LSE EUROPP Athanasia Chalari June 29th, 2023 The 2023 Greek elections were an exercise in disillusionment

 LSE EUROPP 

Athanasia Chalari

June 29th, 2023

The 2023 Greek elections were an exercise in disillusionment

The legislative election held in Greece on 25 June produced a victory for New Democracy, led by incumbent Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. Yet as Athanasia Chalari explains, the real story may have been the large numbers of citizens who abstained from voting.

There are different ways to read the results of elections, but one of the least favoured is to focus on those who didn’t vote. This approach, however, tells us something important about politics in Greece following the country’s latest legislative election on 25 June.

Greek elections have long been characterised by low turnout rates. At the latest election, the percentage of Greeks who abstained was around 47% – up from 42% at the 2019 legislative election. The result is that just over half of the eligible voting population (around 53%) have elected the parties that will form the new Greek parliament.

Of those who did vote, the 40.55% who backed New Democracy, led by Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, were enough to determine the nature of the next government. This is one of the paradoxes of democracy: voting is (in most countries) not compulsory and even relatively small proportions of the electorate can select a government to lead the country on behalf of everyone.

Why have so many Greeks abstained from voting? The obvious explanation is that they simply don’t care about the outcome of elections. Yet this apparent lack of interest in the political process should not be conflated with apathy.

Indeed, all evidence suggests that Greek citizens are fully aware of the consequences of political developments for society. They choose to abstain from voting not because they are apathetic, but because they are convinced there is no longer any point in doing so.

Over the last decade, I have interviewed hundreds of Greek people of all ages and backgrounds for research projects exploring the ways they have experienced the turbulent periods of the Greek debt crisis (2008-18), the subsequent Greek brain drain and the Covid-19 pandemic. In all this time, I have never found Greek respondents ‘uninterested’ about the impact of such huge social changes on their lives.

In one project studying the effect of the Greek debt crisis on youth identity formation, I found respondents clearly displayed a collective degree of inactivity in relation to social and political developments but without being apathetic. Participants (particularly young participants) commonly expressed their disappointment and lack of trust towards the state and any form of authority, including scientific authorities associated with the Covid-19 pandemic.

The overwhelming feeling among these respondents is that there is no longer any reliable and accountable form of support or protection within Greek society. They feel powerless and therefore consider it pointless to attempt to produce any form of political reaction. They are consciously inactive because they have endured a lifetime of harmful experiences arising from the norms, powers and qualities that govern Greek social and political life. People no longer vote because they can no longer be convinced by the promises of political parties.

This conscious inactivity may not be the most effective way of expressing disapproval at the way democracy functions in Greece. But it could be the most honest way of withholding support from a system that no longer protects its citizens – and from parties who appear to have few alternatives to offer to the status quo.

Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: European Union

Athanasia Chalari

Athanasia Chalari is a Senior Visiting Fellow at the LSE’s Hellenic Observatory.

LSE EUROPP James Hughes June 27th, 2023 Is Putin stronger or weaker after the failed Wagner rebellion?

 LSE EUROPP

James Hughes

June 27th, 2023

Is Putin stronger or weaker after the failed Wagner rebellion?

The Wagner Group’s rebellion against the Russian government ended in failure, but has it done lasting damage to Vladimir Putin? James Hughes writes that while the rebellion itself has not weakened Putin’s regime, it will exacerbate fears within Putin’s circle of the potential for military failure in Ukraine to generate a wholescale crisis.

The commentary from western governments and mass media on the consequences of the failed Wagner rebellion in Russia focuses on the weakening of Putin’s grip on power. This is a continuation of the wishful thinking that has characterised the analysis of the war in Ukraine itself.

The recent events raised hopes that they might lead to the toppling of the Putin regime, which might then engineer a positive turn in the war in Ukraine’s favour. It is interesting that Putin himself in his statement on the rebellion, drew a comparison with the events of 1917 in Russia, when the February and October Revolutions accelerated a collapse of the Russian Army on the Eastern Front.

That was the only significantly obvious sign of weakness on Putin’s part during the two-day rebellion, and this comparison encapsulates a broader fear within the Putin elite about the possible consequences for the regime of a lack of success or even defeat in the war in Ukraine. Why, then, did the rebellion fail, and how much of a threat did it pose to the regime?

The rebellion, as such, was primarily a spontaneous outpouring of personal hatred. As such it was poorly prepared, badly organised, and had no chance of success. No senior Russian military commander joined the rebellion, only a handful of regular army units expressed open support, while Russia’s political elite rushed to articulate publicly their loyalty to Putin. The Russian defensive line in Ukraine remained solid.

