Soft Power or Illusion of Hegemony:
The Case of the Turkish Soap Opera “Colonialism”
ZAFER
YÖRÜK
PANTELIS
VATIKIOTIS
Izmir
University of Economics,
The article develops two simultaneous arguments; one is theoretical,
and the other is analytic. The theoretical argument is based on an assessment
of the utility of the concept of “soft power” in comparison to the Gramscian
concept of hegemony in understanding the developments in the recent regional
power games in the geographical area consisting of Eastern Europe and the near
and Middle East. The analytic argument examines the popularity of Turkish soap
operas, both among a cross-cultural audience and within the wider context of cultural,
economic, and political influences, and in so doing, it points out challenges and
limits for Turkey’s regional power.
Introduction
This article notes the recent boom in the popularity of Turkish soap
operas in the Middle East, the Balkans, and some (predominantly “Turkic”)
former Soviet Republics in Asia, and examines the discourse of Turkish “soft
power” that has developed upon this cultural development.
The research focuses here on the analysis of two case studies—of the
Middle East and Greece— where the Turkish series are very popular. Both cases
are able to contribute different perspectives and explanations of this
“cultural penetration” across both sides of a geographical area containing
Eastern Europe and the near and Middle East, evaluating Turkey’s “influence”
accordingly.11 In this regard, the limits of the analysis of the present study
are set. Although a general framework of
the perception of the Turkish series is provided along both case studies
(popularity; aspirations and identifications), further research is needed in
order to provide a detailed account of the impact of Turkish series on the
related societies. Hopefully, the theoretical argument developed here along the
discussion on the concepts of “soft power” and “hegemony” will sketch the
framework for reflections on popular discourses, as well.
Zafer Yörük: Zafer.yoruk@ieu.edu.tr
Pantelis Vatikiotis: Pantelis.vatikiotis@ieu.edu.tr
Date submitted: 2012–10–19
2362 Zafer Yörük & Pantelis Vatikiotis International Journal of
Communication 7(2013)
The article then highlights the discourse of “soft power” in Turkey
that accompanies the popularity of the Turkish TV series, focusing along the
lines of the political expectations of the Turkish political administration in
the said area. The thesis of “strategic depth” by the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, is taken as the main indicator of these aspirations,
along with the recent critical arguments against it, namely “neo-Ottomanist
irredentism” and the “shift of axis.” These contesting views unite to indicate
that the Turkish “soft power” is expected to lead to a certain level of
diplomatic and strategic “hard power” over these regions, which constitute the
former Ottoman hinterland (Davutoglu
2001, 2008).
Probing into the roots of the popular rhetoric of Turkey’s regional
dominance, the article considers the theory of “soft power,” juxtaposing it, in
principle, with the Gramscian concept of hegemony.
From this prism, the analysis assesses the appeal of these cultural
products to a cross-culturalaudience, relating this fact to the emergence of
both supranational and subnational regional spheres with cultural proximities.
It takes into account a number of aspects of such proximities, including
historical ties, religion and traditions, aspirations and identifications, and
the various formations of cross-national spaces
of identity.
The study also points out that deployment of Turkey’s influence in the
region is not merely cultural, but also includes economic, as well as
political, parameters. Taking into account this interplay,
the study assesses the possibilities of the achievement of a certain
level of strategic power for Turkey over these regions, addressing a number of
shortcomings and potential obstacles, respectively.
Finally, it is emphasized that the rhetoric of Turkish “soft power”
does not provide a sound argument for its portrayal of the contemporary “soap
opera colonialism” as a major cultural/ideological apparatus of Turkey’s
prospective regional hegemony. The article concludes by demonstrating the
paradox of the nexus of “soft” and “hard” power for Turkey,
emphasizing that, like the popularity of Turkish TV series, Turkey’s
prestige lies in its ambivalent identity, which rests on a fragile equilibrium.
Popularity of Turkish Soap Operas
Following the privatization of TV channels in the 1990s, Turkish TV
series proliferated to reflect the popular culture in Turkey, in ways that were
quite creative, achieving momentous success with Turkish audiences in a short
time (Aksoy & Robins, 1997). With this decade-long success at hand, Turkish
TV producers began to look for cross-border markets—a business venture that
proved to be very wise:
“Between 2005 and 2011 a total of 35,675 hours of Turkish TV programs
were sold to 76 countries around the world” (Aydın, 2012). Among the TV program
exports, there have been 65 soap operas, which have generated an income of
US$60 million (Deniz, 2010, p. 52). The most popular destinations of the TV exports
have been the Middle East, the Balkans, and Turkic language-speaking countries
in Asia.
The article reflects on the popularity of Turkish soap operas in the
Middle East and Greece, addressing thus the cultural expansion of Turkey in
both ends of the region. Ideally, the Balkans would be more representative of
the western end. However, two important factors limit this perspective. First,
the International Journal of Communication 7 (2013) Soft Power or Illusion of
Hegemony 2363 different spoken languages in the Balkans (in contrast to the
Middle East) make the research on the field
an impossible task for the present study. Second, while there is
consistent research on the reception of Turkey in the Middle East (TESEV
reports), no relevant research has been conducted for the Balkans.2
Therefore, the article selects Greece as a case study. First, this is
because there is sufficient and consistent interest in Turkey—“[w]ith the
exception of Greece and partially Bulgaria, the Balkan countries have never
been interested in Turkey before; they have just started to study Turkey”
(Türbedar, 2012).
Second, Greece provides the most challenging case study in the Balkans,
taking into account the geographical, historical, and cultural proximities with
Turkey.
In this regard, since no study has been conducted on the popularity of
Turkish soap operas in Greece, the article runs original research that involves
the program schedules, statistical data (TV ratings), and their analysis,3 all
in order to sketch the relevant field.4 On the other hand, the popularity of Turkish
soap operas in the Middle East has been adequately analyzed by research reports
(TESEV) and studies, a body of work on which the article draws.
Middle East
Since their first purchase by the MBC TV channel in 2008, Turkish TV
series have constantly expanded throughout the Middle East, from Iraq and Iran
in the east to Morocco in the west. Most of the Turkish series are broadcast to
the Arab world by Emirates- and Saudi-based satellite channels5 at prime time.
Imported serial melodramas are usually dubbed into colloquial Syrian Arabic,
“the most romantic” Arabic dialect, while the names of the characters are also
adapted into Arabic names. Production
companies also cut intimate scenes which they find “inappropriate” for
the Arabic audience. According to the TESEV reports (Akgün & Gündoğar,
2011; Akgün, Gündoğar, Levack, & Perçinoğlu, 2010), the number
of people in this region who watch Turkish soap operas is a substantial
78% in 2010 and 74% in 2011; Syria and Iraq have the highest number of relevant
viewers. Most of the viewers (60%) are women
(Turkish
Weekly, 2011).
