Germany Turns Merkel's Page (Fondation Robert Schuman)

 

Germany turns Merkel's page

26/04/2021

At the head of the German government since 2005, Angela Merkel will step down after the federal elections on 26 September. If this departure seems to have taken place, the election also heralds other, more structural changes that will affect the tectonics of the deep forces of the German political system. After the psychodrama that the CDU-CSU went through for a week, unable to find a consensual agreement on its candidate to succeed Angela Merkel, the autumn election could thus be a major political turning point. With six major regional elections in 2021[1], the changes underway are likely to reshape the country's political landscape in depth. However, the consequences for the "stability" that has characterized the German political system since 1949 remain difficult to analyse.

The "super election year" 2021 takes place in a particular context. Under the influence of the pandemic, the two major parties that govern together in the "grand coalition", the SPD and the CDU-CSU, continue to tumble in the polls. While more and more Germans hold Angela Merkel and her government responsible for the missteps of the anti-Covid strategy and especially for the slow pace of the vaccination campaign, several members of her own party (CDU-CSU) are being blamed for receiving important "provisions" in connection with the public authorities' acquisition of sanitary masks. Behind the government's record, the question of the renewal of a political class that has been in power (together or separately) since 1949 is emerging.

The first direct effect of the scandals mentioned, the polls now predict that the CDU-CSU will score below 30% of the vote - unprecedented in Germany and unimaginable even a few months ago. The second unexpected effect is that this score suggests the possibility of a government majority without the CDU-CSU - a first since 2002. However, and this is the third piece of information to remember, the weakness of the CDU-CSU does not benefit the SPD. Europe's oldest active democratic party, the party of Willy Brandt and Gerhard Schroeder, no longer exceeds 20% of voting intentions. Combined with the weakness of the CDU-CSU, the German political landscape is facing a real transformation. But the nature of this transformation remains unclear. In contrast to the upheavals that have taken place in France or Italy, the party, the party of The Greens, founded in 1980 and present in Parliament since 1983, is preparing in Germany to fill the void left in the centre after the erosion of the two historical parties (SPD and CDU-CSU). The Greens, who currently participate in 11 of the 16 regional governments, now appear to be in line with the expectations of the "silent majority" in the centre and their leaders are widely acclaimed.

The German political system in the face of structural changes in society

Faced with the chronic instability of the governments of the "Weimar Republic" (1918-1933), the authors of the German "Basic Law" of 1949 sought above all to combine two principles: they first wanted to guarantee the expression of the greatest democratic representation, thus hoping to rally a large majority of the population to the democratic system; but also allow this representativeness to be associated with a system ensuring great governmental stability, framed by the federal system of control and multiple counter-powers. In fact, while allowing regular democratic alternation, this parliamentary system has given a remarkable stability to Germany, similar to the French presidential system of the Fifth Republic[2].

While these provisions continue to contribute to the stability of the system, they have not been able to avoid the erasure, for thirty years, of clearly identified political circles or the misdemeanour of the often generational link between the major parties and their

electorate. To explain this development, we must take into account the structural transformation of Western societies since the mid-1970s. Having become more mobile and fluid, modern societies no longer reproduce the quasi-automatic socialization of citizens in a political environment, allied to one of the two major political blocs[3]. Since 1990, Germany's two major parties have lost 40% of their membership and activists over the age of 60 account for more than half of all registered members. Needless to say, their way of doing politics is no longer in line with the expectations of transparency and participation of the new generations. Even though the hard core of each of the two political blocs still seems to exist - in 2005, unionized workers voted SPD at more than 60% and practising Catholics opted for more than 75% for the CDU-CSU - it now represents only 10% of the voters of the CDU/CSU and the SPD[4] .

The deep social forces that structurized the political field are fading in the face of the increasing individualization of society and the very idea of having collective actors (parties) committed to the "collective good" of society no longer seems to correspond to an atomized society where everyone seeks to privilege his own interests. This slow structural transformation has resulted in a Parliament composed of six political groups (CDU-CSU[5], SPD, AfD, FDP, Die Linke, Bunnis 90 - Die Gronen), and constituencies won directly by seven different parties (except the FDP).

