Exclusive Interview with Luuk Van Middelaar "A European political and public space has emerged from the crises"

 Fondation Robert Schuman

Exclusive Interview with Luuk Van Middelaar

"A European political and public space has emerged from the crises"

Pandemonium is the imaginary capital of the Underworld in writer John Milton’s 

Paradise Lost. Why did you give this title to your latest book? 

This choice is firstly linked to the start of the Covid-19 crisis, a hellish experience, 

with people dying in the corridors of hospitals, the military called to the rescue, 

patients transferred from one place to another. Pandemonium is also about noise, 

so the idea of public debate, of a clash of opinions, from which something new emerges, 

a political action that seemed to me to be specific to this crisis. And then I’m a 

writer and I couldn’t resist the pun with «Pandemic»!

With each crisis, some voices predict the imminent 

demise of Europe as a political project. How can 

this rhetoric of fear be explained? 

It is fascinating. I’ve experienced it several times, with 

the euro crisis, the refugee crisis, Brexit and now the 

public health crisis. I see two reasons for this. The first is 

that observers and even experts tend to underestimate 

the forces that hold us together. There are the economic 

forces: the internal market has played a decisive role in 

uniting the EU-27 vis-à-vis London. There is the monetary dimension: the idea that we could leave the euro zone 

has almost no credibility. It might therefore be suggested 

that the «de facto solidarity» dear to Robert Schuman 

works; the end of «Europe» would have a high economic 

price, the cost of which is unknown. Finally, even if it 

is less tangible and less quantifiable, there is a political 

will to live together, which remains strong, particularly in 

Germany and France; this involves a certain relationship 

with history, a recognition that a group of states shares 

the same space. This is what makes it possible in times 

of crisis to find the energy to act together, an energy thatsometimes surprises the heads of state and government 

themselves. 

Why are Europeans not more aware of what binds 

them together?

The problem is that all of these things seem to be taken 

for granted now, we forget that they were sometimes 

painfully acquired. This is true for the economic fabric; 

it is true for peace on the continent. Various centrifugal 

and centripetal forces shape the European Union, but it 

is as if the centripetal elements have very few advocates, 

credible ones at least. This is where I see the second reason for the discourse about the end of Europe, and that is 

what I call «the prophets of doom», a tendency to exaggerate the danger when it comes to taking action. We are 

a Union, not a State, with divergent interests depending 

on the culture, history, and geography of each state. Political leaders therefore need to face a crisis before they 

feel they can move forward together.

The European Union has long been a dispassionate, bureaucratic space. How has it changed?

For very deep-seated reasons, Europe was created as a 

regulatory, depoliticised area, governed by law and expertise. The ability to defuse conflicts, to calm passions 

and to build a continental market is certainly a quality, 

but it can become a handicap when danger arises. Then 

it is necessary to act quickly, win over public opinion and 

show leadership. The old system was organised to take 

time, to be patient, to negotiate long and hard. This was 

done between experts, far from public opinion and the 

media, which was not a problem as long as standards 

VAT, compensatory amounts and other technical issues 

were discussed. Not so with the crucial issues that the European Union is now facing, such as security, identity, solidarity, finance, borders: these issues concern all 

citizens and not only the stakeholders dear to the Brussels bubble. A few years ago, some political scientists 

wrote that no national election had ever been decided on 

a European issue. This is no longer true; we have entered 

another world! Today there is a European political and 

public space that has emerged from all these crises.

You mention an «existential, Machiavellian moment» for the Union: it knows it is mortal and is 

starting to react in the short term. Is it possible to 

talk about a tipping point?

Yes, if you take ‘moment’ in the sense of a time of transition; I like to talk about a metamorphosis, with accelerations. Things really started to move in 2008, with the 

banking crisis, and then in 2010 with the euro: a dozen 

heads of government were defeated in elections in less 

than two years because of the decisions, or non-decisions, that had been taken at EU level. Then there was 

the migrant crisis which divided opinion. During the pandemic, 

it was as if all these painful experiences came to the surface 

and for the first time triggered bottom-up 

political decisions, called for by the public. There was a cry 

of alarm, a call for solidarity coming first from Italy, then 

from Spain and France, calling on Europe to act. This 

cry was louder than the lack of European competences 

in the field of public health, louder also than the very 

selfish reaction of the Member States (France included) 

that was witnessed at first. Notably Angela Merkel heard 

this cry. It was she, with the Franco-German agreement 

of 18 May 2020, who realised that her country could not 

afford to play the miser again, not only because it had to 

come to the aid of countries that were going through hell, 

but because it had to protect its own economic interests, 

protect its exports and jobs. There was much less German 

hypocrisy during this period than during the euro 

area crisis. 

