the months ahead. 

Despite all the likely cavils and pitfalls, Türkiye now has a golden opportunity to end its decades-old conflict with the PKK. Ending this violent struggle would bring major benefits to Ankara and its neighbours, as well as relief to supporters of the Kurdish movement. Nothing is assured, and if recent history is a guide, setbacks and spoilers are sure to await. The determination of all sides will be critical in navigating the hard choices ahead.