As a result, it is becoming increasingly difficult to find structural majorities, associating a "large party" of the centre-left or centre-right with a small liberal party of the left or right, to govern. Moreover, Angela Merkel's long term as chancellor from 2005 to 2021 has mostly been at the centre of the political spectrum, where the CDU-CSU was forced to ally with the SPD. Many observers believe that Angela Merkel's longevity at the helm of Germany was only possible at the cost of a programmatic pragmatism, geared towards the management of current affairs. By avoiding ideological or visionary debates and for lack of a clear "cape" defined by the government, Angela Merkel has contributed to the crime of the political camps mentioned. Part of its electorate now finds itself lacking in benchmarks and guidance.

The first to pay the costs of this middle-ground centrism are the Social Democrats of the SPD, who can no longer reproduce the synthesis that allowed their historical

successes. This synthesis was able to bring together voters beyond their working-class social base: it was the fusion of working-class and progressive intellectual circles (teachers, journalists and professors) that had enabled the success of Willy Brandt and Gerhard Schroeder. But in the face of the tensions and divisions that underlie today's German society, the SPD fails to reproduce such integration of different social strata. Instead of converging on the SPD, some of Angela Merkel's disgruntled voters are becoming radicalized, and the most progressive party is turning to the Greens.

To this fluidization of the structural components of the company are added, at least since 2002, new material divisions that divide society. With gerhard Schroeder's reforms, the German (western) model of a relatively generous welfare state, difficult to reform because of its corporatist co-management between trade unions, employers and the political class, has modernized. The result is a much more dynamic society and economy. Without being able to give a satisfactory answer to the environmental and climate problems that concern a growing part of the electorate, this new economic dynamic nevertheless produces its share of excluded, victims of a new precariousness. Politically, this has resulted in the enduring establishment of Die Linke (the left), credited with 7 to 9% of the vote, and an SPD that is torn between the voters of the centre (which it covets, because it is with them that the elections are won) and the left-wing voters (which it must not lose to Die Linke).

For fifteen years, Angela Merkel's CDU took advantage of this situation, to establish itself even more in the centre, where the party won the elections. For reasons other than the SPD, but in a similar arithmetic the CDU abandoned its right wing with these maneuvers. The national-conservative electorate found itself confused, looking for alternatives - and this explains the birth of the far right of the AfD (Alternative for Germany). Currently torn between a national-conservative and economically ordo-liberal wing (the "old" CDU voters) and an overtly neo-fascist wing, which brings together the discontented from all over the country, the AfD is currently embarking on an even more radical shift in its programme by advocating the return of Deutsche Mark and the end of the European Union, to which is added a policy that wants to prevent all immigration. Regional elections in the eastern states, and then the federal elections, will show whether, with such a programme, the party has surpassed its zenith.

The forces involved

An X-ray of the "political forces in place" in Germany in the spring of 2021 remains a difficult exercise. According to the latest polls (April 2021), the Bundestag would once again be composed of seven parties. The forecast gives the two major parties CDU-CSU and SPD only 44% together. This means that the "grand coalition", which supported three of Angela Merkel's four legislatures, made up of the two major political parties that have structured Germany's political life since 1949, would no longer have a majority to elect a chancellor and govern the country.

The big loser in these projections seems to be the CDU-CSU.

Estimated[6]between 27 and 30% of the vote, the party is far from the 41.5% obtained in 2013. With the "war of the right" that the two presidents of the CDU (Armin Laschet) and the CSU (Markus Soder) have openly engaged in for ten days, the party finds itself without an undisputed leader, without a clearly identified project and faces the worst crisis of confidence on the part of activists and voters since the end of the Helmut Kohl era. Even though the party's executive committee finally softened its chairman (Laschet) to wear the colours of the right in the September 26 elections, the length of the decision-making process (since 10 April), the way in which the internal divisions of the party were exposed (the verbatim of internal meetings was commented live on twitter), and the mediocre score finally obtained by Laschet (only 31 of the 46 votes of the executive committee, whereas he had already been informally nominated as the CDU-CSU candidate) will leave traces.

Behind this dramatic news for the CDU, we tend to forget the even more alarming figures for the SPD. This party now accounts for only 15-17% of the vote in the average of the polls. No poll currently sees him above 20%, far from the 41% obtained by Schroeder in 1998, even though he has for some time nominated his candidate for chancellor, the current Finance Minister Olaf Scholz, and published his pre-program.

