The Russian Invasion of Ukraine: What ChinaThinks March 2, 2022

 

The Russian Invasion of Ukraine: What ChinaThinks

March 2, 2022

Russia and China have sought to sow discord between the United States and its allies

as part of their "divide and conquer" strategy.

WORLD ER-WIN TAN

Russian President Vladimir Putin attends the opening ceremony of Beijing 2022 Olympic Games in Beijing, China, 04

February 2022. — Photo by Kremlin Press Office via Anadolu Images

The parallels between Ukraine and Taiwan are striking – both have aligned

themselves with democracy, even as both countries face powerful autocratic

neighbors. Ukraine and Russia, both demographically Slavic nations, have taken

different political directions. Since the breakup of the USSR, Ukraine has moved to

align its political identity with the democratic transatlantic community. The 2005

Orange Revolution resulted in the downfall of the pro-Russian President Viktor

Yanukovych, who was subsequently impeached after the 2013 Euromaiden Protests

that saw Ukrainians seeking alignment with the EU.

The notion of Ukrainian consolidation of its fledgling democracy is anathema to

Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is aware that domestic discontent against his

regime needs only a neighboring democratic spark to gain momentum for public

dissent. It is unsurprising that Putin’s 21 February 2022 speech sought to delegitimize

the Ukrainian Government’s democratic credentials and its sovereignty.

Taiwan occupies a status broadly similar to Ukraine. Having broken away from

mainland rule in 1949, Taiwan’s democratic transition stands in contrast to the

mainland’s authoritarianism. Taiwan illustrates that an ethnic Chinese population is

capable of being a mature democracy and a digitally-savvy economic powerhouse.

Whilst the mainland’s attempts to cover up the initial outbreak of the COVID19

pandemic in 2019 led to its worldwide spread, Taiwan has been lauded worldwide for

its public health policy response based on trust and transparency between the

government and its people.

There is a further notable commonality between the two countries, namely the

ambiguity of the international community’s obligations to the sovereignty and

security of Ukraine and Taiwan. Ukraine dismantled the nuclear weapons that it

inherited from the USSR’s breakup, and participated in NATO-led operations in the

Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and the Indian Ocean.

Taiwan and Ukraine have notable commonality, namely the ambiguity ofthe international “

community’s obligations to the sovereignty and security ofthe two countries.

Ukraine’s reward for these contributions did not go beyond receiving a NATO

Membership Action Plan (MAP) that fell short of any NATO security commitment.

For Taiwan, the closest thing to a foreign commitment to its security falls under

Washington’s 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).

The latter has overseen a U.S. policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ insofar as Washington’s

security obligations to Taiwan are concerned – whilst the U.S. supplies armaments,

and hints at intervention in the event of a mainland attack, the TRA eschews any

official U.S. obligation to militarily defend the island.

Such ambiguities play to the advantage of Russia and China, which have sought to

sow discord between the U.S. and its partners as part of a strategy of ‘divide and

conquer’.

China and Russia have increasingly embraced a range of hybrid warfare strategies,

with resulting diplomatic and security implications for the U.S., its allies, and

numerous countries in Europe and Asia that, although faced with the threat of

Russian and Chinese expansionism, do not enjoy the full-fledged security guarantees

offered by the U.S. and its alliance partners.

To understand the nature of hybrid warfare tactics, it is necessary to move away from

the state-centric paradigm of security that has focused on such quantifiable indices

of power such as tanks and troops, and to appreciate that hybrid warfare is based on

throwing the defender off balance through a unconventional means that, although

falling short of direct military action, is a definitively hostile action seeking

geopolitical objectives.

The repertoire of hybrid warfare instruments includes espionage, financially-based

influence operations and misinformation, enabling the perpetrator to begin their

activation in peacetime as part of a low-visibility, pre-conflict phase of operations,

during which the perpetrator can undermine its target from within. Russia’s donation

of financial contributions to the British Conservative Party and its injection of

misinformation to fuel the Brexit vote in 2016 has resulted in the British

Government’s indecisive, ill-prepared response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Russian injection of disinformation during the U.S. 2016 elections skewed the result

in favor of Trump, thus polarizing U.S. society. China, too, has embraced hybrid

warfare operations. Beijing has utilized its Confucius Institutes to promote the notion

that China is a peaceful power, mobilized the United Front Work Department (UFWD)

to encourage the Chinese diaspora to identify politically with the PRC and participate

in espionage operations, and financed corrupt diplomats and foreign politicians to

promote pro-Beijing policies.

