The National Interest
November 28, 2024
Why the North Korea-Russia Alliance Is a Grave Threat
In this volatile and extremely uncertain landscape, South Korea has little to gain and much to lose by taking premature action that might harm its national interests.
by Byong-Chul Lee
The deployment of North Korean troops to support Russia in the war with Ukraine, once speculative, is now confirmed. Russia has stopped short of outright denial that North Korean soldiers are already on Russian soil, positioned to aid the Kremlin’s efforts on the Ukrainian front.
On October 25, President Vladimir Putin revealed that under a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty signed with North Korea this past June, discussions are underway to determine if, and to what extent, Pyongyang might further assist Moscow. North Korea’s foreign ministry also commented on this possibility, stating that if North Korean forces are deployed, their actions would align with “international legal norms.”
This convergence between Russia and North Korea is unsurprising, but it is also deeply troubling.
Since the onset of Russia’s invasion in February 2022, North Korea has remained one of Moscow’s staunchest supporters. During a UN General Assembly emergency special session on March 2, 2022, North Korea joined a small group of countries opposing a resolution condemning Russia’s aggression. In early 2023, Kim Yo-jong, sister to Kim Jong-un, went further, mocking the Ukrainian government, suggesting that they were “no match for Russia” and warning that their nuclear “delusions” could make them a target for Russian nuclear strikes.
After the failed 2019 Hanoi summit with then-President Trump, Kim Jong-un abandoned the United States as a central player in his strategic calculus.
In the meantime, South Korea’s response has been unusually proactive. On October 22, Deputy National Security Advisor Kim Tae-hyo announced that South Korea would take “phased response measures” in reaction to this deepening North Korea-Russia military cooperation. While the specifics remain undisclosed, the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol government of South Korea seems ready to expand its support for Ukraine, potentially even considering military aid.
Any notion of a quick end to this conflict is, however, unrealistic. The situation feels disturbingly reminiscent of the interwar period (1919–1939) between the world wars. The outlook for Ukraine remains unclear, with President Biden unlikely to achieve a resolution before his term ends. Meanwhile, Russia continues to launch relentless missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure, further destabilizing the region.
When U.S. President-elect Donald Trump returns to the White House in 2025, Ukraine may face an even more uncertain future. The soon-to-be forty-seventh president has claimed he could end the war “in twenty-four hours,” a promise many assume implies the withdrawal of American aid for Ukraine if re-elected, but has offered no further details. Not surprisingly, his unpredictable approach and apparent rapport with President Putin could result in a peace deal favoring Russia.
At the same time, we see early signs that Western nations, including the United States, are exploring more direct actions against Russia. This is a testament to the breakdown of the post-Cold War, U.S.-led unipolar order, and the emergence of a multipolar world marked by heightened instability.
In this volatile and extremely uncertain landscape, South Korea has little to gain and much to lose by taking premature action that might harm its national interests. Shattering over three decades of diplomatic relations with Russia to support Ukraine’s uncertain future is an imprudent gamble. Even during tough economic times in the 1970s, South Korea avoided such reckless moves.
History offers a cautionary tale. During the Vietnam War, Seoul sent some of its most elite units to aid the defense of South Vietnam, a decision driven by national interests and economic needs.
Today, South Korea’s national strength is considerably greater, and North Korea is a nuclear-armed state with considerable conventional forces. Therefore, South Korea’s foreign policy should be based on strategic calculation, not knee-jerk responses to shifting global pressures.
There is also a real risk that the Seoul government may resort to reactive, short-term measures in response to what can only be described as the “absurdity of diplomacy” between Kim Jong-un and Putin. Instead, South Korea must prioritize de-escalation and careful management of inter-Korean tensions. South Korean decision-makers, most of whom are relatively hawkish, should exercise particular caution, as missteps could destabilize an already precarious situation.
Reckless foreign policy actions that prioritize values over national interests may sound noble, but they are the stuff of second-rate strategies. In a sense, North Korea likely views this conflict as an opportunity to advance its military capabilities and potentially deceive international watchdogs like the IAEA. As part of its growing alliance with Moscow, the communist regime in North Korea may be poised to receive advanced military technology, including intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology and satellite reconnaissance capabilities. These developments could dramatically boost its nuclear program. If North Korea-Russia cooperation solidifies into a full-fledged military alliance, akin to the U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty, it could seriously destabilize Northeast Asia.
