Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.
Benjamin Franklin Room
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Well, good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to the State Department. I want to begin by thanking our friends and colleagues, Foreign Minister Cho, Defense Minister Kim, for their partnership, for their friendship, and for the very good discussions we had today. And as always, it’s great to be with my friend, my colleague, Secretary Austin.
In 2021, the two of us made our first foreign trip together and we visited Seoul, as well as Japan. This was our first overseas trip and the first 2+2 of this administration. I just got back from another trip to the Indo-Pacific a couple of weeks ago which, by our count, was my 20th trip to the region since the start of this administration. But with the Republic of Korea, over the last three and half years we’ve strengthened our alliance; we’ve modernized our alliance – an alliance that for seven decades has advanced peace, prosperity, and stability on the Korean Peninsula, in the Indo-Pacific, and increasingly around the world. Today, we had an opportunity to build on that progress and to also lay the groundwork to ensure that we continue delivering shared security and shared opportunity for our people in the years to come.
Now, one of the things that we emphasized today was a reaffirmation of the United States ironclad commitment to the ROK security, and that includes through extended deterrence. That’s especially important in light of the ongoing provocations coming from North Korea, including another ICBM launch just yesterday. We condemn it in the strongest terms, the latest launch of many and other provocative actions that it’s taken, flagrant violations all of multiple UN Security Council resolutions. All countries should be demanding that the DPRK cease these destabilizing actions. We are closely consulting with our partners and also with Japan. In fact, Foreign Minister Cho and I were on the phone early this morning with our Japanese counterpart and we will be focusing, as always, on this in the days to come, including the actions we’ll take in response.
All of this reinforces why we have to remain focused on maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and on the Korean Peninsula in particular, even as we work with European partners to respond to the DPRK’s deepening security relationship with Russia. We now assess that there are some 10,000 North Korean soldiers in total in Russia. And the most recent information indicates that as many as 8,000 of those North Korean forces have been deployed to the Kursk region. We’ve not yet seen these troops deploy into combat against Ukrainian forces, but we would expect that to happen in the coming days.
Russia has been training DPRK soldiers in artillery, UAVs, basic infantry operations, including trench clearing, indicating that they fully intend to use these forces in frontline operations. Should these troops engage in combat or combat support operations against Ukraine, they would become legitimate military targets.
Now, one of the reasons that Russia is turning to these North Korean troops is that it’s desperate. Putin has been throwing more and more Russians into a meat grinder of his own making in Ukraine. Now he’s turning to North Korean troops, and that is a clear sign of weakness. Russia’s been suffering some 1,200 casualties a day in the east, more than at any other time during the war. And with the deployment of these North Korean troops to Russia, and now to the front lines, this is the first time in a hundred years that Russia has invited foreign troops into its country. Our two sides today discussed a range of options in response and we’re closely coordinating with allies and partners, particularly our European partners. We’re continuing to surge security assistance to Ukraine, the United States, and we’ll announce more in the coming days.
What we’re also seeing underscores the indivisibility of security between the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic theaters, something that is clearer and clearer to all of our allies and partners in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. It’s reflected in South Korea’s growing partnership with NATO as well as its support for Ukraine, providing generators, humanitarian assistance, and we’ve discussed what more the Republic of Korea may do in the future. But in all of the conversations that I’ve been having with partners in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific, increasingly we see a focus on the indivisibility of the security.
With regard to China, we discussed the need to responsibly manage our competition with the People’s Republic of China. We agreed that China should do more to curb the DPRK’s provocative actions and to stop support for Russia’s defense industrial base, which is helping to perpetuate the conflict and the aggression by Russia in Ukraine. In the face of China’s unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea we remain committed to upholding freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight. We also underscored the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan strait.
Even as we addressed these security challenges, we’re also working together to expand our economic cooperation in ways that are having clear, direct, and powerful benefits for people in both of countries.
South Korea is now America’s number-one source of foreign direct investment, and this is really worth reflecting on, because foreign direct investment may be the best measure of trust and confidence, because you don’t make these investments unless you believe in the future of the country that you’re making the investments in. So it’s a powerful gauge of the confidence that South Korea has in the United States and, more broadly, we are the number-one recipient of foreign direct investment in the world – again, a very powerful indicator of the way the world sees the United States.
