The National Interest December 2, 2024 The Return of ​​Syria’s Rebels: Neither Unexpected Nor Final

 The National Interest 

December 2, 2024  

The Return of ​​Syria’s Rebels: Neither Unexpected Nor Final

The survival of the Assad regime now depends on coordination and mutual understanding between Iran, Russia, and Turkey.

by Arman Mahmoudian Follow @MahmoudianArman on TwitterL

 

The sudden territorial gains of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in northern Syria, including Aleppo—Syria’s second-largest city—have reawakened the nation’s dormant civil war. Although these developments may catch some off guard, they are neither unexpected nor unprecedented. In fact, they have been a long time coming; the regime of Bashar al-Assad has been vulnerable to such upheaval for years.

First, for over a decade, the Syrian army had struggled to obtain the upper hand in a brutal civil war, resulting in a decline in its military capabilities and morale. While the situation had notably stabilized in favor of Assad’s regime since 2018, the Syrian army never received a chance to recover. Once considered a proud military force, the Syrian Arab Army has, in recent years, devolved into a fragmented patchwork of factions and militias heavily influenced by foreign powers, including Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia.

The presence and activity of external forces, establishing bases and asserting control across the country, have likely impacted troop morale. Many have begun to question the extent to which they are truly fighting for their country’s sovereignty. Additionally, the Syrian army’s infrastructure, command centers, and bases have been relentlessly targeted by Israeli airstrikes over the past decade. Hundreds of these strikes have critically weakened its operational capacity. These external pressures, alongside the army’s decline and frustration, dealt a serious blow to the overall effectiveness of the Syrian army.

The second factor behind the current developments in Syria is Russia’s so-called “Ukrainian fatigue,” or more precisely, the strain caused by its protracted war in Ukraine. Back in 2015, when Russia declared its support for Assad, it played a pivotal role in restoring the regime’s health. Massive Russian airstrikes were critical in shifting the balance of the civil war, allowing the Syrian regime, supported by Iranian forces and allied Shia militias, to gain the upper hand.

However, the situation today is vastly different. Russia’s focus has shifted almost entirely to the war effort in Ukraine, with little capacity to spare. Although Russia still maintains a military presence in Syria and has launched more airstrikes against the rebels, its priorities lie in the conflict in Europe. Limited ammunition and resources are being channeled toward the Ukrainian front, and much of Russia’s elite military personnel, particularly its air force, have been redeployed there.

This diversion of resources and attention has significantly weakened Russia's ability to support the Syrian regime as effectively as before. Consequently, this shift has further eroded the morale of the Syrian armed forces and emboldened rebel factions, who have seized the opportunity to exploit Russia’s diminished focus on Syria.

Syria has also suffered from the decline of its primary support system, the Axis of Resistance. The second reason could be that throughout much of the Syrian Civil War, this coalition—a network of Iranian-backed Shia militias from Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen—was essential in assisting the Assad regime and driving its military advances. However, in the past year, the dynamics within this alliance have shifted significantly.

Since October 7, 2023, the Israel-Hezbollah conflict has escalated to unprecedented levels. During the recent war between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel inflicted severe blows to Hezbollah’s military capabilities. Approximately 4,000 elite Hezbollah fighters, as well as Hassan Nasrallah and other senior figures, were killed. The group’s command structure was severely damaged, and although new commanders have been appointed, the leadership overhaul has undoubtedly left the militias in a semi-paralyzed state.

Moreover, the heightened conflict with Israel has compelled Hezbollah to redirect much of its attention and resources toward Lebanon, significantly detracting from its involvement in Syria. This shift has created a gap in the Assad regime’s support network. The reduced backing from Hezbollah and other Iranian-aligned elements has further undermined the regime’s capacity to maintain control and effectively address the challenges it faces.

Another contributing factor is the internal state of Syria, particularly within the territories under Assad’s control. Since 2018, the Assad regime has managed to regain control of approximately 70 percent of the country. However, it has struggled to sustain control over outlying areas. Syria continues to face severe economic challenges, and the government has been unable to provide even basic services like the power supply. Many areas under regime control have endured years without reliable access to electricity, further fueling public dissatisfaction.

This dire situation has sparked protests in regions that were traditionally considered strongholds of support for the regime. These demonstrations expose the growing gap between regions that previously backed Assad. These events have not only demoralized Syrian troops but also undermined the regime’s institutional stability, creating opportunities for opposition groups, including rebels and the HTS movement, to advance their positions.

Nevertheless, none of this means that Assad’s fate is sealed. The regime still has pathways to survival. To endure, Assad must first and foremost maintain his control over the political establishment in Damascus. Any coup or internal mutiny within the Ba’athist regime, especially while it faces a major threat from northern rebels, could lead to the total collapse of the government. Preserving internal unity is, therefore, critical.

Second, Assad’s regime must slow the rebels’ advances in the short term. By temporarily stabilizing the frontlines, the regime could give Iran time to mobilize and deploy Iraqi militias to bolster Syrian forces. Additionally, it would allow Russia to reassess its position and potentially redirect more resources to Syria, at least temporarily, to counter the rebel threat. Such reinforcements could be critical for Assad to maintain his hold on power.

Finally, ensuring the survival of the Assad regime, now more than ever, requires greater coordination and mutual understanding between Iran, Russia, and Turkey. While some suggest that Turkey may be supporting the rebel advance, this view overlooks Ankara’s likely aversion to the total collapse of the Syrian regime. Factors such as Turkey’s wariness of HTS (previously linked to Al Qaeda), concerns over the group’s future trajectory, and the potential for Syrian Kurds to exploit any ensuing chaos are elements that might push Ankara toward favoring limited objectives and some level of de-escalation soon. Therefore, cooperation among these key players could serve as a lifeline for the regime as it navigates the perils facing it.

Dr. Arman Mahmoudian is a research fellow at the USF Global and National Security Institute and an adjunct professor at the USF Judy Genshaft Honors College.

The Washington Post Breaking News - December 3, 2024 - South Korean military says martial law will remain in place despite parliament’s vote to reject it

 

World Alert Dec. 3, 11:46 a.m. EST South Korean military says martial law will remain in place despite parliament’s vote to reject it. Follow our live coverage. A majority of the parliament voted to end President Yoon Suk Yeol’s state of emergency hours after it began; under the constitution, the president must comply and end the decree. But no time frame is specified for compliance, and the army said martial law will remain in place until the president lifts it. Read more

Newsweek Europe Quietly Prepares for World War III Published Dec 03, 2024 at 3:00 AM EST Updated Dec 03, 2024 at 10:10 AM EST - By Ellie Cook Security & Defense Reporter

 Newsweek 

Europe Quietly Prepares for World War III

Published Dec 03, 2024 at 3:00 AM EST

Updated Dec 03, 2024 at 10:10 AM EST

By Ellie Cook

Security & Defense Reporter

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With warnings swirling over a possible war with Russia in a matter of years, NATO's European members have already started laying the groundwork for defenses, should Russian troops set foot on alliance soil.

"Russia is preparing for a war with the West," Bruno Kahl, the head of Germany's foreign intelligence service, said in late November.

But it's not likely to be a large-scale attack into NATO territory, the intelligence chief warned. Moscow could opt for a limited incursion or upping its hybrid warfare tactics to probe the alliance's conviction, Kahl said.

NATO is trying to prepare for both scenarios: an all-out war, and less obvious techniques designed to undermine stability in the alliance's member countries.

Europe Quietly Prepares for World War 3

A Newsweek graphic shows various weapons of war along with iconic images from a number of European cities. European NATO members have made visible preparations for a war against Russia. Photo Illustration by Newsweek/Getty Images

"There are multiple options for Russia to test the cohesion of the alliance," including limited land grabs, the former head of NATO's Multinational Corps Northeast based in northwest Poland, Lieutenant General Jürgen-Joachim von Sandrart, told Newsweek just before leaving his post in November.

The urgency is now obvious from senior military and political officials. Andrius Kubilius, the European Union's commissioner for defense, said in September that defense ministers and NATO commanders "agree that [Russian President] Vladimir Putin could be ready for confrontation with NATO and the EU in six to eight years."

Estonia's foreign intelligence service warned in February NATO "could face a Soviet-style mass army in the next decade" if Russia successfully reforms its military. The army would be "technologically inferior" to NATO forces in areas other than electronic warfare and long-range strikes, the service said, but its "military potential would be significant."

"If we take these assessments seriously, then that is the time for us to properly prepare, and it is a short one," Kubilius, a former Lithuanian prime minister, told the Reuters news agency. "This means we have to take quick decisions, and ambitious decisions."

The main catalyst is Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, prompting Sweden and Finland to abandon their long-held policies of non-alignment and join NATO, lengthening Russia's border with the alliance.

Putin ally predicts nuclear "radiation zone" could end war in UkraineRead morePutin ally predicts nuclear "radiation zone" could end war in Ukraine

Across Europe, NATO is now battling to raise defense spending up and beyond the two percent of GDP requested—but not enforced—by the alliance. Many countries have historically fallen far short of this benchmark in the decades since the end of the Cold War.

But times are changing. European nations have pledged to meet or exceed the target, and officials and experts broadly expect the incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump to double down on pressure on Europe to increase military spending further.

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The countries snaking along NATO's eastern flank are way ahead. How quickly Europe will be able to pull up spending and prop up the companies producing more equipment, however, remains to be seen. NATO's top military official, Admiral Rob Bauer, said in late last November that businesses "need to be prepared for a wartime scenario and adjust their production and distribution lines accordingly."

"While it may be the military who wins battles, it's the economies that win wars." Bauer said.

Already, there are visible signs of preparations across Europe, particularly striking in the countries closest to Russia's borders.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić said in July that NATO was "not ready now" for a possible war with Russia but that they "will be ready" in the future.

"They are already preparing for a conflict with the Russian Federation and are preparing much faster than some people would like to see, in every sense," he told Serbian television, in remarks reported by Russian state media.

"We know this from military preparations. We know how they are being conducted. And I want to tell you, they are preparing for a military conflict," Vučić said.

Germany has started putting together plans for how Berlin would would shield important buildings and installations in the event of an attack, and how Germany would be a conduit for hundreds of thousands of soldiers heading further east in Europe, the German daily newspaper, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, reported in November.

The first draft of the strategy paper, labeled "Operationsplan Deutschland," is 1,000 pages long, the newspaper reported.

Baltic Defense Line

The three Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia signed an agreement back in January this year to beef up protection along their land borders with Russia and Belarus.

Belarus is a key Russian ally, and the Kremlin used Belarusian territory to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The country also links Russia with its isolated Kaliningrad exclave, sandwiched between NATO members Poland and Lithuania.

"We are undertaking this effort so that the people of Estonia can feel safe, but if the slightest risk emerged, we would be ready for various developments more promptly," said Estonia's defense minister, Hanno Pevkur.

Tallinn said there would be a "network of bunkers, support points and distribution lines" along the border.

Lithuania's defense ministry said in early September that it had "set up a blockade" on and near the bridge in Panemunė, the Lithuanian border settlement that connects the NATO country with Kaliningrad.

Vilnius said it had set up mines, and other defenses, like dragon's teeth, against tanks and armored vehicles.

Dragon's teeth are concrete blocks used to halt tank advances and prevent mechanized infantry from gaining territory. This type of anti-tank fortification has littered Ukraine.

"This is a precautionary step to ensure more effective defense," Lithuania's government said.

Lithuania's neighbor to the north, Latvia, has put similar defenses in place. The Latvian government has said around €303 million ($318 million) will be funneled into building up defenses on its eastern border with Russia over five years. There will be outposts for support personnel, reinforced structures, anti-tank trenches and storage dumps for ammunition and mines, Riga said.

"We will be able to slow down and block the movement of potential aggressors more efficiently," Latvian Defense Minister Andris Sprūds said in a statement in January.

In July, Riga said that obstacles designed to hamper military movements were now being "procured and transported to temporary storage areas near Latvia's eastern border." Russia lies to the east of Latvia.

Estonia's ERR broadcaster reported in October that the Latvian military was testing barriers making up the Baltic Defense Line, including dragon's teeth.

Kaspars Lazdinš, from the Latvian armed forces, said the military had used a T-55 tank to "simulate conditions similar to those our eastern neighbors might present." The T-55 is a Soviet-era main battle tank.

"The anti-tank barriers held up well," Lazdinš told the broadcaster, adding: "The concrete blocks successfully protected people and infrastructure from direct fire."

Latvia anti-tank defenses

Anti-tank defenses are seen in Karsava, Latvia, on August 16, 2024. The Latvian government has said around €303 million will be funneled into building up defenses on its eastern border with Russia over five years. GINTS IVUSKANS/AFP via Getty Images

Further to the south, staring down Kaliningrad and Belarus, Poland has started construction of what it has called its "East Shield," costing over $2.5 billion and described by Warsaw as "the largest operation to strengthen Poland's eastern border, Nato's eastern flank, since 1945."

