Insights, analysis and must reads from CNN's Fareed Zakaria and the Global Public Square team, compiled by Global Briefing editor Chris Good Seeing this newsletter as a forward? Sign up here. November 1, 2024 |
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Fareed: After the Last Presidential Election, US Democracy Faced a Close Call |
The Jan. 6 riot at the US Capitol resulted in death and property destruction. But for US democracy, Fareed writes in his latest Washington Post column, something else was very troubling, too.
“To me, the most frightening aspect of what happened on Jan. 6 was not the event outside the Capitol but the one inside it—after the violence had ended and order had been restored,” Fareed writes. “The House reconvened that night to certify the election results that had been sent forward from the states. Remember, this was after dozens of objections in many of the states had been considered and rejected and dozens of court cases had been filed and dismissed. After all those legal procedures had been followed, after a violent assault on the Capitol, Donald Trump and his allies still urged his supporters to reject the results, reject electors, and in effect nullify the election. And a majority of House Republicans—139 of them—readily assented and voted against certifying the election. Had they had enough votes, well, we don’t know what would have happened; it’s possible Trump could have managed to stay on as president.”
As Constitution framer James Madison warned, America’s system of government relies on virtuous people to abide by checks on power and follow explicit rules and traditional norms. Fareed concludes: “We might be about to embark upon an experiment to see whether our institutions, checks and balances can hold, even when leaders try their best to bend them.” |
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The Election and the World |
When it comes to geopolitics—and even US foreign policy—some things are likely to remain constant no matter who wins the US presidential election on Tuesday, the editors of the World Politics Review write. “Those trends include a retrenchment on globalization, as most clearly evidenced by growing trade protectionism and stricter measures limiting immigration,” they write. US foreign policy “is also increasingly defined by geopolitical competition, primarily with China, but also with its autocratic ‘axis’ of Russia, Iran and North Korea.”
Donald Trump and Kamala Harris are, however, wildly different in many ways. They may manage similar problems in similar fashions but with entirely different goals in mind. (The WPR editors note that Trump and Harris might both pursue protectionist trade policies—but Trump views them as part of a larger isolationist agenda, while Harris likely views them as temporary fixes.) Harris would represent a continuation of President Joe Biden’s “pragmatic realism” and support for global democracy and human rights. The less-predictable Trump would make democracy abroad a “non-issue.”
The Financial Times’ editorial board offers a survey perspective: “Trump is hostile to Nato and friendly to Russia’s Vladimir Putin. His consistent admiration for the Kremlin strongman bodes badly for Ukraine … The Trump effect on China is less predictable. He would be as likely to strike a deal with Xi Jinping as to target full US-China decoupling. The only given about Trump’s approach to the Indo-Pacific is his allergy to alliances. … Nations of all sizes could … abandon hope of further US involvement in collective action against global warming. … In contrast to the upheavals promised by Trump, Harris represents business as usual. … The switch to renewable energy, a central plank of her agenda, would be a service to America and the world.” |
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What the US Election Could Mean for Latin America |
This being a global-affairs newsletter, it’s worth looking more closely at different regions of the world and what effects the US election might have on them.
Beginning with Latin America: Immigration at the US–Mexico border looms as a major policy difference between Trump, who has promised mass deportations, and Harris, who has pointed to the bipartisan immigration-reform bill scuttled by pro-Trump congressional Republicans (which would have tightened some restrictions) as a policy solution.
But for most of the region, trade and political affinities loom larger. Harris’ climate-friendly policies could be better for Latin American commodities exporters, whose raw materials can be used to build green-energy infrastructure like wind turbines, Alfonso Blanco and Michael Kerns write for the advisory firm BNamericas. Trump’s protectionism could see manufacturing relocation to Mexico slow down. Changes to trade arrangements would affect each regional economy differently. Trump’s right-wing populism and Harris’ traditional center-left politics would naturally win more affinity from different sets of Latin American leaders.