2 Few exceptions, like the public surveys by Gallup Balkan Monitor (http://www.balkanmonitor. eu/index.php), do
not cover the whole region, and they reflect only on the question regarding the
extent to which Turkey is perceived as a “friendly, neutral, or
hostile country/entity.”
3 Data kindly provided by the Nielsen Audience Measurement Greece and
the departments of “Audience Research” of the TV stations Antenna and Mega
Channel, which have broadcast 10 out of the 14 Turkish
soap operas in Greece to date.
4 It is necessary here to identify the limits of this approach. The
discourse of ratings is “technical” and “dry,” according to the needs of
television industry (Ang, 1996), and it cannot provide the full picture of
who and what people actually do at their homes when they are watching
television. Still, taking into account the absence of any research on the
popularity of Turkish soap operas in Greece, these statistical data and their
qualitative parameters are used here indicatively to sketch the relevant field.
5 MBC and Abu Dhabi are the most prominent ones among them.
2364 Zafer Yörük & Pantelis Vatikiotis International Journal of
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There are times when the Arabic romance with Turkish soaps reaches its
extremes: The final episode of the series Silver (Noor in Arabic) was viewed by 85 million people throughout the Arabic geography.6
Turkish soap stars have become pop idols around the Arab world, leading to a
wave of Arab visitors booking special tours to the mansion by the Bosphorus
where Noor has been shot.
The most popular Turkish melodramas being broadcast in the Middle East
are Silver (Noor),Ihlamurlar Altında,
Aşk-ı Memnu, Yaprak Dökümü,
Asmalı Konak, Binbir Gece and
Muhteşem Yüzyıl.
Storylines vary from romance to mafioso action, and from
modernity-tradition conflict to the problems of couples and extended families.
Greece
The first Turkish series, Yabancı Damat (Synora Agapis), was broadcast in 2005 by the private TV station
Mega Channel during the prime time zone of weekdays in summer. Due to this
success, it was rescheduled for the next TV season.7 The second one, Binbir Gece (Χίλιες και μία νύχτες),
was broadcast in 2010, also during the summer, by another private TV station,
Antenna.8 Since then, Turkish soap operas
have been regularly scheduled on Greek TV. For the 2010–2011 season,
Antenna continued broadcasting Binbir Gece while
launching another one, Dudaktan
Kalbe (Kismet) in the off-peak zone, which was later
replaced by Gümüs
(Ασημένια Φεγγάρια);
moreover, Antenna scheduled a new series, Ezel, in prime
time at the end of that season.9 Another private station, Alpha TV, introduced
Turkish soap operas in its
programming at that time, too—Acı Hayat (Το αγιάζι του έρωτα) and Menekşe ile Halil (Μενεξέ). More Turkish series have been broadcast during the last TV season,
2011-2012. Antenna launched Aşk-ı
Memnu (Πειρασμός), after Ezel ended, and it
currently broadcasts Asi.10 Furthermore, Mega Channel launched its 6 In
parallel to the growth in audience, the prices also go up. Abeed Khair, general
manager and owner of Sama Art Productions, a Syrian TV-production company, was
quoted as saying: “Several years back, I
bought a one-hour Turkish drama for $600 or $700. Today, there are
those who are willing to pay $40,000 for one hour dramas” (Hurriyet Daily News, 2012).
7 During the summer the programming environment is not competitive, nevertheless,
the ratings of the program were extremely high—47.8% share (the percentage of
total TV viewers who watched the
program on the average minute of a given period over the total viewers
of the average minute of the same period). Moreover, when rescheduled on the
beginning of the next TV season (every Monday,
September to June) at 9:00 p.m.—one of the most important slots of the
week) it reached a share of 23.1%, a percentage that is equal to the one
reached by several Greek series in that slot. 8 Once more, it was scheduled on
prime time, weekdays (June–September 2010, Monday to Friday at 9:00 p.m.),
reaching a share of 29.6%. 9 17 new episodes of ‘Binbir Gece’ were broadcast
every Tuesday (October 2010–February 2011) at 21:00—a very competitive
slot—reaching a share of 20.8%. ‘Dubaktan Kalbe’ (September-December 2010) was
scheduled on weekdays at 17:00 (35.1% share), followed by ‘Gumus’ (December
2010–May 2011) (32.1% share); and, ‘Ezel’ on weekdays too (July–September) at
21:00 (32.9% share).
10 Aşk-ı
Memnu was initially broadcast on
prime weekdays (September–October 2011) at 9:00 p.m.(22.1% share), and then
during an off-peak time (October 2011–January 2012) at 6:00 p.m. (28.2%
share). Asi
has run since June on weekdays, at 10:00 p.m.
(moved from 9:00 p.m.). International Journal of Communication 7 (2013) Soft
Power or Illusion of Hegemony 2365 first soap opera since Yabancı Damat, starting with Aşk ve Ceza (Έρωτας και τιμωρία), and then followed
by Unutulmaz
(Μοιραίος έρωτας)
and Sila.11 In addition, Alpha TV launched two more series this TV season: Yer Gök Aşk (Ρώτα την αγάπη)
and Lale Devri (Λαλέ, έρωτας στην Κωνσταντινούπολη).
Concluding, out of 10 (nine during the last season) Greek national TV
channels, three channels (two of them leading the ratings for the last two
decades) have broadcast Turkish soap operas. Even though the first one,
broadcast in 2005, was very successful, it was only five years later, in 2010
(when the economic crisis in Greece started) that more Turkish soap operas
entered the Greek TV market (out of 14 total, 13 have been launched within the
last two years). Although the first should be considered a comedy (with some
dramatic elements), the ones that have followed are pure dramas. Finally, when observing
their programming across the three TV channels, we notice that, after a short
period (usually
during the off-peak summer season) of placing them in prime time, the
channels moved the Turkish series to off-peak time slots (mainly in the
evening).
Still, these parameters tell us very few things about either the
perception of Turkey by the Greeks or the extent to which “Turkish series have
destroyed many taboos in Greece regarding Turkey and Turks,” as reported in Hürriyet (Kırbaki, 2011).