For Pyongyang, which appears to be determined to pull up the drawbridge between the two Koreas, the Ukraine war presents a strategic opportunity. The chances of voluntary denuclearization are now effectively zero. In this climate of deepening “adversarial duality” between North Korea and the rest of the world, we cannot ignore the “inconvenient truths” we now face: the end of unipolarity, the hardening of geopolitical blocs, and North Korea’s relentless nuclear advancements. These realities make the growing North Korea-Russia alliance a serious and immediate threat.
In a rapidly changing global structure, it is no coincidence that Mr. Kim has set his survival strategy on the “two hostile states” doctrine, shifting his diplomatic pendulum from President Xi Jinping to Putin. However, this doesn’t mean that North Korea can entirely replace China with Russia. While it’s not a mechanical equidistant diplomacy akin to the Sino-Soviet split, Kim’s choice of Russia over China appears aimed at advancing nuclear capabilities. The essence of nuclear weapons has evolved from being contained within U.S.-led nonproliferation norms to a kind of chess game involving major powers like the United States, Russia, and China.
All in all, the North Korean nuclear equation has grown more complex, making it harder to untangle. The UN Security Council’s role has also become ineffective.
The North Korean nuclear issue is a dependent variable within the competitive dynamics of great powers. The war in Ukraine vividly illustrates this shift toward a multipolar world. Both denuclearization and unification, which are the starting points for strengthening the peace and stability in the region, have ultimately become challenges that our generation is unlikely to resolve.
Byong-Chul Lee is an Assistant Professor at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES) in Seoul, South Korea. His research interests include North Korean denuclearization, nuclear non-proliferation, and policies on ROK-US relations. Before joining the IFES, Dr. Lee worked as an aide to the Presidential Senior Secretary for Foreign and National Security Affairs and served as a foreign and national security policy planning staff member at the Presidential Office of South Korea from 1993 to 1999. He also served as a special aide and policy planning secretary to the Speaker of the National Assembly from 2015 to 2016. His op-eds and comments have appeared in The New York Times, 38North, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, YaleGlobal, Project Syndicate, and The South China Morning Post, among other publications.
The National Interest
November 28, 2024
Why the North Korea-Russia Alliance Is a Grave Threat
In this volatile and extremely uncertain landscape, South Korea has little to gain and much to lose by taking premature action that might harm its national interests.
by Byong-Chul Lee
The deployment of North Korean troops to support Russia in the war with Ukraine, once speculative, is now confirmed. Russia has stopped short of outright denial that North Korean soldiers are already on Russian soil, positioned to aid the Kremlin’s efforts on the Ukrainian front.
On October 25, President Vladimir Putin revealed that under a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty signed with North Korea this past June, discussions are underway to determine if, and to what extent, Pyongyang might further assist Moscow. North Korea’s foreign ministry also commented on this possibility, stating that if North Korean forces are deployed, their actions would align with “international legal norms.”
This convergence between Russia and North Korea is unsurprising, but it is also deeply troubling.
Since the onset of Russia’s invasion in February 2022, North Korea has remained one of Moscow’s staunchest supporters. During a UN General Assembly emergency special session on March 2, 2022, North Korea joined a small group of countries opposing a resolution condemning Russia’s aggression. In early 2023, Kim Yo-jong, sister to Kim Jong-un, went further, mocking the Ukrainian government, suggesting that they were “no match for Russia” and warning that their nuclear “delusions” could make them a target for Russian nuclear strikes.
After the failed 2019 Hanoi summit with then-President Trump, Kim Jong-un abandoned the United States as a central player in his strategic calculus.
In the meantime, South Korea’s response has been unusually proactive. On October 22, Deputy National Security Advisor Kim Tae-hyo announced that South Korea would take “phased response measures” in reaction to this deepening North Korea-Russia military cooperation. While the specifics remain undisclosed, the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol government of South Korea seems ready to expand its support for Ukraine, potentially even considering military aid.
Any notion of a quick end to this conflict is, however, unrealistic. The situation feels disturbingly reminiscent of the interwar period (1919–1939) between the world wars. The outlook for Ukraine remains unclear, with President Biden unlikely to achieve a resolution before his term ends. Meanwhile, Russia continues to launch relentless missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure, further destabilizing the region.