Thanks to the CHIPS and Science Act, thanks to the IRA, since 2021, Korea’s companies have pledged to invest $140 billion in the United States, and that will help create some 100,000 jobs. And those jobs will be in the industries of the future. We’re now Korea’s second-largest investor. Together we’re advancing a shared economic vision for the Indo-Pacific and actually for the world. These goals are bolstered by growing trilateral cooperation with Japan, building on the historic Camp David Summit that President Biden convened and hosted, and we look forward to another trilateral summit at the earliest opportunity.
I mentioned at the start that Korea is increasingly a powerful and consequential leader around the world, a global, pivotal state. It hosted the Summit for Democracy in March. We look forward to Korea hosting APEC next year. And together, we are working to uphold the rules-based international order at the UN, right now in the Security Council, where Korea is a member.
Our alliance is continuing to do what it does best, which is deliver real results for our people – real benefits for Americans and for Koreans – and we’re grateful for the strong bipartisan support that we enjoy in Congress for the alliance. President Yoon has said that the United States and Korea are marching together toward the future. Today is another reflection of the work that we’re doing together, the fact that we are joined together in building a better, more secure, more prosperous future for all of our people.
Thank you. Lloyd.
SECRETARY AUSTIN: Minister Cho.
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Oh, Minister Cho, you’re right. Thank you.
FOREIGN MINISTER CHO: Thank you, Tony.
(Via interpreter) First of all, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to Secretaries Blinken and Austin for cohosting the sixth ROK-U.S. foreign and defense ministers meeting today and warmly welcoming the Korean delegation. In this time of geopolitical transformation, where regional and global security threats are ever increasing, causing grave security landscape, our two nations’ foreign and defense ministers have come together and discussed joint responses, which was an extremely meaningful and timely endeavor. In today’s meeting we addressed the Korean Peninsula matters, ways to strengthen the alliance, as well as regional and global issues by having comprehensive and in-depth discussions, based on which we agreed on a joint statement.
The DPRK’s troops dispatch included, its military cooperation with Russia is a clear violation of the UN Security Council resolutions. Reaffirming this, we condemned it in the strongest language possible and called for an immediate stop to such dispatch and all other illegal military cooperation. The DPRK’s troop dispatch will further prolong Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and place not only the Korean Peninsula but also Europe’s peace and security under a grave threat, a view that we shared. Going forward, based on close information sharing and coordination as circumstances evolve, we agreed to take necessary measures accordingly.
We reaffirmed the goal of complete denuclearization of the DPRK. Its ongoing illegal, lethal provocations in nuclear and WMD development were strongly condemned. Especially the DPRK’s launch of a long-range missile yesterday was a grave violation of the UN Security Council resolutions and a threat to the Korean Peninsula and the world.
To address the DPRK’s habitual violations of the UN Security Council resolutions and ensure a strong and effective enforcement of North Korean sanctions, we are resolved to continue our partnership with the international community. To ensure its nuclear and missile developments become not a strategic asset but a liability to the DPRK, active diplomatic endeavors will be made to this end, and also our two countries welcomed the launch of a new mechanism to monitor the UNSC sanctions implementation against the DPRK, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team.
We also had discussions on President Yoon Suk-yeol’s August 15th Unification Doctrine and for his vision of realizing a free, peaceful, and prosperous Korean Peninsula that’s reunified. The U.S. reiterated its support.
Last April, President Yoon’s state visit to the U.S. unveiled the historic Washington Declaration. Its follow-up measures have further strengthened extended deterrence cooperation, based on which we also agreed to steadfastly develop a nuclear-based alliance. The U.S. reaffirmed its unwavering extended deterrence commitment to the ROK. Any nuclear attacks on the ROK by the DPRK will be met with a swift, overwhelming, and decisive response. We made it clear.
We have reconfirmed that the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty extends to space and cyberspace domains as well. Deterrence in these areas will be further bolstered, as we agreed. In addition, cooperation in defense, science, and technology, as well as defense industry, will be further reinforced to render the foundation of the alliance even stronger. To safeguard the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific, we agreed to continue working in close concert. We opposed any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the region. Freedom of navigation and overflight is among the fundamental rights and obligations of the UNCLOS and international law, establishing a maritime order, where such is guaranteed as crucial, as we reaffirmed.
