Seizing the assets of Russian oligarchs

 Seizing the assets of Russian oligarchs

BRANKO MILANOVIC 25th April 2022

The episode has proved, Branko Milanovic writes, that Russia is not ruled by a few rich men but by a single autocrat.

Russia,Putin,assets,oligarchs

From have-yacht to have-not: the German federal police this month impounded in Hamburg the Dilbar, owned by a sister of the sanctioned Russian oligarch Alisher Usmanov (M J W / shutterstock.com)

The threat of confiscation of Russian oligarchs’ assets has been floated since at least December of 2021, around the time Russia issued its ultimatum to the United States and began the military manoeuvres around Ukraine’s borders. The assets were then ‘frozen’ (or even confiscated) by the US and a number of mostly European countries after the Russian invasion began on February 24th. What lessons can be drawn so far?

The first lesson we can learn from the confiscations is that before February 24th Russia was not an oligarchy, as many people believed, but an autocracy. Rather than being ruled by a few rich people, it was ruled by one person.

To draw this (rather obvious) conclusion, we need to go back to the initial rationale given for the threat of asset seizure. The US government ventured the idea before the war and with the expectation that the oligarchs, faced with the prospect of losing most of their money, would exert pressure on the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, not to invade.  

We can assume that 99 per cent, perhaps all, of the targeted oligarchs (and those who feared they might be) realised the stakes and were against the war. But if so their influence was, as we now know, zero.

So, ironically and perhaps paradoxically, they were punished not because they were powerful but because they were not. If their sway over such an important matter, on which their entire assets and lifestyle depended, was nil, then the system was clearly not a plutocracy, but a dictatorship.

Political fiat

There is a distinction to be made between the early and more recent Russian billionaires. The former, beneficiaries of the privatisations when the Soviet Union collapsed, controlled the political system. The late Boris Berezovsky, who gained control of the main public television channel, brought Putin to the attention of his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, because he thought Putin could be easily manipulated.

The more recent oligarchs have by contrast been treated as custodians of assets which the state might, by political fiat, take from them at any time. As it happened, it was not the Russian state which seized these but the American one (along with some others). It did so precisely because it thought, probably not accurately in all cases, that these billionaires were ‘state oligarchs’.

This is the lesson as to the nature of the Russian political system. As to the implications of the seizure of assets, these are of two kinds: global and Russia-specific.

Much less sure

The global implication is that plutocrats who in the past often moved their money from their own countries to the ‘safe havens’ of the US, the United Kingdom and Europe will be much less sure that such decisions make sense. This applies in the most obvious way to the Chinese billionaires who might experience the same fate as their Russian counterparts. But it may also apply to many others.

The frequent use of economic and financial coercion means that if there are political tensions between the west and (say) Nigeria or South Africa or Venezuela, the same recipe will be applied to the billionaires from these countries, whether simply as a punishment or out of an expectation that they should influence the policy of their governments. Under such conditions, they would be very unwise to keep their money in places where it may be as insecure as at home.

We can thus expect the growth of other financial centres, perhaps in Gulf states and India. Financial fragmentation would be driven not only by the fears of billionaires but by those of potential US adversaries, such as China, that their governments’ and central banks’ assets might too prove to be just pieces of paper.

Complete power

What are the likely implications for Russia? Here we have to take a longer-term view, and to look past the Putin regime. The conclusion that billionaires and people close to power will draw is one that was drawn a few times in Russian/Soviet history—only to be forgotten.

But let’s leave aside the ancient conflicts between the boyars of the feudal nobility and the tsar. Consider just the similarities with Josef Stalin’s regime. Stalin was able, through skillful manoeuvring, to move from being a ‘grey blur’ (as his assassinated adversary Leon Trotsky put it) to acquisition of complete power—including, in his final years, over the Communist Party’s Politburo.

Putin has not yet started executing people around him, but he has shown that politically they do not matter at all. The conclusion to be drawn, I believe, by future Russian oligarchs (including the top figures in state-owned companies, formerly known as ‘the red directors’) is that made by the Politburo members after Stalin’s death: it is better to have a collective leadership, where individual ambition will be checked, than to let one person assume full power.

The oligarchs to come will realise they can stick together or they will hang together. Under Yeltsin, when they did dictate policy, they preferred to fight each other. They brought the country close to anarchy and even civil war, and in so doing facilitated the rise of Putin, who introduced some order.

Economic logic

For the other implication it is also useful to go back in time. During the early privatisations in the 1990s, it was typically asserted that no matter who got the privatised assets, they would have an incentive to fight for the rule of law, simply to protect their gains. Politically, the Communists would thus not be able to return to power.

Comparison was made with the plutocratic ‘robber barons’ of late-19th and early-20th-century America. They often became rich by dubious means but they had an interest in fighting for the safety of property once they got rich. The expectation was that the Russian billionaires would do the same.

These expectations were however upended by the billionaires finding a (seemingly) much better way to make their money safe—move it to the west and invest in real estate, companies, football clubs or just buy yachts. This seemed an excellent decision—all the way through to about eight weeks ago.

The new, post-Putin billionaires will probably not forget that lesson. So we may expect them to favour the creation of a true oligarchy (rather than allow for another autocracy), and to insist on the domestic rule of law—just because they will no longer have any place else to which they can move their wealth.

This is a joint publication by Social Europe and IPS-Journal

BRANKO MILANOVIC

Branko Milanovic is a Serbian-American economist. A development and inequality specialist, he is visiting presidential professor at the Graduate Center of City University of New York and an affiliated senior scholar at the Luxembourg Income Study. He was formerly lead economist in the World Bank's research department.

ABD'nin Atina BE Geoffrey R. Pyatt'ın Kathimerini gazetesine mülakatı

 

INTERVIEWSGEOFFREY PYATT

US helped keep Aegean crisis from spiraling out of control

Outgoing American ambassador speaks to Kathimerini about tensions with Turkey, the Ukraine crisis and the Greek PM’s upcoming meeting with Biden

Geoffrey R. Pyatt is expected to assume the role of assistant secretary of state for energy resources, one of the most important portfolios of the State Department at this time, which will also allow him to continue working with Greece. [InTime News]

Tom Ellis

30.04.2022 • 11:00

•  
•  

In the summer of 2020 Greece and Turkey were on the brink of open conflict, which required putting “a lot of energy into helping to keep things from spiraling out of control,” stresses outgoing United States Ambassador to Greece Geoffrey R. Pyatt in an interview with Kathimerini, noting that the situation was far more dramatic than what was shown by the news media.

He also mentions the unacceptable activities, the rhetorical excesses and silly statements made by Turkey on the sovereignty of the Greek islands, while also suggesting that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization acts as a security guarantee to Greece by the United States with respect to Turkey.

Pyatt also speaks of the strengthening of US-Greek relations during his five and a half years in Athens, a development that unfolded over three US and two Greek governments, proving the across-the-aisle and widespread support for this endeavor. It also underlines Greece’s strategic value, with the ambassador stressing that “Greece is a core part of the West.”

The 58-year-old career diplomat, who is expected to assume the role of assistant secretary of state for energy resources (one of the most important portfolios of the State Department at this time, which will also allow him to continue working with Greece), also discusses the imminent meeting of Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis with US President Joe Biden in Washington, the war in Ukraine, which he says is a “battle between good and evil,” while he believes that it is incomprehensible for anyone to feel sympathy for Russian actions. Finally, he discusses Greece’s cautious approach to energy issues, pointing out that it is far less vulnerable than Germany and other European countries.

You had a long tenure in Athens. Five and a half years, three US administrations, two Greek governments, and the whole ideological spectrum. Was it difficult? Was it useful?