The big winners of this transformation at the centre of the political spectrum are the Greens. Currently predicted between 20 and 23% at the federal level (compared to 8% in 2017), they clearly support a modernization of society, both economic and ecological, and defend the idea of an inclusive society, open and respectful of individual freedoms. They could become the true heirs of the centre-left and centre-right parties, even if their record in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Hesse, the two states they govern with the CDU, urges caution about their innovative strength in the face of the incremental weight of the structures in place.

With all the necessary precautions five months before the election, it must be admitted that the consequences of such an outcome would be considerable: if a new participation of the Greens (after 1998-2005) in government seems to be in effect, no one is in a position to say in what form. A coalition between the conservative CDU-CSU and the Greens, as has been envisaged in the polls for several months already and desired by many voters, would be unprecedented. However, with its current weakness, the CDU is no longer certain that it has a majority in Parliament. What alternatives then?

By also allying with the FDP Liberals, currently credited with 9% in the polls, the majority formed by these parties (CDU-CSU, Greens, FDP) would become more obvious, but would it be more

stable? Such a coalition would remain a high-risk undertaking, as the parties differ in their political positioning, in their political identity and culture, and of course in their electorate. No one in Germany has forgotten that after the last elections in 2017, the negotiations already advanced between these parties failed in the face of the incompatibility of the programmatic positions defended by the FDP and the Greens.

This uncertain situation makes it possible to speculate on the possibility of a coalition without the participation of the CDU-CSU, which would be a first since 2005.

From this perspective, the hypothesis of an alliance between the Greens, the SPD and the FDP is a lot of ink. This "tricolour fire" coalition (red - yellow - green) is currently in power in Rhineland-Palatinate. The government led by Minister-President Malu Dreyer (SPD) was re-elected on 14 March for four years. The "tricolour fire" coalition would also have a majority in Baden-Wuerttemberg since the elections on 14 March, but the outgoing Minister-President of the Land, Winfried Kretschmann (the Greens), prefers to continue his coalition with the CDU.

At the federal level, such a configuration (Greens, SPD, FDP) has never existed and the leader of the FDP, Christian Lindner, seems to hesitate in front of a constellation that would leave even less room for the FDP to achieve its priorities.

If the Greens can claim the chancellery, the FDP would find itself the smallest partner, facing the two centre-left forces that share a number of economic and fiscal policy priorities. While advocating the "return of the state", with more effective regulations and tax reform, towards a greater contribution of large incomes and wealth, the FDP has just adopted a programme built around "individual responsibility", which calls for reducing state interventionism, including by lowering taxes.

The option remains the "left-wing pact", a coalition between the Greens, the SPD and Die Linke, which would be a real political alternative. The Greens would have the largest number of seats and would nominate the chancellor. This coalition, clearly distancing itself in the polls from the one that could be formed by the CDU and the Greens, faces the still tense relations between Die Linke and the SPD, but also the question of whether Die Linke would be willing to take responsibility for entering a government. This would involve revisiting many of the dogmas that make the party special, particularly in foreign and defence policy. However, the new party leadership (Janine Wissler and Susanne Henning-Wellsow) seems to be setting the stage for a turnaround by establishing in the media the slogan that there would be a "responsibility to govern" for the left, in order to "limit the break" and defend the cause of their constituents.

With at least five possible types of coalition (excluding cooperation with the far right), Germany is entering a very open political situation. Much will depend on the key players in the positions of responsibility and their courage or political prudence to dare new alliances, partly atypical, and finally their strength (after the elections) to impose them on the delegates of their respective parties. Despite all this new diversity, an alternative to Angela Merkel's "pragmatic centrism" is not a given.

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Campaign divides: Candidates and their agenda

So who are these actors who will have to negotiate together after 26 September, with a view to forming a government for Germany, and what programme do they defend? The main confrontation that is emerging will take place in the centre, between the CDU-CSU and the Greens, with a minor role for the SPD.

The SPD

The first party to nominate its candidate for chancellor, the Social Democratic Party had to face mockery at first (why nominate a chancellor if one is credited with only 15% of the vote!) Even if this is not yet reflected in the polls, Olaf Scholz seems optimistic. A current finance minister (since 2017), he was mayor of Hamburg, first secretary of the SPD under Schroeder, and then labour minister in Merkel's first government in 2005. He is playing a clever game between his role as a pillar of the government and a loyal supporter of Angela Merkel in the health crisis, and the regular publication of proposals, some of which are surprising to say the least, which he promises to achieve if the SPD succeeds. The latest is aimed at creating a European army "in the distant future" under the responsibility and control of the European Parliament, according to the German model of the Bundeswehr controlled by the Bundestag.

