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Iran
- More Than 80 Nuclear Nonproliferation Experts Reaffirm Support for the Iran Nuclear Deal
(September 12, 2017) - Trump Signals Iran Deal Showdown
(September 1, 2017)
- More Than 80 Nuclear Nonproliferation Experts Reaffirm Support for the Iran Nuclear Deal
(September 12, 2017) - Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran
(August 31, 2017)
Urge the Trump administration and the U.S. Congress to continue to fulfill Washington’s commitments under the multilateral accord.
For Immediate Release: Sept. 13, 2017
Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, 202-463-8270 ext. 107; Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy, 202-463-8270 x102.
(Washington, D.C.)—More than 80 of the world's leading nuclear nonproliferation specialists issued a joint statement Wednesday on why the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between six world powers and Iran “has proven to be an effective and verifiable arrangement that is a net plus for international nuclear nonproliferation efforts.”
Centrifuges enriching uranium (illustrative photo: US Department of Energy/Wikimedia Commons)
“Since the nuclear deal was implemented in January 2016, the JCPOA has dramatically reduced the risk posed by Iran’s nuclear program and mandated unprecedented monitoring and transparency measures that make it very likely that any possible future effort by Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, even a clandestine program, would be detected promptly,” the statement notes.
The statement is endorsed by former U.S. nuclear negotiators, former senior U.S. nonproliferation and intelligence officials, a former director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a former member of the UN Panel of Experts on Iran, and leading nuclear specialists from the United States and around the globe.
“We firmly support vigorous efforts to monitor and enforce compliance with the JCPOA,” the experts say, “ but we are concerned by statements from the Trump administration that it may be seeking to create a false pretext for accusing Iran of noncooperation or noncompliance with the agreement in order to trigger the reimposition of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran.”
Under the terms of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, the administration must certify to Congress every 90 days that Iran is fully implementing the nuclear deal. Failure to issue the certification would open the door for Congress, under expedited procedures, to introduce legislation to reimpose nuclear sanctions that were lifted in exchange for restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program that block its pathways to a bomb. The next certification deadline arrives in mid-October.
“Abandoning the deal without clear evidence of an unresolved material breach by Iran that is corroborated by the other EU3+3 partners runs the risk that Tehran would resume some of its nuclear activities,” they warn.
Thus far, reporting from the U.S. intelligence community, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the other parties to the agreement make it clear that Iran is meeting its many JCPOA commitments. These include long-term, verifiable restrictions on Iran's sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities, many of which will last for 10 years, some for 15 years, some for 25 years, with enhanced IAEA monitoring under Iran's additional protocol agreement with the IAEA and modified code 3.1 safeguards provisions lasting indefinitely.
“[U]nilateral action by the United States, especially on the basis of unsupported contentions of Iranian cheating, would isolate the United States. In doing so, the United States would discourage Iran and others—including Washington’s EU3+3 partners—from supporting any U.S. proposal for negotiations on a new agreement while simultaneously damaging the agreement in place,” the experts say.
The statement concludes: “we urge the Trump administration and the U.S. Congress to continue to fulfill Washington’s commitments under the accord and to refrain from actions that undermine U.S. obligations in the agreement.”
“Given that we are already struggling to contain the North Korean nuclear and missile crisis, it would be extremely unwise for the president to initiate steps that could unravel the highly successful 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which could create a second major nonproliferation crisis,” said Kelsey Davenport, nonproliferation policy director for the Arms Control Association, which organized the statement.
The full text of the statement is below and available in a PDF version.
The JCPOA is also considered an important success of multilateral diplomacy, the full implementation of which is critical to international peace and security.
Since the nuclear deal was implemented in January 2016, the JCPOA has dramatically reduced the risk posed by Iran’s nuclear program and mandated unprecedented monitoring and transparency measures that make it very likely that any possible future effort by Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, even a clandestine program, would be detected promptly. By blocking Iran’s potential pathways to nuclear weapons, the JCPOA has also decreased the likelihood of destabilizing nuclear competition in the region.