“Strategic Depth,” the “Turkish Model,” and the Soap Operas
The unprecedented popularity of Turkish soap operas in a region
consisting primarily of the Ottoman geography has usually been interpreted as a
manifestation of Turkey’s expanding influence in
this region, in line with a project of neo-Ottomanist restoration
(Fisher Onar, 2009). Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu baptized this
approach as “strategic depth” in his 2001 book, arguing that,
since Turkey is located at the center of important “geocultural basins”
(the Middle East, Balkans and Central Asia), it should act to take advantage of
all opportunities existing in these areas.12
Guided by this perspective, the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
government adopted a foreign policy line of “zero problems with neighbors” and
improved relations with both Muslim and non- Muslim governments in the former
Ottoman geography.13 Since 2005,14 relations (particularly with the 11 Aşk ve Ceza was initially scheduled in prime time on weekdays
(September–November 2011) at 10:00
p.m. (25% share), then moved to an off-peak windown (November 2011–February
2012) at 6:00 p.m. (33.3% share), followed then by Unutulmaz (March–August 2012). Sila has run since June on prime weekdays at 9:00 p.m. 12 Mumcu (2011)
lists three core components of the strategic depth doctrine as follows: zero
problems with neighbors, utilization of cultural and geographic “depth” to form
alliances, and the restoration of the
Ottoman civilization.
13 Non-Muslim governments include, in particular, Russia, Armenia, and
Greece. Among the Muslim countries, the relations with Iran and Syria have
deteriorated again in parallel with the Turkish government’s involvement in the
civil war in Syria on the opposition’s side.
14 According to Giannotta (2012), AKP foreign policies can be
periodized in two phases: between 2002 and 2005, when the government
concentrated on democratization and integration with the EU, and the phase 2366
Zafer Yörük & Pantelis Vatikiotis International Journal of Communication
7(2013) Muslim Middle East) have improved in parallel to Turkey’s increasingly
active role in regional disputes as a peace broker and defender of Muslim
interests.15 Besides, this new turn toward the region and the Muslim world is
claimed to have been achieved without sacrificing Turkey’s Western
orientation.16
The aggregate of these factors has been observed to lead to the
formation of a Turkish zone of political, economic, and cultural influence—that
is, to a zone of “soft power”—in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle
East. This observation and the accompanying events have led to two
conclusions. First, a vast number of analysts and reporters assert that
Turkey has become a regional power with considerable global weight. Second, it
is also asserted that Turkey presents an achievable
model of democracy for the Middle East. It is, “an alternative model
of governance for Muslim societies”
(Çandar, 2009, p. 10), a political system incorporating a “moderate”
secularism and a moderate Islamism—that is to say, it upholds both the norms of
Western liberal democracy and the traditional values of Islamic conservatism.
The talk of a “Turkish model” has intensified since the outbreak of the “Arab
Spring” in 2010.17
The synchronicity of the increase in Turkey’s economic and diplomatic/political
activities on a territory consisting of former Ottoman domains; increasing talk
of Turkish moderate Muslim democracy
being a model for the Middle Eastern societies; and the rising consumption
of the Turkish cultural products, primarily the soap operas, in the same
regions needs an analytic explanation beyond mere coincidence. The most popular
explanation is that Turkey’s political, economic, and cultural expansion signifies
a process of the construction of Turkish “soft power.” The next section of this
article is devoted to an examination of this assertion, along with its
theoretical tenets.
Soft Power vs. Hegemony
Since the end of the Cold War, the academic discipline of international
relations has been searching hard to develop a theory of geopolitics
appropriate for the analysis of the structures and dynamics of the “new world
order.” Following a short-lived popularity of Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) “the end
of history” thesis, based on a Hegelian narration of the transition from a
bi-polar world dominated by super-power conflicts to a global pax-Americana,
Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis (1993, since 2005, when it
has focused on improving relations with the Muslim Middle Eastern governments
and societies.
15 It would not take long for these policies to lead to hostilities
with Israel, thereby exposing Turkey to criticism from Europe and the United
States that Turkey had undergone of a “shift of axis” in its orientation from
West to Middle East (see Çağaptay, 2009).
16 “Despite mutual misgivings, Turkey’s European Western vocation has
not been a variable in its outward reach. It has remained a historical
constant. One reason is that Turkey is an heir to the legacy of Eastern
Rome” (Çandar, 2009, p. 11).
17 The discussion on the Turkish model has further intensified since
the fall of the Egyptian regime, a trend which has continued with Turkey’s
involvement in the Syrian conflict. A selection of recent analyses and
opinion pieces include Kenyon (2012); The Economist (2011); LeVine (2011); Ülgen, Techau, Yannis
& Yenel (2012); Christie-Miller (2011); and Gümüşçü (2012).
International Journal of Communication 7 (2013) Soft Power or Illusion
of Hegemony 2367 1996) picked up. Huntington’s argument, although based on a
mysterious essentialism of the notion of “civilization” that mostly inspired
the neoconservative war against “Islamic fundamentalism” in the post- 9/11
world, heralded the emergence of a multipolar global recomposition of regional
powers.
Joseph Nye’s geopolitical theory has the advantage of leaving out
Huntington’s essentialism while reflecting adequately on the tendency toward
the pluralization of global powers (Nye, 1990, 1993). On
these grounds, Nye elaborated the concept of “soft power,” which has
the advantage of taking into account not only the geopolitical power games, but
also the economic, political, and cultural dynamics of
globalization, along with the consequences of the information
revolution (Nye, 2002). Nye argues that the contemporary world is witnessing
the transformation of the very nature of power, and the subsequent
emergence of a new form of power, that is, “soft power,” regarding its
sources and distribution. Soft power, as opposed to the conventional perception
of (hard) power of military and economic resources, is
based on setting the agenda and attracting others, through the deployment
of cultural and ideological means of provoking acquiescence.
The major theoretical problem in Nye’s thesis is the movement between
soft and hard poles of power. Nye points out that “hard and soft power are
related and reinforce each other” (Nye, 2002, p. 5), but his theorizing does
not probe into this interaction. Put clearly, Nye’s geopolitical theory does
not relate sufficiently the practices of soft power with concrete aims. Where
the notion of soft power falls short, the conceptual framework of the theory of
hegemony may be able to carry us one step further in a
comprehensive analysis of regional/global, cultural/political
hegemony.
In the theory of hegemony, as formulated by Antonio Gramsci, hegemony
is above all the totality of what Nye calls soft power and hard power.
Gramsci’s analytic break-down consists of cohesion (active consent) and
coercion (force). As Nye emphasizes the importance of the achievement of “co-optive
power, (that is), the ability to shape what others want,” in the global information
age (Nye, 2002, p. 9), Gramsci stressed the importance of the cohesive
component of hegemony, which consisted primarily of a cultural battle to
transform popular mentality (Gramsci, 1971, p. 348).
