Fragmentation, distractions weaken Europe’s Indo-Pacific pivot
Although it has gained momentum over the past several years, Europe’s Indo-Pacific pivot risks stalling unless it overcomes internal fragmentation, manages strategic distractions and develops a coherent approach. Europe’s engagement in the region matters deeply, not only for its own interests, but also for the global balance of power amid strategic competition between the United States and China. Despite obstacles, Europe retains unique leverage as a potential third-way actor.
The following are key findings from our new book, Europe’s Indo-Pacific Pivot: Navigating new horizons, the first systematic analysis of all European engagements with the Indo-Pacific.
Most European nations have formulated strategic Indo-Pacific pronouncements and stepped up their regional engagement, albeit with varying degrees of intensity. Unsurprisingly, Europe’s big four—France, Britain, Germany and Italy—invest the most. France and Britain, as resident powers, have the most at stake. They each have overseas territories, bases, nationals and extensive exclusive economic zones in the Indo-Pacific, engaging through numerous hard and soft power initiatives. Germany and Italy, though extra-regional, have major economic interests, extensive partnerships and significant naval and air force regional deployments.
Beyond larger actors, two middle powers have been gradually enhancing their role. The Netherlands has adopted a comprehensive approach across economic, diplomatic and joint strategic initiatives. Sweden has focused on defence and upholding international law, with its presence so far limited to the Indian Ocean.
Europe’s small powers, despite distance and constrained resources, have developed specific Indo-Pacific policies under the European Union umbrella. Czechia, Lithuania, and Ireland have prioritised trade and diplomacy, although Czechia and Lithuania also signalled potential security contributions.
Finally, the EU maintains vast economic and political interests through ambitious initiatives. While its security engagement remains smaller, its Indian Ocean activities and coordinated maritime presences hint at potentially broader Indo-Pacific roles in future.
Notably, other European actors increasingly recognise the region’s importance, and in our book we briefly reviewed 20 additional approaches. However, these otherwise promising developments are actively constrained by several challenges.
Economically, Europe’s Indo-Pacific engagement offers the chance to project regulatory, environmental and technological leadership, but internal divisions and policy fragmentation could erode its credibility. Militarily, deepening defence diplomacy and tactical interoperability offer Europe new regional reach. However, the multiple security threats on its borders and in its neighbourhood, along with industrial fragmentation and slow policy tempo, risk undermining its operational effectiveness.
Cross-regionally, there is a growing perception of the EU as a trusted, rules-based partner in the Indo-Pacific, though historical sensitivities and perceived US alignment could strain key relationships, for example with some Southeast Asian countries. Strategically, expanding industrial and energy resilience offers Europe greater autonomy and competitiveness, yet internal discord and insufficient redundancy risk deepening external dependencies. Geopolitically, Europe can help balance US-China rivalry through cooperative multilateralism, although potential US retrenchment and widening transatlantic divergence could curb this.
Internally, Europe’s renewed global momentum and Indo-Pacific focus provide strategic visibility, but limited capacity and simultaneous crises risk overstretch and unmet expectations. Lastly, in terms of security engagement, regional deployments and partnerships between NATO and the Indo-Pacific Four—South Korea, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia—allow Europe to enhance presence and maritime stability. Still, infrequent operations, limited readiness, and entrapment risks could undermine this.
Europe faces three choices. First, will it sustain its current Indo-Pacific engagement, or succumb to strategic distraction? Second, will it promote policy coherence across Europe as a whole, or continue allowing its fragmented national approaches? Third, will it pursue genuine strategic autonomy, or maintain its structural dependence on the US?
Of course, there are two major external variables that could tip the balance. The first is the second Trump administration, with its transactional approach to international engagement and an emerging effort to keep European engagement closer to home. The other is China, whose economic coercion and military build-up have the potential to affect European decisions.
From these circumstances, five lessons emerge for policymakers:
—Europe should harmonise economic policies and promote common standards to build a resilient regulatory framework and set global benchmarks;
—Investing in strategic defence capabilities and a unified European defence industry is essential for credibility and security cooperation;
—The EU and its member states should actively engage with Indo-Pacific institutions, using tailored diplomacy to strengthen partnerships;
—Dedicated resources and resilient institutions are necessary to protect long-term strategic goals despite immediate crises; and
—Fostering cross-regional dialogue and prioritising shared interests will maintain European cohesion and enable collective Indo-Pacific influence.
As Europe continues to calibrate its diverse strategies, its evolving presence in the Indo-Pacific has the potential to shape regional dynamics. However, internal divisions, limited capacity and strategic sensitivities may constrain its influence. Acknowledging and addressing this will help promote both European and Indo-Pacific interests.
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