IISS - the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
Online Analysis 6th March 2025
Regional reactions to the transition in Syria
Syria’s neighbours have accepted the change in leadership in Damascus and are now looking to act on their own interests, priorities and anxieties vis-à-vis the country.
In December 2024, Syria’s Assad regime, in power since 1970, collapsed following a major rebel campaign led by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohamed al-Golani and then-emir of HTS, later named himself as transnational president at the end of January 2025 and is now overseeing the country’s transition. Syria’s regional neighbours have accepted these new political realities in Damascus, and are now manoeuvring to influence the new leadership and pursue their interests. Whether they can cooperate, both with Syria and each other, will determine to a large extent Syria’s future stability and economic prospects.
Lebanon: overcoming a tortuous legacy
Emile Hokayem
The Assad regime had an abusive relationship with Lebanon, a country Syria effectively occupied between 1976 and 2005 and whose politics it shaped through coercion and cajolement. It was therefore no surprise that the demise of the Assad regime was welcomed with as much joy on the streets of diverse Beirut and Sunni-dominated Tripoli as on those of Damascus and Homs, and with as much dread on the streets of Shia-dominated Baalbek and Nabatieh as on those of Alawite-heavy Tartous and Jableh.
Regardless of the regime in place in Damascus, Syria and Lebanon have always had intimate yet tortuous relations. The former has resented the latter’s independence and liberalism, seeing itself as the larger, more important country. For its part, Lebanon has always looked down on Syria as the less sophisticated country, politically and economically. This has made for a uniquely unhealthy dynamic.
Above all, Syria has seen Lebanon as part of its sphere of influence, while Lebanese Hizbullah has considered Syria its strategic depth. Scores of Lebanese politicians, journalists and civil actors were killed by Bashar al-Assad’s forces, and Hizbullah spearheaded Assad’s counter-uprising military efforts, killing tens of thousands of Syrians in the process. This bloody legacy colours perceptions, but the concomitant ouster of Assad and the weakening of Hizbullah have also given rise to more positive narratives in both countries.
The coincidental arrival of new administrations in Damascus and Beirut provides an opportunity to address some of the structural drivers. Syria has for decades refused to demarcate its land and maritime borders with Lebanon, which Beirut saw as a way for Syria to challenge its sovereignty. Syria’s new authorities have pledged to prioritise this matter, which in time could help secure the border. Syrian workers and, since 2011, 1.5 million refugees have sought livelihoods and safety in Lebanon, aggravating that country’s economic, social and demographic problems. Syria’s newfound freedom from Assad may allow refugees to return under safe conditions. Syrian deposits in Lebanese banks evaporated during Lebanon’s 2019–20 financial meltdown, but the reconstruction of both states may boost economic growth, cooperation and connectivity.
Old sources of tension will not disappear overnight. Clans, militias and mafias have long operated on both sides of the border and will fight to defend their interests. Cultural and societal competition is hardwired. Limited pools of funding for reconstruction will generate competition for attention in Western and Gulf capitals. More than anything, Hizbullah and Iran, but also Israel, can act as spoilers.
Turkiye: the new regional-security architect?
Emile Hokayem
Turkiye has emerged as the uncontested geopolitical winner of Syria’s stunning transformation. But until early December, it seemed that it was entangled in Syria, at the mercy of Russia.
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Turkiye has been the most consequential and consistent ally of Syria’s rebel groups since 2011. Its original objective was to help them depose Assad; Russia’s intervention, the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) and Western dithering shifted Turkish attention to containing and rolling back Kurdish political and military ambitions. To do so, Ankara turned several Syrian armed groups into vassal organisations but also launched military campaigns, seizing a de facto buffer zone in northern Syria.
Frustrated by Assad’s refusal to accept any compromise and by Russia’s inability to broker any sustainable political and security arrangement, Ankara sought to turn the tables. While Ankara likely did not have the ouster of Assad in mind when it greenlit the HTS-led rebel campaign that started in late November 2024 and liberated Damascus in early December, Ankara has been only too happy to take credit for Syria’s newfound freedom. It was lost on no one that the Turkish intelligence chief and foreign ministers were the first foreign officials to visit Damascus. Sharaa, the new strongman, met Erdoğan in Turkiye in February and profusely thanked him for his support.
