CHATHAM HOUSE Why peacebuilding fails and what to do about it Evidence from conflict economies in the Middle East and Africa Chatham House report Published 11 June 2025 Updated 16 June 2025

 

CHATHAM  HOUSE  

Why peacebuilding fails and what to do about it

Evidence from conflict economies in the Middle East and Africa

Chatham House report

Published 11 June 2025

Updated 16 June 2025

ISBN: 978 1 78413 648 2

DOI: 10.55317/9781784136482 

Image of smoke after explosions in Port Sudan

Dr Renad Mansour

Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme; Project Director, Iraq Initiative

Mark White

Director, First Call Partners Ltd

As the world becomes geopolitically more fragmented, conflicts are increasing in complexity and number – up by almost three-quarters since the 2000s. In this shifting order, conflict is being internationalized in new ways as states, armed groups and other actors cultivate adaptive alliances with multiple partners across the political and ideological spectrum. Many of these relationships are motivated by economic survival or pragmatism, entrenching profit-driven dynamics that are often impervious to external policy intervention. Internationally led stabilization and peacebuilding policies must adapt accordingly.

This report, the culmination of a five-year project, considers the pressing question of how to respond more effectively to such challenges in an era in which traditional rigid geopolitical spheres of influence are dissolving. To trace this, we explore geo-economic fronts in this shifting global power order via three case studies: the transnational trade of Sudan’s gold; the adaptive supply chains around oil of Iranian origin; and the networks for transporting migrants via Libya to Europe. In each regional case study, we illustrate how the ‘multi-alignment’ of actors demands a new strategic paradigm to stabilization and peacebuilding. 

The report offers a range of recommendations for international policymakers, including adopting a transnational approach to conflict analysis, strategically leveraging economic power, brokering influence through pragmatic and multi-aligned engagement, improving bureaucratic coordination, and developing accountability mechanisms in collaboration with civil society.

Image — Smoke rises after explosions in Port Sudan, following drone attack by the Rapid Support Forces, 6 May 2025. Photo credit: Copyright © Stringer/Anadolu/Getty Images

Topics

Peacekeeping and intervention

Regions

Gulf states Israel and Palestine Horn of Africa Iran Iraq Libya Syria and the Levant

Departments

Middle East and North Africa Programme

Projects

Cross-border conflict, evidence policy and trends (XCEPT)

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Report summary

01 Introduction: the rise of ‘multi-alignment’

02 Conflict economies in practice: three case studies

03 The mechanisms and impacts of transnational conflict

04 Rethinking policy and programming in an era of multi-alignment

About the authors

Acknowledgments

Peacebuilding often fails to address the chaotic realities of modern conflicts. Interventions designed by international policymakers must adapt to a world of fluid transnational ties and economically driven, ad hoc alliances.

Armed conflicts have rarely been confined within national borders. Even civil wars have often extended into, or been influenced by, neighbouring states. In today’s shifting global landscape, however, conflict is being internationalized in new ways. While combatants, as in the past, are often embedded in local economies and cross-border supply chains, the transnational networks and interdependencies that sustain conflict have become more fluid and multidimensional. Stabilization and peacebuilding policies must adapt accordingly.

Two interrelated trends underpin our research. The first is a rise in the number, duration and complexity of conflicts. In 2024, there were 61 armed conflicts globally, a third more than a decade earlier and 74 per cent more than the average that prevailed throughout the early 2000s. The UN has noted that conflict has become ‘more protracted, and less responsive to traditional forms of resolution’. As geopolitical currents shift, not only does the incidence of conflict seem to be increasing but the challenges of addressing it are more complex.

The second trend – which, we argue, greatly contributes to the first – is the rise of what might be called foreign policy ‘multi-alignment’. Today’s wars occur in a global landscape where pragmatic, often economic, interests now outweigh rigid Cold War-style alliances or spheres of influence. At a state-to-state level, this can be seen in interventions in the Middle East and Africa, where middle powers such as Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates cooperate with Western governments or institutions on certain issues while opposing the very same partners on others. The ongoing transition from the post-Cold War era of unipolar American power – albeit an era marked by an uneven global distribution of peace – partly underpins this behaviour.

Multi-alignment is also reshaping how local elites and armed groups in conflict zones cultivate foreign relationships. These actors are forming pragmatic, adaptive alliances with multiple partners across the political and ideological spectrum, not only overturning conventional ideas about patron–client dynamics but adding to the variables that any conflict resolution policy must consider.