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk visited the Polish border with Kaliningrad over the weekend to inspect fortifications being built on Warsaw's territory.

"Poland's investments have been a mix of building up both defensive capabilities and offensive capabilities, designed to deter Russia by convincing them that any attack would fail to achieve its objectives and come at very high cost," said William Freer, a research fellow in national security at the U.K.-based think tank, the Council on Geostrategy.

"Poland's 'East Shield' fortifications build on the lessons of the fighting in Ukraine, which have shown how hard it is to push through heavily entrenched defenders," Freer told Newsweek. "In combination with traditional fortifications such as dragon's teeth, East Shield will make use of a suite of electronic warfare and surveillance systems."

Mass Evacuation Plans

The preparations aren't just military, they're civil, too. In mid-November, NATO's newest member, Sweden, published a brochure it said helped the country's residents to "learn how to prepare for, and act, in case of crisis or war." The pamphlet outlines what a heightened state of alert would mean, how each inhabitant would pitch in to a war-time effort, and what different sirens sound like.

"Military threat levels are increasing," the leaflet warns the Scandinavian country's citizens. "We must be prepared for the worst-case scenario—an armed attack on Sweden."

Norway, too, has published a leaflet on how to deal with "extreme weather, pandemics, accidents, sabotage—and in the worst case acts of war."

Finland has publicly-available guides on how it prepares for "the worst possible threat, war."

In the Baltics, Agnė Bilotaitė, Lithuania's interior minister, said in September that each of the country's local authorities had to quickly draw up evacuation plans that are "ready" to be put in motion.

"It is important to note that we are at the forefront, so today, civil defense has become a priority on our agenda," Bilotaitė said. The Lithuanian minister has urged neighbouring countries to do the same.

Latvian Interior Minister Rihards Kozlovskis said in September that the Baltic state had roughly 5,000 underground buildings that Riga hoped to have "ready for use as shelters by November."

Bilotaitė said in October that Vilnius would spend €12 billion in 2025 to install and upgrade shelters.

"If necessary, we could shelter two cities like Vilnius underground," Vilnius Mayor Valdas Benkunskas said in remarks reported by domestic media.

Germany's government has also said it is putting together a list of bomb shelters that will be available for citizens to see where their closest shelter is.

Air Defenses

In January, the Baltic states also stressed the need they felt to build up NATO air defenses on the eastern flank, according to a Latvian government readout.

Hungary's defense minister, Kristof Szalay-Bobrovniczky, said in November that Budapest will place an air defense system in the northeastern region of the country.

"We still trust that there will be peace as soon as possible, through diplomacy instead of a military solution," Szalay-Bobrovniczky said in a video address. "However, to prepare for all possibilities, I ordered the recently purchased air control and air defense systems and the capabilities built on them to be installed in the northeast."

Europe has a chronic shortage of air defenses, although military and political officials have swerved providing specifics.

East Versus West

While Poland, the Baltic states, Finland and Sweden, as well as Romania, which borders western Ukraine, have significantly upped defense investment, western Europe is lagging behind.

"It is no coincidence that the greatest increases in defense spending in NATO are coming from those closest to Russia," Freer said. "Behind NATO's eastern flank, other allies are acting with less urgency and have proven far less willing to increase investment at the same level."

Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the head of the British armed forces, conceded in November that the U.K. was in a "slightly weaker" position than many countries closer to Russian soil.

"We don't have some of the civil aspects or planning aspects that other countries within NATO have as part of their traditions," Radakin said.

The U.K. has committed to increasing defense spending to 2.5 percent of GDP. France is on course to hit the NATO target of 2 percent this year, as is Germany.

Estonia's defense spending is hovering at around 3.4 percent of its GDP, with plans to hike this to 3.7 percent by 2026. Lithuania said in March it would raise defense spending to 3 percent from 2025, and its defense minister has floated hitting 4 percent, to finance new long-range air defenses and other equipment. Poland has said it will spend 5 percent of its GDP on the military in 2025.

Western European countries are taking "some meaningful steps," Freer added. Countries in the alliance are looking at how to improve NATO's integrated air and missile defense capabilities, pulling lessons from Russia's hammering of Ukraine.

USAID from the American People - December 3, 2024 - The United States Announces More Than $1 Billion in Humanitarian Assistance to Address Food Insecurity and Other Needs in Africa

 

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Office of Press Relations

For Immediate Release
December 3, 2024

PRESS RELEASE

The United States Announces More Than $1 Billion in Humanitarian Assistance to Address Food Insecurity and Other Needs in Africa

Today, President Joseph R. Biden announced that the United States is providing more than $1 billion in additional humanitarian assistance to address food insecurity and other urgent needs of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and affected communities in 31 African countries. This funding, announced during President Biden’s visit to Angola, includes nearly $823 million through USAID – of which more than $202 million is from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Commodity Credit Corporation – and nearly $186 million through the U.S. Department of State.

At the U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit in 2022, President Biden reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to our African partners to accelerate progress toward achieving food security, including addressing the immediate and acute food insecurity crisis through humanitarian assistance. Africa is the region with the largest percentage of the population facing hunger. According to the UN, one in five Africans – almost 300 million people – faced hunger in 2023, and the number of people facing acute food insecurity and malnutrition continues to rise. Armed conflict, extreme weather events, natural disasters, and other emergencies are driving humanitarian needs across the continent and requiring humanitarian assistance to save lives and alleviate suffering among the most vulnerable. Today’s announcement, yet again, demonstrates our firm commitment to stand alongside our African partners and people across the continent in addressing the challenge of food insecurity. 

With this additional assistance, including funding from the bipartisan National Security Supplemental, U.S. humanitarian partners are providing life-saving assistance and vital programs for people at risk of exploitation and abuse, including refugees, IDPs, and affected communities. Additionally, implementing partners are providing emergency health care and water, sanitation, and hygiene services to help prevent the transmission of infectious diseases among the most vulnerable people affected by acute food insecurity and malnutrition. This funding will also assist affected populations to meet other essential needs, such as protection, mental health, education, and shelter. With the Commodity Credit Corporation funding, USAID is purchasing, shipping, and distributing U.S. agricultural commodities from American farmers to provide life-saving food assistance for food-insecure populations in East and Central Africa. 

The United States has long supported communities in need of food aid and other lifesaving humanitarian assistance across Africa and intends to continue this support and continues to urge other donors to step up in this time of historic need. In Fiscal Year 2024, the United States provided nearly $6.6 billion in humanitarian assistance across sub-Saharan Africa, but much more must be done by the entire international donor community to address critical and increasing needs.

Middle East Forum Online Reasserting American Power in the Middle East: A Blueprint for the Trump Administration A Comprehensive Plan to Restore American Leadership, Counter Iranian Aggression, and Secure Stability in the Middle East December 2, 2024

 Middle East Forum Online

Reasserting American Power in the Middle East: A Blueprint for the Trump Administration

A Comprehensive Plan to Restore American Leadership, Counter Iranian Aggression, and Secure Stability in the Middle East

December 2, 2024

Gregg Roman, Michael Rubin, Jonathan Spyer, Jim Hanson, Winfield Myers, Benjamin Baird, Sam Westrop, Eric Navarro, Dexter Van Zile, Alex Selsky   Middle East Forum

The Middle East remains a region of vital strategic importance where American leadership is urgently needed to counter threats and promote stability. The October 7 Hamas massacre and its aftermath have exposed the fragility of current U.S. policies and the necessity of a bold, cohesive strategy. Reasserting American Power in the Middle East, 2025–2029 offers a series of policy proposals for the incoming Trump administration, focusing on confronting Iran’s destabilizing influence, reshaping alliances with Saudi Arabia, and addressing interconnected challenges like countering American Islamism, Qatar’s dual role, extremism on campuses, and border security vulnerabilities. These proposals aim to restore American leadership and safeguard national interests in an increasingly volatile region. You can download the policy proposals by clicking here.

Trump and ministers from Middle East states sign the Abraham Accords.

Washington DC, USA - September 15, 2020: Benjamin Netanyahu, Donald Trump, Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani, and Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan attend the Abraham Accords ceremony in The White House.Shutterstock

Introduction

The United States stands at a critical juncture in its approach to Middle East policy, domestic security, and institutional reform. This comprehensive strategic planning document provides detailed analyses and recommendations for the Trump administration.

The fundamental challenges facing the administration remain consistent: an increasingly assertive Iran wielding influence through proxy networks; the complex dynamics of Gulf state partnerships, particularly regarding Qatar and Saudi Arabia; persistent threats from terrorist organizations; and growing concerns about foreign influence in American institutions.

The second Trump administration will likely pursue an aggressive, multi-front approach characterized by maximum pressure on adversaries, enhanced support for key allies, and dramatic domestic policy reforms. This would represent a sharp departure from current policies, emphasizing executive action, strict enforcement measures, and rapid implementation of change across all domains.

The incoming administration must contend with unprecedented challenges in higher education, where foreign funding transparency and campus extremism have emerged as critical national security concerns. The dramatic increase in antisemitic incidents on college campuses, coupled with questions about foreign influence through undisclosed funding, demands comprehensive reform.

Domestic Islamist radicalization presents a unique challenge within the broader context of U.S. Middle East policy and must be addressed through targeted counter-Islamism strategies, encompassing both domestic and international dimensions.

This document provides a detailed roadmap, including specific policy recommendations, implementation strategies, and metrics for success. The following sections detail these approaches across multiple domains, providing a comprehensive framework for policy implementation in this critical period of American foreign and domestic policy.

The second Trump administration’s success will depend on careful coordination across multiple agencies, sustained political will, and the ability to build lasting coalitions both domestically and internationally. This document serves as both a strategic planning tool and a framework for evaluating progress toward these critical national security objectives.

Part I: Executive Overview

Executive Summary

The United States stands at a critical juncture in its approach to Middle East policy, domestic security, and institutional reform. As we approach Trump’s 2025-2029 presidential term, we must address the interconnected challenges of regional security, counterterrorism, immigration control, and educational reform. This comprehensive strategic planning document outlines these challenges and provides detailed analyses and recommendations for both the incoming Trump administration.

The fundamental challenges facing the administration remain consistent: an increasingly assertive Iran wielding influence through proxy networks; the complex dynamics of Gulf state partnerships, particularly regarding Qatar and Saudi Arabia; persistent threats from terrorist organizations; and growing concerns about foreign influence in American institutions.

This document serves as both a strategic planning tool and a framework for evaluating progress toward critical national security objectives. It provides specific policy recommendations, implementation strategies, and metrics for success based on the Trump administration’s governing philosophy and institutional relationships.

Strategic Context and Critical Challenges

The regional security landscape presents unprecedented challenges, with Iran’s expanding influence through proxy networks representing the central threat to stability. Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, combined with its control or influence over Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, create a complex web of security challenges that demand comprehensive strategic responses. The recent surge in Iranian proxy activities, including Hamas operations and Houthi maritime threats, underscores the urgency of addressing this expanding influence.

Domestically, the United States faces escalating security concerns, particularly regarding border control and institutional integrity. The dramatic increase in Special Interest Alien crossings, combined with weaknesses in vetting procedures, presents immediate security risks. These challenges are compounded by the unprecedented rise in campus extremism and foreign influence in higher education, where a 2,500 percent increase in physical assaults on Jewish students post-October 7 represents just one facet of a broader security crisis.

The higher education sector has emerged as a critical battleground for national security concerns. Widespread non-compliance with foreign funding transparency requirements, coupled with the closure of crucial oversight mechanisms such as the Department of Education’s reporting portal, has created dangerous vulnerabilities in our academic institutions. The presence of over 130 Faculty for Justice in Palestine chapters, correlating with increased violence and threats against Jewish students, demonstrates the urgent need for comprehensive reform.

Comparative Analysis of Administrative Approaches

A second Trump administration will likely pursue an aggressive, multi-front approach characterized by maximum pressure on adversaries, enhanced support for key allies, and dramatic domestic policy reforms. This would represent a sharp departure from current policies, emphasizing executive action, strict enforcement measures, and rapid implementation of change across all domains. Trump’s approach will likely focus on immediate action through executive orders, aggressive enforcement of existing laws, and rapid implementation of new security measures.

Trump’s success will depend heavily on the administration’s ability to build and maintain necessary coalitions, both domestic and international, while effectively managing institutional resistance to change. Its approach offers potential for rapid, dramatic change, but faces significant challenges in institutional resistance and international cooperation.

Resource Requirements and Implementation Framework

The implementation of comprehensive Middle East and security policies for 2025-2029 will require substantial and carefully allocated resources across multiple domains. Under a Trump administration, funding priorities will focus heavily on executive action implementation, particularly in border security and institutional reform. Initial estimates suggest a required allocation of $5–7 billion for enhanced border security measures, including technology upgrades, personnel expansion, and infrastructure development. The potential relocation of Al Udeid Air Base alone could require $10–15 billion in capital expenditure over three to five years.

The administration will also need to address the substantial costs of education oversight reform, estimated at $2–3 billion annually for comprehensive implementation of the DETERRENT Act and associated monitoring systems.