I will leave the judgments about utility and difficulty to the historians. I will say that I don’t think anything that’s happened in our relationship on either side, through any of the five governments involved, has happened by accident. It has taken hard work from both sides to get us where we are. I’m very proud of the team at the embassy here, during my tenure, and the sense of mission and dedication that they demonstrated and the creativity that they brought to the task. I’ve been privileged to have had outstanding Greek interlocutors through multiple governments, and I’m very grateful for the access and the respect and the collegiality they demonstrated. They’re all very different in so many ways. I’m very optimistic about what the future holds, because of the architecture and the institutions that we’ve established and that’s the ultimate measure of success in these jobs. I’m very grateful personally for the commitment that the prime minister has demonstrated to us, but also for his real hospitality. I’ve been really privileged to be here at this particular time and to be part of a story of rebirth. But also to be here for long enough that I can actually measure a very specific way, how different things look today, compared to what they did in September of 2016.

Can you take us through the two meetings the two Greek prime ministers had with former US presidents?

Very different. Also came at different times. One of the things that I’m quite proud is of that bipartisan commitment that we have seen to the US-Greece relationship, Republicans and Democrats. Everybody knows President Biden’s commitment to this relationship, Tony Blinken’s, Senator Menendez’ commitment to this relationship, but it’s also really important that we were able to have the kind of support that we had from Mike Pompeo, from Chairman Risch and Chairman Corker before him. That’s something Greeks should not take for granted. Because at a time when American politics has been very divisive, there are relatively few issues that have enjoyed the kind of bipartisan support that the US-Greece relationship is founded upon. That support is rooted in our shared values, but it’s also rooted in an active and increasingly activist diaspora, the relationship between Greece and Israel. So, I think both meetings that I was part of were premised on the idea that the United States wants a strong economically healthy, militarily secure, socially stable Greece, something that advances American interests because of how we look at this part of the world.

That might have been a given with Obama or Biden, but I was wondering if you were worried, under the Trump administration or Trump personally, about what might happen?

I’ll just say I got a lot done in the US-Greece relationship, working for Mike Pompeo, working with Wilbur Ross, with General Mattis. I will let the historians judge how much of that progress depended on having the right advice coming from the team at the Athens Embassy, but what I will say is I think there is nobody who would have assumed in January of 2017 that things would progress as strongly and as positively as they did in the subsequent four years. Concerning all these administrations and governments, meetings at that level, if you’re the guy on the ground, you’re always anxious. There is a lot at stake and because of how our government is organized, those kind of meetings can have a dramatic impact. And I’m proud to say that, by and large, the impact has been for the good.

About Prime Minister Mitsotakis’ trip to Washington in January 2020, we were extraordinarily lucky about the fact that it happened before the pandemic because it gave us a huge burst of positive momentum.

In a recent interview with Mike Pompeo, he mentioned the summer of 2020, noting that he was on the phone with his ambassadors in Athens and Ankara. Did Greece and Turkey come close to a confrontation?

Certainly it felt to be as severe a crisis as the countries have encountered since Imia in 96, and I’ve lived many other incidents between the countries. But this was different because the stakes were very high, the risks of miscalculation were extraordinarily high and you actually had a military accident that could have gone catastrophically wrong with just a slightly different set of circumstances. So Secretary Pompeo shared with you how intensively we all worked on this and how it had grabbed his attention at the most senior levels of the Trump administration.

To share a story, when the secretary called me and said he was proposing to come to Greece, I said: “That’s great, Mr Secretary, but let me try an idea out on you. Instead of coming to Athens, why don’t I take you to Thessaloniki, which no secretary of state in history has ever done before? As long as you’re coming all this way, please also go to Souda Bay, because I want you to see how much we’re doing together in our military relationship.” But part of the choice of Souda Bay was also to demonstrate US engagement and US presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, because Souda is that much closer to where the crisis threatened to erupt. It was a very good place to talk about our interests, visibly Libya, about our concern for some of these issues of maritime delimitation in the Eastern Mediterranean and our interest in seeing all of these issues resolved on the basis of international law and not on the basis of provocative, unilateral military actions. So that was a very important part of the diplomatic story as well. But one thing that I’m proud of is the very strong partnership with the Ankara embassy and the work that I have done. And now I was really pleased that we were able to get Jeff Flake to come here to Athens and to Delphi so early in his tenure. And he had extremely positive encounters with Prime Minister Mitsotakis and Foreign Minister Dendias. And I think he got a strong sense of both how much possibility there is around the US-Greece relationship, how anxious people in Greece are about some of these unresolved maritime issues, and the importance of American engagement and American diplomacy to keep things as they should be between NATO allies. So, that was very beneficial. The partnership between the two embassies is something that’s very important. I’ve encouraged George Tsounis to invest in the same because it’s really important that we work together.

Things have dramatically improved from what they were in the summer of 2020, when it was more severe than what’s sometimes understood in the press.

Did we come close to war, to put it bluntly?

I think you have to ask the governments that. And certainly the United States. You heard from Secretary Pompeo we thought it was a very severe crisis and we put a lot of energy into helping to keep things from spiraling out of control. The circumstances today are dramatically improved, even with all of the continued unacceptable activities, the overflights, the rhetorical excesses, the silly statements questioning the sovereignty of islands, which from an American standpoint is unquestionable.

The strategic landscape around the Aegean, the Black Sea, Asia Minor has changed dramatically since February 24, and I think the developments in Ukraine make it even more important to the United States to do everything that we can to make sure that Turkey behaves as a good NATO ally vis-a-vis all its neighbors. And again, this is not the time when we need distractions, whether generated by politics or rhetoric or military maneuvers.

A message to your successor, Ambassador Tsounis?

The most important thing I told him was: “You’re inheriting an extraordinary embassy staff. Listen to them, empower them and you can’t go wrong.” It’s really true. I’m very proud of the team that we put together. I would also encourage him to get out of Athens. There is so much to discover in Greece outside of Athens and Greek politics tends to be Athenian-driven but there is so much to discover both in terms of some of the economic issues and investment issues that have importance to us. Obviously continuing to demonstrate the commitment that the US has demonstrated to a very strong business, social, educational presence in Thessaloniki is very important. Alexandroupoli is a whole other story, we will continue as US government to work on the energy connections out there, to be involved in the privatization. Thirdly find opportunities to talk to young people.

Greece is redrawing the energy map

How do you deal, the “day after,” with the leader of a nuclear power whom you described as a war criminal. And also, the West encouraged Ukraine, but offered no security guarantees. Some, including in the US, say the West pushed Russia to act the way it did.

When you say the West, you’re talking about all of us, and one of the things that has changed about Greece, over the time that I’ve been ambassador here, is that today nobody questions the fact that Greece is a core part of the West. In fact, it is right in the middle of the story in terms of shaping the European and transatlantic response to this crisis.

Putin’s actions in Ukraine are a challenge to all of us. Particularly to Greece, as a country which is on NATO’s frontier, which has a deep attachment to the values of democracy that the Ukrainians themselves are fighting for. Greece has a relationship with Ukraine for reasons of history and values and interests. And certainly one of the consequences of this war will be that the center of geopolitics of Europe is going to shift to the East and to the South. I take fundamental issue with anybody who suggests that the responsibility for this war rests with anyone other than Vladimir Putin and his enablers in Moscow. Those saying that somehow overlooked that it is the Ukrainians who have chosen to move towards European institutions. And everything that Vladimir Putin has done since the fall of 2013 has only accelerated that shift in opinion and you have a Ukraine today which is more united than it has ever been and is content to be part of a larger European community.

Former ambassador in Moscow – now CIA director – Bill Burns had noted that NATO’s expansion is seen by all in Russia as a direct challenge.

I will leave the historical judgments to the historians. I will point out the obvious fact that Russia’s borders with NATO are miniscule even today and that it is not the US or Europe which presented the Ukrainians with a “with us or against us” choice. And this I know very well because I lived through it in 2013, which is when the Kremlin went to Viktor Yanukovych and essentially ordered him to abandon the EU association agreement, using a combination of threats and coercion and economic inducements.