To meet its JCPOA obligations, Iran dismantled more than 13,000 centrifuges, placed them in monitored storage, and shipped out more than 11 tons of low-enriched uranium. Since implementation day, Iran has met its commitments to enrich uranium only up to 3.67 percent uranium-235, retain no more than the equivalent of 300 kilograms of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent in its stockpile, and enrich using only 5,060 first generation, IR-1 centrifuges.
Taken together these restrictions ensure that Iran’s capability to produce enough bomb-grade uranium sufficient for one weapon would be approximately 12 months for a decade or more. This conclusion was underscored by Daniel Coats, Donald Trump’s Director of National Intelligence, who stated in the May 2017 Worldwide Threat Assessment, that the JCPOA has “enhanced the transparency of Iran’s nuclear activities” and “extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about a year.” Prior to commencing negotiations with Iran in 2013, that timeline would have been 2-3 months.
The JCPOA has effectively eliminated Iran’s ability to produce and separate plutonium for a nuclear weapon for at least 15 years. Iran removed the vessel that would hold the core of the Arak reactor, filled it with cement, and is working with the EU3+3 on new core reactor design in which plutonium production would be reduced ten-fold. Iran also committed not to research how to reprocess spent fuel, much less engage in it, which would delay even more significantly Iran’s ability to ever extract plutonium from any nuclear fuel it possesses. Additionally, Iran agreed to ship its spent fuel out of the country for 15 years.
Since implementation day in January 2016, Iran’s compliance with its obligations has been effectively verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through an intrusive, multilayered monitoring regime that spans Iran’s nuclear supply chain. The JCPOA mandates continuous surveillance of key activities, such as uranium mining and centrifuge production, and application of Iran’s Additional Protocol, which gives inspectors additional information about, and access to, Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran’s enrichment levels are also monitored in real time.
Taken together, these rigorous limits and transparency measures will make it very likely that any future effort by Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, even a clandestine program, would be detected promptly, providing the opportunity to intervene decisively to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
The JCPOA has proven flexible and responsive to implementation problems that emerge. When Iran’s supply of heavy water twice marginally exceeded the limit set by the JCPOA, the IAEA noted the excess and Iran promptly rectified the situation, which never posed a proliferation risk. While exceeding the limit by any amount is unhelpful, the way it and other definitional disagreements have been promptly rectified demonstrates the effectiveness of mechanisms established by the deal to resolve technical concerns. As of August, no international organization or national government has made any allegations of Iranian violations.
We firmly support vigorous efforts to monitor and enforce compliance with the JCPOA, but we are concerned by statements from the Trump administration that it may be seeking to create a false pretext for accusing Iran of noncooperation or noncompliance with the agreement in order to trigger the re-imposition of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran.
Abandoning the deal without clear evidence of an unresolved material breach by Iran that is corroborated by the other EU3+3 partners runs the risk that Tehran would resume some of its nuclear activities, such as enriching uranium to higher levels or increasing the number of operating centrifuges. These steps would decrease the time it would take for Iran to obtain enough nuclear material for a warhead.
Furthermore, unilateral action by the United States, especially on the basis of unsupported contentions of Iranian cheating, would isolate the United States. In doing so, the United States would discourage Iran and others—including Washington’s EU3+3 partners—from supporting any U.S. proposal for negotiations on a new agreement while simultaneously damaging the agreement in place. Such an approach would also impede the United States’ ability to seek future nonproliferation agreements, both with Iran and in the broader international community.
As long as Iran continues to fully implement the JCPOA, the nuclear deal advances the security interests of the United States, its EU3+3 partners, states in the region, and the entire international community. Abandoning the deal would also increase the likelihood of wider conflict in the Middle East and could trigger a destabilizing nuclear competition in region.
We strongly urge all parties to the JCPOA to meet their respective obligations under the terms of the agreement and to refrain from actions and statements that undermine its continued and effective implementation.
Furthermore, we urge the Trump administration and the U.S. Congress to continue to fulfill Washington’s commitments under the accord and to refrain from actions that undermine U.S. obligations in the agreement.