The development of sustainable funding mechanisms that can survive political transitions will be critical for success. This includes establishing dedicated funding streams for key initiatives, developing public-private partnership frameworks, and creating efficient resource-sharing agreements with state and local authorities. The successful implementation of Trump’s agenda will require careful balance between immediate operational needs and long-term strategic investments.

The path forward must ultimately strengthen America’s capacity to protect its interests, support its allies, and maintain its democratic institutions. The implementation of these strategies will determine not only the success of the incoming Trump administration, but also the long-term security and stability of the United States and its position in the global order.

Part II: Core Strategic Frameworks

Regional Security Strategy

The cornerstone of U.S. Middle East policy must address Iran’s expanding regional influence and its network of proxy forces. Under the Trump administration, this will manifest as an enhanced version of the “maximum pressure” campaign, with the explicit goal of regime change in Tehran. This strategy represents an evolution from previous approaches, acknowledging that containment and negotiation strategies have failed to modify Iranian behavior. Key elements will likely include renewed sanctions, support for internal opposition movements, and active disruption of Iran’s regional proxy networks.

The administration must also address Iran’s nuclear program, its support for terrorist organizations, and its destabilizing influence across Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

Strategic partnerships in the region require careful recalibration, particularly regarding Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Saudi Arabia’s influential position among Arab states presents significant opportunities for regional stability and counterbalancing Iranian influence. The Kingdom’s desire for economic diversification and international acceptance, particularly following the Khashoggi incident, creates leverage points for deepening cooperation. The Trump administration will most certainly seek to strengthen this relationship.

The Qatar relationship presents unique challenges, given the emirate’s contradictory role as both military host and supporter of various extremist groups. The presence of Al Udeid Air Base underscores this complexity, requiring a thorough reassessment of U.S. military positioning in the region. Alternative basing options in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, or Israel merit serious consideration, though any transition would require careful management of regional sensitivities and operational requirements.

Domestic Security Framework

The domestic security landscape demands comprehensive reform across multiple domains, with particular emphasis on counter-extremism efforts and border security. The establishment of a Commission on Islamism, originally promised but not delivered during Trump’s first term, would represent a crucial step in addressing domestic extremist threats. This commission would serve as the coordinating body for a range of critical functions, from surveying American Islamist movements to developing new protocols for law enforcement and immigration screening.

Regarding border security, the incoming Trump administration is poised to implement an aggressive control strategy, including an expanded travel ban, elimination of the CBP One program, and focused deportation efforts targeting Special Interest Aliens (SIAs). The strategy will emphasize direct federal action and enhanced state-level enforcement capabilities.

The Trump administration must also address the critical situation at the Darien Gap, where current screening procedures have deteriorated from examining 90 percent of transiting migrants for terrorism links to just 3 percent.

The role of USAID requires significant reform. Current vetting procedures for grantees and sub-grantees have proven insufficient, allowing organizations with documented ties to terrorist groups to receive federal funding. Enhanced transparency requirements, stricter oversight mechanisms, and reformed reporting procedures must be implemented to prevent the misuse of aid funding for extremist activities.

Educational Reform Strategy

The higher education sector presents unprecedented challenges requiring immediate attention and comprehensive reform. The current crisis in foreign funding transparency, exemplified by widespread non-compliance with Section 117 of the Higher Education Act, demands stronger oversight mechanisms and enforcement protocols. The DETERRENT Act, while representing a step forward, requires strengthening and consistent implementation to achieve its intended effects.

Campus security has emerged as a critical national security concern, particularly following the dramatic increase in antisemitic incidents and violence. The correlation between Faculty for Justice in Palestine (FJP) chapters and increased violence against Jewish students demands immediate attention. The Trump administration will likely pursue aggressive reform through executive action and stricter enforcement measures.

The Trump administration must also address the fundamental challenge of foreign influence in American academic institutions. This includes not only direct financial relationships, but the broader impact of foreign funding on academic freedom, institutional integrity, and student safety. The Qatar Foundation International’s role in circumventing U.S. reporting requirements illustrates the sophisticated methods used to avoid transparency and accountability measures.

The implementation of these reforms requires careful coordination between federal agencies, academic institutions, and state-level authorities. Success metrics must include both quantitative measures, such as compliance rates and incident reductions, and qualitative assessments of institutional culture change and security improvements. Regular evaluation and adjustment of implementation strategies will be crucial for maintaining momentum and achieving lasting reform.

This comprehensive framework provides the foundation for specific policy initiatives and implementation strategies detailed in subsequent sections. The success of these efforts will depend on careful coordination across agencies, sustained political will, and the ability to build lasting coalitions both domestically and internationally.

Smoke and debris rise into the air following an explosion in Gaza, a stark reminder of the region's ongoing conflict.

Smoke and debris rise into the air following an explosion in Gaza, a stark reminder of the region’s ongoing conflict.Shutterstock

Part III: Regional Analysis and Policy Recommendations

Iran: The Central Challenge

The Islamic Republic of Iran represents the primary challenge to U.S. interests in the Middle East today. Through its strategy of proxy warfare, Iran has established effective control or significant influence over four Arab countries: Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. As a threshold nuclear state with an expanding network of regional proxies, Iran’s ambitions to replace the U.S.-led regional security architecture with a Tehran-centered power structure must be confronted directly.

Past strategies toward Iran have proved insufficient. The incentive-based approach, exemplified by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 and subsequent attempts at diplomatic engagement failed to modify Iran’s revolutionary ambitions or regional behavior. While the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign from 2016-2020 created significant economic pressure, it too failed to generate fundamental changes in Iranian policy or regional posture.

A new approach must learn from these failures. Only a comprehensive strategy aimed at regime change in Tehran can address the depth and nature of the Iranian regime’s ambitions. This strategy should combine renewed sanctions, support for internal opposition movements, and direct action against Iranian proxies. The successful example of U.S. proxy warfare in Syria via the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) demonstrates the potential effectiveness of such approaches when properly implemented and sustained.

Qatar: A Problematic Partnership

Qatar presents a complex challenge requiring careful recalibration of U.S. policy. The emirate’s role as host to Al Udeid Air Base while it simultaneously supports various terrorist groups creates significant strategic challenges. Under Trump’s previous administration, policy toward Qatar proved inconsistent, shifting from support for the anti-Qatar blockade to eventual accommodation, influenced as it was by Qatar’s sophisticated influence operations and strategic investments.

Current U.S. military reliance on Qatar through Al Udeid Air Base needs to be reassessed. Alternative basing options in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, or Israel’s Negev Desert merit serious consideration. However, any transition must account for operational requirements and regional political sensitivities. The relationship with Qatar demands tighter restrictions, particularly regarding its support for extremist organizations and its role in regional mediation efforts.

Qatar’s influence extends beyond military concerns into American domestic institutions, particularly in higher education. The Qatar Foundation International’s role in circumventing U.S. reporting requirements for university donations requires immediate attention and reform. New legislation, including the proposed Qatar Risk Reporting Act and enhanced FARA enforcement, must address these challenges comprehensively.

Saudi Arabia: Strategic Opportunity

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s influence over other Arab states presents significant opportunities for advancing U.S. regional objectives. Saudi Arabia’s desire to regain regional leadership following the Khashoggi incident, combined with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s economic diversification initiatives, creates leverage points for deeper cooperation. The Kingdom’s potential role in post-war Gaza reconstruction and Red Sea security, particularly regarding Houthi threats, aligns with U.S. strategic interests.

Success in this relationship requires early and public engagement with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, whose succession appears probable but not assured. While his reform efforts may be largely performative, his vision of transforming the Kingdom into a modern business hub motivates alignment with U.S. strategic interests. This relationship must be managed carefully to balance security cooperation with broader regional stability objectives.

Syria: Maintaining Strategic Advantage

Syria’s current frozen conflict presents both challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy. The country’s de facto partition between the Assad regime (60 percent of its territory), Kurdish-controlled areas (30 percent), and Sunni Islamist enclaves (10 percent) requires distinct policy approaches for each zone. The U.S.-supported Kurdish presence in northeastern Syria represents a significant success in identifying and supporting effective local partners.

Recent developments, such as the HTS’s takeover of Aleppo, underscore the need to prevent jihadist control in Syria, while addressing Turkey’s role in stabilizing the region.

Current efforts by some Western and regional governments to normalize relations with the Assad regime must be actively resisted. Assad’s continued alignment with Iran and Russia makes any genuine change in Syria’s strategic orientation unlikely. The status quo, which contains Assad while maintaining U.S. influence through Kurdish allies at minimal cost, represents the optimal arrangement absent realistic prospects for regime change in Damascus.

Iraq: Containing Iranian Influence

Iraq’s trajectory toward greater Iranian influence demands immediate attention and strategic response. The permanent mobilization of pro-Iran Shia militias and the creation of a government headed by the pro-Iran Coordination Framework represent significant challenges to U.S. interests. Iran’s strategy of creating a “deep state” within Iraq mirrors its successful approach in Lebanon and must be countered effectively.

The U.S. maintains significant assets in Iraq, particularly through the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and the Sunni Taqadum movement. While the current agreement calls for ending U.S. military presence by 2026, maintaining a reduced force, potentially based primarily in the KRI, serves vital strategic interests. This presence can be justified through ongoing anti-IS operations while supporting broader efforts to prevent Iraq’s complete absorption into the Iranian sphere.

Lebanon: Confronting Reality

Lebanon’s current status under Hezbollah’s dominant influence requires a fundamental reassessment of U.S. policy. The October 2023 attacks on Israel, initiated without consultation with Lebanon’s formal government, demonstrate the fiction of Lebanese sovereignty. U.S. policy must acknowledge this reality and adjust accordingly, including the suspension of assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces while Hezbollah maintains its independent military capability.

The goal of restoring Lebanese sovereignty requires abandoning the false distinction between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah. Support for Israeli operations to disarm Hezbollah and establish genuine Lebanese independence aligns with long-term U.S. interests. However, until the IRGC’s franchise is effectively confronted, treating Lebanon as a sovereign state merely enables the continued expansion of Iranian influence.

Maintaining the ceasefire aligns with American interests in regional stability, contingent on ensuring accountability for all parties, including UN peacekeepers and Hezbollah.

Kurdish Policy: A Strategic Asset

The Kurdish populations across Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran represent valuable strategic assets for U.S. policy. In Syria, the Kurdish-dominated SDF controls critical territory and resources with minimal U.S. investment. In Iraq, the KRI remains the most stable and pro-U.S. region despite internal challenges. The Kurdish population in Iran presents opportunities for supporting internal opposition to the regime, as demonstrated during the 2022 protests following Jina Mahsa Amini’s murder.

U.S. support for Kurdish allies must be maintained and expanded while addressing legitimate concerns about internal governance and corruption. The strategic importance of Kurdish-controlled territories in limiting Iranian access to the Mediterranean justifies sustained U.S. commitment to these partnerships. However, this support must be coupled with reform requirements and unity-building efforts among Kurdish factions.

Part IV: Implementation Frameworks

Administrative Implementation Priorities

The transition period immediately following the 2024 election presents a crucial window for shaping the incoming administration’s policies. During the first 100 days, the Trump administration will likely focus on immediate executive actions to implement key policy changes. Priority will be given to reinstating and expanding travel restrictions, restoring the Education Department’s foreign funding transparency portal, and launching the Commission on Islamism. These early actions would set the tone for an aggressive reform agenda.

The first year presents distinct implementation challenges for the incoming administration, which will prioritize enhanced border controls, expanded deportation programs, and strengthened oversight mechanisms across federal agencies. The Iran pressure campaign will be escalated while simultaneously pursuing closer ties with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf allies, excluding Qatar. Higher education reform will focus on aggressively enforcing transparency requirements and new security protocols.

Operational Components

Interagency Coordination

The complexity of modern security challenges demands unprecedented levels of interagency coordination. Under the Trump administration, this coordination will be centralized through the National Security Council, establishing clear hierarchical decision-making structures and expedited information-sharing protocols. Cross-functional teams will focus on specific initiatives such as Iran policy implementation and campus security reform.

State and Local Integration

National security policy implementation increasingly requires active participation from state and local authorities. The Trump administration will emphasize enforcement capabilities, expanding 287(g) agreements for immigration enforcement and enhancing information sharing about Special Interest Aliens. Direct federal support will likely flow to state-level security initiatives, particularly in border states. This will require careful attention to jurisdictional boundaries and resource allocation.

States are advancing legislation to counter malign foreign influence in politics, business, and education, complementing federal efforts.

Private Sector Engagement

Private sector entities play an increasingly crucial role in national security implementation. The Trump administration will probably mandate direct cooperation requirements, particularly in banking oversight and technology implementation. Enhanced reporting requirements and mandatory cooperation frameworks will be established for key industries. This will require clear legal frameworks and efficient cooperation mechanisms.