The pandemic has therefore greatly accelerated 

the evolution towards a shared destiny, what you 

call a European res publica?

Indeed, you can see interactions within a wide European public space which do not always take the form 

that theorists previously outlined. It cannot be said that it 

is intergovernmental when one public opinion addresses 

another directly; an attempt should be made to understand that something much more powerful, more interesting, more vibrant is happening. There were several 

examples of this during the pandemic. In August 2020, 

Italian mayors bought a page in the Frankfurter Allgemeine 

Zeitung to call on Berlin to show financial solidarity. 

Two German ministers wrote several op-eds in the press of 

southern countries. The former Italian Prime Minister, Giuseppe 

Conte, made appeals for help in the German and Dutch press. 

This is not unprecedented; the former Greek finance minister, 

Yanis Varoufakis, used this European public space in 2015 

to try to shift the balance between discipline and solidarity, 

albeit without much effect. In his own unpleasant way, 

Viktor Orban talks about Europe, and not just about Hungary, 

when he tries to influence the migration debate with his crusader 

rhetoric and calls on the West to defend itself against the 

so-called «infidels». 

Isn’t the end of the ‘permissive consensus’, the 

complacent indifference of citizens to a large market 

that created jobs and wealth, more complicated to manage?

Political passion obviously goes both ways; citizens 

sometimes want to applaud, sometimes want to criticise. 

That is political life! This still proves very difficult for 

many in Brussels to understand. Let’s take the example 

of the public health crisis: the decision to purchase vaccines 

jointly was one of the most far-reaching, almost 

revolutionary taken by the European Union, because 

the vaccine was the saviour, the light at the end of the 

tunnel. But the Commission underestimated the public’s 

expectations and therefore the tensions, criticisms and 

passions that would be unleashed in the event of disappointment or problems. It is not used to being exposed to such an extent, to the heated media coverage that a public crisis brings, whereas in national politics you have to deal with one crisis after another.

The European project has been built up around two 

visions, geographical extension and communitarisation, a perpetual movement towards more competences and more member states. 

Did the founding fathers set Europe on the wrong path?

It would be foolish to say that they were wrong when 

they did one of the few things that could be done in their 

time. Those who are wrong are the ones who think that 

the same answer is still valid today. The founding fathers 

of Europe were men steeped in history, who had lived 

through one or even two world wars. They were acutely 

aware therefore of ‘historicity’, the fact that the world is 

constantly changing and that each generation must find 

its own answers. The method of building Europe was not 

only supposed to be good historically, but also morally, 

because it was supposed to lead to peace and that this 

future represented good. So, for a long time it was difficult

 to criticise certain aspects of it without being accused 

of being anti-European. However, there are many taboos 

associated with this period that must now be tackled 

head-on.

What are these “taboos”?

The simplest one to understand is that of the border. 

The Europe of the 1950s, and even of the Delors years, 

was the Europe without borders. This meant removing, 

dismantling, abolishing the borders between European 

countries, not just for economic reasons but also because 

the border was seen as a bad thing, a reminder of the 

past, a reminder of wars, divisions and therefore of evil. 

It was as if, to overcome the dangers of nationalism, a 

universalism, a cosmopolitanism, was needed, in which 

Europe would serve as a model for the whole world, in 

which Europeans would be ‘citizens of the world’. Europe 

was supposed to be an open space, and this space is 

indeed a godsend for those citizens who like to move 

around, to travel, trade, study abroad; but in the process

 it has neglected its protective function as a place, 

as a home. Moreover, no thought has been given to the 

question of external borders. Where does Europe stop, 

how far should it expand? The whole issue of space was 

left unsaid, and this has led to disasters. The conflict 

between Ukraine and Russia is partly linked to our lack 

of clarity on the subject. The same applies to Turkey

where a situation of great ambiguity has been created. 

Nevertheless, thought is being given to the matter. Think 

of Frontex, which has become a more robust European 

border guard. Or think of international trade, with new 

requirements in terms of reciprocity and trade defence 

vis-à-vis the outside world, as opposed to open trade within our own single market. A very concrete difference is 

now emerging between ‘we’, Europeans’ and ‘the others, 

the rest of the world’. For the first time, there is even a 

European Commissioner responsible for «Promoting our 

European way of life».

What would you include in this European identity?

Firstly, values such as democracy, equality, and the rule 

of law can be included. But this does not exhaust the 

subject, the difficulties begin afterwards, for example 

regarding what distinguishes us from the Americans. 