We also reiterated our commitment to international solidarity and support for Ukraine. Now, it is the 71st year of the ROK-U.S. alliance rooted in democracy, human rights, rule of law, and other core shared values, and unwaveringly trusted by our people, remains stronger than ever. Hearing this view, we agreed to further broaden and deepen the alliance by convening regular ROK-U.S. foreign and defense ministers meeting going forward. Such regular rotation of the 2+2 meeting will ensure that the ROK-U.S. alliance is one of the most successful alliances engaged in more institutionalized and substantive cooperation.
Thank you, Secretaries Blinken and Austin, once again.
SECRETARY AUSTIN: Minister Kim, and Foreign Minister Cho, it’s great to have you with us here in Washington. Today’s meeting has once again demonstrated the importance of our ironclad alliance. Yesterday, Minister Kim and I discussed ways to strengthen and modernize our alliances’ combined defense posture. And in today’s 2+2, we talked about evolving our alliance into a comprehensive global partnership.
So let me touch on three key points. First, we agreed today to further enhance our interoperability and strengthen our extended deterrence. Our countries are deepening our nuclear and strategic planning efforts through the Nuclear Consultative Group. And we’re increasing the regular deployments of U.S. strategic assets on the Korean Peninsula.
We also affirmed that attacks in space or cyberspace that clearly challenge the security of the alliance could lead us to invoke Article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty. So to improve our awareness of threats in the space and cyber domains, we’re enhancing our interoperability and information sharing.
Second, we’re expanding the cooperation between our defense-industrial bases. That includes the U.S. Navy certification of ROK shipyards to maintain, repair, and overhaul U.S. Navy ships. And that will help our alliance – help keep our alliance resilient. And it will help ensure that we have the capabilities to deter potential foes, and if necessary, prevail in conflict.
Third and finally, we’re continuing to advance our defense ties with our regional allies and partners, especially the historic growth of trilateral security cooperation among Japan, the ROK, and the United States. Our robust partnerships – especially with Japan and the ROK – let us share information, assess threats, and craft thoughtful responses, just like last night when the DPRK conducted its latest irresponsible missile test. And across the Indo-Pacific, we’re working to strengthen maritime security and to bolster interoperability through multilateral exercises. And we’re helping to build up the capacity of our partner countries to tackle shared security challenges.
We also recognize the profound links between Indo-Pacific security and Euro-Atlantic security. As you know, we now assess that North Korea has sent around 10,000 of its soldiers to train in eastern Russia. And as the Secretary of State pointed out earlier, our most recent information indicates that about 8,000 of those DPRK soldiers are now in the Kursk Oblast.
Now, we’ve not yet seen these soldiers deploy into combat against Ukraine’s forces, but we expect that these North Korean soldiers will join the fight against Ukraine in the coming days. Our assessment is that Putin’s forces have trained these North Korean soldiers in artillery operations, UAV operations, and basic infantry operations, including trench clearing. The Kremlin has also provided these DPRK troops with Russian uniforms and equipment. And all of that strongly indicates that Russia intends to use these foreign forces in front line operations in its war of choice against Ukraine.
Make no mistake: If these North Korean troops engage in combat or combat support operations against Ukraine, they would make themselves legitimate military targets. So we are consulting closely with our allies and partners and other countries in the region on these reckless developments and on our response.
As I discussed last week in Kyiv, Ukraine’s military continues to perform admirably on the battlefield. And Putin’s forces have suffered serious losses. In recent months, Ukrainian forces have caused more than 1,200 Russian casualties per day – more than at any other time during Putin’s war. And by tin cupping to North Korea for manpower, Putin is showing the world another clear sign of weakness. The Kremlin’s North Korean gambit just underscores how badly Putin’s war has gone, and how much trouble he’s in.
This is the first time in more than a century that Russia has welcomed foreign troops onto its own soil. As Secretary Blinken noted, a permanent member of the UN Security Council is violating Security Council resolutions that it agreed to. So at the direction of the President, the United States will continue to surge security assistance to Ukraine, and so will our allies and partners in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. That includes artillery and air defense, armored vehicles, munitions, and other crucial capabilities. The United States will announce additional security assistance for Ukraine in the coming days.