Sincerely,
Amb. Nobuyasu Abe, Commissioner of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission,* former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs and former Director-General for Arms Control and Science Affairs of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
James Acton, Co-Director, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*
Amb. Sergey Batsanov, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and former Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament (1989-1993)
Amb. Brooke D. Anderson, former Chief of Staff and Counselor for the National Security Council
Alexandra Bell, Senior Policy, Director Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Bruce Blair, Research Scholar, Princeton University; U.S. Secretary of State's International Security Advisory Board Member (2011-17)
Barry M. Blechman, Co-Founder, Stimson Center*
Hans Blix, former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency
Hon. Avis Bohlen, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control
Des Browne, Lord Browne of Ladyton, former Secretary of State for Defense of the UK, Chair of the European Leadership Network (ELN) and Vice Chair of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)
Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and former adviser to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
Susan F. Burk, former Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation and former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State
John Carlson, Counselor, Nuclear Threat Initiative, former Director General, Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office
Joseph Cirincione, President, Ploughshares Fund
Avner Cohen, Ph.D., Professor and Senior Fellow, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey
Tom Collina, Director of Policy, Ploughshares Fund
Thomas Countryman, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation
Philip E. Coyle, III, former Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association
Amb. Jayantha Dhanapala, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs
Professor Shen Dingli, Associate Dean at the Institute of International Studies and Director of the Program on Arms Control and Regional Security Studies at Fudan University
Amb. Sergio Duarte, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs
Robert J. Einhorn, former U.S Department of State Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control (2009-2013)
Dina Esfandiary, MacArthur Fellow, Centre for Science and Security Studies, Department of War Studies, Kings College London
Marc Finaud, Arms Proliferation Cluster Leader, Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Trevor Findlay, Senior Research Fellow, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne
Jon Finer, former U.S. State Department Chief of Staff and Director of Policy Planning
Ellie Geranmayeh, Senior Policy Fellow, Middle East & Africa Programme, European Council on Foreign Relations
Alexander Glaser, Associate Professor, Co-Director, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University
Ilan Goldberg, Director of Middle East Security Program, Center for a New American Security, former Iran Team Chief, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense
Lisbeth Gronlund, Co-Director, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists
Morton H. Halperin, former Director of Policy Planning Staff, U.S Department of State
Amb. Laura S. H. Holgate, former U.S. Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency
Amb. Bonnie Jenkins, Joint Fellow, Brookings Institution* and University of Pennsylvania Perry World House,* and former Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs at the U.S. Department of State
Colin H. Kahl, former Deputy Assistant to President Obama and National Security Advisor to Vice President Biden
Mary Kaszynski, Deputy Director of Policy, Ploughshares Fund
Togzhan Kassenova, Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*
Catherine Kelleher, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia
R. Scott Kemp, Assistant Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering at MIT, former science advisor to the U.S. Department of State's Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control
Amb. (ret.) Laura E. Kennedy, former U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva
Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association
Michael Krepon, Co-Founder, Stimson Center
Ulrich Kühn, Nonresident Scholar, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Ellen Laipson, President Emeritus, Stimson Center and former Vice Chair, National Intelligence Council
Jeffrey Lewis, Adjunct Professor, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey*
Rebecca Lissner, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations*
Jan M. Lodal, former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense
Robert Malley, former Special Assistant to the President and White House Coordinator for the Middle East, North African and Gulf Region
Jessica Matthews, former Director, National Security Council Office of Global Issues
Fred McGoldrick, former Director of the Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy, U.S. Department of State
Brian McKeon, former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense
Oliver Meier, Deputy Head, International Security Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)*
Zia Mian, Co-Director, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University
Nicholas Miller, Assistant Professor, Dartmouth College
Adam Mount, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress*
Richard Nephew, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University, former Principal Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy at the U.S. Department of State, and Director for Iran on the National Security Staff