The rebellion was very much the product of personality clashes and infighting within a certain section of the Putin elite that is managing the war. While much attention and commentary has focused on Yevgeny Prigozhin, the chief of the Private Military Company Wagner, the rebellion leader, much less has been articulated as to his motivations. This was not a “coup” against Putin. The target for Prigozhin’s wrath was the two men that Putin has encharged with commanding the Russian war effort in Ukraine: Sergei Shoigu, the Minister of Defence, and Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff and Deputy Minister of Defence.

All three are long-standing Putin cronies. Putin has the closest personal relationship with Prigozhin, tracking back to the mid-1990s in St Petersburg when both were forging careers amidst the brutal realities of post-Soviet Russia. Shoigu came within Putin’s circle in the latter stages of the Yeltsin era, when Putin was prime minister and Shoigu was Minister for Emergencies. Shoigu became firmly embedded as a Putin loyalist after the election of Putin as President in 2000. Gerasimov’s star rose within the army as a result of his unwavering fulfilment of Putin’s orders to crush the Chechen insurgency in the early 2000s.

The problem for Putin is that the quagmire war in Ukraine developed and accentuated personal ambitions, rivalries and hatreds between these three key players. Prigozhin is derisory about what he sees as the mismanagement of the war, and focuses his discontent on ad hominem attacks on Shoigu and Gerasimov. He refers to Shoigu as the “Tyvan” (Tuvan), highlighting the ethnic slur and Russian nationalism of Prigozhin’s political instincts, whereas he dismisses Gerasimov as “Gerasim”, the deaf and dumb stubborn peasant character from Turgenev’s short story Mumu.

However, during the rebellion blood was spilt. Wagner columns were bombed from the air, and there were armed clashes with state forces in Voronezh. Potentially greater bloodshed involving Kadyrov’s “Akhmat” force and Wagner in Rostov was avoided by Prigozhin’s ending of the rebellion as spontaneously as he had initiated it. What then might the consequences be for the regime and for the war?

Two main consequences follow. First, the rebellion did not weaken the regime as such but rather will have served more to exacerbate the fear within Putin’s circle of the potential for military failure in Ukraine to generate a wholescale regime crisis. Prigozhin and Wagner’s popularity as heroes within Russian society for their perceived military successes in the war, means that Putin will have to tread carefully on how he manages the relationship with them post-rebellion. Prigozhin also taps into Russian popular sentiment that holds that the war is being mismanaged by incompetent leaders, and that Russia is not unleashing its full military might against Ukraine to bring the war to a close.

Secondly, Putin will also have to tread carefully in deciding whether to address these populist sentiments. His cronies, Shoigu and Gerasimov, could be moved on to retirement in due course no doubt with much fanfare about how successfully they performed. Replacing these loyalists like for like will not be easy for Putin. Putin may well now also consider it necessary to escalate the war to address the claims that the regime is waging it in too moderate a fashion. The conundrum for Putin is how to bring the war in Ukraine to successful closure without facilitating the rise of an authentic Bonaparte who could better prepare, organise and mobilise a rebellion.

Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: Дмитрий Астахов, ТАСС / kremlin.ru

About the author

James Hughes

James Hughes is a Professor of Comparative Politics in the Department of Government, LSE.

Posted In: LSE Comment | Politics | Russia-Ukraine War

LSE EUROPP : Daphne Halikiopoulou Sofia Vasilopoulou June 20th, 2023 Democracy and discontent: The multifaceted appeal of the far right

 LSE  EUROPP  : 

Daphne Halikiopoulou

Sofia Vasilopoulou

June 20th, 2023

Democracy and discontent: The multifaceted appeal of the far right

0 comments | 9 shares

Estimated reading time: 5 minutes

That role does discontent with democracy play in support for the far right? Drawing on new research, Daphne Halikiopoulou and Sofia Vasilopoulou show that democratic discontent can fuel support for far-right parties, but this relationship varies depending on voters’ attitudes toward immigration.

Does democratic discontent drive far-right party support? Existing research focuses on the common features of the typical far-right voter, who is likely to be a lowly educated, male individual with strong anti-immigrant attitudes and poor prospects in the labour market.

This individual is also likely to be discontent with the democratic process and distrust political institutions. Empirically, however, findings are conflicting with regards to the relationship between low trust in institutions and far-right voting as certain individuals who evaluate the democratic process positively may also vote for the far right.

In a new study, we offer a theoretical and empirical reassessment of the association between evaluations of the democratic process and far-right party support, taking into account the heterogeneity of the far-right voter pool. We identify two routes to far-right voting: discontent and ideology.