Support Systems

Technology Infrastructure

The technological infrastructure supporting security initiatives requires continuous modernization and enhancement. The incoming administration is expected to prioritize immediate operational capabilities, particularly in border security and monitoring systems. This could include rapid procurement of advanced technologies and aggressive implementation of new systems. Successful implementation will require substantial investment in technical infrastructure.

Personnel Development

Implementing comprehensive security initiatives requires well-trained personnel across multiple agencies and jurisdictions. The Trump administration will emphasize rapid training and deployment, focusing on operational capabilities and immediate implementation skills. Accelerated training programs would prioritize border security and counter-terrorism capabilities. Substantial investment in training infrastructure is necessary for this approach to succeed.

The federal government should prioritize operational efficiency over the politically driven DEI frameworks, ensuring government agencies focus solely on national interests and merit-based practices.

Research and Analysis Capabilities

Effective security policy requires sophisticated research and analysis capabilities. The new Trump administration is likely to emphasize operational intelligence and immediate tactical analysis, focusing on direct support to policy implementation and enforcement actions. This will include enhanced cooperation with law enforcement agencies and expanded use of data analytics. Successful implementation will require robust analytical capabilities.

Public Communication Strategy

Effective security policy implementation requires sophisticated public communication strategies. The Trump administration will implement more aggressive communication approaches, emphasizing direct messaging and rapid response to challenges. This will include extensive use of executive communications and coordinated media strategies which, if successful, will demand sophisticated media engagement capabilities.

Crisis Response Protocols

Modern security challenges require sophisticated crisis response capabilities. The Trump administration is likely to implement centralized response structures, emphasizing rapid decision-making and decisive action, to include streamlined command structures and pre-authorized response options. Again, this approach needs robust communication systems and regular training exercises for optimal results.

The success of these implementation frameworks depends on careful coordination across agencies, sustained political will, and the ability to adapt to changing circumstances while maintaining focus on core strategic objectives. Regular assessment and adjustment of implementation strategies will be crucial for maintaining momentum and achieving lasting reform.

Part V: Risk Management and Mitigation

Trump Administration Scenario Analysis

The Trump administration’s aggressive reform agenda presents distinct risks requiring careful management. Primary among these is the significant institutional resistance from within the federal bureaucracy. Career officials, particularly within the State Department and intelligence community, may resist rapid policy changes, especially regarding Iran and Qatar. This resistance could manifest as delayed implementation, information leakage, or active opposition to policy initiatives.

Legal challenges represent another significant risk area. Executive actions, particularly regarding immigration enforcement and campus security measures, will likely face immediate court challenges. The administration’s expanded travel ban and aggressive deportation policies will almost certainly encounter judicial scrutiny. To mitigate these risks, the administration must develop robust legal justifications for each major initiative, preparing multiple layers of defense for inevitable court challenges.

International resistance poses additional challenges. European allies may oppose maximum pressure tactics against Iran and enhanced sanctions regimes. Regional partners could resist changes to Qatar’s status as a Major Non-NATO Ally. Traditional multilateral frameworks may strain under the administration’s more unilateral approach to regional security issues. These challenges require careful diplomatic management and the development of alternative partnership structures.

Coalition sustainability presents ongoing concerns. The administration’s aggressive stance on various issues may complicate efforts to maintain necessary domestic and international support for long-term policy implementation. Building and maintaining congressional support, particularly for funding initiatives, requires careful attention to stakeholder concerns and strategic communication efforts.

Cross-Cutting Risk Mitigation Strategies

Legal Framework Reinforcement

The incoming Trump administration must strengthen legal foundations for policy initiatives. This requires:

Comprehensive legal review of proposed actions before implementation.

Development of multiple legal justification frameworks.

Preparation of alternative implementation pathways if primary approaches face judicial blocks.

Close coordination with the Department of Justice on enforcement strategies.

Regular consultation with congressional legal staff on legislative initiatives.

Institutional Resistance Management

Managing bureaucratic opposition requires sophisticated approaches:

Strategic placement of aligned personnel in key positions.

Development of internal communication strategies emphasizing policy rationales.

Creation of performance metrics tied to implementation success.

Establishment of cross-agency working groups to build institutional buy-in.

Regular engagement with career staff to address concerns and maintain morale.

Resource Allocation Protection

Securing and maintaining necessary funding requires proactive measures:

Development of detailed cost-benefit analyses for major initiatives.

Creation of multiple funding pathways for critical programs.

Establishment of public-private partnerships to supplement federal resources.

Regular engagement with congressional appropriations committees.

Development of contingency plans for funding interruptions.

Stakeholder Management

Maintaining support from key stakeholders demands ongoing attention:

Regular briefings for congressional leadership and committee chairs.

Sustained engagement with state and local government partners.

Proactive media relations strategies.

Regular consultation with allied governments and international organizations.

Development of metrics demonstrating program effectiveness.

Implementation Timeline Management

Balancing speed and effectiveness requires careful planning:

Creation of realistic implementation schedules.

Development of early warning indicators for potential delays.

Establishment of contingency plans for accelerated implementation if necessary.

Regular review and adjustment of timeline metrics.

Clear communication of progress to stakeholders.

Crisis Prevention and Response

Preparing for potential crises requires comprehensive planning:

Development of scenario-based response protocols.

Regular crisis simulation exercises.

Establishment of clear chains of command for emergency decisions.

Creation of rapid response communication strategies.

Regular updating of contingency plans based on emerging threats.

Strategic Risk Assessment Framework

Success in risk management requires ongoing evaluation and adjustment. Key assessment areas include:

Political Risk Monitoring

Regular analysis of the domestic political landscape.

Assessment of international partner stability.

Evaluation of opposition strategy development.

Monitoring of media environment changes.

Analysis of public opinion trends.

Operational Risk Assessment

Regular review of implementation effectiveness.

Evaluation of resource allocation efficiency.

Assessment of personnel performance metrics.

Analysis of interagency coordination effectiveness.

Monitoring of technological system performance.

Security Risk Evaluation

Continuous threat environment assessment.

Regular review of vulnerability matrices.

Analysis of emerging security challenges.

Evaluation of countermeasure effectiveness.

Assessment of intelligence sharing efficiency.

The success of the Trump administration’s initiatives depends significantly on their ability to anticipate and mitigate these various risk factors. Regular assessment and adjustment of risk management strategies must become an integral part of the policy implementation process. This requires not only careful initial planning but also the flexibility to adapt as circumstances change and new challenges emerge.

Budget and Resource Allocation

The implementation of comprehensive Middle East and security policies for 2025-2029 will require substantial and carefully allocated resources across multiple domains. Under a Trump administration, funding priorities will most likely focus on executive action implementation, particularly in border security and institutional reform. Initial estimates suggest a required allocation of $5-7 billion for enhanced border security measures, including technology upgrades, personnel expansion, and infrastructure development. The potential relocation of Al Udeid Air Base alone could require $10-15 billion in capital expenditure over three to five years.

The administration will also need to address the substantial costs of education oversight reform, estimated at $2-3 billion annually for comprehensive implementation of the DETERRENT Act and associated monitoring systems.

The development of sustainable funding mechanisms that can survive political transitions will be critical. This includes establishing dedicated funding streams for key initiatives, developing public-private partnership frameworks, and creating efficient resource-sharing agreements with state and local authorities. Successfully implementing the administration’s agenda will require carefully balancing immediate operational needs and long-term strategic investments.

Interagency Coordination Framework

The complexity of modern security challenges demands unprecedented levels of interagency coordination. This framework must address not only traditional security cooperation between the Department of Defense, State Department, and intelligence communities, but also the integration of newer priorities such as education oversight and financial monitoring.

Under the Trump administration, interagency coordination will likely be centralized through the National Security Council, with clear hierarchical decision-making structures and expedited information-sharing protocols. Establishing cross-functional teams focused on specific initiatives such as Iran policy implementation or campus security reform will be key to this approach.

Successful implementation will depend on clear the delineation of authority and defining escalation procedures. Also central will be the development of a shared technological infrastructure for information exchange, standardizing reporting protocols, and developing clear metrics for measuring coordination effectiveness. This includes creating secure communication channels, shared databases, and integrated analysis tools that can be accessed across agencies while maintaining necessary security protocols.

State and Local Government Integration

The implementation of national security policies increasingly requires active participation from state and local authorities. This is particularly evident in border security, campus monitoring, and counter-terrorism initiatives. A comprehensive integration framework must address both operational coordination and resource sharing while respecting jurisdictional boundaries.

Under the Trump administration, state-level integration will focus heavily on enforcement capabilities, particularly regarding immigration and campus security. This would include expanded 287(g) agreements for immigration enforcement, enhanced information sharing about Special Interest Aliens, and direct federal support for state-level security initiatives.

It will also require careful attention to legal authorities, resource allocation, and operational coordination.

Private Sector Engagement

Private sector entities play an increasingly crucial role in national security implementation, from financial institutions monitoring terror finance to technology companies supporting border security. A comprehensive engagement strategy must balance security requirements with business operations while leveraging private sector capabilities.

In the Trump administration, private sector engagement will focus on mandatory compliance and direct cooperation requirements, particularly in areas such as banking oversight and technology implementation. This is likely to include enhanced reporting requirements, mandatory cooperation frameworks, and direct participation in security initiatives. Successful implementation will require clear legal frameworks, protection of proprietary information, and efficient cooperation mechanisms.

The United States Capitol building.

The United States Capitol building.Shutterstock

Congressional Strategy

Success in implementing comprehensive security reforms requires sustained congressional support and cooperation. This entails not only securing necessary appropriations but also maintaining legislative support for key initiatives and oversight functions.

The incoming Trump administration will focus on leveraging Republican support while identifying key Democratic allies for specific initiatives, particularly regarding campus security and counter-terrorism measures. This will include regular briefings, direct engagement with key committee chairs, and coordinated media strategies. A successful strategy will pay careful attention to committee dynamics, legislative calendars, and political considerations.

International Organization Engagement

The effectiveness of U.S. security policy increasingly depends on strategic engagement with international organizations, from the United Nations to regional security frameworks. This engagement must balance American sovereignty with the benefits of multilateral cooperation and international legitimacy.

Under the incoming Trump administration, international organization engagement will be highly selective and transactional, focusing on specific security objectives rather than broad institutional participation. This approach will emphasize bilateral relationships and targeted multilateral initiatives where U.S. interests are directly served. The administration will likely maintain distance from U.N. frameworks while strengthening participation in security-focused organizations that align with U.S. objectives. The administration much also address the challenge of maintaining U.S. influence while managing institutional constraints and competing national interests.

The key will be developing effective mechanisms for leveraging international organizations to advance U.S. security objectives while maintaining flexibility to act independently when necessary. This includes establishing clear protocols for international cooperation, developing effective information-sharing mechanisms, and maintaining robust representation in important international bodies.

Crisis Response Protocols

Modern security challenges require sophisticated, multi-layered crisis response capabilities that can address both traditional security threats and emerging challenges such as cyber-attacks or campus security incidents. These protocols must be comprehensive, flexible, and capable of addressing various crisis scenarios while maintaining operational effectiveness.

The Trump administration is likely to implement a centralized crisis response structure, emphasizing rapid decision-making and decisive action. This will include streamlined command structures, pre-authorized response options, and clear escalation procedures. It will focus on immediate action and clear lines of authority. Also required are robust communication systems, clear chains of command, and regular training and simulation exercises.

Technology and Cybersecurity Components

The technological infrastructure supporting security initiatives must be sophisticated and secure, capable of supporting complex operations while protecting against increasingly advanced cyber threats. This requires continuous modernization of systems, robust security protocols, and effective integration across agencies and jurisdictions.

Under the Trump administration, technology development will focus on immediate operational capabilities, particularly in areas such as border security and monitoring systems. This will include rapid procurement of advanced technologies, aggressive implementation of new systems, and enhanced cybersecurity measures focused on critical infrastructure protection.

Successful implementation of these plans will require substantial investment in technological infrastructure, robust security protocols, and effective integration mechanisms.

Research and Analysis Framework

Effective security policy requires sophisticated research and analysis capabilities that can provide both strategic insight and tactical intelligence. This framework must integrate various information sources while maintaining analytical integrity and operational relevance.

The Trump administration will likely emphasize operational intelligence and immediate tactical analysis, focusing on direct support to policy implementation and enforcement actions. This will include enhanced cooperation with law enforcement agencies, expanded use of data analytics, and focused research initiatives supporting specific policy objectives.

This approach requires robust analytical capabilities, effective information sharing mechanisms, and clear protocols for translating research into operational guidance.

Personnel Development and Training

The implementation of comprehensive security initiatives requires well-trained, properly equipped personnel across multiple agencies and jurisdictions. This necessitates sophisticated training programs, clear career development pathways, and effective knowledge transfer mechanisms.

The Trump administration’s personnel development will focus on operational capabilities and immediate implementation skills, emphasizing rapid training and deployment. This will include accelerated training programs, enhanced operational exercises, and focused skill development in key areas like border security and counter-terrorism.