And in our meetings yesterday and today, we discussed with our ROK allies how we’re doing – how we’re going to work together with our allies and partners to respond to this dangerous and destabilizing escalation. We’re also closely tracking other bullying by the DPRK, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China. And that’s why the United States and the ROK are working so closely with our partners to stand up to coercive destabilizing actions in both the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic. Our work together is central to ensuring peace and stability and to enhancing deterrence. Foreign Minister Cho and Minister Kim, thanks for your leadership and your commitment to this proud alliance.
Minister Kim, over to you.
DEFENSE MINISTER KIM: (Via interpreter) Good afternoon. I am the minister of national defense of the Republic of Korea. First, I’d like to thank Secretary of State Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin for hosting the ROK-U.S. foreign and defense ministerial, and for your warm reception of the Korean delegation.
The international community today is faced with complex challenges which threaten peace and security, and we are in the most stern security environment since the Cold War. It is at this time that the ROK-U.S. foreign and defense ministers have gathered together to discuss ROK-U.S. alliance development and various issues on regional peace and security, which is very timely and significant. At the meeting, we agreed that the ROK-U.S. alliance is the core pillar of peace, security, and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and the Indo-Pacific region, and we agreed to strengthen cooperation as global comprehensive strategic alliance.
On North Korea’s ICBM launch yesterday, we denounced this with one voice and urged North Korea to abide by the UN Security Council resolutions. Also on the escalating North Korean nuclear and missile threats, we agreed to continuously strengthen cooperation on deterrence and response. On North Korea’s deployment of troops to Russia and illegal military cooperation with Russia, we denounced this with strong words and strongly urge the immediate withdrawal of North Korean troops.
We have completed a joint guidelines in July – last July – and thus uplifting the ROK-U.S. alliance into a nuclear-based alliance in name and in substance. We reconfirmed our common goal of the complete denuclearization of North Korea. And based on historic joint guidelines, we agreed to continuously strengthen the implementation of extended deterrence. The U.S. reconfirmed the strong commitment to useful scope military capabilities to provide extended deterrence to the Republic of Korea. We confirmed that the scope of the Mutual Defense Treaty applies to space and cyber domains, and agreed to strengthen cooperation in space and cyber domains.
To respond to new challenges, including global supply chain crises and advanced technology competition, we concurred that we need to evolve into a science and technology alliance and agreed to strengthen cooperation in defense industry and defense science and technology. We concurred on the importance of upholding rules based international order in the region and on enhancing cooperation with other value-sharing countries.
In particular, we agreed to strengthen ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation. And based on our Indo-Pacific strategies, we agreed to expand cooperation with the ASEAN and Pacific Island nations. And in new areas of cooperation, such as AUKUS Pillar Two, we have agreed to create synergy. The meeting today, we assessed, is a cornerstone for developing the ROK-U.S. alliance into a global comprehensive strategic alliance, and we will closely cooperate for peace, security, and prosperity on the Korean peninsula and in the region.
Katchi Kapshida. We go together. Thank you.
MR MILLER: The first question goes to Shannon Kingston with ABC.
QUESTION: Thank you very much. Now, my first question is for the four of you. You discussed the need for Beijing to do more to reign in North Korea’s aggression, but so far China has been largely silent on North Korea’s deployment of troops to help Russia’s war effort. What do you make of this silence? What do you want to see? What specific steps would you like to see happen next? And is now the time for South Korea to supply offensive arms to Ukraine?
And then over to the Middle East, if I may. Secretary Austin, Secretary Blinken, do you see a Lebanon ceasefire deal coming together? Is that on the horizon? And then in Gaza, the U.S. has been pushing Israel for answers on that devastating strike in Beit Lahia for days now, to no avail. Also, the letter you sent to the Israeli Government called for the creation of a new channel on civilian harm incidents by the end of this month. So far it doesn’t appear that has happened. Has anything changed on either of those fronts, and if not, how do you justify continuing to arm a foreign power that won’t cooperate?
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Any more? (Laughter.)
I’m happy to start. As we said, I think each of us, and as we say collectively, we believe that the entire world should be insisting and demanding that the DPRK cease its provocative actions both in terms of the repeated missile launches in violation of UN Security Council resolutions and now also providing its troops for Russia’s use in this war of aggression against Ukraine. And when it comes to China, as a member of the United Nations Security Council, we would and should expect no less.
