1945 Forty Five The Embassy Russia’s Imperial Mindset: Understanding the Roots of the Ukraine War ByAndrew A. Michta Published 1 day ago

 

1945  Forty Five

The Embassy

Russia’s Imperial Mindset: Understanding the Roots of the Ukraine War

ByAndrew A. Michta

Published  1 day ago

As the second Trump administration prepares to take charge of US foreign and security policy, there is intense debate in Washington about what the end state in Ukraine should be, what kind of a peace deal can be negotiated with Putin, and what long-term prospects there might be for reaching a modus vivendi with Russia. 

Much of the discussion is tied up in American domestic politics, as it trails the last presidential election.  Indeed, this war should have never happened, and whatever “Russia explainers” might say going forward, there should be no doubt that the horrendous cost in Ukrainian and Russian lives is squarely on Vladimir Putin and his enablers in the Kremlin.  

What Putin Wants in Ukraine 

But taking a principled stance will not move the needle toward a durable armistice.  In fact, by all indications, Moscow is not interested in anything short of an all-out surrender by Kyiv, including the foreclosure of any prospects for Ukraine’s membership in NATO, the de facto disbandment of the Ukrainian armed forces, and consigning Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence.  Putin has no real incentive to negotiate in good faith because he believes that at this stage, he is winning, and unfortunately, he is right. 

For three years, the US and Europe prioritized escalation management that left Ukraine with no clear path forward to an equitable negotiation for a lasting peace, or at the very least, an enduring armistice with Russia.

Today, Putin continues to signal that there is no deal he would accept that would not be tantamount to a victory for Russia because he believes he can defeat Ukraine at an acceptable cost, and thus deliver a devastating blow to US interests across the globe, undermining the system the United States and its democratic allies put in place post-Cold War.  For three years of this war the West has offered no strategy for victory, while the horrendous attrition on the battlefield, combined with the mass flight of civilians from the front, has left Ukraine with roughly one-fourth of the population of the Russian Federation. 

To appreciate the scope of the bloodletting and the attendant emigration from Ukraine, consider that on the day of its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 Ukraine had some 52 million citizens, on the eve of Russia’s second invasion in 2022 the number was just under 40 million, while today there are somewhere between 27-30 million people left in the country.  So, while much of the debate in Washington has centered around whether to continue to supply Ukraine with money, weapons, and munitions, the stark reality is that the country is beginning to run out of people.  

Simply put, absent a Western strategy for breaking the Russian military in Ukraine that would impose prohibitive costs on Moscow, Putin’s approach to the war is poised to deliver him a de facto victory, the consequences of which leaders in the United States and Europe have yet to fully appreciate, for he is not fighting a war against Ukraine, but a civilizational war against the West.  Until real setbacks force him to realize that he cannot win at an acceptable cost to his power base, he will not stop. 

Russian Msta Artillery. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Russian Msta Artillery in Ukraine. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Let’s be clear about what is possible today when it comes to negotiating with Russia.  We may in the end reach some form of a deal with Russia, but it will be at best a breather which Putin will use to rearm before attempting once more either to fully subjugate or destroy the independent Ukrainian state. 

If such a temporary armistice is reached, much will depend on what happens next, i.e., whether the United States and Europe will create a credible enforcement mechanism and most importantly arm Ukraine to the point that another Russian invasion will not have a chance for success. 

The United States and its European allies need to have a frank conversation about the kind of state the Russian Federation is and the realistic prospects for a long-term peaceful accommodation with Moscow.  The “Russian question” that Western leaders continue to fail or refuse to understand, i.e., the problem posed by a quintessentially revisionist power straddling the Eurasian landmass of eleven time zones, cannot be reduced to the traditional “good tsar-bad tsar” formula that has defined both US and European approaches during the post-Cold War decades.  The issue is both historical and systemic, and until Western leaders understand this, we have no realistic prospect of crafting a workable strategy to deal with Russia, either today or in the future. 

How to Think of Russia: As An Empire 

Any Russia policy must start with the realization that the Russian Federation is not a nation-state as we would understand it in the West; rather, it is and has always been an empire, whether in the tsarist, Soviet, or oligarchic varieties.  The population consists of a multitude of nationalities governed by a centrally-run repressive state, with top-down pressure as the historic mode of governance and expansionism as the state’s raison d’être. Russia comprises over 80 sub-entities, including 21 non-Slavic autonomous republics. Ethnic Russians—though the population majority—are in decline. 

In the West political leaders tend to mirror-image Russia based on their own experience of national consolidation giving rise to democratic government.  Western leaders who perennially hope for a democratic Russia to emerge, or at least a pluralist one, need to accept that because a unified Russian nation doesn’t exist, there is no chance for democracy or any sort of polyarchic system to take root.  Western analysts – many of whom neither speak Russian nor have a deep grounding in Russian culture and history beyond the Kremlin’s own version – fail to understand the systemic and cultural limitations that define that country’s policy choices.    

The Russian Federation is a top-down imperialist power.  In its current form, the systemic nature of this empire offers no path forward for the West to reach a lasting modus vivendi with Moscow.  Russia can be blocked and contained, as it was during the half-century of the Cold War, but until a fundamental systemic change occurs inside Russia that would begin to transform its political culture, the idea of turning Russia into a responsible stakeholder in the international system by satisfying its current demands will remain a pipedream.  This should be the starting point for Washington in any negotiation with Moscow on stopping the war in Ukraine, and we should tailor our expectations as to its durability accordingly. 

The Path Forward on Ukraine 

Russia will take the West seriously and heed its warnings only if it sees that we possess the military capabilities and, most importantly, the intestinal fortitude to deter aggression and, if need be, defend our interests with force. 

We need to reinvest in our military, and we need our European allies to rearm at speed and scale to provide the bulk of conventional deterrence and defense within NATO.  But perhaps most of all, we urgently need political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to recognize the reality of what Russia is, not what they wish it to be.  Only then can a deal with Russia that brings peace to Ukraine, or at the very least an enduring cessation of hostilities on the frontline, and thereby security to Europe, be achieved.  

About the Author: Andrew A. Michta 

Andrew A. Michta is Senior Fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council of the United States. Views expressed here are his own.