Successfully implementing these plans will demand substantial investment in training infrastructure, clear professional development pathways, and effective knowledge management systems.

Public Communication Strategy

Effective security policy implementation requires sophisticated public communication strategies that can build support for initiatives while managing opposition and addressing emerging concerns. This includes both proactive communication efforts and crisis response capabilities.

The Trump administration is likely to implement an aggressive communication strategy that emphasizes direct messaging and a rapid response to challenges. This includes extensive use of executive communications, coordinated media strategies, and a robust social media presence.

These plans require sophisticated media engagement capabilities, effective crisis communication protocols, and clear messaging strategies.

Legal Framework Analysis

The execution of security initiatives demands robust legal frameworks that can support operational requirements while withstanding judicial review and public scrutiny. This includes both domestic legal authorities and international legal considerations.

Under the Trump administration, legal analysis will focus on maximizing executive authority and defending aggressive implementation measures. These include extensive use of executive powers, robust legal defense strategies, and aggressive interpretation of existing authorities.

Successfully implementing these initiatives requires sophisticated legal analysis capabilities, effective compliance mechanisms, and clear protocols for addressing legal challenges.

Implementation Metrics and Evaluation

The success of these initiatives requires clear metrics for measuring effectiveness and mechanisms for adjusting strategies based on operational experience. This includes both quantitative measures of operational success and qualitative assessments of strategic impact.

The Trump administration will need to develop comprehensive evaluation frameworks that can track progress, identify challenges, and support continuous improvement of security initiatives. This includes establishing clear baseline measures, developing sophisticated monitoring systems, and maintaining effective feedback mechanisms for policy adjustment.

PART VI. Presidential Policy Proposals

U.S. Force Deployment in the Middle East

The incoming Trump administration should actively consider what type of U.S. military presence in the Middle East best advances its policy goals. Since World War II the United States has had some form of military presence in the region. That is unlikely to change, but its composition, mission, and locations deserve ongoing evaluations to ensure maximum effectiveness and efficiency.

The purpose of U.S. bases in the Middle East is largely to provide support for operations in the theater. This was especially important during times of active conflict such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, but ongoing conflicts have shown the value of logistical and operational support in the region. Aircraft carriers are invaluable, but they cannot replace full air and port facilities.

The largest U.S presence in the Middle East is al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and it is also the most problematic. A new Administration should actively consider whether relying on an Islamist state that actively supports most of the major terrorist groups in the world is a viable option. Qatar plays a two-sided game in which it supports al Qaeda, ISIS, Hamas, and the Taliban, yet uses these connections to provide actionable intelligence to the U.S. on groups or factions that are out of Qatar’s favor. Any continued partnership should demand an end to Qatari state support of terrorism.

Other possible basing options include the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, or the Negev Desert in Israel. All of these choices should be explored publicly to allow the administration to gauge the level of support and the possibility of creating an alliance with these and other countries that may be interested. Sentiments from opponents could also be voiced and discussed.

Other active bases and deployments in the region should also be evaluated. Incirlik Air Base and other facilities in Turkey are useful, but the Erdoğan regime is increasingly unreliable as an ally. U.S. Forces in Iraq and Syria have been regularly under attack from Iranian-backed militias. Continuing those operations requires careful planning, including the safe positioning of American troops in the region.

The Houthi Challenge: A Comprehensive Strategy for Yemen

The Houthi movement in Yemen has emerged as a critical threat to both regional stability and global commerce. With substantial Iranian backing, the Houthis have demonstrated an increasingly sophisticated capability to project power beyond Yemen’s borders, most notably through attacks on international shipping lanes in the Red Sea and strikes against Saudi infrastructure. This expanded operational capacity, combined with their entrenched control over significant portions of Yemen, presents a complex challenge requiring a comprehensive U.S. response.

Iran’s material support has transformed the Houthis from a local insurgency into a significant regional threat. Through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Tehran has provided the Houthis with advanced weapons systems, technical expertise, and financial support. This partnership has emboldened the Houthis to pursue increasingly aggressive actions that threaten vital maritime commerce and regional stability. Addressing this Iranian connection must form the cornerstone of any effective strategy to neutralize the Houthi threat.

The U.S. strategy must operate across multiple domains simultaneously. On the financial front, expanded sanctions targeting both IRGC networks and local Houthi funding sources can restrict their operational capabilities. These measures should extend beyond traditional sanctions to include sophisticated financial intelligence operations targeting the informal networks and charitable organizations that sustain Houthi operations. Enhanced maritime interdiction efforts, coordinated with regional partners, can further disrupt the flow of Iranian weapons and material support.

Delegitimizing the Houthis requires a sophisticated influence campaign focused on exposing their human rights violations and governance failures. The systematic recruitment of child soldiers, suppression of dissent, and economic exploitation of controlled territories provide compelling narratives that can erode their popular support. This effort must be coupled with positive messaging highlighting the legitimate government’s reconstruction efforts and delivery of services in areas under its control.

The military dimension requires careful coordination with regional partners, particularly Saudi Arabia. Establishing a joint operational command structure can improve the effectiveness of air campaigns while reducing civilian casualties. The provision of advanced defensive capabilities, particularly anti-drone systems, can help counter the Houthi’s increasing reliance on unmanned aerial attacks. However, military action alone cannot resolve the crisis.

Covert operations play a crucial role in degrading Houthi capabilities. Targeted actions against weapon depots, missile sites, and command centers, combined with the cultivation of local intelligence networks, can systematically weaken their military infrastructure. Supporting local anti-Houthi militias creates an additional pressure point, fomenting internal resistance within Houthi-controlled territories while securing humanitarian corridors for civilian relief.

The international shipping dimension requires particular attention given the global economic implications. The deployment of additional naval assets and advanced surveillance capabilities in the Red Sea, coupled with close coordination with commercial shipping operators, can help secure vital maritime routes. This effort must balance military necessity with the need to maintain efficient commercial operations through these critical waterways.

The ultimate objective must be the comprehensive degradation of Houthi military capabilities while strengthening Yemen’s legitimate government. This requires a sustained campaign combining airstrikes and special operations with robust support for government institutions and security forces. Success demands careful sequencing of military and political actions to ensure that tactical gains translate into strategic advantages.

Humanitarian considerations must remain central to this strategy. The establishment of secure zones and humanitarian corridors, coupled with increased development assistance in government-controlled areas, can demonstrate the international community’s commitment to civilian welfare while undermining Houthi propaganda regarding governance capabilities.

This comprehensive approach recognizes that the Houthi threat extends beyond Yemen’s borders to impact regional stability and global commerce. By integrating diplomatic, military, economic, and humanitarian efforts, the U.S. can work toward degrading Houthi capabilities while strengthening legitimate governance structures in Yemen. Success requires sustained commitment, close coordination with regional partners, and careful attention to the complex interplay of local and international dynamics that shape Yemen’s political landscape.

Qatari Corruption: Behind Closed Doors - Unmasking the ties between state operations and illicit activities.

Qatari Corruption: Behind Closed Doors - Unmasking the ties between state operations and illicit activities.Shutterstock

Trump Administration on Qatar

Under his presidency, Donald Trump’s policies towards Qatar were inconsistent and difficult to predict. He initially supported the anti-Qatar blockade in 2017, breaking with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and pointing to state funding of terrorism. Qatari media then published reports suggesting Trump was influenced by a cabal of wealthy Jewish billionaires and bureaucrats. Yet, this did not stop the president from approving $12 billion in F-15 fighter jet sales to the Gulf emirate.

To win over Trump, Qatar launched a sophisticated “charm offensive” by courting around 250 influencers with ties to the president. Less than a year later, Trump reversed course and praised Qatar for its anti-terrorism efforts. He proceeded to approve the sale tens of millions of dollars in military hardware and praised Qatar for investments in American businesses. Trump relied on Doha to broker a deal with the Taliban as he negotiated peace with the jihadist group and set conditions for a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

During the closing months of his administration, and facing pressure from Congress, Trump’s Justice Department ordered the Qatar-owned Al Jazeera affiliate AJ+ to register as a foreign agent. The Department of Education unearthed billions of dollars in undeclared foreign grants to U.S. universities, with the lion’s share originating in Qatar.

There are indications that Trump will continue close relations with Doha. He met with Qatari leaders at his Florida resort in September 2024. His son-in-law Jared Kushner, who spearheaded Trump’s Middle East policy, and the newly-appointed special envoy to the Middle East Steven Witkoff visited the emirate several times post-presidency and have accepted hundreds of millions of dollars from Qatar in investments to their businesses.

Strategies

The federal government should continue partnering with Qatar on counterterrorism and anti-money-laundering, despite Doha’s negative track record. This cooperation led in 2017 to the legal restructuring necessary to apprehend and prosecute terrorist financiers. Yet, a great deal of work remains.

Though problematic, the more than $1.8 billion funneled from Qatar to Gaza since 2014 should not be the focus of policymakers looking to eliminate terror finance channels in Doha because Israel and the U.S. approved and disseminated these funds in the Gaza Strip. Private donations from individuals and entities inside Qatar, most of which are bound for Al Qaeda and its affiliates, represents the greatest danger to regional stability and U.S. interests. Qatar has failed to effectively implement and enforce anti-terrorism legislation. The next administration must pressure Qatar to enact these reforms.

Moving U.S. Central Command from the Al Udeid Airbase in Qatar is an unreasonable prospect under the new Trump administration. Policy advocacy toward this eventual goal should be aimed at the military establishment and foreign policy leaders expected to serve well into the future. It is also unlikely that Trump will designate Qatar as a state sponsor of terrorism. However, advancing toward these goals could include amplifying negative Qatari media reporting of Trump, such as articles that criticize White House ties to Israel and Jews, or reports accusing Trump of persecuting Muslims.

Regarding hostage negotiations, a Trump White House should aggressively pressure Qatar to free hostages in Gaza by any means necessary, including by expelling or arresting Hamas leadership in Doha.

Policy Proposals

Trump should be pushed to strip Qatar of its status as a Major Non-NATO Ally of the U.S. This will require strong bipartisan support in Congress.

Trump should endorse a reintroduced version of the Hamas International Financing Prevention Act, which would levy sanctions against countries that fund Hamas. However, the bill should be expanded to include countries that fail or refuse to prosecute members of designated terrorist groups.

MEF will push the Justice Department to enforce the Foreign Agents Registration Act against AJ+ and broaden the scope of the registration to include Al Jazeera English print and broadcast networks.

Al Jazeera correspondents should be denied access to White House and executive branch press briefings, and the president should work with Congress to revoke Al Jazeera’s congressional press credentials.

The administration should restore transparency to Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 by relaunching the interactive portal and bringing back other reporting metrics that were systematically degraded under Biden’s Education Department.

Trump should urge Congress to reintroduce the DETERRENT Act, a bill that would require schools that receive grants and sign contracts with Qatar of any amount to report the funding to federal authorities. If Congress fails to move this bill, MEF will encourage Trump to pass an executive order in the interest of national security that targets Qatar and other countries of concern with the same reporting requirements.

Qatar Foundation International (QFI) is used to circumvent U.S. reporting requirements for foreign donations to universities, since Qatar claims the charity is privately-owned. Most of Qatar’s donations to Ivy League schools are filtered through QFI. To close this loophole, the Trump administration should designate QFI as a foreign agent, thereby holding it accountable to Higher Education Act requirements.

Trump should implement a Qatar Risk Reporting Act requiring publicly traded companies that file reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission to discuss in their annual reports: (1) the degree to which the company is dependent upon Qatar and the risks Qatar poses as a state sponsor of terrorism, such as supply chain disruptions, money laundering risks, or the freezing of assets, and (2) the steps the company has taken to reduce its Qatar risk. This bill will force companies competing for capital to reduce their exposure to Qatar.

The administration should enforce a Qatar Human Rights and Terror Finance Capital Markets Sanctions Act requiring the Treasury Department to produce a report identifying at-risk businesses in Qatar, including state-owned and controlled enterprises, involved in human rights abuses and/or terror finance. Americans are prohibited from investing in stock of companies on these lists.

Saudi Arabia

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has tremendous influence over the path of the other Arab states in the Middle East. While that does not always translate into the ability to generate a consensus, it does allow guidelines for large policy areas to be developed, socialized, and implemented. The new Trump administration should work to reengage better relations with the Saudis to take advantage of this.

The recent attacks on Israel have a number of root causes, but Iran and Hamas’s desire to derail the potential normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel is central. The Gulf Arab states should be asked to serve as part of the solution for post-war Gaza by funding reconstruction and providing security once an Israeli military occupation ends.

This engagement could help pave the way to remove the “Palestinian Issue” from its position of primacy regarding progress toward coexistence between Israel and the Gulf States. It also can provide a counterweight to Iran and its Axis of Resistance.

Saudi Arabia wants to regain a leading role that was damaged by Khashoggi’s murder. Their progress toward economic diversity and acceptance in the community of nations would be advanced by a productive role in the plans to end the current regional conflict. The new Trump administration should work to make them the lead partner in this effort.