There are, however, important differences between the theory of soft
power and theory of hegemony.18 First, while Nye’s geo-strategy privileges
“co-optive power” over what he calls “command
power,”19 Gramsci’s theory does not underestimate any of the
intertwined levels of power—economic, 18 This may be due to the fact that Nye’s
concept is based on “the second phase of power,” as it is known
in the literature of political theory, which emphasizes agenda setting
(Bachrach & Baratz, 1962). In
pointing out this theoretical connection, Gallarotti (2010, pp. 34–35)
dismisses Lukes’ (1974) third dimension of power, which has been influenced by
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, for holding a notion of
“real interests.” This may be a legitimate criticism of Lukes’ theory,
but it does not explain why and in what sense the concept of soft power may be
superior to the Gramscian notion of hegemony. Therefore, a
theoretical engagement with the theory of hegemony does not exist anywhere
in the elaboration of the notion of soft power.
19 Nye uses the term “command power” as synonymous to the notion of
“hard power” or the conventional realist concept of power. A nation’s resources
of command power could be measured through quantitative
2368 Zafer Yörük & Pantelis Vatikiotis International Journal of
Communication 7(2013)
cultural/ideological, and political. Second, Gramscian discourse
articulates the cohesive, that is, cultural and ideological, aspects of power
struggle into a coherent strategy of achieving hegemony, where Nye’s
theory lacks clarity. Finally, the Gramscian notion of “war of
position” (as opposed to “war of maneuver”) rigorously defines the field and
the time scale of the hegemonic power struggle: As opposed to a shortterm
or one-off confrontation, hegemony requires a perpetual struggle to
transform “common sense,” fought mainly at the level of “civil society.”
From the perspective of the theory of hegemony, the strengths and
weaknesses of, and potential challenges to, a supposed Turkish “soft power”
project can be clarified. If Turkish “soft power” practices
aim for the construction of a territory of political influence in a
region located geographically beyond the east, south, and west of its borders,
then an analytic inquiry is required to measure the relevance of
Turkish soap operas as an ideological apparatus of this Turkish
neo-imperial vision.
Such an inquiry would confront the popular emotional formula that “Turkish
soap operas sell, therefore Turkey is a regional ‘soft power,’” which no doubt
originates from nationalist bias—that is, from
a tangible confusion of objective analysis with subjective opinion,
intention, and aspiration.20 The argument in this section implies that this
confusion may also be due to the ambiguity of Nye’s geostrategic
thesis regarding the dynamics and apparatuses of soft power, and the
mechanisms of interaction between force/persuasion and influence/prestige—that
is, between coercive and co-optive types of power.
In the next section, we argue that the popularity of Turkish soap operas
in Greece and the Middle East rests on a series of cultural proximities,
including historical ties, common traditions, and shared cross-cultural
aspirations and identifications.
Cultural Proximities
In our assessment of the role of cultural proximities in the popularity
of Turkish TV series, mainly in Greek- and Arabic-speaking societies, we need
to focus on those levels of proximity other than language, which are “based in
cultural elements per se: dress, ethnic types, gestures, body language, definitions
of humor, ideas about story pacing, music traditions, religious elements, etc.”
(La Pastina & Straubhaar, 2005, p. 4). We can also add this spectrum of
cultural proximity: “clothing styles; living
patterns; climate influences and other relationships with the
environment” (Trepte, 2003, p. 7). Here, we categorize these layers under three
headings: historical ties, religion and tradition, and aspirations and
identifications. Moreover, as pointed out by La Pastina and Straubhaar
(2005, p. 5), the logic of cultural proximity works not only at the national
and supranational level, but also at the subnational and regional
spheres. As such, we will focus on the formation of cross-national
spaces of cultural identity. In addition,Istanbul, not merely as a significant
space of cross-national identities, but, more significantly, as an
metrics, such as population size, concrete military assets, or a
nation’s domestic product. In international relations, this conventional form
of power is practiced through military and diplomatic activities. Soft
power, or co-optive power, on the other hand, requires further
resources and practices, including culture, reputation, ideology, and language
(Nye, 1990, pp. 29, 32–33).
20 For an academic example of this confusion, see Deniz (2010, p. 63).
International Journal of Communication 7 (2013) Soft Power or Illusion
of Hegemony 2369 emergent global city with significant potential of cultural
influence, particularly in the Balkans and the Middle East, is also considered
as a dimension of the cultural proximities argument.
Historical Ties
Middle East
Historically, for four centuries, the Middle East was part of the
Ottoman lands, when Arab and Turkish cultures were not thought of as being
separate. This historical intertwinement ended dramatically
in early 20th century, leading to a century-long reign of discourses of
mutual segregation, that is, “Ottoman Imperialism” on the one side, and “Arab
Betrayal” on the other (Kalin, 2009, p. 86). Since the
1920s, one of the constitutive denials of the official Turkish
republican ideology has been the cultural proximities between Turkey and the
Middle East, as part of its Westernization program of Turkish society.
Commentators agree that, since AKP’s ascent to power in 2002, a
tangible shift has been observed in the Turkish government’s approach toward
the governments and societies of the Middle East
(see See Çandar, 2009; Grigoriadis, 2010; Hakura, 2011; Küçükcan, 2010;
Lindenstrauss, 2012), which has evidently unleashed Turkish society’s repressed
desire to rediscover their particular cultural
proximities with the Arab world. Turkish culture industries swiftly
moved to convert these proximities into cash in the regional entertainment
market. The success of this business venture, along with the tangible
improvement in the image of Turkey in the Middle East (see TESEV
reports: Akgün, Perçinoğlu, & Gündoğar, 2009; Akgün et al., 2010; Akgün
& Gündoğar, 2011), indicate that the rediscovery of cultural proximities
was not merely unilateral.
The hostile perceptions have been gradually changing on both sides
since the turn of the 20th century, and the expansion of Turkish TV programs in
the Muslim Arab world is suitable to be seen as both a cause and a consequence
of this bilateral rapprochement.
Greece
Over the past two centuries, Turkey and Greece, situated at the crossroads
of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, have been involved in strong clashes
along mutual movements of expansionism or
national consolidation. From the fall of the Ottoman Empire to the
emergence of Greek and Turkish nationalist projects during the 18th and 19th
centuries and the war in 1919–1922, to the current Aegean
conflicts and Cyprus crises, Greece and Turkey are, as the intriguing
title of Özkırımlı and Sofos’ 2008 book indicates, being “tormented by
history”: “Both countries have been historically posited as the “Other” in
their respective nationalist imaginaries, each being seen, from the outset, as
being the antipodes of the survival of the other” (ibid., p. 2).