You asked how we envision a future relationship with a Russian leadership that has committed war crimes. Frankly, I think it’s too early for that conversation. But one lesson of this crisis and one of its few benefits has been to reaffirm the importance of our transatlantic community. It’s given the Biden administration an opportunity to demonstrate very dramatically Washington’s commitment to our alliance, to consultation with our allies, to working on the whole range of issues that are part of the toolkit of Russian malign influence, not just military and security reinforcement, but also energy security, and energy diversification.

However, Russia is a big player, so how do you find some modus vivendi to go forward if he’s a war criminal?

That’s a question that all of us have to answer together as a transatlantic community. It will depend on the conditions under which the war ends. And we welcome the fact that Foreign Minister Dendias, like so many other European leaders, has spoken so clearly on the issues of war crimes.

Greece has sent military equipment. Some say we could have sent humanitarian aid. Also, what about the significance of Alexandroupoli and other facilities?

First of all, the Greek response. Vitally important. The most important aspect of it was the totally unambiguous position of the prime minister that Greece will be on the right side of history. His clear recognition that this was an issue that transcends Ukraine and goes to the whole question of the international order and what the future is going to look like.

Second, the leadership that the Greek Foreign Ministry exercises, the diplomatic presence in the humanitarian assistance and then the vitally important security assistance is not just symbolic. It’s vitally important that we give Ukrainians the tools to defend themselves. This is the only way to solve the humanitarian crisis.

Then, in terms of facilities, they’ve all been vitally important. Souda Bay is busier than ever. The Harry S Truman carrier battle group has been in Greek waters almost continuously for the past two months. The facilities that we use out of Volos and Stefanovikeio, the UAVs operating out of Larissa and Alexandroupoli, and many others, demonstrating the strategic value of that location and the importance of the agreement that we reached under the MDCA.

A higher percentage of Greeks seem to be more understanding toward Russia.

Reading in newspapers the atrocities they have done, how can you imagine any sympathy for Russia? The rapes, the murders, the basement torture chambers. It’s so heartbreaking that any sympathy or understanding to why Russia was so upset misunderstands the nature of the battle between good and evil that’s unfolding in Ukraine today.

How do you see Greece’s energy presence – moving forward with exploring its own gas reserves, TAP, Revithoussa, IGB, the FSRU in Alexandroupoli? And also, how do you respond to people who say the US is benefiting from pushing Russia off the gas global market?

Concerning your second question. There is much concern in the US among American voters about the price of petrol at the station. This is a political challenge for President Biden, as it is for Prime Minister Mitsotakis and every leader in Europe. So, we are not benefiting from this.

On the question of energy security and energy diversification, bravo to Greece for having identified this priority much earlier than many others in Europe. While Germany was still constructing Nord Stream II and deepening its dependence on Russian gas, Greece was building the TAP pipeline, was expanding Revithoussa, was building the IGB, and was moving ahead with the Alexandroupoli FSRU. All these projects have been important to Greece’s relative energy security at this particular moment, but much more so to the role that Greece is now playing as energy security enabler for its neighbors. In so many ways Greece is redrawing the energy map of Southeastern Europe because Greece is the answer to vulnerability to Russian energy coercion. And the other part of the equation is getting all of our economies off of the dependence on oil and gas. And here too the Greek government has been ahead of the curve. Prime Minister Mitsotakis went all in on renewables, accepting the short-term political cost of energy transition, in part for climate reasons, but now also for energy security reasons.

I think the East Med gas will pass in Europe through Greece. The US strongly supports energy connectivity in the Eastern Mediterranean. That’s one of the reasons we championed the 3+1 process since 2018. It’s clear that the diversification of energy sources has become even more important since the 24th of February, but it’s also important to get that gas to market as quickly as possible. The quickest way is to move it from Israel or Egypt to European markets. Greece is going to play a central role in that, both because of geography, but also because shipowners play such a dominant role in the global LNG trade.

About interconnectors, the United States has spoken very clearly their support for the EuroAsia, the EuroAfrica, and the idea of bringing renewable electricity from Egypt to European markets through Greece.

On the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement. Some people are asking why some islands are not included. Why there are no security guarantees?

In June of 2019, shortly before the elections in Greece, I met with Kyriakos Mitsotakis, who was leader of the opposition. We talked about the elections to come and his determination, if elected, to accelerate and deepen the US-Greece relationship. We talked about the MDCA and I said to him that this was an issue that had been a priority for the US over a number of years ago, and that I also believe that both of our militaries saw advantage in identifying additional facilities, opportunities for further US investment and mechanisms to build even stronger interoperability. Two and a half years now, one of the things I’m proudest of, is how quickly we were able to move on that vision, to sign the amendments. The US has tried to be a good partner with every means of support, but especially with software, especially at a moment when Greece’s strategic neighborhood is not becoming any easier. And it’s a source of confidence for Greece to have this visibly close partnership. Of course, I think there’s more that we can do together and it’s going to be driven first and foremost by the military leaderships in the two countries.

Allow me to come back to the security guarantees. Is it too much to ask of your superpower ally in this difficult neighborhood just described?

There is Article 5. You have heard from President Biden an absolutely unequivocal commitment to it, and the willingness to put US forces, equipment and treasury on the line to reinforce and defend that guarantee.

Even if the threat is from within the Alliance?

Article 5 is the basic foundation of everything that we do in terms of our security relationship with Greece and with NATO.

Ukraine, gas on agenda of Biden-Mitsotakis talks

What will top the agenda of the Biden-Mitsotakis meeting, and how does the president assess Greece’s location and role in light of the war?

I was especially thrilled to see the White House confirm the date for President Biden to host Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in Washington on May 16, 2022. A little over a year ago, President Biden sent a video message to the Greek people to congratulate them on their bicentennial on March 25, 2021. That video message made clear just how much President Biden cares about Greece – in fact, he mentioned how sincerely he wished he would be able to visit Greece again. So, I know how important this invitation was to him personally and how important it was because the entire US government deeply values its relationship with Greece.

The leaders will discuss ongoing efforts with allies and partners to support the people of Ukraine and impose economic costs on Russia for its unprovoked invasion. The prime minister’s visit will give our two leaders the opportunity to have discussions about how we and other NATO allies are working together to give the Ukrainian people the defensive military tools they need to repulse Putin’s brutal campaign. This is in addition to the full range of bilateral issues, including Greece’s admirable response in support of the people of Ukraine, as well as economic cooperation and joint efforts to combat global challenges like climate change and energy security. And of course, it will also provide an opportunity for them to honor the history and democratic values that have formed the foundation of the US-Greek relationship for now more than two centuries.

In addition to the president’s longstanding relationship with Greece, as we know, Greece has enjoyed strong bipartisan support in Washington for many years. Our leadership understands how important a geopolitical role Greece plays in this region. As it relates to the current situation, President Biden has made a very strong commitment to helping facilitate Europe’s very welcome effort to reduce its vulnerability to Russian energy manipulation by diversifying sources and routes for energy supplies. So, our work with Greece on projects like the Alexandroupoli floating regasification unit, the expansion of the Revithoussa Terminal, the gas interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB), Greece-North Macedonia gas interconnector, and the proposed East Mediterranean electricity interconnections offer the prospect of Greece developing its role as a hub for bringing those gas resources to countries in Europe which are much more vulnerable than you are to the manipulation of Russian energy supplies.

I am enormously honored to have recently been nominated by the president to undertake the role of assistant secretary of state for energy resources. If confirmed, I look forward to remaining engaged on energy issues where Greece plays such an important role.

Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, April 29, 2022

 

Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, April 29, 2022

APRIL 29, 2022

•

PRESS BRIEFINGS

James S. Brady Press Briefing Room

2:12 P.M. EDT

MS. PSAKI:  Hi, everyone.  Okay.  A couple items for you at the top. 

President Biden is committed to doing everything he can to address — (staffer pulling chair seat down) — some sticky seats over there —

MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Sorry.  (Laughter.) 