The emergence of the Houthis ability to stop global trade through the Red Sea is another area where the Saudis could be helpful. Along with the United Arab Emirates, they were engaged in a military effort to limit the Houthis’ capabilities, although this effort was largely by U.S. and international pressure. Crucial sea lanes must be reopened and the U.S. should actively recruit both the Saudis and UAE in this effort.

King Salman is not likely to live until the end of the next U.S. administration; the succession of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is probable, but far from assured. The United States should engage with MbS early and publicly to cement a positive relationship. His reform efforts are largely performative, but his desire to turn the Kingdom into a modern business hub more akin to the UAE can be used to motivate him to be helpful to U.S. strategic interests.

Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s strategy to replace the U.S.-led regional security architecture with a new power structure controlled by Teheran is the key challenge to U.S. interests in the region today. Through its network of proxies, Iran is today effectively controls or has freedom of action in four Arab countries: Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

Moreover, Iran constitutes a threshold nuclear state, and its support for and arming of Hamas made possible the October 7 massacres and precipitated the current regional war. As such, it is the main challenge to the U.S. and to the regional order.

Over the past half decade, and intermittently since 2009, the U.S. has pursued an erroneous strategy vis-a-vis Iran that sought to incentivize Teheran in the mistaken belief it would end Iran’s revolutionary ambitions. The JCPOA in 2015, the Biden administration’s decision to remove sanctions against Iran and billions of dollars to flow to the regime, and the fruitless effort in the Vienna negotiations to induce Iran to return to the JCPOA formed parts of this strategy. But it failed to produce the desired results, as Iran continues to pursue conquest by proxy so that today it enjoys effective control of a large swathe of the Arab world.

The Trump administration abandoned this policy of accommodation from 2016-20, implementing in its place a strategy of so-called “maximum pressure.” As part of this strategy, the U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA, imposed punishing sanctions, and assassinated IRGC-QF leader Qassem Soleimani. Yet this strategy did not force Iran to change its behavior.

The second Trump administration should learn from past failed policies and comprehend that it must adopt a strategy of regime change in Teheran to effect genuine change in the Middle East, as Iran is the principal barrier to regional stability. A new strategy of renewed “maximum pressure,” but with the goal of inducing an overthrow of the regime, should be launched. The United States pursued on a more limited scale a successful policy of proxy warfare in Syria, via the Syrian Democratic Forces. Analogously, the U.S. should support opposition forces in Iran. This should be combined with renewed sanctions and an increase in direct hits to Iranian proxies such as the Houthis and the Shia militias in Iraq and Syria for their attacks on U.S. forces.

It is essential that the new Trump administration recognize that, because of Iran’s centrality in fomenting instability and warfare in the region, there is an urgent need for regime replacement in Tehran.

The Kurds and U.S. Policy

The Kurds form the largest stateless minority in the Middle East, as Kurdish communities are spread between four states: Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, with the Kurds of Turkey forming the largest segment. The Kurds are politically conscious, with strong national aspirations, but they are deeply divided politically and, in certain areas, tribally. The political situation of the Kurdish communities also varies starkly among countries. In two of the four countries mentioned – Iraq and Syria – the Kurdish population controls a non-sovereign but autonomous self-governed area. In both these cases, the governing structure constitutes the most pro-U.S. element in the country in question, and the Kurdish area of governance forms a de facto safe zone for U.S. and allied personnel. Sunni political Islam (Kurds are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim) of both the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi varieties exists within the Kurdish populations to varying degrees in each country, but secular nationalist politics dominate, with a generally pro-Western or at least not overtly anti-Western orientation.

In all these countries, the Trump administration should view the Kurdish population and its political and military structures as valuable assets to be supported and used in pursuit of policy goals. In Syria, where the U.S.-supported, Kurdish dominated Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES) exercises de facto control of around 30 percent of the country’s territory, the Kurdish dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) represent a singular American success in identifying and working successfully with a local partner force. This U.S. ally controls a third of Syria, including most of the country’s gas and oil resources, with only minimal direct U.S. involvement on the ground from some 900 U.S. service personnel.

Support for the SDF/AANES project should continue and extended to recognize AANES on the political level, as currently the relationship is managed in the framework of Operation Inherent Resolve, i.e., the war against ISIS. The administration should resist calls for withdrawing U.S. forces or ending U.S. support. In a Middle East characterized by state fragmentation and de facto non-governmental rule, U.S. support for the SDF represents a singular success for U.S. policy and should be reinforced and continued. Such support is particularly urgent given the strategically important nature of the Kurdish area of control, which significantly narrows the area available to the Iranians to transport men and materiel from east to west toward Lebanon, the Mediterranean Sea, and Israel.

Similarly, in Iraq, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), the long-standing Kurdish autonomous area of the country, is the most stable and pro-U.S. region of Iraq. Over the past several years, Iraq has drifted toward an ever-increasing Iranian penetration of the country’s government and political systems so that the current Iraqi government is dependent on pro-Iranian political forces. The Popular Mobilization Units, dominated by pro-Iran militias, are now part of the state’s official security apparatus.

The KRI has grown significantly weaker since its abortive bid for secession following an independence referendum in September 2017. Nevertheless, the Kurdish area and Kurdish military and political capacities remain natural American allies in the ongoing competition with Iranian expansionism in Iraq, and U.S. support should be sustained and expanded. At the same time, internal divisions and political corruption are significant issues in Iraqi Kurdistan. As a result, while U.S. support should remain, it should also insist on the continued reform of political and governing institutions to facilitate the pursuit of unity.

In Iran, the Kurdish population in Kordestan (Kurdistan) province forms a potential asset for the U.S., should the incoming Trump administration choose (as we recommend) to adopt a strategy of seeking regime change. The protest movement that swept Iran in 2022 began following the murder of an Iranian Kurdish woman, Jina Mahsa Amini, because she “incorrectly” wore her hijab. The protests started in Saqqez, Amini’s hometown. This city and neighboring Sanandaj were the epicenters of the protest movement. Existing Kurdish nationalist parties played an auxiliary role in the demonstrations by helping the mainly youthful protestors with medical assistance, and at times—thanks to the help of smuggling networks—by offering a means of escape across the Zagros mountains to Iraqi Kurdistan.

The situation in Kordestan province in Iran is, therefore, ripe for further exploitation and offers a strategically useful way to keep the Iranian regime busy attending to local unrest. Exploiting this tinderbox situation should form part of a larger administration strategy for regime change in Iran, which should (again) form the lynchpin for any coherent Middle East strategy.

Turkey, unlike the three other countries covered here, has a formal democratic system. However, Kurdish representatives are repressed via spurious charges of supporting terrorism. The imprisonment of Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP in Turkish) leader Selahattin Demirtas exemplifies this persecution and is part of a more general erosion of democratic freedoms under the Islamist leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP in Turkish). Erdoğan’s harassment and jailing of Kurdish political figures should concern the incoming Trump administration, which should raise these issues and other anti-democratic, pro-Islamist issues with the Turkish government. Ankara acts as a de facto anti-U.S. force in key areas of the Middle East via its use of proxies in Syria, among the Palestinians, and in Libya, and by its anti-Western propaganda to its population and across the region. The U.S. should use Erdoğan’s repression of the Kurds to pressure him to withdraw his persecution of them and to moderate his overall behavior.

Syria

Since 2019, the battle lines in Syria’s unresolved civil war have been static. The fall of the last independently held rebel enclaves in southwest Syria in 2018, followed by the eclipse of the Islamic State in the southeast of the country in summer 2019, have left Syria subject to a static conflict and a partition of its territory. The areas controlled by the Assad regime comprise roughly 60 percent of Syria’s pre-war territory, including the capital, Damascus, the coast, the Kurdish area east of the Euphrates, which comprises roughly 30 percent of Syria’s land area, and a Sunni Islamist/insurgent enclave in the northwest that amounts to around 10 percent of Syria’s territory.

Each of these enclaves is underwritten by international actors whose strength equals or surpasses that of local forces. These consist of Iran and Russia for the Assad regime, the U.S. and its allies for the Kurds, and Turkey for the Sunni insurgents.

Iran has freedom of operation in the Assad regime-controlled area. Israel is engaged in an open-ended campaign to degrade and damage Iranian attempts to build a permanent infrastructure on Syrian soil and to use Syria as a transit point for weapons and materiel on its way from Iran to Lebanese Hezbollah.

The Assad regime, meanwhile, remains subject to international sanctions and isolation because of its brutality during the civil war. Some Western and regional governments hope to normalize relations with the Assad regime, but these efforts should be resisted. There is no reason to assume that Assad will at any stage act to curtail the Iranian presence within the area he controls. To believe gullably that he has changed, and therefore to push for the reunification of Syria under his control (which is where efforts to normalize the regime would lead), is to concede Syria to the Iran-led regional alliance and to Russia. The status quo, wherein Assad is contained and the U.S., at very little cost, maintains a strategic foothold in the country, is the optimal situation at present in the absence of realistic prospects for regime change in Damascus. The U.S. should strive, therefore, to maintain the status quo in Syria while monitoring closely and supporting any efforts to weaken Assad and the Iranian presence in the country.

Iraq

Over the last decade, the pro-Iranian element in the Iraq has strengthened both politically and militarily. In the military sphere, the jihad fatwa of Ayatollah Sistani in the summer of 2014, when Islamic State forces were threatening Baghdad, has resulted in the permanent mobilization of the pro-Iran Shia militias. The creation in 2022 of a government headed by the Coordination Framework, an alliance of pro-Iran parties, cemented the advance of pro-Iran forces in the country. Similar to what has occurred in Lebanon, Iran is seeking to insert a “deep state” under its control to operate within and alongside the official bodies of state and to eventually become stronger than the official state. This process is already well advanced.

The incoming Trump administration should grasp the depth, seriousness, and dire implications of this Iranian project. Geostrategically, Iraq is critically important. Iranian dominance of Iraq eases Iran’s efforts to subvert Jordan and opens the direct route to the Mediterranean that Iran seeks.

The U.S. has both powerful and potential allies in the Iraqi arena. The Kurdistan Regional Government, the Kurdish Democratic Party, the Sunni Taqadum movement, and, in the military sphere, the Counter Terrorism Service and parts of the Kurdish armed forces are all available assets. The U.S. should strengthen these movements and organizations as well as its ties with them. At present, the U.S. is scheduled to end its military presence in Iraq by 2026. Although it is not clear if the agreement reached mandates the withdrawal of all forces, whatever its terms, the U.S. should maintain a military presence. If necessary, this could number fewer than the current deployment of 2,500 troops in Iraq. Troops could, if required, be based mainly or solely in the Kurdistan region, where there is greater security.

Maintaining such a force could be justified by the need for continued anti-Islamic State operations. Such a justification would not be false – Islamic State is currently experiencing a limited revival in Syria. But the primary rationale for a continued, limited U.S. presence is to back up the existing U.S. assets in the country in the ongoing political (and potentially military) struggle to prevent the complete absorption of Iraq into the Iranian sphere.

Lebanon

Lebanon is dominated by Hezbollah, itself a franchise of the Iranian IRGC. Because of this domination, Lebanon is in a state of de facto war with Israel thanks to Iran/Hezbollah’s decision to begin hostilities on October 8, 2023, in support of another Iranian client – Hamas. This decision was made without consultation with the formal government of Prime Minister Najib Mikat and demonstrates the extent to which the Lebanese state today cannot act as an effective bulwark or brake on the activities of the pro-Iran bloc. The situation south of the Litani River, in which over the last 18 years Hezbollah was able to build up a massive military machine under the noses of the Lebanese Armed Forces and U.N. forces, further demonstrates this fact.

U.S. Envoy Amos Hochstein has travelled to Lebanon no less than seven times since October 8, 2023, in an effort to work with the Lebanese government and state to bring peace between Hezbollah and Israel. He has failed, because U.S. policy rests on a false premise, according to which the Lebanese government and state execute even a modicum of influence over Lebanese foreign policy. They do not, because the Lebanese state is a useful fiction.

This inconvenient fact must be acknowledged, and policy adjusted accordingly, by the incoming Trump administration. Assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces should be discontinued for as long as Hezbollah retains its independent armed capacity. Diplomatic acceptance of the false division between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah should be dropped. Concurrently, the administration should support Israeli demands for freedom of operation north of Israel’s border to disarm Hezbollah and for freedom of action in Lebanon’s skies.

Disarming Hezbollah and regaining Lebanese sovereignty should be adopted as policy goals by the Trump administration. Forces within Lebanon who can accomplish this should be identified and supported. Yet, as long as the IRGC franchise Hezbollah remains the strongest force in Lebanon, there is no basis for recognizing Lebanese sovereignty, as this would simply permit Iran’s projects to proceed unimpeded.

The Trump Administration on Border Control

In 2017, Trump’s executive order prohibited travelers from seven at-risk countries that fail to share intelligence with U.S. authorities. In 2020, Trump added six more countries to the list. The travel ban was overturned on the first day of Biden’s administration.