A few attempts of rapprochement between the two countries have occurred
in the last three decades, though none have lasted long. A significant
reconciliation process was conducted in 1988 from
Prime Ministers Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Özal, known as the Davos
process. In 1999, earthquakes hit both countries (Istanbul in August, and
Athens in September), generating sympathy among Greeks
2370 Zafer Yörük & Pantelis Vatikiotis International Journal of
Communication 7(2013) and Turks, generous mutual assistance, and the signing of
bilateral agreements for the improvement of the relations, the so-called
“earthquake diplomacy” (Ntokos, 2010, p. 6). Finally, Greece’s position on Turkey’s
membership application to enter the European Union changed in 2005; Greece
started supporting Turkey’s candidacy for the European Union, foreseeing
improved relations between the two countries.
Despite their turbulent relationship and the reciprocal nationalist
rhetoric that celebrates the “differences” of the two countries,21 there is a
great deal of historical and geographical relevance for their people. For
hundreds of years, they lived together in the same lands, and later on
(1922–1924), they had to exchange populations. Inevitably, they share the
physical environment, places, and memories.
The first Turkish soap opera broadcast in Greece, Yabancı Damat,22 deals with the love affair between an
Orthodox Greek man and a Muslim Turkish woman, and the difficulties and
prejudices they face in their attempt to get married. The setting of the
series, Gaziantep, a small city near the Syrian border, “might mean that
(Greeks) are seeing an urban Istanbul’s image of a remembered Turkey, filtered through
the fantasy of an authentic ‘Eastern’ homeland” (Papailias, 2005, p. 2).
Religion and Traditions
Middle East
Turkey is a Muslim society, and regardless of their genres or
storylines, the dramas communicated through Turkish soap operas occur against
the background of a Muslim society. Professor Orhan Tekelioğlu of Bahçeşehir
University points out the conservative nature of modernity that is
presented in the Turkish series with a strong tendency for the
“protection of family,” which, he argues, has its roots in the Turkish
modernization process.23 Most of the dramas take as their main theme conflict
between generations and various clashes between the norms of modernity
and tradition, all of which are usually eventually consolidated within a
conservative normative framework.
The representation of Turkey as a society with an achievable degree of
modernism also appeals to the social imaginary of the Arabic world. As Iwabuchi
(2002) points out, the hegemonic role of the United States as the cultural
avatar of modernity is in decline as other countries—such as Japan for East Asia—begin
to represent a more familiar regional form of modernity. Similarly, Turkey may
be gradually replacing, for the Middle East, the status of the United States as
the cultural avatar of modernity, thanks to its more proximate and achievable
form of modernity.
Greece
Greece and Turkey differ in terms of religion and language. Still,
though, their peoples have a long history of cultural interaction: “[B]oth
Greeks and Turks must have received cultural influences from both East and
West” (Sifianou & Bayraktaroğlu, 2012, p. 293). Actually, they have many
things in
21 For a comparative analysis, see Millas, 2004.
22 The title in Turkish means “foreign groom,” while in Greek, it is
“borders of love.”
23 Tekelioğlu, interviewed by Buğdaycı, 2011.
International Journal of Communication 7 (2013) Soft Power or Illusion
of Hegemony 2371
common: customs and traditions such as food culture, music and dances,
markets/bazaars, textile goods; and similar ways of living, including
expressions and gestures, close family bonds, common words
(especially in cuisine and navigation), and even surnames.
Until very recently, Greek consumption of Turkish TV consisted
exclusively of Turkish news reports about the conflicts in the Aegean and
Cyprus, filtered by the Greek mass media, which reproduce national discourse
and stereotypes and promote oppositional schemes (Kostarella, 2007). The
broadcasting of Turkish series signified the first time that the Greek
audience was exposed massively to the Turkish entertainment industry. In
Turkish series, the living of a modern, prosperous, and exciting life
is not incompatible with having “traditional” beliefs and
relationships. The issues of the hierarchical structure of the family, the
honor of the woman, and the strong friendships between men, as well as family
vendettas, all prominently covered by the Turkish soap operas, were pertinent
in Greek society a few decades ago.
In addition, Turkish series depict several cultural elements that hold
a strong interest for the Greek audience. The originality of various products
is often at stake.24 The Greek audience cannot help but to also be touched by
familiar situations, expressions, and habits:
They enjoyed listening to the Turkish language and picking out Turkish
words used in Greek and vice-versa. . . . People commented on certain intimate
gestures that “we” also do (or remembered that we also once did). . . . They
found perfectly familiar the scenes of the extended family living under the
same roof. . . . Was this us “as we used
to be”? The part we lost when left? What we expect them to be? What we
still “really” are? (Papilias, 2005, p. 2)
Aspirations and Identifications
So far, we have pointed out the cultural proximities at the macro
level, i.e., between “nations.”
However, as David Morley and Kevin Robbins (1995) argue, in the contemporary
world dominated by globalized media, collective cultural identities are no
longer delimited by national borders. Globalization, in
this sense, divides the existing nations and reunites these divided
elements with similar communities of other nations to form sometimes even
larger communities than the existing national unities. This way, the
transnational proximities are capable of forming alternative “imagined
communities” which subvert national boundaries.
Here, it should be recalled that Turkish soap operas have been supplied
to the Eastern European, Asian, and Middle Eastern audiences after their
success in domestic ratings. It is therefore only natural to expect the
existence of similar audience groups made up of viewers on both sides of the
Turkish borders
24 Baklava sweet, kahv(f)e, kebab, raki, and tavla/i are a few of
them. “Baklava is a genuinely Turkish sweet. They pretend they are superior in
doner kebab and coffee! In a moment, you will tell us that raki is
also yours!” (excerpt from Yabancı Damat,
in Sifianou & Bayraktaroğlu, 2012, p. 303).
2372 Zafer Yörük & Pantelis Vatikiotis International Journal of
Communication 7(2013)
having concerns and patterns of identification that resemble each
other’s more than those of other social groups of their own nation.
In the context of the Middle East, two such cross-national “imagined
communities”—youth and women, housewives in particular—deserve analysis, since
in both Turkey and the Middle East these twosocial categories of predominantly
middle-class background constitute the core of the soap opera audiences. In the
case of Greece, while sharing the category of women with the Middle East, the
second “imagined community” is the opposite of the second group in the Middle
Eastern case: Instead of the youth, the elderly form a cross-national audience
group between Greece and Turkey.
Middle East
A sector of Turkish society, the secular elite, consisting of liberal
urban upper-middle-class families that represent the shop-window of modern
Turkey and their youth, may be immune to the messages of soap operas, but the
majority of the Turkish youth do not have much in common with this elite, while
they do share a proximate cultural habitus with the Middle Eastern youth.
