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FACING WAR: RETHINKING EUROPE’S SECURITY AND DEFENCE

edited by Serena Giusti and Giovanni Grevi

introduction by Paolo Magri

Founded in 1934, ISPI is an independent think tank committed to the study of 

international political and economic dynamics.

It is the only Italian Institute – and one of the very few in Europe – to combine research activities with a significant commitment to training, events, and global risk analysis for companies and institutions. 

ISPI favours an interdisciplinary and policy-oriented approach made possible by a research team of over 50 analysts and an international network of 70 

universities, think tanks, and research centres.

In the 2020 “Global Go To Think Tank Index Report” edited by the University of Pennsylvania, ISPI ranked first among 153 Italian think tanks. ISPI was also chosen as “Centre of excellence” for topping one of the categories of the ranking for three years straight, in 2018-2020.

FACING WAR: RETHINKING EUROPE’S SECURITY AND DEFENCE

edited by Serena Giusti and Giovanni Grevi

© 2022 Ledizioni LediPublishing

Via Antonio Boselli, 10 – 20136 Milan – Italy

www.ledizioni.it

info@ledizioni.it

Facing War: Rethinking Europe’s Security and Defence

Edited by Serena Giusti and Giovanni Grevi

First edition: November 2022

Print ISBN 9788855268141

ePub ISBN 9788855268158

Pdf ISBN 9788855268165

DOI 10.14672/55268141

ISPI. Via Clerici, 5

20121, Milan

www.ispionline.it

Catalogue and reprints information: www.ledizioni.it

This Report is realized with the support of the Policy Planning Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation pursuant to art. 23-bis of Presidential Decree 18/1967.

The opinions contained in this Report are solely those of the authors and do not 

necessarily reflect the opinions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and ISPI. 

Table of Contents

Introduction

Paolo Magri............................................................................................. 7

1. EU Security and Defence Policy

 in a Volatile Context

 Serena Giusti.................................................................................. 13

2. A Watershed Moment? European Defence

 and the War in Ukraine

 Fabrizio Coticchia....................................................................... 23

3. EU Defence: Joint Capability Development

 Andrea Locatelli.......................................................................... 35

4. The EU’s Role in Security and Defence:

 Still Indispensable

 Sven Biscop.................................................................................... 47

5. The EU-Nato Partnership

 Nicolò Fasola, Sonia Lucarelli............................................ 61

6. A Zeitenwende in Cyber Security

 and Defence?

 Antonio Missiroli.............................................................................. 73 

7. Rethinking the EU’s Approach to Space:

 The Case of Security and Defence

 Daniel Fiott......................................................................................... 85 

Conclusions. European Defence:

Quantum Leap or Limbo?

Giovanni Grevi......................................................................................... 99

About the Authors............................................................................ 113

Introduction

European security has made some important strides since 

becoming part of the EU remit in 1992. However, three 

decades after its first foray, it remains an incomplete project. 

Nowhere has this been easier to see than in the EU’s response 

to the Ukraine crisis.

As with many other crises of the recent past, Russia’s invasion 

of Ukraine elicited a common response from EU Member 

States. In fact, even more than during other crises, countries 

found a common ground very fast, in just a few days and weeks 

after February 24th. It took Eurozone countries months, and 

often even years, to agree on a number of common tools to 

lower the risk of repeating another debt crisis, and to improve 

their resilience in the face of a new one (2011-2014). During 

the worst phases of the Covid-19 pandemic, it took EU 

countries months of negotiations to agree on a common fund 

to support the post-pandemic recovery, leading to the first-ever 

issuance of common EU debt. On this regard, it could be said 

that the EU’s response to Russia’s invasion was exceptional: it 

came swiftly, and it remained strong and balanced throughout 

the first months. For instance, harsh sanctions against Russia 

were approved in (so far) eight rounds. This was not to be taken 

for granted, given that approving sanctions at the EU level 

requires unanimity between its 27 Member States, and that 

some of them were less keen than others to undermine their 

longstanding relationship with Moscow.

8 Facing War: Rethinking Europe’s Security and Defence

As with many other crises, however, such a communion of 

intent soon started to fade. Divergences re-emerged between 

members who wanted to do more (Poland and the Baltic 

countries, among others), those who preferred to tread more 

carefully (for example, Germany and Italy), and outright 

Moscow allies (Hungary). For months, those very negotiations 

over European sanctions have had to face stiff opposition from 

Hungary and a few other sceptical countries, and have been 

progressively softened in order to be approved by the 27.

Pledges to strengthen the EU common defence’s industrial 

base by developing “European” weapons systems are also in a 

wobbly position. On the one hand, in early October the French 

President Emmanuel Macron and Germany’s Chancellor Olaf 

Scholz called the heads of their respective defence industries 

to unblock work on the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) 

programme, which should aim to build a common European 

aircraft by 2040. On the other hand, however, on the same 

month Germany and another 13 countries announced the 

“European Sky Shield Initiative”: the joint acquisition of an 

air and missile defence shield to be composed by German, 

American and possibly Israeli systems. By doing so, they angered 

France, which voluntarily remained outside the project, as it 

was developing its own shield with Italy. Moreover, since the 

2021 botched withdrawal from Afghanistan, President Macron 

had been advocating for strengthening Europe’s “strategic 

autonomy” – surely difficult to do by relying on US-made 

weapons systems. In a nutshell, as Serena Giusti puts it in her 

opening chapter, “whereas the EU has converged on common 

positions and actions (e.g. numerous packages of sanctions) 

against (…) the Russian Federation, it has so far failed to boost 

integration in security and defence”.