Faced with such threats, the greatest concerns should be felt not by the nuclear

powers and their treaty allies, but rather the various countries to whom the

international community’s diplomatic and security obligations are rather more

ambiguous. Such ambiguity can be exploited by Russia and China – after all (from the

Russian government’s perspective), if Ukraine is not a member of NATO, what

business does NATO have in extending its nuclear umbrella to Ukraine during a

Russian ‘peacekeeping operation’ in a Russian ‘sphere of influence’?

Likewise, China can exploit Taiwan’s lack of international diplomatic recognition to

block any attempt by the international community to meddle in the mainland’s

supposed ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity’. Tellingly, the U.S.’s posture towards

Taiwan is increasingly moving away from the past policy of ‘strategy ambiguity’

towards one of ‘strategic clarity’ in underscoring Washington’s will to defend the

island.

Furthermore, given the expansionist behavior of China and Russia, other European

and Asian countries should heed the implications of the current crisis – particularly

those in the vicinity of China and Russia, have strained relations with these powers,

and do not have the protection of a nuclear-armed ally. Finland, Moldova and

Vietnam spring to mind.

inland seceded from the Russian Empire in 1917 but was invaded by the USSR

in 1939. Present-day Helsinki is an EU member, but not in NATO – even as

Finland remains on Russia’s borders. Moldova, a former Soviet Republic that

has aligned itself with the EU, should also be wary. The Transnistria region, a

breakaway region in northeastern Moldova that borders Ukraine, has a sizeable

ethnic Russian demographic, a situation analogous to the Russian communities in

eastern Ukraine over whom Russia initiated its separatist insurgency in 2014.

Moldova is not a NATO member, and thus cannot expect NATO intervention in Putin’s

ambitions reach Moldova.

Yet, having constitutionally committed itself to neutrality, Moldova is not a NATO

member, and thus cannot expect NATO intervention in Putin’s ambitions reach

Moldova. Vietnam, too, has reasons to be concerned, as it has no nuclear-armed allies

and no nuclear arsenal. Given its formidable land warfare reputation, Vietnam is

unlikely to face a land invasion by China; rather, the latter is more likely to exploit its

overwhelming air-naval superiority and its Maritime Militia to continue encroaching

on Vietnamese waters, possibly to the extent of seizing islands that are indisputably

part of Vietnam’s territory, but which might be retroactively claimed by Beijing under

the guise of ‘historical maps’ of ‘traditional Chinese territories’, from which China

may be prepared to present Hanoi with the fait accompli of Beijing’s nuclear arsenal.

Such states should ensure the de facto status of alliances with nuclear powers, before

they release de jure statements seeking formal alliance membership. The security

postures of Sweden and Singapore are notable in this regard. Sweden is not a member

of NATO, but has a quasi-alliance relationship, as reflected in its high level of security

cooperation with the alliance. Likewise, Singapore does not have an alliance

relationship with the U.S. (but is allied to nuclear-armed Britain under the Five Power

Defense Arrangement). Singapore does, however, have a high level of security

cooperation and joint military exercises with the U.S.

The quasi-alliance relations that Sweden and Singapore have with nuclear powers

highlight their ability to upgrade their existing partnerships with Washington to a

fully-fledged alliance at short notice, should they feel the need to do so in the face of

an overwhelming threat to their security. Had Ukraine done likewise before seeking

official NATO membership, it is conceivable that it would have been able to formally

join NATO, after having already assured itself of an extended nuclear umbrella to

deter the type of aggression currently being undertaken by Russia.

#russia #china #nato #russia ukraine relations #taiwan

Er-Win Tan

Er-Win Tan holds the position of Associate Professor at The Graduate School of

International and Area Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, Republic

of Korea. His research interests include security dilemma theory, security and diplomacy in

the Indo-Pacific region, strategic culture, Korean Peninsula affairs, and hybrid warfare