Götz Neuneck, Professor of Physics and Acting Co-Director of the Institute of Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) *
George Perkovich, Ken Olivier And Angela Nomellini Chair, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*
Amb. Thomas R. Pickering, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Russian Federation, India, Israel, and Jordan
Amb. (ret.) Steven Pifer, Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution*
Paul R. Pillar, former U.S. National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia
Valerie Plame, former CIA covert operations officer
Joshua Pollack, Senior Research Associate, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey*
Dr. William C. Potter, Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey*
Edward Price, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Obama
Professor Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary General of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and Professor of Mathematical Physics, Universita' degli Studi di Milano
Tariq Rauf, former Head of Verification and Security Policy Coordination, Office reporting to the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency
Laura Rockwood, Executive Director, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
Nickolas Roth, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center, Harvard University
Dr. Randy Rydell, former Senior Political Affairs Officer (retired), UN Office for Disarmament Affairs
Andrew K. Semmel, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Nonproliferation (2003-2007), U.S. Department of State
Thomas E. Shea, Ph.D., Senior Adjunct Fellow, Federation of American Scientists, former International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards official, and former Sector Head of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Jacqueline Shire, former Member of UN Panel of Experts (Iran) established under Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010)
Leonard Spector, Executive Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies,* and former Assistant Deputy Administrator for Arms Control and Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration
Sharon Squassoni, Director, Proliferation Prevention Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies*
Ariane M. Tabatabai, Director of Curriculum, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University
Greg Thielmann, former Director of the Strategic, Proliferation and Military Affairs Office, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State
John Tierney, Executive Director, Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, former Member of Congress (1997-2015)
Dr. Ali Vaez, Senior Iran Analyst, International Crisis Group
Frank N. von Hippel, former Assistant Director for National Security, White House Office of Science and Global Security
David Wade, Chief of Staff to U.S. Department of State (2013-2015)
Dr. James Walsh, Senior Research Associate, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Security Studies Program
Anthony Wier, Legislative Secretary for Nuclear Disarmament and Pentagon Spending, Friends Committee on National Legislation
Jon Wolfsthal, former Special Assistant to the President for National Security and Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Arms Control at the National Security Council
David Wright, Co-Director, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists
*institution listed for identification purposes only
For Immediate Release: Sept. 13, 2017
Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, 202-463-8270 ext. 107; Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy, 202-463-8270 x102.
(Washington, D.C.)—More than 80 of the world's leading nuclear nonproliferation specialists issued a joint statement Wednesday on why the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between six world powers and Iran “has proven to be an effective and verifiable arrangement that is a net plus for international nuclear nonproliferation efforts.”
Centrifuges enriching uranium (illustrative photo: US Department of Energy/Wikimedia Commons)“Since the nuclear deal was implemented in January 2016, the JCPOA has dramatically reduced the risk posed by Iran’s nuclear program and mandated unprecedented monitoring and transparency measures that make it very likely that any possible future effort by Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, even a clandestine program, would be detected promptly,” the statement notes.
The statement is endorsed by former U.S. nuclear negotiators, former senior U.S. nonproliferation and intelligence officials, a former director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a former member of the UN Panel of Experts on Iran, and leading nuclear specialists from the United States and around the globe.
“We firmly support vigorous efforts to monitor and enforce compliance with the JCPOA,” the experts say, “ but we are concerned by statements from the Trump administration that it may be seeking to create a false pretext for accusing Iran of noncooperation or noncompliance with the agreement in order to trigger the reimposition of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran.”
Under the terms of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, the administration must certify to Congress every 90 days that Iran is fully implementing the nuclear deal. Failure to issue the certification would open the door for Congress, under expedited procedures, to introduce legislation to reimpose nuclear sanctions that were lifted in exchange for restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program that block its pathways to a bomb. The next certification deadline arrives in mid-October.
“Abandoning the deal without clear evidence of an unresolved material breach by Iran that is corroborated by the other EU3+3 partners runs the risk that Tehran would resume some of its nuclear activities,” they warn.
