The National Interest - In Ukraine, a Bad Peace Won’t End the War—It Will Prolong It - November 24, 2025 By: Kaush Arha

 The National Interest 

In Ukraine, a Bad Peace Won’t End the War—It Will Prolong It

November 24, 2025

By: Kaush Arha

The recently unveiled “28 Point Plan” might as well have been a Russian wish list. Secretary Rubio leading the negotiations lends hope that the eventual agreement will strengthen, not weaken, American alliances.

Russia attacked Ukraine. The 28 Point Plan first draft (28P) released last week proffers recognition of unlawful Russian occupation and grants it amnesty for its war crimes. It limits Ukraine’s military and precludes its NATO membership. It rewards the criminal assailant for home invasion. It reflects the Russian wish list and goes against the fiber of the American ideals of fair play and justice.  

It is now time to ensure Ukrainian and European interests are incorporated forcefully in the settlement. Russia should be made to understand that, for the United States to contemplate 28P beyond Russia’s first offer in negotiations, let alone to coerce Ukraine into accepting, would constitute a betrayal of American interests, ideals, and integrity.  

28P would betray the brave and righteous Ukrainian fighters amid their heroic struggle against a marauding American adversary. The Battle of Britain, the Battle of Bastogne, or the Berlin Airlift, shaped American character and lore with an instinctive revulsion toward the defeatism and supplicancy implicit in the 28P. American leaders did not indulge in such thinking when they issued blank checks to arm the Russian military in WWII, without which it would not have been able to hold off, let alone advance against, Nazi Germany.  

President Trump’s drive for peace is laudable. His advisors may well calculate that acceding to Russian demands is a shorter road to a ceasefire and peace during the Trump term than arming Ukraine for a longer war of attrition. President Barack Obama’s advisors fell prey to a similar trap by rushing an undercooked Iran deal, which soon unraveled after Obama left office. President Trump should instruct his advisors to steer clear of such miscalculations.   

28P was conceived in willful ignorance of Russian history and the Kremlin’s need for external threats and “special military operations” to maintain its hold over an increasingly abnormal and artificial empire. A strong sovereign democratic Ukraine or NATO does not threaten Russia, only the Kremlin’s authoritarian rule. No amount of NATO concessions will suffice for Moscow’s need to conjure an external threat to control its people. 

Rehabilitating the Russian economy would greatly disadvantage American energy exports to Europe and Indo-Pacific regions and undermine the United States’ growing economic interests in the Black Sea, Caucasus, and Central Asia. Due to the lower transport costs to Europe and Asia, Russia is a more competitive energy producer than the United States. If implemented, 28P would incur unnecessary economic costs, including the loss of energy profits, global energy primacy, and new markets. Rehabilitating the Russian economy is bad for American economic interests, and it will blemish not burnish President Trump’s deal-making reputation. Simply put, it would be bonkers.  

28P offers naught to Ukraine for its years-long struggle of blood, tears, and sweat. It calls the brave nation to accept territorial losses and restrictions on its military size, capabilities, and alliances. In return, it is offered vague security guarantees not materially different from those of the Minsk Agreements.  

“We want to be free and owe this freedom to nobody”—a harsh lesson the Poles of Warsaw learned during the waning days of WWII, when the Soviet army refused to lend a hand to their insurrection, is applicable to Ukraine. The only security guarantee for Ukraine is the Ukrainian military. An inviolable Ukraine requirement in a ceasefire or peace agreement must be a free hand—with unreserved support from allies—for an expeditious military build-up to prevent future attacks. Any territorial concessions from Ukraine will only invite more territorial aggression. Rewarding the criminal assailant for home invasion invites more breaking and entering.

Europe’s present and future security and standing will be materially affected by the character of the eventual Ukraine ceasefire or peace plan. A strong, resilient Ukraine will act as a force multiplier for European defense against Russian imperialism. A weakened Ukraine would invite greater Russian aggression toward NATO and across the Black Sea. Europe’s standing as a strategic actor on the global stage will be directly influenced by how Ukraine’s future unfolds.

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