Domestically, Erdoğan can claim that his patience and determination have been rewarded and that the victory in Syria will help return most of the 3.2m refugees that Turkiye hosts, contrary to the Turkish opposition’s preference for a deal with Assad.
Regionally, Turkiye is eager to shape the security outlook, using its position in Syria to build a consensus to support the new administration and obtain the departure of United States troops that have backed the Kurdish armed movement and kept ISIS down. Strategically, Turkiye has inflicted significant setbacks on Russia and Iran and reminded the Arab states that it can deploy intelligence and military assets to secure military and political gains in ways they cannot.
Turkiye is uniquely positioned to help Syria’s economic revival and the rebuilding of its infrastructure. Stability would make Syria an invaluable economic and political ally and validate Turkish soft power. The two countries can now delineate their maritime border, facilitating Turkiye’s energy and trade ambitions.
But Ankara could also stunt Syria’s recovery: firstly, if it sees Syria merely as a market, crushing what is left of Syria’s industry and agriculture, and secondly, if it seeks military victory over the Kurdish armed groups operating in the north and northeast without exploring political reconciliation. Importantly, Turkiye must consider Arab preferences more seriously than it did in Libya and Tunisia in the 2010s, where its aggressive posture was matched by Egyptian, Saudi and Emirati efforts. The most magnanimous and constructive way forward would be to cooperate with the Gulf states and the European Union to stabilise Syria.
Egypt: security concerns but limited leverage
Emile Hokayem
Dismay was palpable in Cairo when it became clear that Assad had fled Damascus and the Islamist HTS had established control of much of the state.
The stunning change of command in Syria appeared to awaken the ghosts that hovered over Egypt between 2011 and 2013. After the 2011 uprising, the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to dominate its politics and won elections in 2012 before being deposed by a military coup led by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who has served as president since 2014. Years of Islamist terrorism, insurgency in the Sinai Peninsula and state repression followed.
The new authorities in Cairo quickly showed support for Assad, less out of attachment to him than fear of shared Islamist foes. Despite that, Cairo was not able to initiate any real engagement with Damascus in subsequent years. Assad paid little attention to Cairo’s advice and prodding, instead choosing to court the Gulf states in the hope of financial returns.
Cairo is watching Syria’s transformation with irritation and worry. Cairo fears that HTS success in Syria could galvanise Islamists at home. Seemingly validating this, in January an Egyptian Islamist fighter in Syria broadcast a threat against the Egyptian government. The man was quickly jailed by the new authorities in Damascus, who have insisted they would not allow Syria to serve as a platform for regional instability. Nevertheless, Egypt tellingly has been the last major Arab government to welcome and establish contact with the new Islamist administration in Damascus.
There is a geopolitical dimension to Cairo’s concerns: Cairo has watched Turkiye extend its influence in Libya, Tunisia and elsewhere. Ankara’s success in Syria has renewed Turkish talk of a neo-Ottoman empire, which has unnerved many Arab states. Cairo hopes that this could rally Arab support for a conditional approach to Syria’s transition. Cairo’s difficult economic situation makes it less likely to be a player in Syria’s reconstruction, but its influence over the Arab League is an instrument it is likely to use. Cairo will likely seek to develop relationships with the disgruntled Syrian secular opposition, remnants of the Assad regime and the Syrian business elite.
Jordan: cautious optimism
Laith Alajlouni
Having suffered from the security and humanitarian repercussions of the Syrian civil war for 14 years, Jordanian officials have reacted quickly and with cautious optimism to the change of regime in Damascus, expressing support and seeking stronger cooperation between the two countries. Jordan has been keen to accompany and shape the political transition; notably, it hosted a meeting of the Arab Contact Group on Syria in Aqaba merely a week after the fall of the Assad regime. The meeting was attended by representatives from Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Arab League, and it emphasised the importance of preserving the territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of Syria, as well as providing the necessary humanitarian aid to the country. This urgency underlined the perceived risk that a mismanaged, contentious or failed transition would generate regional instability.