Other proposals that break with the German policy of the last fifteen years, and which seem more conceivable in the near future, concern European policy (establishing a more substantial common budget, possibly linked to the possibility of borrowing together; establishing European unemployment insurance; developing a model of taxation of GAFAM at the global or European level, etc.).

Voters may wonder, however, why Minister Scholz kept his proposals for the election campaign, when he had four years to work on them. Moreover, in the face of the sustained tension that is tearing the SPD apart between its "popular" and "intellectual" components, the proposals on European policy may not provoke the massive return of voters to the SPD. It remains to be seen that a great closeness is emerging with the positions of the Greens, although more innovative, but compatible on the substance with the proactive approach of a strong state that takes in hand the means to finance its idea of the future.

The Greens

The weakness of the SPD, but above all the desolate spectacle of the "war of the right" within the CDU-CSU, allow the Greens a perfect entry into the campaign. The party has established a 132-page manifesto that reads like a government program. The idea of a massive public investment to launch a "social-ecological transformation" occupies the main place. For ten years, the party plans to invest around 50 billion euros annually, financed by debts and an increase in income tax. In addition, a tax on large fortunes (tax of 1% for wealth above 2 million euros) will be reintroduced. These massive investments will be used to reduce CO2 emissions by 70% by 2030 (instead of a 55% reduction currently planned). To allow the necessary public debt, the Greens also want to review the constitutional provision that currently prohibits it (see insert).

It's not going to be a case. Schuldenbremse The principle of the "debt brake" enshrined in the Constitution in 2009, following the European sovereign debt crisis and Greece's bailout, prohibits the federal government from borrowing more than 0.35% of GDP from one year to the next.

It is certainly possible to lift this principle in case of emergency - it has indeed been put on hold in 2020 (debt to the tune of 1.54% of GDP) and in 2021 because of the health situation, and this argument will also be used for the 2022 budget (Olaf Scholz foresees in his draft budget 80 billion euros of new debts). However, unless there is a change, the Constitution will be re-imposed from the 2023 budget. In this case, the German federal budget would be missing an estimated sum of between 30 and 60 billion euros per year. A "typically German" debate about the possibility of modifying (or not) this constitutional principle may well dominate the campaign and the announced duel between the Greens and the CDU-CSU.

The money invested should allow Germany to catch up on public infrastructure. while modernising them (access to very high-speed broadband, extension of the rail network, equipment in charging stations for electric cars). It is also about transforming agriculture, investing in public services, especially in hospitals and schools.

Behind the sums mobilized is also what is emerging as the main divide, and which directly concerns the Greens: the party is popular and even majority among urban, ecological, liberal (left) and open voters.

It is often rejected by those who see themselves as the losers of globalization in the provinces, who seek salvation in often nationalist protectionism. This contemporary divide between somewhere and anywhere[7], at work in most Western democracies, tends to merge, but only in part, with the materialistic divide. However, it gains a new dynamic by its inclusion in a software (partly) new (or even very old), that of an identity nationalism. It is therefore not surprising to see him dominate in the eastern states, lacking the political benchmarks established since 1949 in the West, but he is also making his way into the rest of the country. It directly threatens the liberal, European and internationalist identity of the Greens.

Their program tries to cross both sides of this divide and propose a synthesis. The candidate for the chancellery, Annalena Baerbock, who has established herself electorally in Brandenburg, is working to multiply the positive associations in the Heimat, the small country, to the province so dear to many Germans. The program seeks to define an ecological transformation that is socially balanced and sustainable at the same time. Among other things, the Greens want to modernize the modalities and increase the height of the RSA ("Hartz IV"). The various aids must be merged and increased. The SMIC needs to be increased and single-parent families particularly supported. On foreign and security policy, the Greens have not returned to their painful aggiornamento, which began under the Schroeder government, with Joschka Fischer at the head of German diplomacy.