On the one hand, discontented voters who negatively evaluate the democratic process are more likely to be motivated by the desire to express their dissatisfaction and vote primarily against the system as opposed to in favour of the far right. On the other hand, voting for the far right is not exclusive to discontented voters. The mechanism here is ideology: ‘nationalist’ core voters are principled and support the far right because they identify with the entirety of its platform, which centres on prioritising in-groups over out-groups in every policy domain.

Democracy and discontent

Organised democratic society is best understood as a framework of collective cooperation that involves a trade-off between individual freedoms and collective payoffs. Citizens experience democracy through their everyday interactions with institutions: public benefits, the quality of local hospitals and schools, corruption, neighbourhood crime levels or the conditions determining employment security.

Their perceptions of how state resources are extracted and utilised, and what makes decisions as per the use of these resources legitimate, are inextricably interwoven with their perceptions of their interactive experiences. Citizens assess two components of the democratic process. First, the diffuse, which refers to broad support towards the democratic system, expressed through trust in institutions; and second, the specific, which refers to satisfaction with system performance and policy outputs.

The extent to which citizens trust institutions and expect effective policies is likely to shape their voting preferences. Declining institutional trust and negative evaluations of system performance and policy outputs are likely to damage mainstream parties, which become associated with the poor policy choices that negatively impact on citizens’ personal everyday experiences. Voters with low or declining levels of trust, as well as those voters who negatively evaluate system performance and policy outputs, are likely to reward political parties that challenge the establishment and existing political norms.

Protesters and nationalists

Far right populist parties are among the prime beneficiaries of these processes. These parties offer nationalist solutions to all socio-economic problems, centre on a purported conflict between in-groups and out-groups and put forward policies that always prioritise the in-group over the out-group in a quest to forge and maintain the homogeneity of the nation.

They challenge the establishment, both in terms of their populist component, which questions the legitimacy of elites, and their anti-liberal democratic component, which questions the existing mechanisms of democratic representation. Research has shown that far-right parties are often electorally successful in contexts of low quality of government and democratic discontent.

Empirically, however, voting for the far right is not exclusive to discontented voters. Consistent with the idea that political parties often receive electoral support from a broad range of voters, it is both theoretically and empirically possible that far-right core voters behave differently to peripheral voters. While the latter are often motivated by protest and the desire to express discontent, core voters are more likely to be ideological.

Who are the core far-right voters? We relate anti-immigration attitudes directly to the core far-right party ideology, which combines nationalism with xenophobia. The primary far-right party target constituency includes voters who identify fully with the far-right parties’ nationalist-xenophobic platforms. These voters tend to have strong nationalistic attitudes, accompanied by unfavourable attitudes towards immigrants who they view as a threat to the homogeneity, security and prosperity of the nation-state.

Core far-right voters prioritise the protection of the in-group from the out-group and vote ideologically based on a principled endorsement of far-right party agendas. The voting behaviour of these individuals is likely to hinge on questions of deservingness and selective solidarity, i.e. questions about entitlement to the collective goods of the state.

To theorise this, we draw on work which conceptualises the nation as an ‘imagined community of solidarity’. Individuals with strong nationalist and anti-immigrant attitudes are more likely to oppose sharing public goods with ethnic ‘others’. They have a narrower perception of deservingness because they are more likely to see the state and its institutions as benefitting the native majority.

Such individuals are more likely to support a conditional version of the welfare state that differentiates access between immigrants and natives. Therefore, positive evaluations of the democratic process among some individuals with anti-immigrant attitudes are likely to translate electorally into voting for parties that emphasise restricting institutional access to the in-group.

We show this empirically using data from nine waves of the European Social Survey (2002-2008). We commence by comparing far-right to non-far-right voters (Figure 1) to identify how the former score vis-à-vis the latter on their evaluations of the democratic process. This analysis illustrates that, on average, far-right voters are not substantially more discontented compared to non-far right voters.

With regards to the diffuse component, differences between far-right and non-far-right voters are small. These differences are even less prominent when it comes to the specific dimension. Interestingly, a significant share of far-right voters perceive the framework of collective cooperation to be working well. Yet, the mean differences in these evaluations between the two groups are statistically significant, which suggests that the effects of these measures on voting behaviour might also differ.

Figure 1: Comparison of evaluations of the democratic process between far right and non-far right voters

Chart showing that on average, far-right voters do not appear to have more discontent with democracy than non-far-right voters.