Unsealed documents from 2017 show that Trump considered employing extreme vetting of non-citizens based on ideological grounds, but was advised by counsel to reconsider. Nevertheless, Trump’s “travel ban” executive order includes “uniform screening standards” intended to identify visitors who wish to do harm to the U.S.

During his first term, Trump built around 500 miles of border fence across the U.S.-Mexico border. Much of this 30-feet tall fencing replaced existing barriers or acted as a second wall.

Looking ahead, Trump promises to round up and deport illegal immigrants using presidential powers. While most analysts agree that the president has the authority to do so, they also conclude that the government lacks the resources necessary for mass deportations.

In the aftermath of student encampments and pro-Hamas protests, he also promised to revoke student visas of “radical, anti-American and antisemitic foreigners.” Trump also vowed to bar refugees from Gaza and re-introduce his travel ban.

Strategies

With so many Special Interest Aliens (SIAs) crossing the border in recent years, MEF will support robust border policy and immigration reforms, especially those policies that prevent immigration from countries vulnerable to Islamist radicalization. This means interdicting SIAs seeking illegal entry at the Southern border, but it also means employing extreme vetting procedures and fighting the dismantling of the Terrorist Screening Database.

The Darien Gap between Colombia and Panama represents a major migration route for SIAs bound for the U.S. A record-breaking 1.5 million migrants from 170 different countries navigated the Darien Gap during Biden’s term. Panamanian authorities, which used to screen 90 percent of migrants passing through the Gap for terrorism links, now check just 3 percent. For the first time, Panama’s president has agreed to shut down the transit route and send new arrivals back to their countries of origin via repatriation flights. However, the Biden-Harris administration has refused to properly fund the effort. A border control policy that limits SIA entries must include funding for repatriation flights from the Darien Gap.

The federal government should help state governments that are spending billions interdicting, detaining, and deporting illegal immigrants.

Mass deportations should focus on SIAs, where limited resources can be applied for the most productive results.

MEF will continue to promote practical extreme vetting practices, as detailed in Daniel Pipes, “Smoking Out the Islamists via Extreme Vetting.”

Trump should persuade Mexico to keep its southern ports of entry closed and fund repatriation flights until the situation is under control.

Policy Proposals

MEF will advocate for a more expansive travel ban that includes additional countries, especially the Central Asian “-Stans,” whose citizens are showing up in large numbers at the Southern border.

Trump must shut down CBP One, the cell phone app that allows would-be refugees and asylum seekers to sign up for expedited entry into the U.S. and settle in dozens of American cities. The Biden-Harris administration has facilitated entry for 7,332 SIAs from 24 high-risk countries using the CBP One program, and it is not clear that they are receiving enhanced security screenings.

MEF will support the reintroduction of a bill similar to the “Stop Support for Hamas Act” that denies funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East until the Secretary of State can certify that Hamas has been dismantled.

MEF supports the GAZA Act, a bill that denies visas and parole into the U.S. to Palestinian Authority passport-holders. President-elect Trump should consider passing a similar bill or adding Gaza and the West Bank to a travel ban.

Combatting Extremism Policy

An effective counter-Islamism program must focus on one thing above all else: how to incapacitate Islamism, internationally and domestically. Current Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs operated by governments across the West are weak, ill-considered, and self-defeating.

Internationally, an effective CVE program means hindering foreign Islamist regimes’ interference, shutting down Islamist finance networks, and preventing Islamist ideologues and their followers from exploiting Western immigration systems. Domestically, it means studying Islamist ideology in all its forms; educating government and the public about the extent of Islamist influence and activity; and working out how government can undermine Islamist networks without infringing on the constitutional rights of citizens.

A forceful reform of America’s counter-extremism policy can give reformist Muslims a chance to supplant Islamist control over American Muslim communities. Remove the Islamist monopolies and a free market of Muslim ideas, including moderate and reformist strains, can flourish.

The bulk of this work could be coordinated by a Commission on Islamism, which Donald Trump promised in 2016 (referring to it as a Commission on Radical Islam) but failed to deliver.

It is vital that the incoming Trump administration reintroduce such plans, with some fine-tuning and a clear mandate laid out. A revised counter-Islamist effort must reject the old specious CVE ideas that only violent Islamism is deserving of government attention and that Islamism does not underpin Islamist violence, and instead regard lawful Islamists and jihadists as part of the same problem. Islamist ideology, and its consequent violence, can only be tackled if the government is aware of the specific ideological networks that advance, enable, and fund Islamism in America.

The commission’s role will be to investigate the means by which it, or a subsequent body set up within DHS or other departments and offices, can:

Survey American Islamist movements and publish a landmark study of all their components active across the United States.

Explain the core convictions of these Islamist movements to government, law enforcement, and the public.

Study possible means for disrupting lawful Islamist movements’ influence, activities, and finances.

Investigate the involvement of foreign Islamist regimes such as Qatar, Turkey, and Iran over domestic Islamist networks.

Study the teachings and curricula in Islamist-run private K-12 schools.

Review the involvement of Islamists in chaplaincy programs (such as in prisons and the military).

Work with the IRS to study the financial activities of Islamist charities in areas of the world where terrorist groups operate with impunity.

Work with the IRS to clamp down on Islamist groups flagrantly breaking 501(c)3 and (c)4 regulations.

Investigate the backgrounds of all known home-grown terrorists to determine their involvement with lawful Islamist movements before embracing violence and publish the findings.

Educate government and law enforcement officials about the makeup and influence of active Islamist networks.

Provide information and regular briefings about Islamist movements and networks to other government agencies and departments.

Encourage Muslim communities to report examples of Islamist extremism, referring submissions to law enforcement when necessary.

Review state and local government partnerships and funding for Muslim institutions and alert relevant officials to any recipient with Islamist links.

Study Islamist exploitation of immigration rules and recommend necessary immigration law changes.

Develop new protocols for police officers, federal investigators, corrections officers, probation workers, and immigration screeners.

Study the experiences of European countries on the question of Islamist extremism and publish a report examining the lessons and consequences for counter-Islamism work in the United States.

Ensure the Department of Justice enforces the law and no longer allows Islamist charitable terror networks to operate with near impunity, or for foreign agents to lobby state and federal legislatures and e

xecutives without registration.

The idea of finding specific Muslim partners for the purpose of countering extremism is a good one. But it has previously failed because Islamist movements have exploited good intentions, posing as representatives of American Muslims, all while the CVE industry refused to accept the importance of ideology as a driver of ideological violence. Once we all accept that, given the ideological and theological diversity of Islam, no organization can serve as a representative voice of American Muslims, the search for “community partners” does not become a question of the size of these groups’ mandates, but rather their commitment to moderation.Moderate and reformist Muslim partners identified by the proposed Commission will play a vital role in a new counter-extremism program by helping build a coalition of anti-Islamist Muslim organizations and networks to challenge the powerful Islamist networks.

U.S. Aid Policy

Documents on USAID’s Amended and Restated Mission Order No. 21 clearly indicate a need to ensure that a USAID beneficiary does not support acts of terrorism. This extends to its staff and officials as well. A key part of the problem is that USAID staff and prime contractors and grantees are not carrying out this vetting sufficiently; the rules are simply not being enforced.

For instance, between 2007 and 2018, USAID handed over $7.5 million to Mercy-USA for Relief and Development (which has reportedly also operated under the names Human Concern International, Mercy International Relief Organization and then Mercy International-USA).

Mercy-USA officials openly advocate for terror. Indeed, it was federal prosecutors who revealed that Mercy officials have included Abdurrahman Alamoudi, an Al Qaeda fundraiser jailed in 2004 for conspiring with the Libyan regime to assassinate the Saudi Crown Prince. But even the most cursory glance at more recent vetting would have uncovered open support for terrorism. As an MEF study notes: “The vice-chairman of Mercy-USA is Ali El-Menshawi, a psychologist based in Florida. Despite his Hippocratic oath, Menshawi’s Facebook page is replete with support for Hamas and its military wing, the Qassam Brigades. Menshawi has also reposted virulently anti-American and anti-Semitic screeds from an Islamist named Soliman Biheiri, seemingly the same Biheiri jailed as a Hamas fundraiser, and suspected of links to the East Africa bombings in which Mercy-USA was implicated.”

Similarly, USAID beneficiaries openly honor Palestinian “martyrs” of fighting with Israel. A USAID August 2022 news update celebrates the construction of a “USAID-funded Unlimited Friends Association [UFA] educational and community center in Gaza.” Notwithstanding Mission Order 21’s rules on vetting, this funding was approved despite widespread public reporting of UFA’s involvement with Hamas, as well as its efforts to support, in its own words, “the families of martyrs and prisoners.” Moreover, UFA as the ultimate beneficiary of USAID support does not make its way into published federal spending records, as there is no mention of UFA or the Unlimited Friends Association within usaspending.gov data. The rules are simply not being enforced.

The federal government needs to be reminded that the mere fact a group deems itself charitable, or even that it does actual charitable work, does not mean that it is not benefiting terrorism. USAID has forgotten the maxim of then-solicitor general Elana Kagan in 2010 under the Obama administration: when you help terrorists build homes, you help terrorists build bombs.

Some of these problems can be addressed through revised vetting rules and policy changes for USAID:

Policy Changes

Funding should not be used, per existing rules, “for the purpose of recognizing or otherwise honoring individuals who commit, or have committed, acts of terrorism” is insufficient. Any funding to an organization that supports terrorist operatives serves to facilitate support of terror. The vetting procedure must be widened to exclude any organization which, whether through its activities or its staff, openly supports terrorism or lionizes terrorist operatives.

Primary grantees cannot be relied upon to vet subgrantees. Additional vetting by USAID staff should always be conducted. Cursory searches of grantees and subgrantees would have uncovered media reporting about terrorism links and sympathies of prospective USAID grantees. A review of existing public source information, available through easy Google searches, could easily decimate the amount of USAID funds that ends up in the hands of terror proxies.

A greater commitment to transparency is a clear solution to this problem. First, USAID should freely publish the results of its efforts to vet grantors and grantees, so that its efforts and processes can be improved through public accountability. Second, more stringent transparency requirements should be placed upon awardees.

Groups receiving USAID monies should hand over: Complete lists of names and positions of staff, partners, and their own vendors; Details of funding from other government bodies and authorities (in the Gaza Strip, this would include details of their involvement with the Hamas authorities, for instance); and a full list of other contributors to the organization. The federal government expects this of 501(c) organizations in the United States (where such information is provided in Schedule B of the 990 tax return); it is only proper that such transparency is required over foreign grantees as well.

Subsequently. organizations found to be working with groups not disclosed to USAID while receiving federal grants or sub-grants should be barred from all future USAID support.

USAID should publish lists of vendors under consideration and invite submissions from the public. Opening up this process will not only place greater public trust in USAID, but will help prevent future mistakes, and provide general grassroots assistance with USAID’s vetting responsibilities.

Domestic 501(c) organizations that receive federal fundings should be exempted from the ability to redact Schedule B in their public 990 disclosures. During the years in which USAID funds a 501(c), that public charity should publish the full unredacted copy of both Schedule B and Schedule F, which catalog the charity’s contributors and foreign activities, respectively.

Government Funding Policy

A key obstacle in the fight against Islamism is government’s long-standing inability to differentiate between Muslims and Islamists. The Middle East Forum alone has identified almost $100 million of federal dollars ending up in the hands of organizations linked to violent extremism.

Government must find, and statutorily implement, a means to ensure an absolute interdiction on any public partnership or taxpayer funding with:

People or organizations that condone or excuse attacks against civilians.

People or organizations that advocate attacks against U.S. allies.

People or organizations that condone or excuse designated terrorist organizations.

Organizations that U.S. allies have designated as terrorist groups.

Organizations that have incited violence against non-Muslims or minority Muslim sects or have given platforms to speakers who do so.

People or organizations that incite or justify hatred against Muslims who decide to leave their religion.

Organizations that fail to disclose all foreign funding.

Organizations that fail to publish lists of all local partners and funding recipients in areas of the world where terrorist groups operate with impunity.

People or organizations that are funded by entities in foreign states accused by the U.S. of funding terrorism.

People or organizations with ties to officials of foreign states accused by the U.S. of funding terrorism.

Countering Islamist Lobbying Policy

Currently, the federal government is already afforded the tools it requires to suppress malign Islamist influence. The law, however, is simply not being enforced. Mosques, charities, and pressure groups publicly aligned with the regimes of Turkey and Qatar operate openly in American cities and are involved in various Islamist lobbying efforts and media campaigns. The Department of Justice’s FARA unit pointedly fails to investigate, censure, or prosecute these foreign agents and their principals’ activities. The incoming Trump administration has an opportunity to ensure that FARA is applied forcefully, evenly, and consistently.