And we’ve had communications with China. In fact, we had a robust conversation just this week, and I think they know well the concerns that we have and the expectations that, both in word and deed, they’ll use the influence that they have to work to curb these activities. So we’ll see if they take action, but I think this is a demand signal that’s coming not just from us but from countries around the world that see what the DPRK is doing both in the immediate region, on the Korean Peninsula, but also what it’s doing in Europe.
Now, it’s also very important to note that this is a two-way street between DPRK and Russia. We’re seeing what DPRK is providing to Russia in terms of troops. We’re very focused on and concerned about what Russia might be doing in order to enhance the DPRK’s capacities, its military capacity. That, too, should be of real concern to China because it’s profoundly destabilizing in the region.
On Lebanon, let me just say that we are working very hard and making progress on reaching understandings of what would be required for the effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. This would be the basis of a diplomatic resolution to the crisis. It’s important to make sure that we have clarity both from Lebanon and from Israel about what would be required under 1701 to get its effective implementation: the withdrawal of Hizballah forces from the border; the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces; the authorities under which they’d be acting; an appropriate enforcement mechanism. And I can tell you that based on my recent trip to the region and the work that’s ongoing right now, we have made good progress on those understandings. We still have more work to do, but that’s what’s necessary to get us to a diplomatic resolution, including through a ceasefire.
And with regard to Gaza, I can tell you a couple of things. First, both of us and our teams are tracking very carefully Israel’s responsibilities to meet the letter of the law as we sent it jointly to our Israeli counterparts with regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance. And there’s been real progress, but insufficient, and we’re working on a daily basis to make sure that Israel does what it must do to ensure that this assistance gets to people who need it inside of Gaza. It’s not enough to get trucks to Gaza; it’s vital that what they bring with them can get distributed effectively inside of Gaza.
And one other thing on this very quickly. One of the things that has been successful in recent months was the polio vaccination campaign for hundreds of thousands of Palestinian children in Gaza. But in order for that campaign to be concluded, we have to complete a second round of vaccinations, and these vaccinations have to happen within a certain period of time from the first round of vaccinations. It is urgent that this be completed in the days ahead, and we’re looking to Israel to facilitate that action.
And then finally – sorry for going on so long – for many months, Israel has made clear that the strategic objectives that it had in Gaza – in making sure that October 7th and the horrors of October 7th could never happen again – were the effective dismantlement of Hamas’s military capacity, its organized military capacity, and the elimination of the leaders who were responsible for October 7th. So both of those goals have been achieved, and the focus now must be on ending the war and, in the meanwhile, making sure that people who need the assistance for food, for medicine, and other basic humanitarian needs get the assistance that they need.
SECRETARY AUSTIN: So with respect to the PRC and this latest development with DPRK troops in Russia, we’re speaking to countries throughout the region about this alarming development, and that includes – as Tony pointed out, it includes the PRC. And I would refer you to the PRC for their position, but if China is serious about its desire for de-escalation, it should be asking Russia some hard questions at this point, and whether about – whether it intends to broaden this conflict by this kind of behavior. And so we’ll continue to work with allies and partners, and make sure that we’re doing the right things in terms of being prepared to move to the next stage in terms of holding DPRK to task.
Regarding activities in the Middle East, I talk to my counterpart, Minister Gallant, routinely. I’ll talk to him today, this afternoon. And every time I talk to him I emphasize the need to protect civilians in the battlespace and the need to provide humanitarian assistance to the people in Gaza. And as Tony pointed out, they have made some progress recently. We want to see them do much more, and we’ll continue to emphasize that as we engage in the future.
And again, we’re hopeful that we can – we see things – we will see things transition in Lebanon in a not-too-distant future. I think there’s an opportunity for that to happen, but it’s left to be seen when that will happen, but we’ll continue to press to make sure that it happens sooner versus later.
FOREIGN MINISTER CHO: (Via interpreter) Regarding China’s stance on the recent developments and what kind of measures that we will be asking for towards China, concerning the military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK and troop dispatch to Russia, China has been reticent about making its position known, but I believe that it is finding it very uncomfortable, the whole situation. Starting from the spring, because we know that there are things that China can do, we have been engaging in high-level talks and communication with China so that we can make relevant preparations. We will continue to do so going forward, and we will be having many contacts and interactions with the PRC and utilizing those occasions, and we relay our concerns and thoughts to the PRC.
