EURACTİV : How Putin changed Germany

 How Putin changed Germany

By Jonathan Packroff, Julia Dahm, Nikolaus J. Kurmayer and Oliver Noyan | EURACTIV.de

Author name

Oliver Noyan

Senior Editor Germany

 Nov 24, 2022

The coalition agreement between the Greens, the liberal FDP and the Social Democrats that was presented on November 24, 2021, marks a historic shift for many reasons. [CLEMENS BILAN/EPA]

Russia’s war in Ukraine has forced the German government to reconsider many of the plans it presented a year ago when the “traffic light” coalition was first formed, changing the shape of many of the country’s key policies and lines.

The coalition agreement between the Greens, the liberal FDP and the Social Democrats that was presented on November 24, 2021, marks a historic shift for many reasons. It is not only the first time in German history that three parties came together to form a coalition, but it also ended the era of Angela Merkel – who ruled Europe’s largest economy for 16 years.

While the agreement, titled “daring more progress”, aimed to initiate a new era of more progressive politics, these pledges were quickly tested when the war in Ukraine turned German politics upside down.

While the new government aimed at “overcoming the status quo,” as FDP leader Christian Lindner put it, nobody expected anything coming close to the Zeitenwende, or ‘turning point’, in English. Struck by multiple crises – from the war to surging energy prices – the trio had to give up on many of the positions they announced a year ago.

Social Democrats breaking with old traditions

The war in Ukraine marked a major U-turn for the SPD, which used to be a strong advocate for rapprochement with Russia. Rooted in the peace policy of former Social Democrat chancellor Willy Brandt, who laid the foundation of détente with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, many in the SPD still believed that Russia could serve as a partner to the West.

Rolf Mützenich, chairman of the SPD in the Bundestag, called to improve the relationship with Russia in December.  “If it is possible to reconnect with the principles and lessons of détente […] this can be the first step towards a more peaceful world,” he said in an interview on the eve of Putin’s war of aggression.

The war in Ukraine forced SPD to reconsider long-standing positions. The proclamation of the Zeitenwende by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz marked a significant shift in the approach to foreign and defence topics, including arms deliveries, defence spending, sanctions and diplomacy.

“In view of the turning point that Putin’s aggression represents, our approach is: What is needed to secure peace in Europe, that will be done,” Scholz said at the time. And slowly but surely the managed to sway his party to a new course that would break major taboos.

He not only established a special defence fund worth €100 billion to increase the country’s military’s operational capabilities, but also pledged to invest more than 2% of Germany’s GDP in its defence, in line with NATO targets.

Furthermore, the SPD, which had been traditionally opposed to delivering weapons to any crisis areas, slowly changed its course. After heavy critique from multiple sides, it reluctantly green-lighted the delivery of first light weapons and, later, even heavy weaponry and is currently the fourth-largest donor of military aid to the war-torn country.

Bitter pills for the Greens

The Greens have also had to swallow a number of bitter pills during the ‘traffic light’s’ first year in office. The party has compromised on core principles – only for its coalition partners to delay or block many of the Greens’ dearest projects.

When Russia attacked Ukraine, and gas became dear, Germany began to lean heavily on coal. “This is bitter, but it is a sheer necessity in this situation to reduce gas consumption,” Economy Minister Robert Habeck stressed in June.

Then came the multi-month row over whether to postpone the country’s nuclear exit – an issue on which the Greens were particularly founded. While the disaster of a genuine exit delay was avoided, the country’s last nuclear power plants will run for months longer than initially envisioned – a bitter pill for many fervently anti-nuclear senior Greens.

The Greens also took a beating regarding agricultural policy. While the coalition agreement set out big ambitions bearing the Greens’ signature, such as the introduction of a mandatory animal welfare label and “support for making livestock farming in Germany more animal-friendly”, many of these initiatives were blocked by the FDP-led finance ministry. 

The Green minister has shown his frustration at the Liberal coalition partner increasingly openly. “Whoever says no to this funding, in the long term, says no to German meat and livestock farming in Germany,” he stressed in September.

The liberals struggle for profile

For the liberal FDP, entering a coalition with the centre-left Greens and social democrats was never the first choice. As the liberals are politically further apart from their coalition partners, their role in the coalition has turned out to be a double-edged sword. 

While observers, particularly the Greens and the environmental NGOs close to them, blamed the FDP for being too stubborn in their positions despite the multiple crises that required immediate action, the party’s leadership said it actually compromised too much – especially after it suffered some major defeats in regional elections.

One key promise of party leader Christian Lindner, who claimed the position of finance minister himself, was fiscal prudence. The coalition agreement promised neither new taxes nor new exemptions from the constitutional “debt brake” from 2023 onwards.

One year in office, Lindner claims to have delivered on both these objectives. However, critics say this was only due to accounting tricks, notably by creating new public debt outside the official federal budget, in so-called “shadow budgets” such as the €100 billion “special asset” designed to support the under-financed German military, and the €200 billion “protective shield” against the energy crisis.

Even the European Commission has stepped in and warned that in 2023, Germany’s “overall fiscal policy stance is estimated to be expansionary in a situation of high inflation” and thus “not in line with the fiscal guidance” agreed by member states.

On the European level, Lindner was largely sticking to his position of budgetary discipline, arguing that “any reform of fiscal rules must comply with the core principle of ensuring financial soundness”.

Despite increasing pressure from multiple sides, Lindner has also managed to resist calls for joint borrowing by the European Commission and Europe’s largest member states in response to the current crises.

But pressure is rising from all sides, not least since the announcement of Germany’s generous inflation relief packages undermined its credibility on fiscal prudence.

     

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