How the U.S. Can Compromise With Turkey on Syria
Washington should build on past three-way Turkey-U.S.-SDF arrangements to put a real offer on the table.
The latest crisis in the Turkey-U.S. relationship—Turkish threats to launch ground operations into Syria against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) Syrian Kurdish offshoot, the People’s Defense Units (YPG)—has again raised tensions in a bilateral relationship that is as critical as it is tumultuous. Although no final decision has yet been taken by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, it is certainly likely he will launch some form of ground operation, which, depending on where and how, will more or less tank bilateral relations.
The United States has conflicting interests with Turkey. On dozens of issues, from Ukraine to NATO nuclear policy to Iran, both countries’ interests align. Washington, despite many tribulations, is Ankara’s most vital ally, and Turkey, given its economic and military weight and strategic geography, is a key U.S. partner in Eurasia.
Yet differences over Washington’s support for the YPG in the common effort against the Islamic State have roiled relations repeatedly since 2016. (The YPG was renamed in 2015 as the Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF, by the U.S. military in a superficial effort to downplay the group’s PKK links given the latter being on U.S. terrorist lists. The author will henceforth use SDF, but it also means YPG and “Syrian PKK branch.”) This produced two decisions—both fortunately reversed—by former U.S. President Donald Trump to withdraw U.S. forces supporting the SDF from Syria, as well as three Turkish ground incursions into Syria between 2016 and 2019.

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