MS. PSAKI:  — to address the pain Americans are feeling at the pump as a result of President Putin’s price hike and his unjustified war’s impact on global fuel supply.

Today, the EPA announced that it is issuing an emergency fuel waiver to allow E15 sales during the summer driving season.  This, of course, is a follow-up to what the President announced in Iowa just two weeks ago. 

The waiver is a critical step to address the fuel supply crisis.  And, again, as I already noted, it’s a follow-up to the announcement from last week, and it will lay out actions to increase the use of biofuels in order to reduce our reliance on fossil fuels, accelerate the clean energy transition, build real U.S. energy independence, support American agriculture and manufacturing, and save Americans money.

At current prices, E15 can save a family 10 cents per gallon of gas on average.  And many stores sell E15 at an even greater discount. 

There’s just over 2,000 gas stations, mostly in the Midwest, where, without this action, the E15 tank — pump would be covered and Americans wouldn’t be able to access it. 

So this builds on the additional steps the President has taken, authorizing the release of 1 million barrels per day from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve for the next six months and the largest release in history; working aro- — and building a coalition around the world to release an additional 60 million barrels. 

I also wanted to give you a little bit of a week ahead — a quick overview for the week ahead. 

As you’re well aware, tomorrow the President and the First Lady will attend the White House Correspondents’ Dinner, where the President will speak.  And I will lower expectations and say it’s not funny at all.  Just kidding.  (Laughter.)  See?

As you — the following day, President Biden will travel to Minneapolis, Minnesota, to attend the memorial service of former Vice President Walter Mondale, who was his friend and mentor. 

On Monday, the President will present the Presidential Rank Awards to 230 winners for 37 federal agencies in a virtual ceremony.  Then, he and the First Lady will host a reception to celebrate Eid in the East Room. 

On Tuesday, the President will travel to Alabama, as we’ve already announced, to visit a Lockheed Martin facility which manufactures weapons systems, such as Javelin anti-tank missiles, which we are providing Ukraine to defend against the Russian invasion.  He will also discuss while he’s there his supplemental funding request, which will help Ukraine defend itself over the long term, support democracy in Ukraine, and address humanitarian needs and economic disruptions due to Putin’s war.

And on Thursday, the President and First Lady will host a Cinco de Mayo reception in the Rose Garden. 

I also wanted to note: Gary Rosenberg — where are you, Gary?  Hello, Gary.  Gary is retiring.  He’s one of the ABC crew members here at the White House.  He is retiring today after 43 years.  (Applause.)  Great, Gary.  So, amazing.  Thank you for your service.  We’re not going to make any connection between your timing and the fact that ABC is reportedly taking Kim Kardashian and Pete Davidson to the dinner.  (Laughter.)  Maybe you’ll have a wild weekend. 

Okay, so let’s get to your questions.  I have, hopefully, a lot of follow-ups to a lot of the supplemental questions you all had yesterday, which I’m sure will come up. 

So, why don’t we get to you, Chris. 

Q    I was going to start with the supplemental, actually.

MS. PSAKI:  Okay, great. 

Q    So, just wanted to look for an update on where things stand with that and also with COVID funding.  How have the conversations gone so far?  And how are things going with Republicans as well in getting their support for some of these measures?

MS. PSAKI:  Sure.  Well, as I noted yesterday: After we put out and announced this request, we have been working full steam ahead in engaging and having discussions with appropriate members, committees, staff about the urgency in moving both of these requests forward.  

The President, of course, put them forward because — together.  And that is his preference: for them to move together, because they are both essential.  There’s urgency to moving them both forward.

If I may — and this may come up as well, but can I give you just a bit of a rundown?  This is to Alex’s questions yesterday of what has been spent from the 13.5. 

Let me just see if I can find this here.  Okay. 

So, we noted and we’ve confirmed for all of you that of the 13.6, we had already spent 3.25 of the security assistance, so $250 million left.  That remains the case. 

The first supplemental also provided roughly $6 billion in direct security — in direct econo- — I mean, that includes — the $6 billion includes that 3.5, as well as economic assistance — all of that in there.  So, 95 percent of that has been exhausted.  And that means that, of course, the $250 million is part of the 5 percent left and also some economic assistance that has not yet been spent from that tranche.

The first supplemental also provided about $4.2 billion for humanitarian assistance, for humanitarian needs globally.  We’ve spent about $600 million of that so far.  So there’s more obviously left in that fund, which is why that — why we have only requested — less than 3 percent of what is in our new request package is for that type of humanitarian assistance, because we have more left and there are more global requests, of course, given the surge of refugees and needs around the world that we anticipate receiving.

And finally, the supplemental also provided $3 billion to support U.S. troop deployments to reinforce NATO territory, which the Department of Defense is using for this purpose.  Of course, they plan ahead.  It doesn’t mean it’s all been spent out, but it has been planned for how it will be spent.

So, as you can tell, the vast majority of what we had requested and what we had received from Congress has been spent, and the humanitarian pieces still left accounts for how we have framed the next package.

Okay, go ahead.

Q    It appears the European Union is preparing a phase-in ban of Russian oil imports.  The U.S. has been a partner in helping the EU to get natural gas.  Is the U.S. committed to helping them get additional crude supplies?  And will that include ways to increase U.S. production and get it over to the European Union?

MS. PSAKI:  Yeah, so as we’ve talked about a little bit this week with the announcement about Russia’s actions as it relates to Poland and Bulgaria, we started a task force last month with Europe to account for and plan for and work to help them diversify their energy needs and account for any steps that Russia may continue to take to weaponize energy.

There has — there was a meeting of that task force –I believe it was yesterday — to have a discussion about how we can continue to work together.  We’ve already taken steps to provide for additional LNG or natural gas resources because we knew and anticipated that for some of these European countries, that was especially going to be a need.

In terms of oil — it’s, of course, a global oil market.  So our effort there in anticipation of any needs was to take steps to provide more supply, whether that was through our own release from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, or the work that the President and his team has done to do the global release — the biggest ever in history.  So, slightly two different things.

But this task force was started in anticipation of these needs.  They already had a meeting.  We’ll continue our work together to help the Europeans with any shortages they have and also to diversify and ease off of Russian reli- — reliance on Russian energy needs (inaudible).

Q    Sure.  On the E15 emergency waiver, it says it will last a statutory maximum of 20 days per the EPA and that you guys will review that as — to see if it’s still needed.

MS. PSAKI:  Yeah.

Q    The industry itself has been calling for it and I think Biden has been supportive of a summer-long lifting of the ban.

I understand there’s reasons why you do the 20 days, but is this administration committed to making E15 available all summer long?

MS. PSAKI:  That is how the President made his announcement and is his indica- — is his intention.  And I would note because it’s available — if you think of the just over 2,000 gas stations where it’s available in the Midwest — largely in the Midwest — without this, the prior regulations would have been — or without the waiver, that basically the E15 pump would be covered and wouldn’t be available.

So, we do anticipate needs continuing for taking additional steps to cut the cost for Americans.  This lowers it for — by about 10 cents for those who use this type of gas.  And this is just another way to do that.

Go ahead.

Q    Vladimir Putin has confirmed that Russia will be attending the G20 Summit.  So could we get a reaction from the White House on that? 

And then, related to that, is there any scenario — you know, anything that could happen between now and six months from now — where the U.S. would actually welcome Russia’s presence at the G20; you know, see it as being constructive or productive for Russia to be a part of that summit?

MS. PSAKI:  Well, there’s a lot that could happen between now and then, but we certainly haven’t seen an indication to date of Russia’s plan to participate in diplomatic talks constructively.

Our hope certainly is that will change — because, obviously, diplomatic talks and conversations is the way to bring an end to this conflict, and President Putin could end this tomorrow, could end this right now. 

But I’m not going to get ahead of what that looks like.  Obviously, this is an ongoing war on the ground.

