National Security Journal
The Treaty
How to Ensure Iran Never Gets the Bomb After Israel’s Strike
Russell Berman
ByRussell Berman
Published 8 hours ago
An Israeli F-15I Ra'am assigned to the 69th Squadron launches for a sortie in support of exercise Juniper Falcon May 7, at Uvda Air Base, Israel. Juniper Falcon 17 represents the combination of several bi-lateral component/ Israeli Defense Force exercises that have been executed annually since 2011. These exercises were combined to increase joint training opportunities and capitalize on transportation and cost efficiencies gained by aggregating forces. (U.S. Air Force photo/ Tech. Sgt. Matthew Plew)An Israeli F-15I Ra'am assigned to the 69th Squadron launches for a sortie in support of exercise Juniper Falcon May 7, at Uvda Air Base, Israel. Juniper Falcon 17 represents the combination of several bi-lateral component/ Israeli Defense Force exercises that have been executed annually since 2011. These exercises were combined to increase joint training opportunities and capitalize on transportation and cost efficiencies gained by aggregating forces. (U.S. Air Force photo/ Tech. Sgt. Matthew Plew)
Key Points – The endgame of the current Israel-Iran conflict presents two distinct goals: preventing a nuclear Iran and achieving regime change in Tehran.
-While regime change is a hope for many, the primary and more achievable objective for Israel and the US should be the complete and verifiable dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program.
-As Israel gains military dominance, it should not settle for a simple return to diplomacy.
-Instead, it must insist on strict preconditions for any new talks, including Iran’s prior agreement to destroy its centrifuges and uranium stockpile under international oversight, a robust inspection regime, and US-controlled “snap-back” sanctions.
What Happens with Iran Now?
Two different outcomes of Israel’s campaign in Iran compete in analyses of this volatile conflict: preventing Iran’s access to nuclear weaponry and regime change. The former has dominated U.S. foreign policy for decades.
It was the rationale behind the Obama administration’s JCPOA (no matter how flawed that agreement was), just as it motivated the first Trump administration’s withdrawal and the maximum pressure campaign of extensive sanctions. In addition, preventing a nuclear Iran has been Prime Minister Netanyahu’s signature foreign policy agenda.
Meanwhile, the spectre of regime change, the end of the Islamic Republic with its revolutionary agenda, is in the air. Iranian dissidents who deplore the brutal repression that the regime has carried out for decades, as well as proponents of human rights in the West who recoil at the crimes of the leadership in Tehran, see Khamenei and the system of the IRGC severely weakened. They believe that a liberal democratic Iran might emerge. Prime Minister Netanyahu, trying to underscore that Israel’s war is with the Iranian government, not the people, has also pointed to the prospects of a different regime.
Preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons and replacing a dictatorship with a democracy are both desirable. Yet they are different goals. Destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities, including the enrichment site at Fordow (with or without American support), would be a decisive setback for Iran’s belligerent ambitions. Ultimately, one of the world’s most effective anti-proliferation tools has been the Israeli Air Force: it destroyed the Osirak Reactor in Iraq in 1981 and the Al-Kibar Reactor in Syria in 2007. It may be able to do the same for Iran.
In contrast, regime change efforts do not have an auspicious track record; hence, there is legitimate hesitation in American foreign policy circles about “nation building.” Regime change in Iran might take place from within, whether through a coup or a revolution. Leaving that prospect aside however, the end game of terminating Iran’s quest for a bomb ought to be Israel’s primary goal; it would also be beneficial for the whole region which would otherwise face a nuclear arms race; and it would ultimately be significant for the U.S. and the rest of the world through a minimalization of the prospect of nuclear conflict.
Currently, Israel is trying to drive up the costs to the Iranian regime in order to push it to concessions at the negotiation table. This approach dovetails with President Trump’s repeated insistence on the importance of diplomacy. There are even reports that Tehran is looking for an off-ramp from the conflict and renewed negotiations. Yet given Israeli success in achieving air dominance over Iran, a simple commitment to renewed negotiations on the part of Iran will be insufficient. There will be–and should be–preconditions for new talks.
During the previous negotiations, Iran dragged its feet and resisted the key point: ending enrichment. Therefore, a precondition for negotiations is Iran’s prior acceptance of international oversight over the destruction of the centrifuges, the cascade infrastructure, eliminating uranium stock, and dismantling R & D facilities.
In effect, this capacity will have to be destroyed either through war or under oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency or some other agent. Iran should be compelled to accept this as the condition for ending the Israeli campaign.
Iran should also agree in advance to a structure of regular inspections to ensure that it does not rebuild its nuclear program, as the price for any sanctions relief. There should furthermore be an understanding that, as with the JCPOA, sanctions could “snap back” on determination of any future violation. Since the U.S. is the primary author of sanctions, it should be up to the U.S. alone to trigger the snapback provision.
MORE: Israel’s Decapitation Strategy Explained
Other actors, such as Europe and Russia, should not be involved in the deal, as their role would only serve to constrain the U.S.
If that program constitutes the precondition, what would be the point of further negotiations? Meeting the preconditions should end the Israeli campaign, but graduated sanctions relief should be linked to further Iranian concessions: disarmament through elimination of launchers and ballistic missiles; termination of policies of regional destabilization; and cessation of arms exports, including the drones being sent to Russia for use against Ukraine. The list could be longer.
While the war may yet go on and with it the proverbial fog of war, it appears that Israel has achieved the upper hand militarily, and Tehran has been significantly weakened. If the Iranian leadership still has the will to maintain its grip on power, its rational move would be to concede military defeat and accept the implications of the loss, which means renouncing its nuclear ambitions. That might be enough to stabilize its political standing.
However, its defeat on the battlefield will likely lead to accelerated demands for domestic reform. Those reforms might be too much for the regime to bear.
About the Author: Dr. Russell A. Berman.
Dr. Russell A. Berman, the Walter A. Haas Professor in the Humanities at Stanford University, is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and a co-chair of The Working Group on the Middle East and the Islamic World. At Stanford, he is a member of both the Department of German Studies and the Department of Comparative Literature at Stanford, and he specializes on politics and culture in Europe as well as in the Middle East. He has served in numerous administrative positions at Stanford, including as chair of the Senate of the Academic Council. He is a member of the National Humanities Council and, during the Trump administration, served as a Senior Advisor on the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department.
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