Note: A value of 0 indicates a low evaluation; a value of 10 indicates a high evaluation. Source: ESS 2002-2018

Next, our analyses illustrate first that those individuals who trust the domestic political institutions in their country and positively evaluate system performance and policy outputs are less likely to opt for a far-right party in a national election. As their approval of institutions improves, these individuals distance themselves from the far right. These are peripheral far-right voters, driven by discontent.

Second, evaluations of the democratic process are positively associated with far-right party support among some anti-immigrant voters. These are core far-right voters driven by nationalism (see Figure 2). For some nationalist voters, their likelihood to opt for the far right increases as evaluations of the democratic process improve, revealing a potentially galvanising effect among some anti-immigrant voters.

Figure 2: Average marginal effects of evaluations of the democratic process conditional on immigration attitudes

Chart showing that among anti-immigrant voters there is a link between democratic discontent and support for the far right.

Note: Immigration: 0 = anti-immigrant; 10 = pro-immigrant. Estimates from multilevel logistic random-intercept models. Source: ESS 2002 to 2018

In sum, there is no typical far-right voter. We show this by focusing on political trust and system performance: when the broad framework of collective cooperation is perceived to be working well, citizens are indeed less likely to resort to the far right. But for those core far-right supporters with extreme views on immigration, the mechanism is different. Whereas positive evaluations of the democratic process make it unlikely for the far right to expand its appeal, they may intensify support among some segments of its core electorate.

One of the main implications of this finding is that research focusing on these various dimensions of populism and democratic politics, especially in an era of sustained levels of distrust and the simultaneous rise of populism in Europe and beyond, should pay more attention to intra-partisan voter heterogeneity. This is significant as it highlights the multifaceted nature of the far-right populist appeal to voters with different preferences and incentives.

For more information, see the authors’ accompanying paper in the Journal of European Public Policy.

Note: A previous version of this blog was published in The Loop. The article gives the views of the authors, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: Vox España (CC0 1.0)

About the author

Daphne Halikiopoulou

Daphne Halikiopoulou is a Professor and Chair in Comparative Politics at the University of York.

Sofia Vasilopoulou

Sofia Vasilopoulou is a Professor of European Politics at King’s College London.

Posted In: JEPP Series | Politics

LSE EUROPP : Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré Monika Sus June 19th, 2023 Is differentiated cooperation the way forward for EU foreign policy?

 Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré

Monika Sus

June 19th, 2023

Is differentiated cooperation the way forward for EU foreign policy?

0 comments | 6 shares

Estimated reading time: 5 minutes

EU foreign policy cooperation is typically based on unanimous decision-making. Yet as Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré and Monika Sus explain, the war in Ukraine has led to calls from some member states to adopt a more streamlined form of decision-making. Drawing on a new special issue, they examine whether differentiated cooperation might help to resolve this debate.

On 4 May this year, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain launched a Group of Friends on Qualified Majority Voting in EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. This group aims to revise EU decision-making in this policy area. Such a revision is highly controversial and likely to generate heated debates among EU leaders.

Foreign policy is one of the member states’ core state powers. As it is a key function of state sovereignty, member states have historically protected their decision-making competences in this domain. They have not only insisted on employing unanimity as a decision-making principle in the security and defence sector but have also frequently constrained the Union’s capacity-building in this field.

Now, however, Russia’s war in Ukraine has provided fertile ground for institutional revisions in the foreign policy domain. Indeed, the political situation requires the EU to act more quickly on foreign and security policy issues. At the same time, the war has led the EU to offer candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, to provide a European perspective to Georgia and to relaunch the enlargement process in the Western Balkans.

Against this backdrop, the members composing the new group claim that, as EU membership might expand, unanimity would lead to paralysis of the EU foreign policy decision-making system. Building on provisions enshrined in the Treaty on European Union, the members of the group intend to put forth concrete initiatives with the overall objective of reforming the EU’s decision-making system.

Differentiated foreign policy cooperation

Informal groupings are not a novelty for the EU. Throughout its evolution, the EU has frequently witnessed similar institutional practices, especially in the foreign policy domain. Despite the Lisbon Treaty’s intentions to foster the integration of member states’ foreign policies, EU foreign policy has grown increasingly differentiated over the past decade.

In a recent special issue, we bring together a collection of articles to address these complex dynamics. We conceive of recurrent interactions of subgroups of member states in specific policy domains as manifestations of ‘differentiated cooperation’. We see differentiated cooperation as a mode of governance that allows EU member states to work together in a non-uniform manner and engage in consensus-seeking.