We have certainly seen those reports.  And we have — the President has expressed publicly his opposition to President Putin attending the G20.  We have welcomed the Ukrainians attending — or invitation to attend the G20.  It is six months away.  So, we don’t — we don’t know how to predict — we can’t predict at this point what that will look like.

Our understanding — and, of course, you could confirm this with the Indonesians, as we have reached out to them privately — is that they did invite them before the invasion.  So any additional step beyond that I would certainly point to them.  But we’ve conveyed our view that we don’t think they should be a part of it publicly and privately as well.

Q    Just on a —

MS. PSAKI:  Oh, go ahead.  Yeah.

Q    — separate matter.

MS. PSAKI:  Sure.

Q    An American citizen and former Marine veteran, Willy Joseph Cancel, was killed this week in Ukraine while fighting alongside Ukrainian forces.  His mother told CNN that he went to Ukraine because he believes in what Ukraine was fighting for.  First of all, is there a message for his family?

MS. PSAKI:  Well, first of all, our hearts go out to his family and loved ones.  We have not officially — we don’t have official confirmation, even though we’ve seen the reports.  But we have not had that official process through the government, so I can’t speak to other specifics about him beyond that.

But, you know, we know Americans are looking for ways to help.  And the reports about this individual were that he’s a veteran; some — he had a child, I believe; and certainly sounded like a very passionate young man. 

We know people want to help, but we do encourage Americans to find other ways to do so rather than traveling to — rather than traveling to Ukraine to fight there.  It is a war zone.  It’s an active war zone.  And we know Americans face significant risks.  But certainly, we know a family is mourning, a wife is mourning, and our hearts are with them.

Q    So any — any other American that is looking to go to Ukraine for the purpose of fighting alongside Ukrainian forces, the U.S.’s message is strictly, “Do not go”?

MS. PSAKI:  Our advice for months now has been that Americans should not travel to Ukraine for any reason.

Go ahead.

Q    In the President’s conversation with the Me- — with AMLO, with the Mexican President, just ended.  Did President Biden make any specific requests of his Mexican counterpart in terms of increasing Mexican either troops or enforcement along either the U.S.-Mexico border or the Mexico border with Central American countries?

MS. PSAKI:  Well, what the focus — I have not received an extensive readout yet.  I know you will receive one probably while I’m up here.  But the majority of the conversation was about migration and was about continued work on coordination, on economic coordination, on taking steps to reduce migration to the border.  And they have been a partner in that over the last several months.

In terms of specific asks, I just don’t have more on that.  But I know, Mike, that one of the follow-ups here will be coordination and discussion at a high level from members of their respective national security teams to continue to work together as we head toward the important meetings coming up in a few weeks.

Q    Yeah, I mean, I think just — as a quick follow-up, I understand that that it just ended and so maybe you don’t have the information now.

MS. PSAKI:  Yeah.

Q    If there’s a way to get more information about the specific question of whether or not the United States has asked.  You’ll remember President Trump pushed the Mexican government to try to — to increase enforcement along the border by threatening tariffs.  Obviously, that’s a different strategy than —

MS. PSAKI:  It’s not our approach.

Q    It probably isn’t your approach.  But it wouldn’t be out of the question to imagine that this government would encourage, pressure, ask the Mexican government to do more, especially on the eve of Title 42 potentially coming down, if it does.

MS. PSAKI:  Well, I think it’s important to remember — I mean, the tone of the call was very constructive.  This was not a call where President Biden was threatening the Mexican President in any way.  They have been an important partner; we expect them to continue to be. 

And this call was planned in part because of the Summit of the Americas but also because of the approaching lifting of Title 42 and the anticipation and expectation from the Department of Homeland Security of the increased influx of migrants trying to come to cross the border.

So — but it was meant to be a constructive call.  It was not meant to deliver a threatening message.  That is my understanding of what took place.  And certainly, if there’s more to provide, we will provide that to all of you.

Go ahead.

Q    Thank you, Jen.  On the supplemental budget, the administration believes the package will support Ukraine for five months.  Is there anything you can tell us about that timeframe?  Is that when the administration believes the war will come to an end, or that it will last for at least another five months?

MS. PSAKI:  Well, let me give you a little bit of — more of a rundown of each of the components in the package too.  I know some of this was done yesterday, but I think more of it — we could do more from our end on this front.

But to answer your direct question, Weijia: This is — that’s the end of the fiscal year.  And what our objective here was, was to provide a long enough set of funding requests or a funding request that would meet — that would mean we wouldn’t have to come back in a month or six weeks — right? — to ensure that there was planning that was possible through the U.S. military and through our European partners and the Ukrainians as well.

Now, some of this funding — for example, the $6 billion of this — of this $20 billion of the security assistance component — is for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which is basically direct support for Ukraine to purchase its own weapons from the defense — you know, defense contra- — you know, the defense industry here in the United States. 

They could not even intake, you know, billions and billions and billions of weapons and security assistance in this moment. 

So that is likely going to be longer term, because if they place an order for specific weapons, sometimes that takes months to produce.  It’s just meant to provide security assistance so they can plan for what they need over the long term and make those orders directly, which is what that portion of the — of the funding provides for.

The other portions of the funding — so, $5.4 billion — is in drawdown.  So, that — as you’re very familiar with that because that was a large chunk of what we requested and have implemented in our last package.  And that basically allows the United States to — when we provide weapons or give weapons to the Ukrainians, to have the funding to backfill those needs and order those weapons so we can backfill them here and make sure we have what we need here in the United States.

$2.4 billion was to purchase high-demand weapons for the United States, build additional critical war reserves, and increase intelligence and other defense support. 

And then $4 billion is in State [Department] Foreign Military Financing, which is not just for Ukraine.  That’s for a range of countries.  It’s FMF funding that a range — that will be applicable to a range of countries and what their needs are.

And finally, $2.6 billion is to continue supporting U.S. troop deployments in NATO territory.  So, as you know, we had 80- — about 80,000, and now we’re up to 100,000.  And we’re also, of course, you know, providing support to a range of our NATO Allies and partners in the region.  And that helps support that.  It includes U.S. troop transportation, special pay, medical support. 

So that’s kind of the breakdown of what it is, but some of that would certainly go beyond.  It was just meant to be a request that accounts for the fiscal year. 

Q    Got it.  Thank you. 

And then, turning to COVID, I know you’ve talked before about protocols in place to protect the President.  But given what Kate Bedingfield tweeted this morning, I wonder: Is part of the protocol to make sure the President never has any close contacts?

MS. PSAKI:  Well, the way we determine — we do take additional steps, and some of those are additional precautions that go beyond even what the CDC recommends.  Right?  So, if we are in a meeting with the President, I’ve noted before we — you always are tested.  We often wear masks — almost always wear masks in those meetings.  We are — try to socially distance whenever possible.

And the way the CDC defines a “close contact” is 15 minutes at a certain — a close proximity.  So we try to follow those guidelines and take additional steps, of course, as a — out of an effort to protect the President. 

Q    So, those who are in a confined space with the President wear masks and are six feet apart from him? 

MS. PSAKI:  That’s an effort we make, exactly.

Q    Okay, great.

And then, just quickly on the vaccines for children —

MS. PSAKI:  Yeah.

Q    — because the FDA announced a couple potential dates for when they might start reviewing in June.

MS. PSAKI:  Yeah.

Q    When the greenlight is given, assuming it will be, is there enough supply already on hand to start giving these young children their first doses right away — the supply of both the vaccine and vials, materials, et cetera?

MS. PSAKI:  My understanding, Weijia, is that there is.  I will quadruple-check that and make sure for you. 

But we have been planning for the possibility of approval for vaccines for children under five for some time now, and we like to plan ahead. 

Q    Okay.  Thanks, Jen.

MS. PSAKI:  Go ahead, Jacqui. 