Jordan’s forward attitude toward the new Syrian leadership reflects the myriad interests and concerns in Amman regarding the transition. These include the maintenance of border security and the suppression of extremist and criminal groups operating in southern Syria, from drug networks to Iranian-linked militias and ISIS. In recent years, the Jordanian Armed Forces and security apparatus have confronted large-scale smuggling of drugs and weapons across its northern borders, resulting in numerous firefights in the area. In January 2025, the Jordanian government announced it had seized over 27.5m Captagon pills and 3,000 kilogrammes of hashish, originating from Syria, in the previous year. Jordan repeatedly sought the cooperation of the Assad regime, to no avail. It is therefore notable that, following the regime’s fall, Amman quickly set up a security-coordination committee and extended an offer (which was accepted) to train the new Syrian government’s armed forces. Jordan has also expressed interest in working with the new government to facilitate the return of the estimated 1.3m Syrian refugees living in Jordan, most of whom await political stability and security before returning home.
Alongside its interest in Syria’s security, Amman is keeping an eye on the country’s economic reconstruction and energy-sector prospects, both of which could yield opportunities for Jordan. Syria’s construction sector and trading companies have suffered from the country’s 14-year-long isolation, including Western sanctions. Jordan wants to position itself as a node for any connectivity project which would pass through Syria to Lebanon and Turkiye. The government has already approved a plan to build a dry port in Mafraq near the Syrian border to facilitate regional trade. Meanwhile, the government transition provides Jordan with the chance to negotiate new or reimagined energy projects. These include a potential Qatar–Turkiye gas pipeline which would cross through Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria (a project that has been on the shelf since 2009), the potential revival of the Syrian section of the Arab Gas Pipeline, and new plans to link Jordan’s electricity grid to the Syrian one.
Significantly, Jordan is also looking to the new government in Syria to help resolve numerous outstanding water disputes between the two countries. Syria has built some 25 dams along the Yarmouk River, which supplies Jordan with water from Syria, leaving Jordan with only 50–100m cubic metres per year. This is substantially less than the 208m cubic metres agreed with the Assad regime in the bilateral Al-Wahda Dam agreement signed in 1987.
The collapse of the Assad regime offers Jordan a historic opportunity to strengthen its regional position in the new Levantine security architecture. Amman will remain wary of the Islamist nature of the new Syrian government, given the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s history of using its ties with regional Islamist powers to exert influence over the Hashemite monarchy. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has previously cooperated with the Syrian branch of the movement and could leverage both this relationship and its popularity in Jordan to gain a stronger position vis-à-vis the Jordanian government. Conversely, Jordan is worried that a failed transition in Syria that weakens central authority and divides the country could negatively affect its interests. To hedge, Jordan’s security services will likely continue to invest in Syria’s southern armed factions that are currently sidelined in the transition.
Iraq: a complex stance
Laith Alajlouni
The Iraqi government watched the collapse of the Assad regime with alarm, almost horror. Despite historically contentious relations, Iraq and Syria shared enemies (a wide spectrum of Sunni movements, from the nationalist–secular to the Islamist kind, including ISIS) and partners (notably Iran). It was therefore not surprising that in a phone call with Assad just a week before the collapse of his regime, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani reaffirmed his support and described all Syrian rebel groups as ‘terrorists’.
Acknowledging the new realities, the Iraqi government has shifted its rhetoric towards supporting the transition in Syria ‘out of respect for the free will of the Syrian people’. As a gesture of good will, Iraq repatriated 1,905 Assad soldiers who had fled to Iraq and sent its intelligence chief Hamid al-Shatri to meet with the new leadership in Damascus (tellingly, no minister has made the trip so far). The Iraqi government nevertheless remains very cautious about dealing with the new government. The fact that Sharaa is a former fighter with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq is bound to give Baghdad, which fought a violent anti-insurgency campaign against these groups between 2013 and 2017, reason for concern.