Turkish society’s conservative/religious restoration, particularly during the
recent decade, which has been promoted by the
ruling AKP policies,25 bears the potential of bringing the Turkish
youth culture closer and closer to the young population of the Middle East, in
a similar habitat of arranged marriages and extended families
living together.26 The protagonists of the series Noor, for example, help both Turkish and Arabic youths to maintain the
hope for real love and admiration. In this way, young Arabic masses and the
majority of
Turkish youth constitute a cross-national space of “imagined
community,” or, as Manuel Castells coined it, a “cultural commune of the
information age,” which is subsequently subnational and transnational
(Castells, 1997, p. 65). In this space, the youths of each side
identify with the difficulties represented by the dramas and share aspirations
regarding the protagonists’ wealth, glamour, and love.
A similar identification/aspiration couplet applies to the “imagined community”
of Turkish and Middle Eastern housewives. Turkish and Middle Eastern housewives
do not only find the melodrama of arranged marriages and the suppressed female
identity in Muslim societies to identify with, but they also aspire to the
active role that the women characters take in social life, not to mention
finding what they are missing in the typology of the young, handsome, faithful,
and understanding husband on the TV screen.27
The shared patterns of aspiration and identification therefore bring
together the women of various Muslim countries to form an “imagined community”
consisting mainly of housewives.
25 Prime Minister Erdoğan has been vocal about his vision of the
“ideal family with three children” and bringing up “pious generations.”
26 A recent research report on ascending conservatism (Yılmaz, 2012)
has sparked heated debate in media and academic circles, along with the
renowned sociologist Şerif Mardin’s observation (Cingöz, 2008) on
increasing “neighborhood pressure” and the notion of “concerned
moderns” (Toprak, 2010).
27 Noor’s
director, Kemal Uzun, says that the secret of his
show is in the depiction of the kind of family that both the average Arab and
Turkish housewife longs for (Butler, 2009).
International Journal of Communication 7 (2013) Soft Power or Illusion
of Hegemony 2373
Greece
In the Greek case, two “imagined communities” are identified as elderly
people and women in general. Turkish soap operas are very popular among the old
generation in Greece.28 This is not surprising
if one takes into account that the culture of the Greek elderly has
many things in common with the respective Turkish demographic. Aspects of
historical and cultural proximity mentioned above apply especially to a
generation that grew up listening to stories about the life of their parents
and relatives, who were born on the other side of the Aegean Sea. They can
identify with the extended families living together under the same roof in
houses decorated like theirs, eating similar foods, gathering in the cafés, strolling
in the bazaars. At the same time, they satisfy their curiosity about the psyche
of their “distant” neighbors by observing their lives and listening in on their
conversations, witnessing their strengths,
weaknesses, and passions while pointing out what’s “the same” and
what’s “different.” Moreover, the very performances of the actors make them
more attractive to the older audience. Several journalistic
reflections that “comment on the popularity of Turkish series among
Greek viewers likened the innocence of the acting to the old Greek cinema (of
the 1960s and 70s)” (Papailias, 2005, p. 2).
Turkish soap operas are also popular among women of all age groups.29
Shared patterns of aspirations and identifications related to the middle-class
lifestyle (active and independent role of women in social life), the romance,
and the intrigues (emotional dilemmas) all apply here. Turkish series and their
actors are often admired by groups of Greek women; they meet on Facebook pages
created particularly for Turkish series30 and their idols. They exchange
information, photos, episodic synopses, news on the series, information on the
actors’ personal lives, etc.31—and they continue to do so even months after the
shows have ended on Greek TV. They even research information on series that
have not yet been
broadcast in Greece that feature their favorite actors.32 Moreover, there
is one more parameter that makes Turkish series popular in Greece. In contrast
to most Latin and Greek soap operas, the Turkish ones (especially the ones
broadcast in prime time) have high production value, dynamic narration, professional
casting, and good music.
28 The analysis of the ratings shows that the penetration of the
Turkish series (every single one) in the group of people of over 55 years old
is extremely high.
29 Age groups: 15–24, 25–44, 45–54 (for Antenna); and 15–34, 35–54
(for Mega Channel).
30 See the following Facebook pages:
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Turkish-tv-series-and-movies-Greek-fan-page/187772171237494
(generally for Turkish series);
https://www.facebook.com/pages/%CE%A7%CE%B9%CE%BB%CE%B9%CE%B5%CF%82-
%CE%9A%CE%B1%CE%B9-%CE%9C%CE%B9%CE%B1-
%CE%9D%CF%8D%CF%87%CF%84%CE%B5%CF%82-Binbir-Gece/107034399343624;
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Kismet-Dudaktan-Kalbe/106450266084577;
https://www.facebook.com/AskiMemnuOriginalPage.
31https://www.facebook.com/pages/K%C4%B1vanc-Tatl%C4%B1tu%C4%9F-Greek-FANCLUB/
146793782041557 (Kıvanç Tatlıtuğ of Aşk i Memnu and
Menekse ve Halil);
https://www.facebook.com/BurakHakkiOfficialGreekFanClub (Burak Hakki
of Dudaktan Kalbe).
32 https://www.facebook.com/SUSKUNLAR.MURAT.YILDIRIM.GREEKFANCLUB
2374 Zafer Yörük & Pantelis Vatikiotis International Journal of
Communication 7(2013)
Istanbul: Regional and Global
In addition to cultural proximities, a significant aspect peculiar to
our age of globalization deserves reflection: the relationship between the
(re)-emergence of Istanbul as a global city with regional significance and the
sales of the products of Turkish culture industries.
In the changing patterns of commercial and cultural exchange, many
major cities that function as centers of cultural production tend to gain a
degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the modern national context and become
“transnationalized” as global cities (Sassen, 2001). According to Keyder
(1999), Istanbul is one of these cities which seeks integration with
transnational commercial and cultural networks while preserving its local-specific
features. Most of the culture industries of Turkey have naturally developed in Istanbul,
and therefore, the export of soap operas needs to be viewed also as a
cross-national interaction between Istanbul and various societies and cities
located outside Turkey.
This contemporary condition could be rooted in historical ties, given
that, between the 15th and 20th centuries, Istanbul was the most important
cultural capital of the Middle East, more important than the others, such as
Damascus, Baghdad, Beirut, or Cairo. The 20th-century Westernization of Turkey
led to the severing of the cultural ties between Istanbul and the Middle East,
while integrating the city within a national context with Western cultural and
commercial networks.
In the early 21st century, a new opportunity to restore the historical
ties with the “Orient” seems to have emerged in parallel to the political
developments in Turkey. Moreover, the soap operas in question are exclusively
produced in Istanbul at a time when the outputs of the conventional centers of
cinema and TV production, Damascus and Cairo, have dropped (mainly due to
political turmoil). In these circumstances, TV production has developed as the
central industry in the cultural economy of Istanbul and made it possible for
the city to reclaim her leading position in the region.