Q    Thank you, Jen.  The mayor of Eagle Pass told my colleague down at the border today — and the mayor is a Democrat, by the way — that the border is not being effectively managed and asked the President to come and see it.  Does the President have any plans to go to the border?

MS. PSAKI:  I don’t have any plans to preview at this point in time.  Certainly, we’re open to it, but no plans to preview.

Q    Is it something he would consider doing before the Summit of the Americas, where he’s set to meet with the leaders of Central and South America, see the situation firsthand before having that robust conversation?

MS. PSAKI:  Well, he’s meeting with leaders of countries that he’s traveled to many times, and certainly he is very familiar with the issues that will be discussed, which is addressing root causes, coordinating — whether it’s on the economic front or security front. 

And that’s an initiative he led during the — when he was Vice President, so he’s very familiar with those issues.

Q    On the economy: Austan Goolsbee, the former Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers under the Obama administration, said that he felt that the President yesterday in his comments about the GDP report was potentially underplaying the risks of a recession.  And he pointed to geopolitical conditions with Ukraine, with Russia cutting off gas to Europe, and also the GDP shrinking, saying that people should be nervous.  How do you respond to that?

MS. PSAKI:  Well, I have a great deal of respect for Austan Goolsbee — he’s a former colleague — and so does the President.  But what we look at is a range of economic data, including economic data that was in the GDP numbers yesterday, which I did some explaining of yesterday. 

But some of the data that was in there show very encouraging signs that economists look at — independent — many independent economists monitor closely.  American consumer spending, business investment, residential investment — all up. 

The decrease, as it relates to exports, is largely because our economy is stronger than many economies around the world.  And the inventory numbers, which is kind of the number that went down — that brought it down — is in large — a large — in large part because the fourth quarter inventory numbers were the highest in history, and these numbers are drawn — are done as a comparison from quarter to quarter.

So I think we felt it was important to explain the data and what it means.  We continue to monitor economic data. 

It’s important to note that the — some important components of it are: We created more jobs last year than any job [year] in American history.  We’re at a low — a very low unemployment rate.  And while costs are high and inflation is not where we want it to be, the Federal Reserve continues to project that will come down by the end of the year.

So our economists and our economic team continues to feel confident in the strength of the economy even as we monitor a range of data.

Q    Jennifer Granholm said something, though, that was interesting about inflation coming down.  She said, “Some economists are suggesting inflation is going to level off a bit, but it’s just so hard to know because we don’t know what’s going to happen on the war on this.”  So, she’s seeming to also allude to geopolitical conditions that might not result in these projections coming to fruition.

MS. PSAKI:  Well, the Federal Reserve makes the official projections — right? — for the government. 

What I will note, and I think maybe she was referring to, is: Even the new economic data we saw today — energy accounted for 61 percent of the reasoning for the increase in the inflation numbers.  And we know that because of Putin’s unprovoked invasion in Ukraine, that it’s driving food costs but also energy costs, and that is a huge driver.

So that’s why the President is taking a range of steps: the historic release from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve; even the steps, certainly smaller, as it relates to E15 today to work to really target and focus on energy prices and costs.

Q    And then I have just a couple questions on the Disinformation Board.

MS. PSAKI:  Sure.

Q    Yesterday, you had told me that you were not familiar with Nina Jankowicz.  I’m wondering if you’re — if you have more information on her today.

Also, Secretary Mayorkas said that he was not familiar with statements that she had made surrounding the Hunter Biden laptop.  And I’m just wondering: How was she hired if you and the White House are not familiar with her, if Mayorkas is not familiar with her statements?  What’s the process for putting her into a position like this?  Who’s in charge of her hiring?

MS. PSAKI:  Well, let me give you a sense of who she is.  She’s an expert on online disinformation.  She was formerly in the Wilson Center’s Disinfor- — she was formerly a Disinformation Fellow at the Wilson Center.  She’s testified before Congress as well as the United Kingdom and European parliaments; advised a Ukrainian foreign minister — particularly relevant in this moment — under the auspices of a Fulbright Public Policy Fellowship; and overseen Russia and Belarus programs at the National Democratic Institute.

Any hiring decisions are up to the Department of Homeland Security, but this is a person with extensive qualifications.

What I will tell you about the board and what the board is doing: This is a continuation of work that began at the Department of Homeland Security in 2020 under former President Trump.

Q    Is it though — I guess, can you describe what her job is going to be?  Because there’s been some TikToks that she has put out, and it seems like rather than, you know, calling balls and strikes on “this, you know, story is false and this story — and here’s the truth on it,” one line stood out to me: “They’re laundering disinfo and we should really take note, and not support their lives with our wallet, voice, or vote.”  So is —

MS. PSAKI:  Well, here’s what the board is going to do, which I think is of particular interest — again, a continuation of the work of the former President.  So for anyone who’s critical of it, I didn’t hear them being critical of the work under the former President, which is just interesting to note contextually. 

But in the fact sheet that they put out, what they noted yesterday — what they noted in there is that this is meant to — one, the first bullet was about protecting privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, and the First Amendment.  They said the primary mission is to establish best practices to ensure that efforts to understand and respond to disinformation are done in ways that protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.

I’d also note that the first example they gave about what they’re going to do is support the Department of Homeland Security’s work — ongoing work, back to the former administration — on — to address how and understand how misinformation is spread by human smugglers that prey on vulnerable populations attempting to migrate to the United States. 

There’s no question — everybody — that bipartisan support for that, to address disinformation that’s going — that’s helping smugglers pushing, helping people migrate or providing false information, prompting people to migrate. 

So — and this is also work that is helping to address unauthorized — terrorism, other threats, and see how disinformation and misinformation is being pushed to lead — to increase those.  So that’s all work — we think it’s work that’s been ongoing for some time.  This is the form it’s taking.  And there’s a fact sheet that details the specifics of it. 

Q    You just outlined a lot of, you know, efforts that sound very worthy, but you’ve got some from the Home- — the Department of Homeland Security telling people how they should vote.  How do you explain that to critics who say “That doesn’t sound right to me”?

MS. PSAKI:  This is an individual who will overse- — be overseeing the work of that board.  Personnel decisions are up to the Department of Homeland Security.  I just outlined the extensive history and background this individual has. 

But I think what’s important to note here is what the board is doing, which is continuing what is important disinformation-related work that began under the former administration. 

Go ahead.

Q    Thanks, Jen.  I want to ask you about some of the concerns that Democrats are expressing about Title 42, if it is, in fact, lifted.  And these are some quotes that were in Politico today: 

Maggie Hassan says, “What I didn’t hear… [were] specifics about numbers and deployment and really meeting the need” at the border.

Senator Catherine Cortez Masto said she still hasn’t seen a “comprehensive plan.” 

And Senator Mark Kelly has said, “There’s having things on a piece of paper and then what is going on on the southern border — and there is a huge disconnect.”

  What is the administration doing to address those concerns and that criticism that there may be a plan on paper, but they certainly haven’t seen it at the border yet?

MS. PSAKI:  Well, first, there’s an extensive plan on paper that includes a six-pillar approach to planning for and preparing for the lifting of Title 42, including surging resources, personnel, transportation, medical support, facilities to support border operations. 

It also includes enhancing CBP processing efficiency and moving with deliberate speed to mitigate potential overcrowding at Border Patrol stations — something in anticipation they are preparing for the possibility of. 

It also includes administering consequences for unlawful entry.  That’s pillar three. 

It includes — number four is bolstering the capacity of nongovernmental organizations, who have been important partners to us as we’re working to implement — to receive non-citizens after they’ve been processed. 

It also includes targeting and disrupting the transnational criminal organizations.

And finally, deterring irregular migration. 

What it is not — and this is where we absolutely, of course, agree with these members and others — is an immigration reform plan.  And that is something that we strongly support.  This is a reminder of the need for — how outdated it is, how broken the system is. 

But Title 42 has never been an immigration plan.

