CHATHAM HOUSE
Sheikh Hasina verdict and Bangladesh’s upcoming referendum signal a transitional moment for South Asia
Hasina’s conviction, and a referendum on a roadmap of reforms, could open the door to a new multipolar role for Bangladesh.
Expert comment
Published 18 November 2025 —
4 minute READ
Image — Protesters in Barishal, Bangladesh, during the 'Monsoon Revolution' on 5 August 2024. Photo by Niamul Rifat/Anadolu via Getty Images.
Dr Nazam Laila
Academy Associate, Digital Society Programme
Bangladesh stands at a historic crossroads after ousted leader Sheikh Hasina was found guilty in absentia of crimes against humanity and sentenced to death by the country’s International Crimes Tribunal. The court found that Hasina, who denies the accusations, was responsible for the violent crackdown on student-led protests in July-August 2024 in which the UN estimated ‘as many as 1,400 people’ may have been killed. The Gen Z protests, also known as the ‘Monsoon Revolution,’ toppled Hasina’s government and caused her to flee to India.
The verdict marks more than just the fall of a political dynasty. Together with Bangladesh’s upcoming referendum and elections, it signals a rupture in South Asia’s status quo and potentially opens the door to a more multipolar regional order in which Bangladesh is less dependent on India. This transitional moment could transform Bangladesh from a peripheral actor into a stabilizing force in a fragmented region.
New actors, new alignments
The Monsoon Revolution not only toppled Hasina’s regime but also dismantled the decades-long duopoly in Bangladeshi politics held by her party, the Awami League, and its rival, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). An interim government led by Muhammad Yunus came to power after the revolution and has presided over a period of political change.
This transformation has opened space for new political actors ahead of the national elections planned for February 2026. These include the student-revolutionary–led National Citizen Party (NCP) and Jamaat-e-Islami, an Islamist party banned by Hasina’s regime, which is experiencing a resurgence along with its student wing Bangladesh Islami Chhatrashibir, known as Shibir.
The NCP has positioned itself as a centrist, pluralist force calling for a ‘Second Republic’ and a new constitution. Its appeal, despite its organizational weaknesses and political inexperience, reflects widespread fatigue with dynastic and corrupt politics. Jamaat has rebranded as a moderate democratic actor, aligning with the NCP to seek to influence Yunus’ reform agenda and push for proportional representation in the Parliament.
Hasina’s party, the Awami League, has been barred from contesting the February elections after its activities were banned under anti-terrorism laws. Hasina and her party continue to reject the accusations against them and the legitimacy of the interim government. On Sunday, Hasina’s son said the league’s supporters in Bangladesh would seek to block the election and warned of pre-election violence.
The Awami League’s historic rival, the BNP, has faced criticism over disunity among its leaders and allegations its members have engaged in extortive politics, for which it says it has a zero-tolerance policy. While some analysis suggests the BNP is the frontrunner in the election, it is too early to predict with confidence. Shibir’s victory in the National University Student Union elections bodes well for Jamaat, though it may not be replicated on the national level.
The July Charter referendum
The February referendum on the July Charter represents a watershed moment for Bangladesh. The July Charter – a comprehensive roadmap for reforms proposed by the interim government – was signed by 25 political parties including the BNP and Jamaat in October. It has brought together a broad coalition of otherwise disunited parties around ground-breaking institutional reforms. It proposes a bicameral legislature, term limits for prime ministers, proportional representation, and constitutional recognition of the 2024 uprising. It also envisions stronger checks on executive power and safeguards against parliamentary overreach.
Bangladesh’s future now hinges on whether this moment becomes a springboard for inclusive reform or a trigger for renewed division.
If ratified by the referendum, these changes could dismantle decades of dynastic dominance and institutionalize pluralism. However, disagreements remain among political parties over the timing, scope, and implementation of the reforms, which would be decided after the referendum. For example, the NCP has said it will only sign the charter after the government clarifies how the reforms will be implemented.
If the referendum receives strong citizen support and is implemented transparently with the proper legal foundation, it could establish a balance of power that ensures the otherwise fragile unity between the anti-Hasina political parties. This would enable Bangladesh to present a united front and address its security and economic challenges more effectively. If Bangladeshis vote ‘no’, whichever party wins the election will not be bound to implement the July Charter, risking a missed opportunity for unifying reforms.
Regional ripples
With the emergence of a new political order and new actors, Bangladesh’s foreign policy is also undergoing significant change. Under Yunus, Bangladesh is working to reduce its long-standing dependence on India – a hallmark of the Hasina era – and to diversify its foreign relations.
Bangladesh–India ties have been strained by New Delhi ignoring requests to extradite Hasina, despite the two countries having an extradition treaty. This shift is likely to continue after the February elections, as the major Bangladeshi parties competing are critical of India, reflecting a degree of anti-India sentiment among the public due to New Delhi’s support for Hasina’s regime. New Delhi has said it ‘remains committed to the best interests of the people of Bangladesh’ and ‘will always engage constructively with all stakeholders to that end.’
The interim government has sought to diversify Bangladesh’s relations, pursuing talks and agreements across defence, tech and trade with China, Pakistan, Turkey, South Korea, Japan and the US. In March, Yunus signed major cooperation agreements with Beijing. Current Chinese investment in Bangladesh now exceeds $10 billion, spread across more than 30 major projects ranging from power plants to railways and digital infrastructure.
Bangladesh is also poised to receive a record $550 million in foreign direct investment from Denmark’s global terminal operator, APM Terminals – the largest single European investment in the country’s history. In total, Bangladesh’s foreign direct investment surged by 19.13 per cent in the year following the Monsoon Revolution.
Bangladesh currently chairs the seven-country regional forum BIMSTEC. The interim government is also seeking to join ASEAN and has approached member countries for talks. It has discussed reviving the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) with Pakistan to strengthen regional cooperation. These moves towards cooperation in a region embroiled in ongoing geopolitical conflicts and competition could serve as a model for diversified relations and multilateralism in South Asia.
Moment of transition
In the post-Hasina era following the February elections, it will be crucial to preserve the interim government’s legacy of elevating Bangladesh from a regional pawn to a regional player.
This transitional moment could transform Bangladesh from a peripheral actor into a stabilizing force in a fragmented region.
Bangladesh’s main political parties coming together under the July Charter makes this more achievable. But political fragmentation remains acute. Awami League supporters could seek to destabilize the country if they are not convinced to embrace this new era for Bangladesh.
The BNP, NCP and Jamaat all have their own shortcomings that ensure they would likely struggle to govern effectively alone. The current first-past-the-post electoral system should therefore be replaced with proportional representation in future elections – as proposed by the July Charter. This would help to ensure a balance of power between the various parties of different political interests and orientations.
Bangladesh’s future now hinges on whether this moment becomes a springboard for inclusive reform or a trigger for renewed division. The February referendum is more than a vote on constitutional amendments – it is a verdict on the nation’s democratic character and its regional aspirations.
The question is clear: will Bangladesh use this moment of transition to lead, or slip back into another cycle of crisis? If Dhaka succeeds, it could influence South Asian geopolitics by example – helping to move the region toward a future defined by pluralism, connectivity and cooperative security.
Watch the full interview with Muhammad Yunus at Chatham House in June 2025 here.
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