Similarly, Islamist charitable nonprofit organizations that openly coordinate and work with designated terrorists have long enjoyed the ear of the White House, funding from federal agencies, and friends in Congress. These charities are closely involved in a broad array of Islamist lobbying efforts and even advocate bank derisking policies, despite the clear benefit such changes would have for these charities’ own terror finance operations. If an administration were enforcing existing law, sanction and designation actions against terror network charitable proxies in the United States would decimate the lobbying capabilities of international Islamist movements.

To address lobbying issues, the administration should prioritize legislation like the Fighting Foreign Influence Act and the Stop Foreign Payoffs Act.

Transparency in Foreign Funding of American Universities

America’s universities writ large dislike legislation requiring transparency in foreign funding and, led by the American Council on Education, effectively lobby Congress against requiring greater transparency. As a result, Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965, which requires disclosure of gifts and contracts from foreign countries amounting to $250,000 or more, was ignored without consequence by scores of universities. Not until the Department of Education under then-Secretary Betsy DeVos issued an October 2020 report were extant rules enforced, revealing that for 34 years the federal government failed to enforce its own rules. Because this catalyzed $6.5 billion in previously unreported foreign money, the education lobby has struck back with a vengeance. The DoE reporting portal, launched in June 2020 and available to the public, was closed to taxpayers, Congress, and the media in June 2024, leaving it open only for universities. This allows for a return to the status quo ante, wherein the corrupt, symbiotic relationship between academe and its ostensible federal overseers will again mean no transparency in foreign funding.

Action: The Defending Education Transparency and Ending Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious Transactions (DETERRENT) Act, which makes several much-needed changes to reporting requirements for foreign gifts and contracts to American universities and stipulates an enforcement mechanism for non-compliance, passed the House of Representatives in December 2023, in part with MEF support. It was introduced to the Senate, but did not advance. Because a key problem with extant legislation is a lack of disclosure of the use to which such funds would be put, the DETERRENT Act stipulates disclosure at the departmental or program level, although not at the level of the individual scholar(s) involved, a measure MEF advocated but which was disfavored by Democrats on the House Education and Workforce Committee. In short, there is no way of knowing if foreign funds are allocated for medical or scientific research, or for supporting Islamist professors, journals, conferences, or programs. MEF strongly recommends, therefore, that the DETERRENT Act be revisited in the next Congress in 2025, reviewed and, where necessary and feasible, strengthened to ensure full transparency with penalties for failure to follow the law.

Antisemitism and Pro-Islamist Biases on Campus: Faculty for Justice in Palestine (FJP)

There are some 130 chapters of Faculty for Justice in Palestine, mostly in the U.S. with a few in Canada. Few if any publish lists of members, the better to avoid negative publicity and research. Some of these chapters at universities that accept Title VI NAS/FLAS grants list signed petitions, but matching the signatories of letters to the centers across fields would still not demonstrate membership in the individual chapters, and simply signing a letter does not per se demonstrate misuse of funds to the extent that joining an SJP-related organization does. In brief: this is a massive undertaking requiring time and resources not currently available, but outing members of FJP could be a worthwhile undertaking. There are likely some matches at some of the major schools. Who funds them? Where are the funds deposited? In whose name? It is likely that some faculty, staff, and students at individual universities will know at least some members of FJP.

Conditions for action: (1) Membership in FJP; (2) Appointment at an NAS/FLAS-funded (Title VI) department, program, or center. Note that some members – if/when their rolls can be found – may be in Title VI-funded centers other than Middle East studies (i.e., International, Africa, Western Europe, et al.).

Goal: Cut federal Title VI funds to centers whose faculty join organizations associated closely with Students for Justice in Palestine (including but not limited to FJP), which advocates violence against Jewish students and others and openly sides with terrorists from Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Hezbollah, and other active terrorist organizations. Hold such faculty accountable for advocating/excusing violence.

Faculty for Justice in Palestine and Antisemitic Violence

Antisemitic/pro-Islamist activism exploded on college campuses in the wake of the October 7, 2023, massacres in Israel. At many schools, including Columbia, Harvard, and UCLA, Jewish students reported being bullied and worse by demonstrators, many of whom were members of Students for Justice in Palestine (MEF has undertaken a significant project using federal RICO laws as a remedy for these matters).

A new report by the AMCHA Initiative, founded and run by MEF allies, demonstrates a statistically significant correlation between the presence of Faculty for Justice in Palestine chapters and antisemitic incidents on a given college campus. AMCHA notes that in the ten months following the October 7, 2023, attacks, “physical assaults on Jewish students skyrocketed by 2,500 percent, while violent threats—including death threats—rose by 900 percent.” Moreover, “Schools with FJP chapters saw a significant increase of physical assaults and threats of violence targeting Jewish students. These campuses experienced a 7.3-fold increase in the likelihood of physical assaults on Jewish students and were 3.4 times more likely to witness death threats and other violent threats compared to campuses without such chapters.”

Hillel reports 492 antisemitic incidents on campus between July 2024 and October 15, 2024, a ten-fold increase over the same period in 2023. It also reports 1,826 antisemitic incidents on campus between October 8, 2023, and June 30, 2024. It notes that: “Since the terrorist attack on Israel by Hamas on October 7, 2023, antisemitic incidents against Jewish students on college campuses have reached alarmingly high rages, increasing by 700 percent from 2022 to 2023.”

Action: Advocating and/or excusing violence against Jewish students is a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and advocating and/or excusing violence against anyone is a violation of state and federal laws. Universities that turn a blind eye toward such actions, or that through their administrative structures even encourage them, should be held accountable, first by investigations by both the DoE and Congress and, where applicable, by withdrawal of federal support. American taxpayers should never be forced to support illegal, discriminatory, and racist actions by university employees of any rank. The AMCHA study cited above is the most thorough to date and should be mined for information on which campuses to investigate as a first step to ending such unlawful and immoral actions.

Conclusion

The incoming Trump administration will likely pursue aggressive reform through executive action and maximum pressure tactics. It acknowledges the severity and interconnected nature of the challenges facing the United States in the 2025-2029 period.

The Iranian threat, with its network of proxy forces and nuclear ambitions, remains central to America’s Middle East strategy. This challenge is best addressed through maximum pressure and potential regime change, as Iran’s regional influence must be checked. The complex relationship with Qatar, balancing its role as military host against its support for extremist organizations, requires careful recalibration.

On the domestic front, the unprecedented rise in campus extremism and foreign influence in higher education demands immediate attention. The 2,500 percent increase in physical assaults on Jewish students and the widespread non-compliance with foreign funding disclosure requirements represent urgent challenges to American academic integrity and student safety. The incoming Trump administration need to address these issues comprehensively.

Border security and immigration reform present some of the most urgent issues facing the new administration. We recommend the aggressive enforcement of border laws, because the fundamental challenge of securing America’s borders while managing humanitarian considerations is paramount to strengthening America’s security against terrorism and lawlessness.

The success of the Trump administration’s approach will ultimately depend on several critical factors: the ability to build and maintain necessary coalitions, both domestic and international; the capability to overcome institutional resistance to change; and the capacity to implement lasting reforms that survive political transitions. The Trump approach offers the potential for rapid, dramatic change but faces significant challenges in institutional resistance and international cooperation.

What emerges clearly from this analysis is that the United States faces a critical period in which delayed or inadequate response to these challenges risks significant consequences for national security and domestic stability. The implementation of the recommended strategies will require unprecedented coordination across federal agencies, sustained political will, and careful balance between immediate security needs and long-term strategic objectives.

As we look toward 2025-2029, the Trump administration’s choices will fundamentally shape not only American policy but also regional stability, domestic security, and institutional integrity. The administration’s success will be measured not just by immediate policy achievements, but by its ability to create sustainable frameworks that enhance American security and influence while addressing the complex challenges of an increasingly unstable world.

The path forward must ultimately strengthen America’s capacity to protect its interests, support its allies, and maintain its democratic institutions. The implementation of these strategies will determine not only the success of the Trump administration, but also the long-term security and stability of the United States and its position in the global order.

Gregg Roman

Gregg Roman functions as the chief operations officer for the Forum, responsible for day-to-day management, communications, and financial resource development. Mr. Roman previously served as director of the Community Relations Council of the Jewish Federation of Greater Pittsburgh. In 2014, he was named one of the ten most inspiring global Jewish leaders by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. He previously served as the political advisor to the deputy foreign minister of Israel and worked for the Israeli Ministry of Defense. Mr. Roman is a frequent speaker at venues around the world, often appears on television, and has written for the Hill, the Forward, the Albany Times-Union, and other publications. He attended American University in Washington, D.C., and the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) in Herzliya, Israel, where he studied national security studies and political communications.

Michael Rubin

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he specializes in Middle Eastern countries, particularly Iran and Turkey. His career includes time as a Pentagon official, with field experiences in Iran, Yemen, and Iraq, as well as engagements with the Taliban prior to 9/11. Mr. Rubin has also contributed to military education, teaching U.S. Navy and Marine units about regional conflicts and terrorism. His scholarly work includes several key publications, such as “Dancing with the Devil” and “Eternal Iran.” Rubin earned his Ph.D. and M.A. in history and a B.S. in biology from Yale University.

Jonathan Spyer

Jonathan Spyer oversees the Forum’s content and is editor of the Middle East Quarterly. Mr. Spyer, a journalist, reports for Janes Intelligence Review, writes a column for the Jerusalem Post, and is a contributor to the Wall Street Journal and The Australian. He frequently reports from Syria and Iraq. He has a B.A. from the London School of Economics, an M.A. from the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, and a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics. He is the author of two books: The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict (2010) and Days of the Fall: A Reporter’s Journey in the Syria and Iraq Wars (2017).

Jim Hanson

Jim Hanson is Chief Editor for the Middle East Forum. He previously served in U.S. Army Special Forces and conducted counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense operations in more than two dozen countries. He is the author of several books including Winning the Second Civil War - Without Firing a Shot and Cut Down the Black Flag - A Plan to Defeat ISIS.

Winfield Myers

Winfield Myers is managing editor of the Middle East Forum and director of its Campus Watch project, which reviews and critiques Middle East studies in North American universities. He has taught world history and other topics at the University of Michigan, the University of Georgia, Tulane, and Xavier University of Louisiana. He was previously managing editor of The American Enterprise magazine and CEO of Democracy Project, Inc., which he co-founded. Mr. Myers has served as senior editor and communications director at the Intercollegiate Studies Institute and is principal author and editor of a college guide, Choosing the Right College (1998, 2001). He was educated at the University of Georgia, Tulane, and the University of Michigan.

Benjamin Baird

Benjamin Baird is a public affairs specialist who organizes grassroots advocacy campaigns in support of Middle East Forum projects. He mobilizes constituencies to support MEF policy objectives, coordinates effective public pressure campaigns, and uses bold and creative techniques to disrupt the policy-making arena. Mr. Baird is a U.S. Army infantry veteran with a B.A. from American Military University. His writing can be found at National Review, New York Post, Jerusalem Post, and other prominent media outlets.

Sam Westrop

Sam Westrop has headed Islamist Watch since March 2017, when MEF absorbed the counter-extremism unit of Americans for Peace and Tolerance (APT), where he was the research director. Before that, he ran Stand for Peace, a London-based counter-extremism organization monitoring Islamists throughout the UK.

Eric Navarro

An accomplished executive, Eric Navarro has led teams of up to 1,000 in various sectors including military operations and strategy, and technology deployment. As a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps, he served two combat tours in Operation Iraqi Freedom and led full-spectrum missions globally, including in the Caribbean, Latin America, and the Pacific. His academic credentials include a BA in Writing & Film from New School University, an MBA from NYU Stern in Management & Finance, and an MS in National Security Strategy from National War College. A published author, Mr. Navarro’s book God Willing chronicles his Iraq experiences with a focus on US intentions and misconceptions in the Middle East. His insights have been featured in the Washington Post among other leading publications. An esteemed public speaker, he has presented at the Library of Congress and appeared on Book TV.

Dexter Van Zile

Dexter Van Zile is managing editor of the Middle East Forum publication Focus on Western Islamism. Prior to his current position, Van Zile worked at the Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting and Analysis for 16 years, where he played a major role in countering misinformation broadcast into Christian churches by Palestinian Christians and refuting antisemitic propaganda broadcast by white nationalists and their allies in the U.S. His articles have appeared in the Jerusalem Post, the Boston Globe, Jewish Political Studies Review, the Algemeiner and the Jewish News Syndicate. He has authored numerous academic studies and book chapters about Christian anti-Zionism.

Alex Selsky

Alex Selsky is a senior adviser to the Israel Victory Project and serves on the board of directors of Middle East Forum-Israel. Mr. Selsky currently serves as a reserve major in the IDF Homefront Command emergency information unit. He is also a lecturer at the School of Politics and Journalism at Hadassah Academic College in Jerusalem. Previously, Mr. Selsky served as an advisor to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, spokesperson for the Israeli National Economic Council, member of the board of governors of the Jewish Agency for Israel, member of the executive board of the World Zionist Organization, and CEO of the International Israel Beytenu Movement.

He holds a B.A. in Business and an Executive Master of Public Policy from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.