And going forward regarding our plan to provide weapons to Ukraine, there was a question. As was mentioned by the President Yoon, depending on the developments in military cooperation between the DPRK and Russia, relevant measures, corresponding measures, will be taken accordingly. We need to see the level of involvement of the DPRK forces in Russia, and we also need to watch what kind of quid pro quo the DPRK will be receiving from Russia, so we will have to watch that before making a decision as to the weapons support that we will be providing to Ukraine. So currently we are not in a position to share the specifics.
DEFENSE MINISTER KIM: (Via interpreter) So the three earlier ministers have already mentioned much, but I’d like to just add one point on the silence of the PRC. China still continues to be silent. I think the more clear assessment is that it is watching and waiting. And if the situation worsens, at one point, China, either as a mediator or any other role, may be intervening. So when the situation worsens, so there will be a point when the interests of China will be violated, and it is at that point that China will begin to play a certain role.
MR MILLER: For the next question, Sangho Song with Yonhap News Agency.
QUESTION: Thank you. My first question is for Minister Kim and Secretary Austin. Yesterday, North Korea launched an ICBM. Do you assess that there was any Russian technological support vis-à-vis the latest ICBM launch?
And regarding the SCM’s statement yesterday, the statements that the minister and Secretary decided to include North Korea nuclear attack scenario in future combined exercises. Does that require any revision or update of ROK-U.S. wartime operational plans, and when will that happen? And would that be applied to combined exercises in coming years or next year? Can you give us some clarity on the timeframe?
And my second question is for Secretary Blinken and Minister Cho. Can you tell us what specific steps South Korea and the United States are considering taking beyond just public condemnation if North Korean troops’ actual entry into combat is confirmed? Thank you.
SECRETARY AUSTIN: So the first question was on the ICBM, and can you —
QUESTION: Russian technological support involved in that – the latest test. Do you have an assessment that – if there was any Russian support regarding the ICBM – this latest one?
SECRETARY AUSTIN: I can’t hear what you’re saying.
QUESTION: Do you have any assessment indicating that there was any Russian technological support regarding the ICBM launch this week? Thank you.
SECRETARY AUSTIN: Oh, I understand. At this point, it’s very early in the – in our assessment phase, and we don’t see any indication at this point that there was Russian involvement. But again, we’ll continue to work with our partners and our allies in the region to analyze this. But again, let me emphasize how irresponsible this behavior is. And we call upon the DPRK to cease and desist. It’s potentially destabilizing, and again, it violates the UN – UN sanctions. So – but to answer your question specifically, I don’t see any Russian involvement.
And your second question was?
QUESTION: The second question is regarding the (inaudible) SCM statement yesterday. The statement said that the minister and Secretary Austin decided to include North Korean nuclear attack scenario in future combined exercises between South Korea and the U.S. militaries. So I’m wondering if that requires a revision of wartime operational plans between South Korea and the United States, and when will that happen? If that’s happening maybe next year or coming years, do you have any timeframe for that? Thank you.
SECRETARY AUSTIN: Well, certainly I won’t give – provide specifics about the contents of our planning, but I would just say that we are constantly planning and upgrading our plans, and working to make sure that that we are ready to fight tonight if that – if it comes to that. But again, the fact that we continue to increase our interoperability, I think that reassures our allies and partners in the region, and it also serves as a deterrent against anyone who would want to do the unthinkable and try to take on this great alliance.
DEFENSE MINISTER KIM: (Via interpreter) Firstly, on the first question on North Korea’s ICBM launch, was there a technical support from Russia, that has not been confirmed at the moment. And what we predict is that there is no evidence that Russian technology support was provided.
Secondly, so combined exercises based on North Korean nuclear capabilities. In all of the operational plans, it is based on strategy. And based on the strategic plan, implementation happens. And so that is how we proceed with our exercises, and it will be implemented as soon as possible. So I think that is as far as I can say.