Q    How soon will the plan that you just laid out actually go into effect?  Understanding that it may take some time, but —

MS. PSAKI:  Yeah.

Q    — how soon will people actually feel the real impact so that, as Senator Kelly is saying, this disconnect doesn’t exist, so that there’s actual proof that it’s taking place?

MS. PSAKI:  Well, the Title 42 lifts on May 23rd.  It doesn’t lift —

Q    So nothing happens until the (inaudible).

MS. PSAKI:  I would point you to the Department of Homeland Security for the implementation plan. 

But I think that’s what’s important to note here.  We haven’t seen, you know, the impacts of the lifting surges because it hasn’t happened yet. 

I’d also note that Secretary Mayorkas testified, I believe, before four committees over the last two days about exactly this —

Q    And yet, there’s still this skepticism.

MS. PSAKI:  — in order to answer their questions.  And I’m sure he’s happy to have continued conversations.

Q    And how concerned is the President that these members of his own party — who are facing tough reelection battles, as you know — have these serious concerns and clearly are expressing fears that it might impact them politically — might impact their chances for reelection?

MS. PSAKI:  Well, without speaking to the politics, I would say, Kristen: I mean, the President shares the concern about the lack of a workable immigration system, and that impacts many of the border state leaders quite a bit, of course, because there isn’t an effective asylum processing system; because we don’t have smart security and we spent years investing in a faulty border wall that was never going to be an effective mechanism. 

He shares their concerns about that, and he recognizes and agrees with that.

Q    How would you characterize how committed he is?  Understanding that an appeal, if it comes to that — it’s not in his hands — would he want to see this fight go all the way to the Supreme Court?

MS. PSAKI:  I’m certainly not going to get ahead of a legal process.  I will note — and Mary — I think MaryAlice asked about this yesterday. 

So let me — in terms of where things stand: So, right now what we saw yesterday is that the district court presiding over one of the challenges to the Title 42 rescission order officially entered — finally officially entered, because they just done it verbally — a temporary restraining order. 

What that basically means is they’re saying we can’t lift Title 42 before May 23rd.  That has not been our plan to date, as you know. 

What is next is there’s going to be a hearing on Arizona’s preliminary injunction motion.  That’s scheduled to take place on May 13th.  So, any decision about what’s next, of course, would happen from the Department of Justice but wouldn’t happen after — until after that.

What I would note is that the judge has indicated he will rule unfavorably towards the administration at this time, but we don’t know — and we don’t officially know and we won’t know — until he makes a ruling, and then Department of Justice would make any decision about legal action.

Q    One quickly on the supplemental, if I might.  There’s obviously a divide over whether to link it to COVID funding, which we talked about a little bit here yesterday.  But given that there is this divide and given the urgency that we are hearing from President Zelenskyy and others on the ground in Ukraine for this aid, why not just say, “Let’s de-link these two bills and move forward with the Ukraine aid and get it done as quickly as possible”?

MS. PSAKI:  Well, Kristen, I would note that the President feels that both are urgent, both are emergencies.  Of course, the — we know there’s an urgency in getting additional assistance.  We know we have a few more weeks depending on how the final military drawdown is spent out.

But in terms of COVID, what we are doing right now is we are preventing the United States from being able to plan and purchase ahead.  So, for example, if there’s a better booster — which there may be, because science is amazing — one day, right? — if there’s a better vaccine, we can’t make purchases ahead of doing that.  That is what we have done to date.  That is why we have been so prepared. 

It also makes it so that we can’t purchase Evusheld treatments that helps immunocompromised.  We can’t make additional purchases of a range of the treatments we know are effective and make sure that we can say to every American, “We’ll get you a mask.  We’ll get you a test.  We’ll get you a free vaccine.”  So, the President feels that is also incredibly urgent.

Go ahead.

Q    Do you have a reaction to the report that the FBI last year potentially searched millions of Americans’ data?  And secondly, is the President briefed on that?  Does he have any reaction himself?

MS. PSAKI:  I have not spoken with the President about this.  I can get you more details about this after the briefing.

My understanding is that some of this was about researching and doing an investigation into potential hacking and — so — but I will get you more from the FBI after this.  Thanks for your question.

Go ahead.  Go ahead.

Q    Yeah.  E15 fuel is slightly less energy dense than what we consider typical gasoline, so Americans might need to fill up just a little bit more frequently.  So how much did the — does the administration really think that this move will affect Americans’ wallets? 

And does the White House believe the President has exhausted his authority on what he can do related to gas prices or are there more options still being considered?

MS. PSAKI:  I mean, on the second question, we’re always going to look for more options.  I mean, we saw — and I talked about this a little bit earlier, even as it relates to the recent — the inflation data that came out today. We know that 61 percent of that is driven by the price — by energy costs, by Putin’s invasion into Ukraine.  And we need to continue to take every step we can whether that’s working with Congress, considering what authorities we have, continuing to ensure we take steps to make sure the supply meets the demand out there.

You know, the estimates have been: It saves Americans about 10 cents a gallon.  And you know that, to the President and to us, felt like a reason to do it.  And because without taking the step for the waiver, it basically would just be an option of additional supply that is a little bit less expensive that wouldn’t be available in these 2,000 gas stations.

We’re not saying that this is like the silver bullet; it’s not.  It’s just a step that we felt would help ease the — ease the burden for Americans who go to those gas stations.

Q    Sure.  And then, with COVID, on — as we are talking about — as the White House is pushing Congress to pass for more funding, why hasn’t the administration released a plan, at least for now, to transition the burden of paying for COVID drugs and vaccines to the private sector, kind of like has been done with tests, so that insurance companies have time to negotiate?

MS. PSAKI:  Well, there’s a range of steps happening at the same time.  But I will tell you that what we want to continue to be able to do is to provide these treatments for free.  That’s the objective.  That’s the reason for this request for funding.  But also, the request for funding is enabling the United States to be able to purchase ahead in bulk supply a lot of these treatments or, you know, vaccines so that we can make — when they are ready, we can make those available to treatment centers and hospitals around the country.

Go ahead.

Q    Thanks.  I know you said that you didn’t get an extensive readout yet of the conversation with the Mexican President —

MS. PSAKI:  And they’ll be a written readout at some point, not yet.

Q    To the extent that you know —

MS. PSAKI:  Yeah.

Q    — what happened, did the President make any headway in getting Mexico to take a harder line on Russia?  And should we expect them to join the global coalition in imposing sanctions now?

MS. PSAKI:  Well, I would note, obviously, the Mexican government can speak for themselves on any intentions they may or may not have.  They have spoken out against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, so I would note that.

We will always encourage any leaders to take additional steps to support the Ukrainians and stand up in a range of ways against the — the invasion of Ukraine by Russia.

But in terms of any steps they would take, regardless of the conversation, we would let them speak for themselves on that front.

Go ahead.

Q    Sorry.  Has the reticence by the Mexican government impacted the U.S.-Mexico relationship in any way when it comes to sanctions?

MS. PSAKI:  Well, again, I would note they have spoken out against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  We know different countries are going to take different steps.  Some have taken them quickly.  Some took longer to take them.  And we know different countries have different approaches to every step — whether it’s sanctions, assistance they can provide.  We understand that. 

We have an important, strong relationship with Mexico — one that the call today was set up in order to really focus the conversation on migration and addressing root causes in advance of the Summit of the Americas.  So that was really the majority of the conversation.

I’m sorry, I didn’t mean to miss you.  Go ahead.

Q    No worries.  Thank you.  So, Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby was asked this afternoon if he believed that Vladimir Putin was a rational actor.  And he responded saying, “I can’t talk to his psychology, but I think we can all speak to his depravity.”  Now, he later apologized for his emotions there.  But I’m curious: Are these sentiments also shared by the President?

MS. PSAKI:  Well, I think you’ve heard the President call him a war criminal.  So, I don’t think the President thinks of President Putin as somebody who is a model in the world.  He feels — he views him as a pariah and somebody who is guilty of war crimes and of genocide.  So, I think the President’s comments speak for itself.