Limits of Proximity: Shortcomings and Obstacles
While Turkish political and economic influence coincides with the improving
exports of Turkish TV series, the rhetoric of the “Turkish model” and “soft
power” do not convincingly demonstrate the link
between these phenomena, given that cultural popularity and power of
any type (be it soft or hard) do not automatically follow one another.
Telenovelas and Turkish “Soap Power”
Discussing the connection, or the lack of it, between cultural popularity
and power, the popularity around the world of Latin American (mostly Brazilian)
telenovelas in recent decades can be studied as an
example. Brazilian telenovelas have been extremely popular in both
Turkey and Greece since the 1990s,33
33 In Greece, Latin telenovelas were broadcast between 1999 and 2005
(16 series per year, most of them dramas) by 3 private stations and 2 public
ones. In Turkey, two Brazilian and two Mexican telenovelas
were broadcast during the 1980s and 1990s.
International Journal of Communication 7 (2013) Soft Power or Illusion
of Hegemony 2375
as in many countries around the world. In the global identification
with the telenovelas, the geographical and cultural-linguistic distances were
superseded by cross-national spheres of cultural proximity, or the
global attraction of melodrama as a genre—shared perceptions of middle-class
life as a universal “melodrama” that attracts the general audience.
However, this cultural success did not result in any diplomatic or
strategic consequences for Greece or Turkey. Despite their two decade-long
cultural “invasion,” Brazilian or Mexican observers never claimed their
political power over any of the telenovela-consuming countries. Even the
analyses of the popularity of Brazilian telenovelas in the neighboring
territories of Spanish-speaking Latin America limit their emphasis with
cultural proximities.34
Translation from Cultural to Political
A major obstacle of Turkey’s cultural expansion, particularly in Greece
and other Christian countries where Turkish TV programs are popular, is its
profile as a Muslim country ruled by a “moderate Islamist” government. In the
Balkans, where 88% of the people are Christian, the negative image of Turkey,
due to Turkey’s increasing interest in the Arab world and the potential
formation of Islamic alliances, attracts more public attention than the
positive one.35
In Greece, there is escalating criticism of Turkish soap operas’
“invasion” of the Greek broadcasting “territory.” Long-standing stereotypes and
phobias about Turkey fill the pages of populist media and websites in regard to
the threat of a “neo-Ottoman imperialism,” and the “contaminating effects” of
the Turkish culture to the purity of the “Hellenic” one. In addition, the
leader of the far-right party Golden Dawn, which recently entered the
Parliament, called on his constituencies to boycott Turkish series in order to
resist to Turkey’s “cultural invasion.”
Although the religious barrier does not exist between Turkey and the
Middle East, there are still further cultural and political obstacles. Research
conducted on public opinion in the Middle East shows that
the Arab public, in their overwhelming majority, expect Turkey to play
an active role in the solution of the Palestinian question, while a smaller
percentage expect it to intervene in intra-Arab affairs (Akgün &
Gündoğar, 2011). According to the same report, around 60% of the Middle
Eastern public sees Turkey as a model for Arab democracy. Since 2009, when
Turkey’s anti-Israeli stance became clear on the
Palestinian conflict, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan has been
voted repeatedly as the most popular leader of the Muslim world.
However, public opinion on Turkey’s popularity varies dramatically
around the region. Polls indicate high popularity (almost 80%) in Egypt, Libya,
and Tunisia in the post-revolutionary climate.
However, in Iraq and Syria, which Turkey physically borders, the
positive perception falls dramatically under 40%. The reasons for negative
perception are listed as Turkey’s imperial past, close relations with
the West, not being ethnically Arab, and not being Muslim enough.
34 See, for example, La Pastina & Straubhaar, 2005.
35 See here the analysis by Erhan Türbedar (2012).
2376 Zafer Yörük & Pantelis Vatikiotis International Journal of
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Moreover, Turkish TV series, as much as being a pole attraction, also
provoke a great deal of conservative criticism around the Middle East. While
presenting an alternative portrayal of women to the conventional Middle Eastern
housewife, their storylines usually include divorce, extramarital affairs, and premarital
sex (unfaithfulness, unwanted pregnancies, etc.). Strong fatwas against the
most popular of
Turkish soaps, Noor, have been issued by top Muslim clerics charging
it with immorality and corruption (Butler, 2009). Turkish programs are held
responsible for increasing divorce, weakening of faith among
the youth, and even mass murder (Al-Hiajem, 2012). Since 2010, the Arab
Spring has also blamed on the liberal inspirations of Turkish soaps.
These reservations remind us that, in spite of existing cultural
proximities, Turkey is not an “authentic” Middle Eastern country as such. The
differences begin with the language and continue with many behavioral and
normative codes, as well as differences in political/ideological viewpoints. Politically,
the persuasion of the non-Muslim Western domains to a project of neo-Ottoman restoration
could, at its best, be a nationalist Turkish dream, given that, for most of
these people, most of what are referred to as “historical ties” consist of
national traumas and tragedies of their collective memory. It is almost equally
questionable whether the former Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire in the
Middle East are prepared to become the subaltern nations of their historical
“big brother.” Moreover, there exist (and always will) challengers in the
Middle East to a potential Turkish venture of regional leadership—culturally
(Damascus, Beirut, and Cairo), economically (Iran, Gulf States, and Saudi
Arabia), and politically (all).
Finally, while all the talk is about Turkey’s influence over the Middle
East, there is also a risk of assimilation in reverse. The Turkish soap opera
boom coincides with the simultaneous liberalization and de-secularization of
domestic political structures under AKP leadership, changes which have
significant cultural/ideological consequences. While the country’s political
system is democratized through the dissolution of the conventional military
tutelage, society seems to be falling increasingly under the hegemony of a
pious middle-class conservatism. The outcome of this process may equally be the
“Middle Easternization” of Turkish society—that is, Turkey’s assimilation by a
Middle Eastern style conservative Islamist hegemony, as opposed to the
structural adjustment of Middle Eastern societies according to a “Turkish
model.”36
36 The title of Tarık Oğuzlu’s article (2008) is indicative of these
concerns: “Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy” (see also Robins,
2006). Although both the government and Turkish analysts, such as Cengiz
Çandar, insist that Turkey, while opening toward Middle Eastern political
issues, is safely anchored in Europe, critical observers have increasingly
raised the possibility of a “shift of axis”—that is, a reorientation in the
Middle East and Islam at the expense of the conventional Western stance of the republic.