If the dogmatic and sometimes violent debates around anti-militarism and pacifism of the 80s and 90s remain far away, it will be interesting to see how the party will position itself on the reform of NATO, on the latest Franco-German projects in the defence industry, but also in relation to the NordStream2 pipeline, rejected by the Greens. The party also defends the most progressive and pro-European positioning in the German debate, and does not hesitate to claim positions contrary to the "defensive pragmatism" that seems to have guided Angela Merkel for sixteen years when it comes to European affairs.

Apart from a very solid and realistic programme, which does not fail to meet the major challenges of today, the Greens have impressed Germany above all by the choice of their leaders. Given their potential in the polls (and the weakness of the other parties), the party proposes for the first time a candidate for the chancellorship. Unlike the two main parties, the Greens are betting on innovation. By proposing Annalena Baerbock, one of the two co-chairs of the party, who at 40 has never held an executive office, the party is taking risks. But instead of defending himself, he turns these elements to his advantage, "leaving the status quo to others," as Annalena Baerbock herself explains. Above all, its designation was made without noise and without tear, in a joint decision and claimed by the two co-chairs. The fact that Robert Habeck, more popular in the polls, and with the experience of a minister in a regional government, has agreed to withdraw in the face of it shows, if there was any evidence, that the "cockfight" staged by the right is not the only way of doing politics. Robert Habeck's act is more in line with the expectations of the citizens, and even if the Chances of the Greens to gain access to the chancellery remain slim, the choice of Annalena Baerbock seems smarter: she has more support among the activists of the party, who will mobilize in bulk behind her. She distinguishes herself from all the other candidates by her youth, but also because she is a woman and claims her status as a mother of two young children. On the national political scene since 2017 (she has been a member of the Bundestag since 2013), she impresses beyond her party with her seriousness, her knowledge of the issues and her ability to negotiate laborious compromises. In this, it recalls a certain... Angela Merkel. She is also very comfortable in front of the cameras, having made in 2020 the largest number of invitations of all political actors to the tv talk shows that germans love and which define much of the country's political agenda.

The CDU-CSU

While the Greens, whose past has forged the image of a maverick party, with a sometimes "chaotic" militant base, always ready to impose its "principles" (anti-authoritarians, followers of direct democracy within the party) against the pragmatic considerations of "Realpolitik", play a perfect score, the CDU-CSU has sunk in recent weeks. This party, for which government responsibility is part of the DNA, is a "governing machine". Accustomed to well-prepared decisions internally, negotiated in the"hinterzimmer"of the various federations and bodies that make up the strength of the CDU/CSU across the country, the party surprised Germany with a conflict over its candidate for chancellorship that erupted in the open.

Already, the failure of Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer at the head of the party (the initial idea was that this close friend of Angela Merkel takes over the leadership of the party before launching for the chancellery) had revealed the cracks and tensions that tear the heart of the

party. It was forced to announce its withdrawal after the fiasco of the regional elections in Thuringia, where part of the CDU wanted to accept the passive support of the far right (AfD), against the explicit indications of Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer and the national bodies of the party. She was successful, but at the cost of her resignation. She was then forced to organize a long and painful internal process to help plug the cracks that had emerged within the party.

This ended with the appointment of his successor, Armin Laschet.

If the latter thought that by winning the presidency of the CDU against the favorite of the conservative wing, Friedrich Merz, he would automatically win the nomination to lead the party in the federal elections, it was without counting on the ambitions of Markus Suder, Minister-President (CSU) of Bavaria. While denying his interest in the chancellery, Markus Said claimed that his "place [was] in Bavaria" until the turnaround of 10-11 April. By skillfully playing on the fact that he was "available" if the CDU called him, he touched the weakness of the party, the chasm between the "authorities" of a party apparently well organized and established, gathered behind its President-candidate for the chancellery, and MPs who, faced with the lack of popularity of Armin Laschet, fear for their re-election, as well as a base of activists ready to stand behind the "leader" Seder, after years of seeking the best compromises that were imposed "without alternative" (and which were, for the most part, embodied by Angela Merkel). With 44% of Germans and 72% of CDU-CSU voters believing that he would make a better candidate than Armin Laschet, the Bavarian Sunder capitalized on his personal popularity to launch his attack in good standing against the establishment of the sister party, not without recalling the Matteo Renzi rottamatore in Italy or Sebastian Kurz in Austria.