Practices of differentiated cooperation are particularly prominent in EU foreign policy, where integration proceeds through voluntary policy coordination between national leaders and the EU institutions are not autonomous actors. As the following table demonstrates, one can distinguish between different empirical manifestations of differentiated cooperation.

Table: Differentiated cooperation in EU foreign policy

Table showing that differentiated cooperation can be split along an internal/external dimension and along a formal/informal dimension.

Source: Authors’ own elaboration.

First, interactions leading to differentiated cooperation can be both formal, such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); and informal, such as the grouping of Nordic EU member states in EU development policies.

Second, manifestations of differentiated cooperation can occur both in the internal and external dimension of EU foreign policy. The former involves member states interacting among each other and is illustrated best by the case of groupings launched to deal with conflicts and crisis management, such as the Normandy format or Quint. The latter involves interactions between EU member states and non-EU actors within formalised settings of international cooperation, for example at the OSCE or United Nations.

Why do member states engage in this form of governance and what do they expect from it?

We see three key reasons for the occurrence of differentiated cooperation. First, this mode of governance allows member states to overcome the heterogeneity of their preferences, the institutional constraints on EU collective action and the EU’s capacity deficits.

In other words, through the establishment of informal groups, member states whose interests align and that have the capacities to work together to address a specific issue can go beyond the EU institutional framework while remaining loosely connected to it. This is particularly relevant for EU foreign policy as this domain is still characterised by unanimous decision-making, which the Group of Friends on QMV is trying to change.

Second, this mode of governance can lead to a division of labour between the EU and subgroups of member states. An illustrative example is provided by the Quint. This informal group – comprised of France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States – has supported the EU-mediated dialogued between Kosovo and Serbia. In doing so, it has essentially generated instances of cooperative differentiation, with the activities of this informal group being channelled into EU activities in a cooperative way.

Third, in certain cases, differentiated cooperation can also enable the involvement of non-EU states in the EU’s decision-making framework. One recent example is the participation of Canada, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States – key NATO allies of EU member states – in the military mobility project launched by the EU within the framework of PESCO.

Risks and rewards

The EU’s ability to act in a coordinated way is particularly relevant given the numerous security crises on the EU’s borders, notably the war in Ukraine. In this sense, the announcement by the Group of Friends on QMV of their close cooperation with the EU’s institutions and of their intention to keep the other member states regularly informed of the Group’s activities is to be welcomed.

Yet differentiated cooperation also comes with risks. Without an institutional mechanism for channelling differentiated cooperation, this mode of governance could reduce the consistency and accountability of EU foreign policy due to a lack of coordination among member states. Differentiated cooperation could thus impede the EU’s ability to defend its interests and values.

With the 2024 European Parliament elections now fast approaching, it is unlikely that a reform of the EU’s treaties will happen soon. It will therefore be crucial to strike a balance in which informal groupings can be employed as a tool to overcome stalemates, but without creating divisive practices.

For more information, see the authors’ accompanying special issue of Contemporary Security Policy

LSE EUROPP Lena Schorlemer June 16th, 2023 Assessing Germany’s new national security strategy

 LSE EUROPP 

Lena Schorlemer

June 16th, 2023

Assessing Germany’s new national security strategy

0 comments | 19 shares

Estimated reading time: 5 minutes

On 14 June, Germany unveiled its first national security strategy. Lena Schorlemer assesses what the new strategy could mean for Germany and the rest of Europe.

Germany’s long-awaited first national security strategy (NSS), which has been repeatedly delayed, was finally presented by Chancellor Olaf Scholz and four cabinet members on 14 June. The NSS outlines how the current coalition government intends to tackle internal and external security threats, based on a holistic understanding of security (or ‘integrated security’) that goes beyond military and terrorism concerns to include challenges posed by climate change, healthcare and democratic backsliding.

The strategy emphasises three pillars of German security: robust defence, including increased military spending and deterrence efforts; resilience, focusing on safeguarding Germany and its allies’ values and the rule of law; and sustainability, addressing the impact of climate change and the need to protect natural areas. But what implications – if any – will the new strategy have for Germany and the rest of Europe?

A lack of detail

The NSS has some notable shortcomings. First, the identified threats to Germany are rather vague, and important threats are overlooked. While Russia is recognised as ‘the greatest threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area today,’ other threats listed, such as terrorism, extremism, organised crime, illicit financial flows, cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns, to name but a few, are unspecific.

There is also no mention of threats to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Threats from other geopolitical domains, such as the Arctic or outer space, are also neglected. China is still referred to as a ‘partner, competitor and systemic rival’, although the increasing trend of competition and rivalry is noted. This continued ‘strategic ambivalence’ may be problematic in conveying Germany’s strategic priorities to the international community and is likely to frustrate Germany’s transatlantic partners. In addition to the lack of detail on the threats identified, the strategy paper’s failure to prioritise their relative importance is also problematic.