This report, the culmination of a five-year project, explores what protracted wars reveal about the limitations of peacebuilding as typically conducted by the UK, the US, EU states and other like-minded governments or institutions – whether from the ‘West’ (see Box 1) or elsewhere. It draws on research into the civil war in Sudan, the Israel–Iran confrontation and its associated conflicts across the Middle East, and the Libyan conflict. These protracted crises have become key fronts in a shifting global power struggle. Our analysis seeks to ‘follow the money’ by illuminating the persistent forces driving transnational flows of capital, goods and people. We reveal how such activities generate profits for a range of multi-aligned states and actors, sustain long-term violence, and are difficult for policymakers to dislodge. Specifically, the report analyses the gold trade originating from Sudan and its borderlands; the supply chains that have developed for circumventing sanctions on Iranian oil exports; and migrant smuggling through Libya.

The conflicts share critical similarities: each relies on a self-sustaining geo-economic ‘ecosystem’ in which institutions, armed groups, businesses and other interests operate beyond the state’s borders, often in conjunction with external brokers. These systems are decentralized, non-hierarchical, profit-driven and ultimately determined by expediency, with local and external actors alike forming coalitions which no single entity can control entirely. In this landscape, borderlands, ports and airports are key battlegrounds for influence, with external powers frequently supporting multiple sides. Armed groups are not just non-state actors or proxies, but often significant political actors in their own right. They capitalize on state fragmentation and are strengthened by the trend towards flexible alliance-making.

Amid these complexities, internationally led stabilization and peacebuilding programmes frequently yield unintended consequences: exacerbating rather than curbing incentives for profit within illicit markets. Diplomatic, security, economic and development measures are often hindered by the fact that Western foreign policy typically remains state-centric, despite nominally recognizing many conflicts as transnational in nature. Strategies that define particular armed groups or states (or other actors connected to a conflict) according to rigid categories such as ‘ally’ or ‘adversary’ neglect the dynamic reality on the ground. The same applies to governments’ attempts to isolate conflict actors from legitimate trading partners: an economic partner in one context may be aligned with adversaries in another.

This report calls for policymakers in the US, the UK, EU states and elsewhere to adopt a pragmatic, strategic and ‘transnational’ approach to conflict mitigation – i.e. one that moves beyond outdated binary distinctions (local vs international, state vs non-state, etc.) and reflects the complexity of today’s global landscape. In light of this evolving paradigm, our recommendations underline the need to:

Adapt conflict analysis to transnational realities. Conflict analysis methodologies must evolve beyond their current state-centric focus. While existing policy frameworks nominally acknowledge transnational factors, they still typically treat the nation state as the basic unit of international relations. This gives insufficient weight to more complex cross-border, intra-regional and wider transnational dynamics, and deprives analysis and proposed solutions of essential nuance.

Leverage economic power in conflict response. To address conflicts more effectively, policymakers must engage with the often-overlooked economic dimensions of peacebuilding. Instead of relying predominantly on sanctions, interventions can create incentives for peaceful cooperation through strategic support of infrastructure and sustainable economic sectors. Sanctions and financial tools can help disrupt conflict economies if used strategically, with clear end goals and minimal harm to livelihoods. Targeting illicit sectors in which there are fewer vested interests allows for greater impact while reducing unintended disruptions to local communities. Cracking down on illicit economic practices, for example through sanctions, without providing viable livelihood alternatives risks facilitating new forms of violence and harm.

Broker influence through pragmatic engagement with adversaries as well as allies. The rise of multi-aligned actors in transnational conflict economies requires peacebuilders to engage continuously and strategically with allies and adversaries alike. In seeking to manage conflict and mitigate its most violent dimensions, states and institutions must invest in cultivating a wider set of relationships, sometimes with partners with which they would not normally contemplate cooperation. Policymakers must recognize that alliances are not absolute – an ally may diverge on certain issues, just as an adversary may align on others.

Coordinate transnational analysis across policy agendas and government departments. Adoption of transnational conflict analysis could align often-competing policy agendas within governments (where one department will often have different priorities to another in relation to a specific country or conflict). A transnational lens could also help governments to coordinate their policies better with the activities of non-governmental actors operating in conflict zones. An important step would be to expand and pool analytical expertise across government departments, particularly on policy areas where conflict intersects with illicit financial flows and serious organized crime.

Incentivize transnational initiatives through resource allocation. To counter the natural bilateral (i.e. state-to-state) focus of many foreign ministries, dedicated task forces or implementation teams could be established to break down country-specific policy silos and drive coordinated action. Resources need to be allocated to this task in a way that overcomes the limitations of country-focused budgets, so that transnationalism is not just a principle but a funded priority.

Strengthen accountability mechanisms. Political settlements and ceasefires must encompass more than agreements on elite power-sharing and political transition; they must include enforceable measures that enhance accountability. Civil society organizations can play a crucial role in holding actors in conflict zones accountable.