This Report is an attempt to take stock of the state of 

Europe’s security in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As 

it appears that the conflict is going to drag out for several more 

months or even years, it appears to have become part of a new 

state of affairs in the Continent, and it is therefore important to 

Introduction 9

ask how countries are responding to this new reality. Moreover, 

even if the conflict ended in a ceasefire, grand bargain, or the 

victory of one of the parties, the very fact that President Putin 

decided to invade the country will continue to have a profound 

impact on how European governments perceive their own 

security.

This is the central question of Fabrizio Coticchia’s chapter: 

whether we can define the war in Ukraine a turning point 

for EU foreign and defence policy. While it may be too 

early to answer this question properly, Coticchia outlines the 

implications of the conflict in Ukraine for the development 

of EU defence policy, emphasising especially the novelties and 

obstacles therein. In particular, the chapter focuses on the two 

never-ending problems that hinder the attainment of a proper 

EU defence: capabilities and coherence, while delving deeper 

into the potential transformation of the defence policy of two 

specific EU countries: Germany and Italy.

The following chapter focuses on one of these two vexed 

questions: joint capabilities. Efforts to promote defence 

integration appear to have increased after Russia’s invasion. 

However, due to the previous record of failed EU initiatives 

in the military sector, Andrea Locatelli investigates whether 

these renewed efforts are doomed to follow the same path, 

or whether they will eventually change the security landscape 

of the continent. Specifically, Locatelli focuses on the goals, 

strategies and likely impact of the current initiatives on the 

European Defence Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB) – 

i.e. the complex web of infrastructure, institutions, and ideas 

that convert state resources into the means of warfare.

Following along these lines, Sven Biscop argues that, even 

after the Ukraine invasion (and possibly even more so) Europe 

needs a proper and autonomous security and defence policy, 

that remains distinct from NATO’s. At the same time, the EU 

should focus on a number of goals included in its Strategic 

Compass, and that are not NATO’s “core business”: crisis 

management, hybrid threats, and capability development. An 

10 Facing War: Rethinking Europe’s Security and Defence

interesting development is a de facto “Europeanisation” of the 

European theatre for NATO forces, with the core of NATO’s 

New Force Model being 300,000 European troops in a state of 

high readiness. According to Biscop, defence efforts of the EU 

Member States, and of NATO, would not collapse if the EU 

terminates its defence efforts. Yet, national and NATO decisionmakers should acknowledge that, without the assistance of the 

EU’s instruments, the European defence effort will never be 

integrated to a significant degree.

This is also why the uneasy EU-NATO partnership deserves 

a standalone chapter, by Nicolò Fasola and Sonia Lucarelli. 

It is only obvious that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reasserted 

NATO’s significance for European security, putting ideas about 

the Alliance’s obsolescence to rest. So far, the EU and NATO 

have managed to work jointly (or, at least, in non-contradictory 

terms), capitalising on the gradual, growing interconnection 

they have facilitated over the last two decades. According to 

the authors, the current international context offers a unique 

opportunity for stepping up this partnership even more, 

to the benefit of Europe’s security and defence. Rather than 

decoupling, the EU should find its place next to the Western 

military alliance, as the best place to manage non-military 

responses to Russia’s aggression.

In the next chapter, Antonio Missiroli addresses a specific 

question: how has the EU’s cyber security approach changed 

since Russia’s invasion? His response seems to point at the 

fact that a change has occurred, and that it entails EU-NATO 

coordination, as no actor can efficiently develop cyber resilience 

and defence capabilities on their own. Still, Missiroli argues, it 

is precisely among EU members that more needs to be done 

– for instance, in the framework of Permanent Structured 

Cooperation (PESCO), where cyber-relevant projects are few 

and of limited scope – in order to upgrade the bloc’s own 

collective ability to operate and collaborate credibly with more 

capable partners.

Introduction 11

After cybersecurity and defence, Daniel Fiott moves to 

consider the matter of space defence. According to the author, 

one cannot think of EU strategic autonomy or sovereignty 

without first achieving autonomy in space. This is why space 

has arguably witnessed the clearest material realisation of the 

concept of strategic autonomy. Indeed, today the EU can 

boast of autonomous space capacities that help enable global 

positioning (Galileo) and monitoring (Copernicus). In a 

context where other strategic actors are rapidly increasing 

their presence in space, Fiott asks how the EU will meet this 

challenge through its space-defence outlook and the capabilities 

it is developing.

Finally, Giovanni Grevi asks whether European defence after 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is poised for a quantum leap, or to 

fall in a limbo. What is sure is that the war has shaken Europeans 

out of the complacency that had long surrounded and stifled 

their approach to European security and defence. However, 

whether or not a paradigm shift is emerging for European 

defence depends on the extent to which European strategic 

cultures are converging, on collaboration among Europeans 

in generating new military capabilities, and on the role that 

Europeans will be willing to play to uphold their own security. 

Overall, according to Grevi, the experts who contributed to this 

report sense a moment of opportunity to foster cooperation 

on security and defence issues within the EU. However, they 

underscore the enduring systemic challenges facing the EU 

defence agenda, and withhold their judgment on prospects 

for the “quantum leap forward” advocated by the Strategic 

Compass in March 2022.

Paolo Magri

ISPI Executive Vice President