Second, the value-based national security interests outlined also lack detail and clarity in light of geopolitical realities and competition for critical raw materials. Nine high-level strategic interests are outlined, relating to the protection of national sovereignty and the liberal democratic order, strengthening the EU’s ability to act, global peace and stability, and the preservation of prosperity and an open economic and financial system. However, the crucial issue of securing Germany’s economic strength through energy and resource security is only mentioned briefly at the end of the list of interests. This is particularly striking when compared to the latest US national security strategy, published in October 2022, which places much greater emphasis on expanding economic prosperity and opportunities.

Another concern is the lack of clarity in the proposed policy responses to the security threats identified. The NSS fails to establish a clear causal chain between the suggested solutions and the threats outlined. While some policy responses are clearly defined, such as Germany’s plan to increase support for application-oriented research to strengthen innovation ecosystems at regional and supra-regional levels, others are vague.

For instance, there is no clear explanation of how Germany intends to allocate two per cent of its GDP to military spending and expand its military capabilities, or how it plans to diversify its supply of raw materials. Also problematic, but partly explained by the timing of the presentation of the NSS one week before German-Chinese government consultations on 20 June, is the reference to strategies on China, countering disinformation, space security and climate foreign policy that are still being worked on, all of which are currently delaying key policy decisions due to the lack of strategic guidance.

Moving forward

Despite these shortcomings, the benefits of the NSS must be emphasised. The process of developing Germany’s first NSS involved holistic thinking about Germany’s security concerns and capabilities across the Federal Chancellery, various ministries, and civil society stakeholders. This process of initiating thinking about strategic security has enormous value in itself.

Moreover, the NSS expresses a new awareness of interrelated threats and a holistic view of security, which is an important basis for making necessary policy changes. With the NSS, Germany is sending a clear political message to its population and the international community that it intends to take a comprehensive or ‘integrated’ approach to security and that it recognises that its economic strength, diplomatic clout and history entail a responsibility to contribute more to European security.

All in all, the German NSS, although long overdue, is a significant political achievement. It demonstrates a new political awareness of the interrelated security threats and vulnerabilities facing Germany and a greater willingness to take action. Nevertheless, the lack of concrete details remains a notable shortcoming. The continuing strategic ambiguity regarding China as the second global superpower also poses a challenge.

The NSS serves as an initial basis for the development of related German strategies that are currently underway, such as those focused on China, space security and countering disinformation. It would be beneficial for the NSS to initiate a process and be treated as a dynamic and regularly updated document. The key will be to translate the principles and directions of the NSS into concrete policies that clarify how Germany intends to use its resources to achieve its goals. This will also clarify Germany’s position and priorities to its citizens and the international community.

Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: European Union

Lena Schorlemer

Lena Schorlemer is a PhD candidate in Politics at the University of Oxford. Her dissertation focuses on the links between radical right parties and fringe groups in western democracies. Her research interests include European politics, political extremism and party-movement dynamics.

EUOBSERVER OPINION : Sanctions — how they work, and how oligarchs get around them By ANTON MOISEIENKO CANBERRA, 29. JUN, 12:48

 EUOBSERVER    OPINION

Sanctions — how they work, and how oligarchs get around them

While sanctions are supposed to always entail asset freezes, whether property is in fact frozen — or, say, remains hidden behind nominee owners and thus cannot be linked to the sanctioned individual — depends on multiple factors (Photo: Novaya Gazeta Europe)

By ANTON MOISEIENKO

CANBERRA, 29. JUN, 12:48

Think of the word oligarch, and the prefix 'sanctioned' is almost inevitable.

Known as 'targeted sanctions' as they aim to hold individuals rather than states to account, asset freezes and travel bans are a mainstay of the collective Western response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

But that is far from the only way they are used. Sanctions are also imposed to address corruption and human rights abuse, based on what is often described as Magnitsky laws — after the lawyer killed in a Moscow prison for exposing corruption by Russian officials.

The EU already has a targeted human rights sanctions regime. And, in September 2022, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen committed the EU to introducing an anti-corruption sanctions framework, declaring it one of her priorities in 2023.

Some have argued that its omission to date is a major oversight. Others claim that Magnitsky sanctions are ineffectual anyway. After all, if wielded against individuals outside the EU's borders, who have little if any property in the EU, what is their point?

There is a kernel of truth to both those views.