When U.S. President-elect Donald Trump returns to the White House in 2025, Ukraine may face an even more uncertain future. The soon-to-be forty-seventh president has claimed he could end the war “in twenty-four hours,” a promise many assume implies the withdrawal of American aid for Ukraine if re-elected, but has offered no further details. Not surprisingly, his unpredictable approach and apparent rapport with President Putin could result in a peace deal favoring Russia.
At the same time, we see early signs that Western nations, including the United States, are exploring more direct actions against Russia. This is a testament to the breakdown of the post-Cold War, U.S.-led unipolar order, and the emergence of a multipolar world marked by heightened instability.
In this volatile and extremely uncertain landscape, South Korea has little to gain and much to lose by taking premature action that might harm its national interests. Shattering over three decades of diplomatic relations with Russia to support Ukraine’s uncertain future is an imprudent gamble. Even during tough economic times in the 1970s, South Korea avoided such reckless moves.
History offers a cautionary tale. During the Vietnam War, Seoul sent some of its most elite units to aid the defense of South Vietnam, a decision driven by national interests and economic needs.
Today, South Korea’s national strength is considerably greater, and North Korea is a nuclear-armed state with considerable conventional forces. Therefore, South Korea’s foreign policy should be based on strategic calculation, not knee-jerk responses to shifting global pressures.
There is also a real risk that the Seoul government may resort to reactive, short-term measures in response to what can only be described as the “absurdity of diplomacy” between Kim Jong-un and Putin. Instead, South Korea must prioritize de-escalation and careful management of inter-Korean tensions. South Korean decision-makers, most of whom are relatively hawkish, should exercise particular caution, as missteps could destabilize an already precarious situation.
Reckless foreign policy actions that prioritize values over national interests may sound noble, but they are the stuff of second-rate strategies. In a sense, North Korea likely views this conflict as an opportunity to advance its military capabilities and potentially deceive international watchdogs like the IAEA. As part of its growing alliance with Moscow, the communist regime in North Korea may be poised to receive advanced military technology, including intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology and satellite reconnaissance capabilities. These developments could dramatically boost its nuclear program. If North Korea-Russia cooperation solidifies into a full-fledged military alliance, akin to the U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty, it could seriously destabilize Northeast Asia.
For Pyongyang, which appears to be determined to pull up the drawbridge between the two Koreas, the Ukraine war presents a strategic opportunity. The chances of voluntary denuclearization are now effectively zero. In this climate of deepening “adversarial duality” between North Korea and the rest of the world, we cannot ignore the “inconvenient truths” we now face: the end of unipolarity, the hardening of geopolitical blocs, and North Korea’s relentless nuclear advancements. These realities make the growing North Korea-Russia alliance a serious and immediate threat.
In a rapidly changing global structure, it is no coincidence that Mr. Kim has set his survival strategy on the “two hostile states” doctrine, shifting his diplomatic pendulum from President Xi Jinping to Putin. However, this doesn’t mean that North Korea can entirely replace China with Russia. While it’s not a mechanical equidistant diplomacy akin to the Sino-Soviet split, Kim’s choice of Russia over China appears aimed at advancing nuclear capabilities. The essence of nuclear weapons has evolved from being contained within U.S.-led nonproliferation norms to a kind of chess game involving major powers like the United States, Russia, and China.
All in all, the North Korean nuclear equation has grown more complex, making it harder to untangle. The UN Security Council’s role has also become ineffective.
The North Korean nuclear issue is a dependent variable within the competitive dynamics of great powers. The war in Ukraine vividly illustrates this shift toward a multipolar world. Both denuclearization and unification, which are the starting points for strengthening the peace and stability in the region, have ultimately become challenges that our generation is unlikely to resolve.
Byong-Chul Lee is an Assistant Professor at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES) in Seoul, South Korea. His research interests include North Korean denuclearization, nuclear non-proliferation, and policies on ROK-US relations. Before joining the IFES, Dr. Lee worked as an aide to the Presidential Senior Secretary for Foreign and National Security Affairs and served as a foreign and national security policy planning staff member at the Presidential Office of South Korea from 1993 to 1999. He also served as a special aide and policy planning secretary to the Speaker of the National Assembly from 2015 to 2016. His op-eds and comments have appeared in The New York Times, 38North, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, YaleGlobal, Project Syndicate, and The South China Morning Post, among other publications.