FOREIGN MINISTER CHO: (Via interpreter) Other than the public condemnation between our two nations, what specific actions are we considering? That was the question. At this point, strategic communication towards the international community, especially tailoring our messages to different groups of members of the international community and a coordination of independent sanctions, are on our minds. And we will consider the full breadth of possible scenarios for making considerations as to the options to take. Regarding the specific measures and actions to be taken, we’ll have to see the specifics of military cooperation between the DPRK and Russia. Once that’s confirmed, we will take actions accordingly.
SECRETARY BLINKEN: And I can only reinforce what the foreign minister said. We will, of course, consult closely with allies and partners should we see North Korean troops enter into combat. As both Lloyd and I have said, that makes them legitimate military targets, but we’ll be consulting with allies and partners on any additional steps and any additional measures we may choose to take. For our part, for the United States, as I mentioned earlier, you’ll be seeing additional security assistance heading in the direction of Ukraine very soon, to be announced in the coming days. And throughout these months, we will be, with more than 50 countries, continuing to strengthen and build support for Ukraine’s defense with everything that it needs to effectively defend itself, as well as continuing to put pressure on Russia and to deal in many other ways with the ongoing aggression.
MR MILLER: For the next question, Noah Robertson with Defense News.
QUESTION: Thank you all for doing this. To Secretary Blinken, specifically, I wanted to know if you could share whether Israel actually shares your assessment of the war in Gaza right now —
SPEAKER: The microphone is not on.
QUESTION: And it – it began the way that you described, to (inaudible).
Can you hear me? Did you hear the question, or should I repeat it?
SECRETARY BLINKEN: I did. No, I got it. Thanks.
QUESTION: Perfect. Thank you. And to both Secretary Austin and Secretary Blinken, I wanted to know if you could describe the progress that you’ve seen in humanitarian aid and whether you believe with Gaza that Israel is on track to reach a sufficient level for your satisfaction, and if you could expand specifically on what channel that the U.S. has used to communicate with China about the DPRK’s actions in Russia.
To Secretary Austin specifically, I wanted to know now that we have seen these 8,000 DPRK troops deploy toward Kursk, whether you think it’s possible for Ukraine to hold on to its territory there or whether it will have to try to consolidate its defenses given the losses in the east.
And then if I could venture one more specifically to Minister Kim, could you specify the number of containers that the DPRK has provided to Russia during the conflict as it grows its cooperation militarily? Thank you.
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Thank you. Well, of course, I’ll let Israel speak for itself, but I think it actually largely has. As I said, it’s made clear repeatedly and publicly that the critical objectives that it had for making sure that October 7th could never happen again were the elimination of Hamas’s organized military capacity as well as bringing to justice those who were responsible for perpetrating October 7th, and notably Mr. Sinwar. Well, the latter is demonstrably done. And the Israelis themselves have said and said publicly that they have dismantled Hamas’s military capacity. So on that basis, and these are their stated objectives, those objectives having been achieved at great cost in the lives of children, women, men, Palestinians caught in this crossfire of Hamas’s initiation and making – well, this would be the time to move to end the war.
In terms of progress on the humanitarian aid, look, the letter that Lloyd and I sent, which is now in the public domain even though that was not the intent, lays out a number of things that we expect to see them do. And I can tell you that as you go down the list, there are a number of them – a number of these steps have been taken, including, for example, reviving crossings that had been dormant, initiating and opening a new crossing into Gaza, some additional measures. Some are in train; others we’ve not yet seen.
And so we’re tracking this between us, between our teams, with the Israelis and those who are working on the humanitarian response, every single day. I know, as the Secretary said, he’ll be speaking to Defense Minister Gallant, I believe, later today, and I’m sure that will come up. So we’re very focused on making sure that the steps that we outlined in the letter are actually taken and implemented and sustained. Because what we’ve seen in the past is this: We’ve seen Israel take important steps – for example, this spring, also in response to what the United States said was necessary to improve the humanitarian situation for people in Gaza – and we saw real progress, and then we saw it diminish and then tail off, which is one of the reasons we felt it was so imperative to write to our counterparts and to see action taken on this.
In terms of our engagement with China, I mentioned earlier that we had a robust engagement just this week. And what I can tell you is that happens between senior officials in our government, including the State Department, and the Chinese Government.