Thus far, reporting from the U.S. intelligence community, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the other parties to the agreement make it clear that Iran is meeting its many JCPOA commitments. These include long-term, verifiable restrictions on Iran's sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities, many of which will last for 10 years, some for 15 years, some for 25 years, with enhanced IAEA monitoring under Iran's additional protocol agreement with the IAEA and modified code 3.1 safeguards provisions lasting indefinitely.
“[U]nilateral action by the United States, especially on the basis of unsupported contentions of Iranian cheating, would isolate the United States. In doing so, the United States would discourage Iran and others—including Washington’s EU3+3 partners—from supporting any U.S. proposal for negotiations on a new agreement while simultaneously damaging the agreement in place,” the experts say.
The statement concludes: “we urge the Trump administration and the U.S. Congress to continue to fulfill Washington’s commitments under the accord and to refrain from actions that undermine U.S. obligations in the agreement.”
“Given that we are already struggling to contain the North Korean nuclear and missile crisis, it would be extremely unwise for the president to initiate steps that could unravel the highly successful 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which could create a second major nonproliferation crisis,” said Kelsey Davenport, nonproliferation policy director for the Arms Control Association, which organized the statement.
The full text of the statement is below and available in a PDF version.
Statement from Nuclear Nonproliferation Specialists on the Iran Nuclear Deal
September 2017
More than two years after the conclusion of negotiations on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by the United States, its international negotiating partners (EU, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom), and Iran, the agreement has proven to be an effective and verifiable arrangement that is a net plus for international nuclear nonproliferation efforts.The JCPOA is also considered an important success of multilateral diplomacy, the full implementation of which is critical to international peace and security.
Since the nuclear deal was implemented in January 2016, the JCPOA has dramatically reduced the risk posed by Iran’s nuclear program and mandated unprecedented monitoring and transparency measures that make it very likely that any possible future effort by Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, even a clandestine program, would be detected promptly. By blocking Iran’s potential pathways to nuclear weapons, the JCPOA has also decreased the likelihood of destabilizing nuclear competition in the region.
To meet its JCPOA obligations, Iran dismantled more than 13,000 centrifuges, placed them in monitored storage, and shipped out more than 11 tons of low-enriched uranium. Since implementation day, Iran has met its commitments to enrich uranium only up to 3.67 percent uranium-235, retain no more than the equivalent of 300 kilograms of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent in its stockpile, and enrich using only 5,060 first generation, IR-1 centrifuges.
Taken together these restrictions ensure that Iran’s capability to produce enough bomb-grade uranium sufficient for one weapon would be approximately 12 months for a decade or more. This conclusion was underscored by Daniel Coats, Donald Trump’s Director of National Intelligence, who stated in the May 2017 Worldwide Threat Assessment, that the JCPOA has “enhanced the transparency of Iran’s nuclear activities” and “extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about a year.” Prior to commencing negotiations with Iran in 2013, that timeline would have been 2-3 months.
The JCPOA has effectively eliminated Iran’s ability to produce and separate plutonium for a nuclear weapon for at least 15 years. Iran removed the vessel that would hold the core of the Arak reactor, filled it with cement, and is working with the EU3+3 on new core reactor design in which plutonium production would be reduced ten-fold. Iran also committed not to research how to reprocess spent fuel, much less engage in it, which would delay even more significantly Iran’s ability to ever extract plutonium from any nuclear fuel it possesses. Additionally, Iran agreed to ship its spent fuel out of the country for 15 years.
Since implementation day in January 2016, Iran’s compliance with its obligations has been effectively verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through an intrusive, multilayered monitoring regime that spans Iran’s nuclear supply chain. The JCPOA mandates continuous surveillance of key activities, such as uranium mining and centrifuge production, and application of Iran’s Additional Protocol, which gives inspectors additional information about, and access to, Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran’s enrichment levels are also monitored in real time.