The Economist Intelligence Unit makes broad predictions: “If the Republican candidate, Donald Trump, wins the election, [Latin America] will face slower economic growth, higher inflation, steeper borrowing costs and more complicated foreign relations, especially regarding China. If the Democratic candidate, Kamala Harris, wins instead, the regional outlook would be far more benign, although we would still expect some tightening of US policies on immigration and China. Mexico and Central America would be the most vulnerable to dramatic shifts in US policy following the election, whereas South American economies would be more insulated.” |
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Western Europe, as Le Monde’s Sylvie Kauffmann reminds us, is no fan of Trump: “the Republican candidate's ‘discursive style’ is not only confusing, it’s completely off the rails,” Kauffmann laments.
There is some reason to think parts of Eastern Europe hold a more favorable view of Trump than Western Europe does—with the exception of countries acutely concerned about Russian aggression and the war in Ukraine. The Trumpist American right has warmed to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, for instance. Still, Joerg Forbrig and Daniel Hegedüs wrote for the German Marshall Fund (before Harris became the Democratic standard-bearer) that the rift between Washington and Western Europe during Trump’s first term put some Eastern European countries under pressure to choose between the US and EU. That pressure could return if Trump wins.
Harris represents continuity with Biden and traditional transatlanticism—and continued support for Ukraine. Trump has promised to end that war swiftly, and some fear a lopsided settlement favorable to Russia. Steven Erlanger, The New York Times’ chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe, tells the paper’s Natasha Frost and Justin Porter: “The biggest issue is national security, which is for Europe, really, Ukraine and NATO. The two are connected. There is anxiety over Trump, because he is, on many issues, rhetorically firm, but actually unpredictable. He thinks that NATO is a club that people have to pay dues to, and nobody’s paying enough—and America’s being the chump. Some worry that if Trump, for example, starts saying he doesn’t believe in NATO, or won’t defend a member that isn’t spending enough on defense, he’ll undermine NATO’s credibility and the faith in Article 5. That flows into the next real worry, which is Ukraine. If Ukraine falls, Russia’s on the Polish border.” Some in Ukraine are pulling for Harris for that very reason, writes the BBC’s James Waterhouse.
At the European Union Institute for Security Studies, Giuseppe Spatafora and Christian Dietrich supply a helpful interactive map detailing potential US-election implications on various European hotspots and issues. On security and NATO, they write: “The two candidates’ positions on European defence are almost diametrically opposed. Trump has repeatedly threatened to withdraw from NATO, and not to defend allies who do not spend enough on defence. A second Trump administration may pursue a ‘dormant NATO’ policy. Harris, on the other hand, has reaffirmed American support for European allies. However, Biden was the last ‘Atlanticist’ US president, and the shift in resources towards the Indo-Pacific is likely to continue. Therefore, regardless of who wins in November, we might see a decline in US commitments, although the shift would be more drastic under a second Trump term.” |
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Given Trump’s trade-and-tech war with China—and Biden’s broad continuation of it, keeping Trump’s tariffs and enacting new restrictions on Chinese semiconductors—China is top of mind when it comes to the US vote and Asia.
But some don’t foresee a big difference for China, either way. In Washington, Democrats and Republicans appear broadly aligned on protectionist and at times confrontational China policies. “[I]n China,” CNN’s Simone McCarthy writes, there is “a sense that no matter who wins, the tensions of the US-China relationship will remain. … [C]onsensus in China—from policymakers down to regular citizens—that the die is cast for a US administration that wants to constrain China’s rise on the global stage, regardless of” who wins the White House. On trade, Trump has proposed new 60% tariffs on goods from China. Bloomberg reports that Goldman Sachs economists think that policy would nudge Beijing to focus more on boosting domestic Chinese consumer demand.
The Economist Intelligence Unit suggests Southeast Asia could find itself in tariff crosshairs, too, if Trump wins. US allies like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan could be pushed to spend more on defense (and on US arms).