Concurrently, Iraqi Shia militias and politicians have been worried about a possible resurgence of ISIS. Directly following the fall of the Assad regime, the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Units deployed fighters alongside Iraqi Armed Forces along the Iraq–Syria border. Although small numbers of Iraqi militia fighters, estimated at 200, flocked to Syria in support of the embattled Assad regime in its final days, Iraq’s main militia groups, Kataib Hizbullah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Badr Brigades chose to stay out. Despite their hostility to Syria’s Sunni Islamist factions, the Iraqi militias were deterred by the threat of attack by Israel, the rapid collapse of the Assad regime and a lack of Iranian operational and political support.
A stable relationship with the new Syrian government could offer several key benefits for Baghdad. It would help Iraq ensure the continuity of its water supply through the Euphrates River as well as facilitate the repatriation of many of the 270,000 Syrian refugees in Iraq to their homeland. It could also enable greater economic cooperation. Iraq is already thinking of reviving the existing Iraq–Syria pipeline that historically connected Kirkuk to the Syrian port of Baniyas, which would boost Iraqi energy exports to Syria and possibly to Europe. Likewise, Iraq could benefit from the low cost of Syrian pharmaceutical, agricultural and textile exports.
Israel and Iran: conflict in and beyond Syria
John Raine
For Israel, the emergence of a Syria without the Assads, the Ba’ath Party and Iran’s influence is swapping a known enemy for an unquantified threat. There is much in the political agenda of President Sharaa to alarm Israel, not least his roots in radical, proscribed Islamist movements; his support for Hamas; and his near-satellite relationship with the political scourge of Israel, Turkish President Erdoğan. Acting on those concerns, and knowing Sharaa’s personal attachment to the Golan Heights, Israel moved quickly to secure its position in the area by occupying the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force buffer zone, evacuated by Syrian troops as the regime fell in December 2024, and seizing new territories inside Syria. The Israel Defense Forces are now only 40 kilometres from Damascus and have built a number of small facilities, including one on Mount Hermon. Israel has ignored Syrian, regional and international condemnation of its territorial expansion, and refused to provide a time frame for its military deployments. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has also demanded the demilitarisation of southern Syria.
No one is missing the Assads but, under the Ba’ath Party, Syria was for Israel both an enemy and a source of structural stability for the region’s politics. In Syria’s long civil war, the greater risk for Israel was not that Assad would win but that the war would lead to the dismemberment of Syria from which Shia, as well as radical Sunni, elements would emerge that would be more ready to attack Israel than the strategically cautious Assad regime. Israel feared less being surrounded by hostile states, with which historically it has negotiated, than being surrounded by hostile non-state actors, which it can only engage militarily.
Israel will therefore be as concerned by the domestic as by the foreign policy of Sharaa’s government. Like other neighbours, it will be watching to see whether Sharaa graduates to pragmatic statecraft or reverts to the idealistic militancy from which he came. His disbandment of Syria’s rebel militias, including HTS, and formal engagement with the US and Arab states have provided some positive signs that he is thinking in terms of statecraft.
There is further comfort for Israel in that the new leadership in Syria is likely to remain pre-occupied with rebuilding a state ravaged by over a decade of civil war. The complexity and scale of that task will constrain external ambitions. Sharaa faces the enormous tasks of the physical reconstruction of Syria’s cities and the political re-integration of, in particular, the largest and most powerful Kurdish entity Syria has ever known within its borders. He must add to these the reconstitution of critical institutions he has removed by dismantling the Ba’ath Party and the Syrian Armed Forces.
Much of what Sharaa does may affect only Syria, but while Israel may be indifferent to the reconstruction of the Syrian infrastructure and economy, it will not tolerate a rebuilding of Syria’s armed forces to a level that enables it to constitute a credible threat, conventionally or unconventionally. Any attempts by Syria to acquire strategic advantage are likely, under the current Israeli government, to be met with pre-emptive force, regardless of the legality of such an action or international criticism. In addition to taking the Golan buffer zone last December, Israel also destroyed Syrian naval, air, ground and weapons-of-mass-destruction capabilities and dozens of military installations.
Iran, though its reach is now weakened, will be morally obliged to assist Shia and Shia-aligned groups within Syria. Critically for its credibility, it will need to ensure the defence and open access to pilgrims of the Shia shrines. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force used the defence of these shrines as a recruiting point for Shia militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan, many of whom are still in Syria. Their fate and that of Iranian clerics and pilgrims remains uncertain.