Taken together, these rigorous limits and transparency measures will make it very likely that any future effort by Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, even a clandestine program, would be detected promptly, providing the opportunity to intervene decisively to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
The JCPOA has proven flexible and responsive to implementation problems that emerge. When Iran’s supply of heavy water twice marginally exceeded the limit set by the JCPOA, the IAEA noted the excess and Iran promptly rectified the situation, which never posed a proliferation risk. While exceeding the limit by any amount is unhelpful, the way it and other definitional disagreements have been promptly rectified demonstrates the effectiveness of mechanisms established by the deal to resolve technical concerns. As of August, no international organization or national government has made any allegations of Iranian violations.
We firmly support vigorous efforts to monitor and enforce compliance with the JCPOA, but we are concerned by statements from the Trump administration that it may be seeking to create a false pretext for accusing Iran of noncooperation or noncompliance with the agreement in order to trigger the re-imposition of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran.
Abandoning the deal without clear evidence of an unresolved material breach by Iran that is corroborated by the other EU3+3 partners runs the risk that Tehran would resume some of its nuclear activities, such as enriching uranium to higher levels or increasing the number of operating centrifuges. These steps would decrease the time it would take for Iran to obtain enough nuclear material for a warhead.
Furthermore, unilateral action by the United States, especially on the basis of unsupported contentions of Iranian cheating, would isolate the United States. In doing so, the United States would discourage Iran and others—including Washington’s EU3+3 partners—from supporting any U.S. proposal for negotiations on a new agreement while simultaneously damaging the agreement in place. Such an approach would also impede the United States’ ability to seek future nonproliferation agreements, both with Iran and in the broader international community.
As long as Iran continues to fully implement the JCPOA, the nuclear deal advances the security interests of the United States, its EU3+3 partners, states in the region, and the entire international community. Abandoning the deal would also increase the likelihood of wider conflict in the Middle East and could trigger a destabilizing nuclear competition in region.
We strongly urge all parties to the JCPOA to meet their respective obligations under the terms of the agreement and to refrain from actions and statements that undermine its continued and effective implementation.
Furthermore, we urge the Trump administration and the U.S. Congress to continue to fulfill Washington’s commitments under the accord and to refrain from actions that undermine U.S. obligations in the agreement.
Sincerely,
Amb. Nobuyasu Abe, Commissioner of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission,* former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs and former Director-General for Arms Control and Science Affairs of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
James Acton, Co-Director, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*
Amb. Sergey Batsanov, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and former Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament (1989-1993)
Amb. Brooke D. Anderson, former Chief of Staff and Counselor for the National Security Council
Alexandra Bell, Senior Policy, Director Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Bruce Blair, Research Scholar, Princeton University; U.S. Secretary of State's International Security Advisory Board Member (2011-17)
Barry M. Blechman, Co-Founder, Stimson Center*
Hans Blix, former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency
Hon. Avis Bohlen, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control
Des Browne, Lord Browne of Ladyton, former Secretary of State for Defense of the UK, Chair of the European Leadership Network (ELN) and Vice Chair of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)
Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and former adviser to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
Susan F. Burk, former Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation and former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State
John Carlson, Counselor, Nuclear Threat Initiative, former Director General, Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office
Joseph Cirincione, President, Ploughshares Fund
Avner Cohen, Ph.D., Professor and Senior Fellow, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey
Tom Collina, Director of Policy, Ploughshares Fund
Thomas Countryman, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation
Philip E. Coyle, III, former Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association
Amb. Jayantha Dhanapala, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs
Professor Shen Dingli, Associate Dean at the Institute of International Studies and Director of the Program on Arms Control and Regional Security Studies at Fudan University
Amb. Sergio Duarte, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs
Robert J. Einhorn, former U.S Department of State Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control (2009-2013)
Dina Esfandiary, MacArthur Fellow, Centre for Science and Security Studies, Department of War Studies, Kings College London
Marc Finaud, Arms Proliferation Cluster Leader, Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Trevor Findlay, Senior Research Fellow, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne
Jon Finer, former U.S. State Department Chief of Staff and Director of Policy Planning
Ellie Geranmayeh, Senior Policy Fellow, Middle East & Africa Programme, European Council on Foreign Relations
Alexander Glaser, Associate Professor, Co-Director, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University