As for India, Vrinda Sahai writes for The Diplomat that New Delhi appears confident it can get along with either Trump or Harris. Both candidates are expected to move US importers away from Chinese supply chains, Sahai writes, which means new opportunities could open up for India either way. |
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“Both Kamala Harris and Donald Trump are following a trend in the US presidential election well-known by Africans, with neither candidate making US-Africa relations a major election issue,” Silja Fröhlich writes for the German public outlet Deutsche Welle. Under Harris, African countries would likely face more pressure on democracy and LGBTQ rights.
Foreign Policy’s Nosmot Gbadamosi writes: “Security analysts suggest that a win for former President Donald Trump … could prioritize aggressive military solutions over humanitarian assistance. But as Islamist insurgencies by groups linked to al Qaeda ramp up in the Sahel, the threat to U.S. national security could lead a Harris administration to adopt the same policies.”
As in other developing regions, countries in Africa could face enhanced pressure to pick sides between the US and its adversaries—particularly if Harris wins, suggests New York Times Johannesburg bureau chief John Eligon: “South Africa is feeling a push and pull between the West, where it has the strongest economic ties, and the alliance of BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, among others). It seems plausible that if Trump wins, he will be much more isolationist, and might have no problem watching countries like South Africa and Ethiopia draw even closer to BRICS.” |
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American Arab and Muslim voters could play a consequential role in the US election. At Middle East Eye, Azad Essa and Umar A. Farooq write that in the key battleground state of Michigan, 62-year-old Saad Husain plans to vote for Green Party presidential candidate Jill Stein—and “says he has watched with horror over the past year as Biden, who was referred to by many as the ‘lesser evil’, signed off on the most military aid any US administration has ever sent to Israel as it massacred Palestinians by the tens of thousands in Gaza.”
Of course, some say turning away from Harris is self-defeating: The Atlantic’s Hussein Ibish recalls Trump’s desire to ban Muslims from entering the US, a plan that materialized in travel bans on seven Muslim-majority countries. Over the summer, Harris took a tougher line on Israel than Biden has, “telling Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to seal a peace deal and insisting she would not be ‘silent’ on the suffering in the Palestinian enclave,” Le Monde and AFP noted. But in a broad Middle East policy comparison at the Middle East Institute, Brian Katulis and Athena Masthoff write that Harris has not offered “any major differences of views with the Biden administration on its Middle East approach.”
Trump, viewed as a political ally of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, offered some indication that he could be more supportive of Israeli war policies. At Foreign Policy, David E. Rosenberg wonders if that’s really the case, writing: “In the first few months of the Israel-Hamas war, Trump spoke about the need to ‘finish up your war’ and ‘get it done quickly.’ In the September debate with Harris, he said, ‘I will get that settled and fast.’ More recently, he has moved a little more in the direction of supporting the war effort, telling Netanyahu in a phone call, ‘Do what you have to do.’ But Trump has never spoken of the ‘total victory,’ which Netanyahu says is Israel’s goal.”
The Middle East Institute’s Katulis and Masthoff sum it up: “Trump and Harris both have called for the war in Gaza to come to an end. Harris has focused more on a cease-fire and hostage-release deal that the Biden administration has sought to advance for the past few months, while Trump’s main message has focused on making sure Israel achieves ‘victory,’ without offering much detail. Both candidates support efforts to advance normalization and regional integration deals like the proposed Israel-Saudi normalization accord.” Foreign Policy’s Amy Mackinnon writes: “In a briefing hosted by the Jerusalem Press Club in September, Israeli analyst Shmuel Rosner likened the two presidential candidates to different types of investments. ‘Do we prefer the solid state bond that’s Harris, or the high-risk high-reward hedge fund that’s Donald Trump?’”
For Iran, the story is different, with Trump expected to return Washington to a “maximum pressure” strategy if he wins, as Reuters’ Samia Nakhoul and Parisa Hafezi write: “Iran’s main concern is the potential for Trump to empower Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to strike Iran’s nuclear sites, conduct targeted assassinations and reimpose his ‘maximum pressure policy’ through heightened sanctions on their oil industry, according to Iranian, Arab and Western officials. They anticipate that Trump, who was president in 2017-21, will exert utmost pressure on Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to cave in by accepting a nuclear containment deal on terms set by himself and Israel.” |
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