For governments, there is the temptation to make grandiose sanctions announcements without regard to whether they mean anything in practical terms. On the other hand, the steady drumbeat of (non-Magnitsky) sanctions cases hitting the Court of Justice of the European Union demonstrates that those on the receiving end of EU designations do care about being sanctioned by the EU.

To get a proper sense of what corruption sanctions could achieve, we need to move beyond assumptions.

One way of doing so is looking at the use of Magnitsky sanctions elsewhere. This is precisely what we did in a new study, which aimed to answer a very simple question: What happened to the 20 individuals subjected to the first corruption-related sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Act 2016 in the US?

Case study: 20 oligarchs

This select club brings together a senator and a lobbyist from the Dominican Republic; the former president of The Gambia; a former provincial governor and a businessman from Iraq; an Israeli billionaire; a former governor from Mexico; the former president of Nicaragua's electoral council; the son of Russia's prosecutor general; an alleged Serbian arms dealer; a politically-connected businessman from South Sudan; the former president's daughter from Uzbekistan; as well as an Indian-South African business family with ties to the former president of South Africa.

Our aim was not to confirm or deny any of the allegations made by the US government but merely to explore, based on publicly available information, what effect those sanctions had. Here are the highlights.

First, the actual freezing of one's assets, or even the inability to enter the US, are far from the only consequences of sanctions. In fact, we counted no fewer than 10 types of impact, ranging from heightened press scrutiny to the loss of political influence or employment.

Second, while sanctions are supposed to always entail asset freezes, whether property is in fact frozen — or, say, remains hidden behind nominee owners and thus cannot be linked to the sanctioned individual — depends on multiple factors, including the availability of information about their financial network. That said, assets being frozen are indeed the most common form of impact observed..

Third, half of our case studies concerned individuals who had already faced law enforcement action in their home countries prior to US sanctions. Such designations are less likely to result in a diplomatic rift with a foreign government, as well as helping freeze the US-based property of the individuals involved. But, if used in support of foreign investigations, sanctions arguably lose their edge as a tool of true accountability against those shielded by their governments.

Fourth, perhaps most notably, a third of the designations had no apparent effect, save for media scrutiny, which can be taken for granted in all sanctions cases.

Those instances of 'ineffectual' sanctions involve individuals from Iraq, Nicaragua, Russia and South Sudan. Politics is part of the explanation: in each of those cases, the governments concerned opposed US sanctions, and may have shielded those targeted from their consequences. But nor did the US government seek to publish any information on those individuals' overseas holdings or corporate networks, which would have lent the designations a real punch.

It is, in short, a mixed picture, but one with important implications for the EU. Sanctions can have a meaningful impact, if properly calibrated.

That can be done by prioritising individuals with international business dealings, as well as publicising corporate networks associated with them. And, before sanctions are imposed on those whose alleged wrongdoing has already been addressed by overseas domestic justice systems, there should be a clear rationale for doing so, lest the potential of sanctions as a tool against impunity should be diluted.

If the EU takes into accounts these lessons, it cannot just set up a corruption sanctions regime, but create one that really matters.

AUTHOR BIO

Dr Anton Moiseienko is the author of Corruption and Targeted Sanctions and lecturer at the School of Law, Australian National University.

ASPI -The Strategist : Prigozhin’s rebellion is a symptom of the fragility of Putin’s regime 30 Jun 2023|Shlomo Ben-Ami

 Prigozhin’s rebellion is a symptom of the fragility of Putin’s regime

30 Jun 2023|Shlomo Ben-Ami

SHARE

Print This Post

Some military coups purport to represent the vanguard of modernisation and change. Others, such as Chile’s in 1973 and Spain’s failed attempt in 1981, are fuelled by nostalgia for past dictatorships. The majority of coups are at least partly driven by powerful group grievances.

Russian warlord Yevgeny Prigozhin’s aborted quasi-coup, by contrast, seems to have been motivated solely by his personal quest for power and prestige. And while Prigozhin and his Wagner Group mercenaries quickly abandoned their march on Moscow, they exposed the institutional decay of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s praetorian regime.

Prigozhin thus demonstrated that he is less a threat to Putin’s rule than he is a symptom of its inherent fragility. Essentially, he’s a Putin loyalist who developed, as the Russian president put it, ‘exorbitant ambition and personal interest’. With his rising popularity threatening to undermine Putin’s monopoly on the country’s attention, Prigozhin simply became too powerful to be left unchecked.