Armin Laschet, a close associate of Angela Merkel, a member of parliament in 1994, MEP in 1999, regional minister in 2005, then minister-president of North Rhine-Westphalia in 2017, one of the cdu's deputy presidents since 2012, party chairman in 2021, who has been broken for many years in the inner workings of the party, had the greatest difficulty in bringing together the party's delegates behind his ambitions.

But the psychodrama, which ended on 20 April with the inauguration of Armin Laschet and the rallying of Markus Soder, who promises to "campaign loyally", does not mean that the CDU will disappear in September, far from it. The party still has a good chance of emerging as the "winner" of the elections, and can with a little skill impose its boss as chancellor of a coalition government. However, the structural transformation of society, the misdemeanour of political circles, the wear and tear of the years in power and the difficulty of responding to the great challenges that arise will weigh against the ambitions of the Conservatives.

This is confirmed in the CDU/CSU programme. With five months to go until the election, the party does not yet have an elaborate manifesto or electoral programme. By relying on a "participatory" process, the CDU is taking the gamble of modernity. An "open discussion" around the proposals put forward by the party promises to involve economic and trade union forces, professional organisations, but also citizens. This discussion will normally take place on the internet, but it remains to be seen how the time lost by the nomination of the candidate can be made up.

In the face of criticism of its "programmatic vacuum" following Merkel's 16-year government, the CDU wants to demonstrate that it represents the "common sense" of a vast majority of "normal" Germans, which would distinguish it from the "ideological recipes" it associates with the Greens and the left, and of course with the extremist and "populist" positions of the far right. If this positioning allows the CDU to show itself as being close to the people, the "participatory" tool must represent a modernity that is not necessarily associated with that party. The risks of this strategy are twofold: defending "common sense" could lock the party into the status quo,far from innovative proposals that meet the challenges;on the other hand, those looking for benchmarks on the right may still be disappointed and turn away from a candidate who represents the most pro-European and Francophile current of the party, in the tradition of Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl.

Germany on its way to change?

A first poll conducted after the nomination of candidates for the chancellery has just been published. With 28% voting intentions for the Greens and 21% for the CDU-CSU, it indicates a radical reversal of the balance of power between the two parties, which would constitute a real earthquake for the post-election political landscape. But it is still too early to talk about a heavy trend and observers should expect some variations in the polls in the coming days.

The structural and cyclical elements presented in this article, if they support the argument that German policy, in the absence of an earthquake, will soon experience profound upheavals, invite rather to be cautious. Combined with the institutional factors of the electoral system, they argue for a nuanced judgment. The CDU is not comparable to the Democrazia Cristiana of the early 1990s, nor is Armin Laschet Sebastian Kurz. It would have been different with Markus Soder, who, precisely, failed to get his hands on the candidacy.

With the meticulous and methodical preparation of a programme for Germany and the choice of their leader, the Greens are establishing themselves as the next generation at the centre of the political spectrum - without implying the collapse of traditional parties, as in France after 2017.

The most likely scenario five months before the elections remains a coalition between the CDU-CSU and the Greens, around an ambitious and innovative programme, with a renewed staff, but in the tradition of the centrist policy of Federal Germany. It would not be surprising if the Chancellor was then called Armin Laschet, despite his failed entry into the campaign.

[1] Elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate were held on 14 March. Saxony-Anhalt will vote on 6 June and then, on the same day as the federal elections on 26 September, regional elections will be held in the city of Berlin (a separate state), Thuringia and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania.

[2] Germany has known eight chancellors since 1949, France eight presidents since 1958.

[3] For obvious historical reasons, the third force - communist - which exerted a predominant influence in Italy and France played no role in the Federal Republic (RFA), other than that of an "enemy" against which all the forces in power united.

[4] Ralf Thomas Baus: Parteiensystem im Wandel. in: Zur Zukunft der Volksparteien. Im Plenum Kompakt. Hrsg. von der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2009,

S. 12 [5] Although associated in a single parliamentary group in the Bundestag, the CDU and CSU are two separate parties, with the peculiarity that the CSU limits its presence to Bavaria alone, while the CDU agrees not to intervene on its lands and is therefore limited to the other 15 states.

[6] April 17-18

Poll [7] This distinction is the basis of David Goodheart's book (2017): "The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics".

Fondation Robert Schuman