Ilan Goldberg, Director of Middle East Security Program, Center for a New American Security, former Iran Team Chief, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense
Lisbeth Gronlund, Co-Director, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists
Morton H. Halperin, former Director of Policy Planning Staff, U.S Department of State
Amb. Laura S. H. Holgate, former U.S. Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency
Amb. Bonnie Jenkins, Joint Fellow, Brookings Institution* and University of Pennsylvania Perry World House,* and former Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs at the U.S. Department of State
Colin H. Kahl, former Deputy Assistant to President Obama and National Security Advisor to Vice President Biden
Mary Kaszynski, Deputy Director of Policy, Ploughshares Fund
Togzhan Kassenova, Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*
Catherine Kelleher, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia
R. Scott Kemp, Assistant Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering at MIT, former science advisor to the U.S. Department of State's Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control
Amb. (ret.) Laura E. Kennedy, former U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva
Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association
Michael Krepon, Co-Founder, Stimson Center
Ulrich Kühn, Nonresident Scholar, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Ellen Laipson, President Emeritus, Stimson Center and former Vice Chair, National Intelligence Council
Jeffrey Lewis, Adjunct Professor, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey*
Rebecca Lissner, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations*
Jan M. Lodal, former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense
Robert Malley, former Special Assistant to the President and White House Coordinator for the Middle East, North African and Gulf Region
Jessica Matthews, former Director, National Security Council Office of Global Issues
Fred McGoldrick, former Director of the Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy, U.S. Department of State
Brian McKeon, former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense
Oliver Meier, Deputy Head, International Security Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)*
Zia Mian, Co-Director, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University
Nicholas Miller, Assistant Professor, Dartmouth College
Adam Mount, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress*
Richard Nephew, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University, former Principal Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy at the U.S. Department of State, and Director for Iran on the National Security Staff
Götz Neuneck, Professor of Physics and Acting Co-Director of the Institute of Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) *
George Perkovich, Ken Olivier And Angela Nomellini Chair, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*
Amb. Thomas R. Pickering, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Russian Federation, India, Israel, and Jordan
Amb. (ret.) Steven Pifer, Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution*
Paul R. Pillar, former U.S. National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia
Valerie Plame, former CIA covert operations officer
Joshua Pollack, Senior Research Associate, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey*
Dr. William C. Potter, Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey*
Edward Price, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Obama
Professor Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary General of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and Professor of Mathematical Physics, Universita' degli Studi di Milano
Tariq Rauf, former Head of Verification and Security Policy Coordination, Office reporting to the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency
Laura Rockwood, Executive Director, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
Nickolas Roth, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center, Harvard University
Dr. Randy Rydell, former Senior Political Affairs Officer (retired), UN Office for Disarmament Affairs
Andrew K. Semmel, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Nonproliferation (2003-2007), U.S. Department of State
Thomas E. Shea, Ph.D., Senior Adjunct Fellow, Federation of American Scientists, former International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards official, and former Sector Head of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Jacqueline Shire, former Member of UN Panel of Experts (Iran) established under Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010)
Leonard Spector, Executive Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies,* and former Assistant Deputy Administrator for Arms Control and Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration
Sharon Squassoni, Director, Proliferation Prevention Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies*
Ariane M. Tabatabai, Director of Curriculum, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University
Greg Thielmann, former Director of the Strategic, Proliferation and Military Affairs Office, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State
John Tierney, Executive Director, Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, former Member of Congress (1997-2015)
Dr. Ali Vaez, Senior Iran Analyst, International Crisis Group
Frank N. von Hippel, former Assistant Director for National Security, White House Office of Science and Global Security
David Wade, Chief of Staff to U.S. Department of State (2013-2015)
Dr. James Walsh, Senior Research Associate, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Security Studies Program
Anthony Wier, Legislative Secretary for Nuclear Disarmament and Pentagon Spending, Friends Committee on National Legislation
Jon Wolfsthal, former Special Assistant to the President for National Security and Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Arms Control at the National Security Council
David Wright, Co-Director, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists
*institution listed for identification purposes only
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