Putin’s plan to bring Wagner under the direct command of the Ministry of Defence represented a serious loss of income for Prigozhin, who co-founded the private militia in 2014. Prigozhin’s catering firm also reportedly earned 80 billion roubles (US$920 million) a year supplying food to the military. In a not-so-veiled jab at Prigozhin’s business interests after the rebellion had ended, Putin said that he hoped ‘nobody stole anything, or at least did not steal much’.

Putin’s reign has been characterised by the privatisation of national sovereignty. Private armies such as Wagner, which received US$1 billion a year from the state’s budget, have been integral to the Putin system, and the war in Ukraine has spurred the formation of additional mercenary forces. Even the state-controlled gas conglomerate Gazprom has formed a private battalion, recruiting its own security guards to fight in Ukraine and help secure Putin’s rule in exchange for job perks.

These paramilitary units provide Putin with a way to meet the military’s personnel requirements without incurring the politically prohibitive cost of another mobilisation. The previous conscription drive, initiated in late 2022, caused hundreds of thousands of Russian men to flee the country.

Consequently, the battlefield in Ukraine has become a breeding ground for private military companies. Prigozhin was probably just as agitated by this growing competition as he was by his bitter rivalry with Russia’s military leadership, particularly Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. While Russia’s war effort is ostensibly led by the military, warlords such as Prigozhin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov have become increasingly prominent thanks to their direct access to Putin.

Despite the absence of any real threats to his rule, Putin has little to celebrate. Prigozhin’s rebellion, together with the humiliating fact that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s mediation was required to end it, marks the low point of his long rule. For more than two decades, Putin has privatised various parts of the government, creating a narrow class of fabulously wealthy and politically loyal beneficiaries. With his authority openly questioned, it is clear that this strategy has failed.

Moreover, Prigozhin’s rebellion, which Putin himself says pushed the country to the ‘brink of a civil war’, has likely shattered the Russian public’s idealised perception of their military as a heroic force united against a common enemy. With his fate now inextricably tied to his generals’ ability to stave off defeat in Ukraine, Putin’s image as an all-powerful tzar has also been dealt a potentially decisive blow.

The fact that Prigozhin’s mercenaries managed to seize major cities and military headquarters without resistance underscored what informed observers already knew: the Russian ‘empire’ is a dysfunctional, sprawling entity spread over vast territories inhabited by hundreds of ethnic groups, some of which are self-governed. Its vastness, a source of national pride, is also a vulnerability.

Despite his best efforts, Putin seems incapable of defying an iron law of history: all empires must fall. His lofty and unrealistic dreams of imperial grandeur—and his lament at the ‘blow that struck Russia in 1917’—may have fooled the Russian people, but his regime relies on uneasy alliances between deeply corrupt civilian and military elites. While some of that corruption can be traced back to the Soviet Union, Putin has exacerbated the problem by cultivating his own network of clientelism and nepotism.

Paradoxically, the striking display of Russia’s military incompetence in Ukraine and its internal political instability will likely not affect the dynamics on the battlefield or the broader geopolitical equilibrium. Putin’s isolation persists, but he maintains his alliances with China and Iran and can still leverage India’s neutral stance on the war. And his oil partnership with Saudi Arabia remains intact.

Recent events have undoubtedly hurt the Russian army’s already-low morale. While Andrey Kartapolov, the head of the Russian parliament’s defence committee, described the dissolution of Wagner as a ‘gift’ to NATO and Ukraine, the Russian war effort is not necessarily doomed. Putin, after all, remains in control of the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. And, given their perception of the conflict in Ukraine as an existential battle, Putin and his inner circle are unlikely to accept defeat. By now, Putin has completely abandoned his previous persona as a shrewd diplomat striving to reconcile Russia’s ambitions with Western sensibilities, transforming into an almost suicidal advocate of anti-Western revanchism.

Regardless of the outcome, this is not a glorious war for Russia. Prigozhin’s actions have exposed the country’s political instability and underscored the potentially grave consequences of a Russian defeat. A power vacuum in Moscow would have far-reaching implications across Russia’s 11 time zones.

Sixteen months into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the conditions on the ground resemble the frozen, deadlocked fronts of World War I. One hopes that a ceasefire can be negotiated after the Ukrainian counteroffensive has run its course. But as matters stand, the conflict seems destined to evolve into yet another protracted border dispute, with resolution requiring significant political shifts. If such shifts happen, they will most likely be as unexpected as Prigozhin’s weekend mutiny.

AUTHOR

Shlomo Ben-Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister, is vice president of the Toledo International Center for Peace and the author of Prophets without honor: the 2000 Camp David Summit and the end of the two-state solution. This article is presented in partnership with Project Syndicate © 2023. Image: Sergei Guneyev/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images.