Q    And then also, piggybacking on Kristen’s last question: If Congress doesn’t pass supplemental aid to Ukraine or it’s delayed, how much longer can we keep the current pace in supporting them?

MS. PSAKI:  Well, there’s a range of ways we’re supporting them, right?  So this is why I felt it was important to outline in more detail than I did yesterday.  Sometimes you go back and you say, “I need more information.”  Right?  But — and that’s what we did here.  But we know we there’s $250 million left — right? — from the security package.

We know that we were giving — we were at a very rapid pace of providing assistance for several weeks.  That was strategic because we wanted to frontload that, knowing that as Russia repositioned their approach to the war, the needs for the Ukrainians were different because it was going to be a longer, more drawn-out war that was more kind of on the ground.

So, we strategically frontloaded a lot of the security assistance.  But there is not — we expect a couple more weeks this assistance could be.  I don’t have the plans from the Department of Defense on exactly how they will — how they will roll that out.

I also noted that the vast, vast majority of our economic assistance has also been exhausted.  Obviously, many of those — many of those needs are long term.  Some of the funding — about $3 billion of it was for operating needs of the Department of Defense.  Some of those are still being spent out and are part of their budget, not direct assistance, of course. 

And then there are still — there is still funds in the humanitarian assistance bucket, but that doesn’t meet all of the needs, of course, that the Ukrainians have. 

So this is why there’s an urgency to moving forward.

Q    Gotcha.  And lastly, I understand that the circumstances surrounding Mr. Cancel’s are still coming to light.  But does the President have any plans to talk with his relatives?

MS. PSAKI:  It’s a great question.  And what I tried to convey — perhaps, not articulately — is that it has not gone through the proper channels that typically are the State Department, Defense Department, et cetera.  Usually, the State Department, likely, in this case.  And if there is a call to read out, I will certainly let all of you know.

Go ahead.  I can do like a few more, I think.  Go ahead.

Q    So, it sounds like the President is still planning to attend the White House Correspondents’ Dinner.  In the past when he’s been exposed in large events, the White House has noted that there might be an increase in his testing following those.  Are there any plans to change the President’s testing procedures following these big events that he’s been attending, like the dinner and the two memorial services he attended?

MS. PSAKI:  The testing protocol is determined by his doctor.  He was tested yesterday, and he tested negative.  But I don’t have anything to predict in terms of the future. 

I noted this the other day, but I think it’s important for your question here, is that the President — we made a decision — it was important to him to attend the dinner to honor the work of journalists — all of you, many of your colleagues around the world — something the former President didn’t do.

But we also took additional steps.  He’s not attending the dinner portion.  He’s coming for the program.  So — and he will likely wear a mask when he’s not speaking.  Obviously, he’ll speak.  And so he’ll be there for about an hour or 90 minutes, I guess, depending on how long Trevor Noah speaks and others speak in the program.  But we took that additional step as well. 

And then he’s, of course, sitting on the dais up in the front.  So the interaction — he’s not attending any of the receptions or anything along those lines either.

Q    And then, on the remarks, the President has been a guest on several late-night shows.  Has he consulted any of those hosts, comedians, brought in any outside help on his speech?  Can you kind of bring us in the room on how he’s approaching this as someone who has attended several of these dinners and seen them play out?

MS. PSAKI:  He has.  I will tell you the President has a very good sense of humor and is working hard on his own speech.

Q    Thank you, Jen.  The administration has not said how long they expect the war in Ukraine to last, and that’s understandable because no one knows what the —

MS. PSAKI:  Yeah.

Q    — future will hold.  But the administration — and then also in this room yesterday — the administration has declined to say how much the United States is prepared to spend long term or to give a real definition of what a victory in the war in Ukraine would look like. 

So my question is: How long does President Biden, the same President who got us out of Afghanistan because he said it was a costly and unwinnable quagmire — how long does he expect the American people to back this war when they don’t know how long it will last, how much it will cost, or what the ultimate definition of victory actually is?

MS. PSAKI:  Well, I mean, let me just reiterate something the President has said from the beginning.

Q    (Inaudible.)  Right. 

MS. PSAKI:  And I will get to your point.

Q    And these are some of the questions.

MS. PSAKI:  But this — I will get to your questions, I promise.  That combating Russian aggression has costs.  Leaving it unchecked would be even more costly.  Allowing Russia to run rampant around Europe beyond Ukraine, which is what President Putin outlined in his speech right before he invaded, would be incredibly costly to the world and to the United States.  We calculate that as well. 

Right now, I know — let me — I will get there.  I promise.  I know you’re raising your hand.  You asked me a few questions.  I’m going to get there. 

Right now, the importance of this package to the President is because, every day, Ukrainians pay the price of freedom in their lives, and he feels providing them with arms and food is the right thing to do.  And trying to plan for — and I noted that some components of this package are not limited.  It’s not that the spending will end at five months.  It’s just allowing the ability for us, the Ukrainians, and the Europeans to plan over the long term.  In fact, much of the security assistance will be much longer than that. 

The reason it’s difficult to define what winning is is because, obviously, our view continues to be that an ends will be through a diplomatic process and a diplomatic conversation.  The Ukrainians are the ones who determine what the outcome of that will look like, not for us to determine on their behalf. 

Q    So should we expect a line-item appropriation for military aid to Ukraine for the next 5, 10, 15 years?  I mean, is this open ended?

MS. PSAKI:  We, of course, want the war to end as quickly as possible, and President Putin could do that tomorrow.  But right now, what we’re making a decision about, what we’re advocating for is trying to support and have the backs of an incredibly brave country and their people who are kicked out of their homes; fighting an aggressive dictator and his military; lacking food, lacking economic assistance; and preventing Putin from rampaging through Europe, which by the way, would be much more expensive than what we’re talking about here.

Q    And one quick follow-up then.  So the United States’ definition of what success or victory looks like in the region is contingent on how long the Ukrainians are willing to combat the Russians and whether or not they want to, you know, fight them and force them to the negotiation table or push them out of, you know, their borders?  That’s up to them?  But we’re — we’re on board?

MS. PSAKI:  It’s not exactly what I said.  What I will say is that what President Putin defined as his own version of winning and victory from the beginning was taking over Ukraine, their sovereignty, their territorial integrity.

Obviously, he’s already failed at that.  Right?  So in that sense, they are already defeating Putin’s effort to envelop them into Russia.  But this is an ongoing war.  We know that.  We know that diplomacy and having a discussion and negotiation is the way to get an end to it. 

Our effort and our focus is on strengthening them at the negotiating table, and that’s the role that we feel that we can play. 

I’m going to have to wrap this up.  Asma, go ahead.  One more.

Q    Thank you.

MS. PSAKI:  Oh, and Asma, just — you asked me a question yesterday about credit. 

Q    Yes.

MS. PSAKI:  That is not possible.

Q    Yeah.  I did get that from (inaudible).

MS. PSAKI:  Okay.  Good.  But for others.

Q    Yes.  So there have been reports that EU countries are looking to approve a phased embargo on Russian oil as early as next week. 

MS. PSAKI:  Yeah.

Q    And if that were to happen, it would be huge.  And I am curious how the White House is coordinating with the EU on this.

MS. PSAKI:  Sure.  So one of the steps that the President took last month was to start this task force with the Europeans.

I mean, we took steps before that — right? — to work with a range of countries in Asia and around the world to provide additional supply — LNG supply — where they had excess.

Japan, for example, did that to provide excess LNG supply because they had the ability to do that to the Europeans in anticipation that Russia could weaponize energy, as we’ve seen President Putin do. 

There was a meeting of this task force yesterday to continue that coordination, have that discussion, and we’re just looking for ways that we can help them address these needs that we long anticipated. 

Okay.  Thanks, everyone.  Thank you, everyone.

2:58 P.M. EDT