International Journal of Communication 7 (2013) Soft Power or Illusion
of Hegemony 2377
The Economy of Cultural “Colonialism”
Turkey’s cross-border influence is not merely cultural, but also
economic.37 According to The
Economist, between 2002 and 2009,
the value of Turkey’s exports to the Middle East and North Africa has
swollen sevenfold to US$31 billion.38 Turkish direct investments in
the Balkan countries are also in a positive trend.39 Commercial and economic
ties between Turkey and Greece, though relatively limited, have remained
steadfast despite the economic crisis in Greece: “Turkey’s exports to Greece in
the first half of 2011 have increased by 19%, compared to the same period last
year. Imports from Greece have also seen an increasing trend” (SETimes, 2011).
The causality between the development of Turkish culture industries
and the sales of TV programs abroad also needs consideration.40 Since 1980s,
Turkish society has been through a development of popular culture industries,
in parallel to the reign of a “pop culture”and the transformation of the
Turkish nation into a consumer society.41 It was only after the domestic boom
of TV business and the overdevelopment of related culture industries that Turkish
soap operas began to expand to the cross-border regional markets.
Another economic aspect is economic crisis, which has played an important
role in Greece in the introduction of Turkish soap operas to TV schedules. The
domestic production of series has decreased significantly, taking also into account
that Greece, as a small nation, has a limited market, and as such, it does not
have enough resources to produce many national programs.42 Accordingly, when
audiences, particularly in the middle and popular classes, cannot find the
preferred national material in certain genres, they tend to prefer productions
that are relatively more culturally proximate (Straubhaar, 1991, pp. 55, 57).
37 In fact, the answer to the questions in TESEV research (Akgün &
Gündoğar, 2011) “Have you ever consumed a Turkish product?” and “Have you ever
watched a Turkish TV series?” had exactly the same
percentage (74% Yes).
38 The
Economist (October 29, 2009) points
out that, in addition to exporting industrial products “from cars to
tableware,” Turkey has been involved in large-scale energy, infrastructure, and
construction
contracts “from Algiers to Tehran.”
39 According to the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy, “Turkish
investments which is just 30 million dollars in 2002 increased 189 million
dollars in 2011.” See http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=countriesandregions®ion=9
40 The pluralization and privatization of TV channels in 1990s brought
about the demand for national programs (Çakmur & Kaya, 2011). TV companies
encouraged the emergence of entertainment production
business within their own studios to provide programs, including, in
addition to serial dramas, comedy programs, contests, advertisements, and music
videos, for their channels’ airtime.
41 Nurdan Gürbilek (1992), Can Kozanoğlu (1992), and Meltem Ahıska and
Zafer Yenal (2006) reflected on the social transformations in parallel to the
development of consumer society, communication technologies, and pop culture
through the 1980s, 1990s, and early 21st century.
42 “Each part of a Greek series costs around 70,000 to 80,000 euros,
whereas each part of a Turkish series cost 7,000 to 8,000 euros” (Kırbaki,
2011).
2378 Zafer Yörük & Pantelis Vatikiotis International Journal of
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Similarly, many viewers in the Middle East point out the superiority
of the Turkish soaps to their Arabic counterparts, regarding better animation,
use of higher technology, better picture quality, and more sophisticated
storylines.43 Contemporary Arab culture industries, being inspired by the
Turkish products’ “more daring storylines” and technological advances, may
improve the products in near future to reclaim their “authentic” market (El
Shenawi, 2011). On the other hand, the political turmoil that has shaken Cairo
and Damascus in recent years, coinciding with the Greek economic crisis, has
played a similar role in the Middle Eastern cultural markets.
Economic data that accompany Turkish cultural expansion indicate that
the current expansion, and with it, the idea of Turkish “culturalhegemony” or
“soft power” may not be sustained, since it has been contingent upon a series
of opportunities arising from regional conjuncture.
Conclusion
The article has considered the recent success of Turkish TV series in
the Middle East and Greece, along with the discourses that reflected on this
cultural expansion, such as “strategic depth” and “soft power.” Instead of
macro-political arguments, the article has pointed out a series of cultural
proximities that this expansion has conjured throughout the region. In the
assessment of the possibility of the conversion of this cultural capital into
political hegemony, a series of weaknesses, shortcomings, and
challenges has been identified.
The main argument that has been pursued through the article is that
the rhetoric of Turkish “soft power” does not provide a sound argument for its
portrayal of the contemporary “soap opera colonialism”
as a major cultural/ideological apparatus of Turkey’s prospective regional
hegemony. The pinning of exaggerated aspirations onto soft power does not
automatically lead to any proper hegemonic ends,
though it certainly is capable of generating an illusion of hegemony.
The concluding discussion that follows on the paradox of soft/hard power could
be illustrative of this observation.
Turkey’s image and prestige have undoubtedly improved in Balkans and
the Middle East since AKP’s accession to power. However, it would be premature
to derive from this observation that this improvement is leading to
diplomatic/strategic influence over the Middle Eastern and Balkan/European affairs.
In other words, the “soft power” has not, so far, been successfully converted
into any concrete forms of “hard power,” as such.44
Such conversion necessitates serious “hard” strategic decisions that
concern, above all, Turkish national identity, something that is negotiated
among competing pulls between the West and the East, between the Balkans and
the Middle East, between modernity and tradition, and between secularism and 43
According to Marwa al Kubanji, a Londoner from Iraq, Turkish programs, which
contain “emotional
dilemmas and conflicts of the heart,” run deeper than the didactic and
patronizing Arabic soaps (El Shenawi, 2011).
44 The analysis here, although it deploys Nye’s terminology, is
grounded upon its criticism informed by the theory of hegemony.
International Journal of Communication 7 (2013) Soft Power or Illusion
of Hegemony 2379
Islam. The paradox seems to arise at this precise moment of choice: The
increasing regional cultural, economic, and to a certain degree, political
influence of Turkey could be interpreted as a consequence of
its ambiguous identity. At the same time, Turkey is both of those
above-listed opposing entities, and it is neither of them.
This is probably the main reason why its cultural products, particularly
the soap operas, become popular for both Western and Middle Eastern audiences.
They appeal to the nostalgia for the lost tradition,
the externalized Orient, and the demoded religious values in the Greek
audience, while representing the dream of an achievable degree of modernity,
Westernization, and secularization to the Arabic middle
classes.45 The first thing that a prospective “hard” decision has to
sacrifice is this fragile equilibrium—and with it, the existing cultural attraction
toward Turkey in both ends of the region.
45 Turkish soap operas are also attractive, according to al Kubanji, because
they “show Western norms clashing with the traditional backgrounds of the
Muslim characters” (El Shenawi, 2011).
2380 Zafer Yörük & Pantelis Vatikiotis International Journal of
Communication 7(2013)
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