While that may generate friction between Tehran and Damascus, the risk of Syria becoming another flashpoint for tension between Tel Aviv and Tehran has been largely removed. For now, Israel, having taken the Golan Heights and with Iran’s supply line to Hizbullah cut, is focusing its capabilities on Gaza and the West Bank. Iran may continue to snarl, but it has been repulsed as a force in the Levant and, largely, defanged. Once able to resupply Hizbullah militarily at will with sophisticated weaponry, the reported interception by Lebanese authorities of couriers carrying currency at the Beirut airport in February, as well as the prevention of Iranian planes from landing in Beirut in January, show how damaged its reach now is.
For all his opposition to Israel and his support for co-sectarian Hamas, Sharaa’s accession to power removes the scope for IRGC activities in Syria which triggered direct hostilities between Iran and Israel. There may be other triggers elsewhere as Tehran attempts to rebuild its influence and Syria itself must militarily or otherwise confront Israeli occupation. But for now, Syria has concerns closer to home, Iran is in strategic recovery and Israel is busy on other fronts.
The Gulf states: common strategic interests, divergent political approaches
Hasan Alhasan
The Arab Gulf states have shared interests in Syria. Curbing Iran’s influence in the Levant, stemming the flow of drugs into Gulf markets and preventing Syria from turning into a terrorist haven are common objectives. Moreover, they also have similar tools with which to shape political, security and economic outcomes in post-Assad Syria, and are able to work with various partners to do so.
Despite their shared objectives and tools, the Arab Gulf states have differed markedly in their approaches to the new Syrian administration. In the absence of a Gulf Cooperation Council consensus, key Arab Gulf states Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar have chosen to approach the new transitional Syrian administration bilaterally and with varying degrees of enthusiasm, reflecting differences in their respective attitudes toward Syria’s Islamist rulers and their Turkish backers.
Saudi Arabia
Leveraging its position as a regional heavyweight, while also exploiting the policy paralysis of the Trump administration’s early days, Saudi Arabia is playing a more active leadership role in coordinating regional and international diplomatic and humanitarian approaches towards Syria. With estimates of de facto Syrian refugees in Saudi Arabia ranging from approximately 500,000–2.5m people, Saudi Arabia has an interest in Syria’s stability should it wish to facilitate the repatriation of Syrian nationals.
The new Syrian administration has reciprocated Saudi Arabia’s embrace. Riyadh was the first foreign destination of both Syria’s President Sharaa and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates Asaad al-Shibani.
Saudi Arabia views the fall of the Assad regime as an opportunity to reassert its influence in the Levant. Its previous attempts to secure the regime’s cooperation on key issues – cracking down on Captagon smuggling, facilitating the return of Syrian refugees, curbing Iran’s influence and restarting political relations, including via the Arab League – had failed. The new Syrian administration’s enthusiasm for mending ties with Riyadh thus provides the Saudis with an opportunity to shape outcomes in its favour.
Nevertheless, Syria’s new reality poses risks for Saudi Arabia. Riyadh wants to counterbalance Turkiye’s influence over the new Syrian administration; prevent Iran from re-establishing a foothold in Syria; stem the flow of drugs; and ensure that Syria does not serve as a haven for terrorist organisations. It will seek to shape the new administration’s behaviour by leveraging its diplomatic influence and economic resources for reconstruction and engagement.
United Arab Emirates
Blindsided by the lightning collapse of the Assad regime, the UAE has been the most cautious of the three Arab Gulf states in its approach toward the new Syrian administration. Over the past few years, the UAE, along with Bahrain and Oman, had led the charge for the Assad regime’s reintegration into the international community. The UAE was the first Arab state to reopen its embassy in Damascus in 2018; received president Assad in 2022; and championed his country’s readmission into the Arab League in 2023. The UAE had been lobbying the US ahead of the potential expiry in December 2024 of the Caesar Act sanctions to lift sanctions on Syria in return for Damascus curtailing ties with Iran. A few days before the Assad regime’s collapse in early December 2024, UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan expressed his country’s ‘solidarity with Syria and its support in combating terrorism and extremism’.