SECRETARY AUSTIN: Regarding progress with respect to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, I agree with what Tony has said. We are seeing progress, and we’ll continue to watch this on a daily basis, and I’ll continue to engage my counterpart and encourage him to pick up the pace. More crossings being opened, more humanitarian assistance going in – we’ve just to make sure that they increase it even more.
The question – the other question you had for me was that, based upon the 10,000 troops from the DPRK that have entered the battle space, is it possible for Ukraine to hold on to Kursk? The answer is yes. And if you take a look at what I said earlier in terms of the numbers of casualties that Russia is suffering on a daily basis – some 1,250 or so casualties per day – you do the math on a given month, that’s – those are pretty big numbers. And so the number 10,000 kind of pales in comparison to those kinds of casualties.
So this 10,000 won’t come close to replacing the numbers that the Russians have lost. And again, I think they’re at a point now that if they’ve got to go seeking for assistance to a country like the DPRK, then I think they have some problems. But yes, I do believe that they can – they can hold on to the territory if they choose to do that. They do have options, they can do a number of things, but if they choose to do that, they can hold it.
SECRETARY BLINKEN: And just before turning to my colleague, there’s one thing I want to make sure that I emphasize as well, because I’d be remiss if I didn’t say it. Of course, the other absolute requirement for this war to come to an end is for the hostages to come home, and that includes the seven Americans. So we’re working on that every single day, but that is absolutely necessary and with every passing day increasingly urgent.
DEFENSE MINISTER KIM: (Via interpreter) On North Korea’s munitions support to Russia, it will be in the hundreds of thousands. So it’s not 1 million or 2 million, but it’s close to tens of millions of munitions, and missiles will be about 1,000 – over 1,000 missiles have been provided.
MR MILLER: And for the final question, Min Seok Lee with Chosun Ilbo.
QUESTION: Thank you. My first question is to Secretary Austin. Has there been any new U.S. intelligence or assessment of what Russia might offer North Korea in exchange for deploying over 10,000 troops, whether in the form of military aid, advanced weapons technology, or economic support?
And to Secretary Blinken, as DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs have become increasingly advanced, U.S. officials have been mentioning the interim steps to engage with North Korea, which raise some speculations about whether the U.S. is poised to employ a policy shift. There was no phrase “denuclearization” in the joint statement released yesterday after the SCM. So is the U.S. moving the focus of the – its diplomacy from the pursuit of complete denuclearization of the North Korean – North Korea to one of deterrence? Thanks.
(Via interpreter) Next, my question is for Ministers Kim Yong-hyun and Cho Tae-yul. Minister Kim, yesterday you talked about enhancement of ICBM, and there’s a possibility that North Korea will be asking for advanced technology from Russia. And so do you have any signs that this is actually happening? And if this concern is visualized, comes to fruition, what will the Korean Government do as a response? And what are the preventive measures that we can take?
SECRETARY AUSTIN: In terms of what the DPRK may be getting in return for its provision of 10,000 troops, we – that’s unknown at this point, but I – as you look at things, you would guess that technology would be at the top of the list, and that’s, again, one of those things that could be and will be destabilizing depending on what kind of technology we’re talking about; financial assistance; and you can go down the list, right. And certainly, DPRK stands a chance of gaining in this – in this exchange here. This is something that we’re going to have to continue to watch very, very closely. It will embolden their – potentially embolden them to do more of the kinds of things that we’ve seen them do here recently, especially the kinds of things that we saw yesterday with the launch of an ICBM.
SECRETARY BLINKEN: And our policy remains what it has been, and will remain, which is the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
DEFENSE MINISTER KIM: (Via interpreter) On Russian technology transfer to North Korea, as of yet nothing has been confirmed. It has not been confirmed as a fact, but we are just making predictions about the possibility. However, if there will be a transfer of Russian technology to North Korea, we can overcome that through the advanced technology that the alliance has.
FOREIGN MINISTER CHO: (Via interpreter) To deter such situation, I believe our efforts in that regard is most important. In collaboration with the international community, we are engaged in strategic communication and coordinating independent sanctions. All these activities have exactly that situation, deterrence of that situation in mind as the top priority. And once that’s done, as to what kind of actions to be taken, I will have to repeat the principle that I’ve already told you about. Thank you.
MR MILLER: Thank you all.
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