From the UAE’s vantage point, the Assad regime seemed like ‘the only game in town’, with no viable alternatives on the horizon. Given its hostility to Islamist ideology, the UAE was concerned that the successor to the Assad regime could harm Emirati interests. Rather than isolate the Assad regime, the UAE argued that offering incentives could encourage Syria to budge on its ties with Iran and curb drug smuggling, though such hopes were dashed by the regime’s visible lack of cooperation with the ministerial liaison committee formed after the 2023 Arab League summit in Jeddah.
The UAE has thus approached the new Syrian administration tentatively. Their leaders spoke by phone, and the UAE received Syrian foreign minister al-Shibani in Abu Dhabi in early January 2025, but it has yet to dispatch a delegation to Damascus. Abu Dhabi will likely wait and observe Syria’s behaviour before it embraces Damascus’s new rulers.
The UAE is concerned that under HTS’s rule, Syria could turn into a regional hub for terrorist groups and the Muslim Brotherhood, which the UAE considers to be a terrorist organisation. In January 2025, the UAE added 19 individuals and entities allegedly affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood to local terrorism lists, perhaps to signal that it would be opposed to the group flourishing in post-Assad Syria. Although the UAE’s relations with Turkiye – the Muslim Brotherhood’s main regional backer – have improved since relations were fully resumed in 2021, it nevertheless views Ankara’s growing regional influence as potentially destabilising.
Nevertheless, the UAE is well positioned to play a humanitarian and development role in Syria. Between 2011 and 2023, the UAE donated roughly US$1 billion in predominantly humanitarian aid to Syria and Syrian refugees in third countries. The creation of the new UAE Aid Agency in November 2024 suggests that aid will continue to feature prominently in the UAE’s foreign policy, of which Syria could be a key beneficiary.
Qatar
Among the Arab Gulf states, Qatar is arguably the main beneficiary of the Assad regime’s collapse. Doha had been the regime’s staunchest opponent among the Arab Gulf states and had backed efforts as recently as 2022 to unite Syria’s disparate opposition groups. Qatar’s hostility stemmed both from the ideological disposition of its rulers, who favour Islamist groups and governments with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, and its geostrategic alignment with Turkiye, whose relations with the Assad regime were tense. Qatar publicly opposed, without seeking to veto, Syria’s readmission into the Arab League in 2023. Unlike Bahrain, Oman and the UAE, Qatar chose not to reinstate diplomatic relations with Syria after their rupture in 2011.
During the final few days of the Assad regime, Qatar hosted the members of the Astana Process – Iran, Russia and Turkiye – in addition to Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia – to discuss the situation in Syria. Following the Assad regime’s collapse, Qatar’s newly appointed Chairman of the State Security Service Khalfan al-Kaabi joined his Turkish counterpart İbrahim Kalin for talks with HTS leader Sharaa, illustrating the extent of coordination between Ankara and Doha on Syria. Doha could use its close alignment with Ankara to exercise greater influence over the new administration in Damascus, including to obtain security and intelligence cooperation or gain preferential access to lucrative economic opportunities in Syria.
Qatar has since been the most eager of the Arab Gulf states to embrace the new administration in Damascus. Qatar’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs Soltan bin Saad Al Muraikhi was the first high-ranking official from the Gulf to visit Damascus on 23 December, ending a more than 13-year rift between the two countries. In January 2025, Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani became the first foreign leader to visit Syria post-Assad.
Qatar has pledged to assist Syria with its reconstruction needs, including to provide support for the operation of Damascus International Airport and to reportedly fund public-sector wage hikes promised by the new Syrian administration. Qatar and Turkiye are also set to dispatch floating power plants to Syria following the easing of US sanctions on the country.
Authors
Emile Hokayem
Director of Regional Security and Senior Fellow for Middle East Security
Laith Alajlouni
Research Associate for the Middle East Programme
John Raine
Senior Adviser for Geopolitical Due Diligence
Hasan Alhasan
Senior Fellow for Middle East Policy
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