It might be said that we occupy a space together that 

is neither Asia, nor Africa, nor America, nor the Arctic, 

that we have lived through eventful times together, 

historically, on this small piece of Eurasia, including two 

world wars. And it cannot be denied that Christianity is 

the religion that has shaped the way of life in Europe. In 

the Middle Ages, the Church structured society, people’s 

relationship with others, with life and death, with time; 

it also laid the foundations of the pre-modern political 

order, with its parishes and bishoprics, with the Pope at 

the top. Europe was then Christian in the societal and 

political sense, which is why today’s Europe is among 

other things ‘post-Christian’.

How can the Union’s plurality of values, which is 

also a European strength and uniqueness be managed?

I would distinguish two levels. When I speak of a conflict 

between values, I am doing so with a view of raising 

awareness that the world of tomorrow will be more difficult for Europeans than that of today or yesterday. It 

will no longer be self-evident to have security, prosperity 

and freedom at the same time. 

How will we react when we have to choose between 

contradictory demands from Beijing and Washington, for example if the Americans ask us to stop exporting to China?

 Will we have to accept this in the name of the protection

 the US offers us with NATO? 

Will we be prepared to accept the consequences for our 

citizens, in terms of jobs or climate negotiations? Or take 

migration. What should we do at the time of major crises 

and instability in the neighbourhood, between either opening or closing borders? How can solidarity and security 

be articulated? But let there be no mistake, plurality of 

values does not mean that everything is permitted in the 

Union. To some extent we must admit that Chinese President

Xi Jinping can do what he wants at home, in the 

name of Realpolitik, but this is not the case for Viktor 

Orban. Hungary is a member of the European Union, and 

we must, for the sake of the fundamental values on which 

our identity is based, ensure that coherence is maintained

 between the member states.

The attacks on the rule of law in Budapest and Warsaw 

show that it is difficult to maintain this consistency. How can the European Union resolve the crisis with Poland, accused of 

questioning the primacy of European law and flouting 

the independence of the judiciary? 

This crisis is obviously very difficult to resolve. Of the two 

problems you mention, the attack on the independence 

of the Polish judiciary seems to me by far the most serious. 

The future of Poland is at stake: will it remain a constitutional 

democracy or will it continue on the path to autocracy? This is a real headache for the Union, which defines itself as a club of 

democracies. 

The Polish attack on the supremacy of European law is a side issue. 

This is a very clever move on the part of the government, since 

it allows it to pose as the true defender of the homeland 

against ‘Brussels’, invoking - in bad faith - other European examples such as the rulings of the German Constitutional Court and even the Brexit vote. To make the supremacy of European law the main issue is therefore to fall into a trap that the Polish Prime Minister, Mateusz 

Morawiecki, is setting for the EU institutions. Political and 

financial pressure will have to be increased against the 

Polish government for its autocratic excesses, but without 

damaging the Polish opposition’s chances of winning in 2023. Ultimately, it is not the EU that will be able to «solve» this crisis,

it is the Polish electorate.

You see the European Union as a kind of great public theatre. 

But the Union suffers from a lack of 

identification of its leaders. Can you explain this? 

The metaphor of the theatre works for what I call, in my 

previous book[1], the ‘politics of the event’ – as opposed 

to the politics of rules which is played out more behind 

the scenes, without an audience. Only a few people can 

be the protagonists: the presidents of the Commission, 

the European Council, the European Central Bank and the 

German and French leaders, for the most part. It is clear 

that Angela Merkel has embodied Europe in recent years, 

perhaps more than Ursula von der Leyen, including in 

the rest of the world. When Emmanuel Macron gives his 

speech at the Sorbonne, he has no problem speaking to 

all Europeans at the same time. But these actors do not 

have a pre-written script; they have to improvise in the 

face of events. It is up to them to find the right answers 

to reach the public and match their words with their actions; 

this is all the more difficult, as expectations are not 

the same from one political culture to another. The narrative 

is the thing that will allow them to speak and act. I 

like what Hannah Arendt said: «By acting and speaking, 

men reveal who they are”.

How can this narrative with our shared but extremely 

conflicted history be articulated?

Any narrative has to be anchored in history, taking the 

long view, without denying everything that may have 

divided us in the past. The founding fathers decided in 

1950 to take Europe out of history and time, to wipe 

out the past: wars, borders, identity. This was perhaps 

necessary to win their great wager, to initiate something 

utterly new; but this is no longer necessary today. History 

is moving forward and, as Europeans, we are no longer 

in the same place, either in time or in space. We are 

entering a new era that will be dominated by the global 

struggle between the United States and China for geopolitical

 primacy. It is going to be quite difficult for us as 

Europeans not to be vassalized by the Americans in a 

new cold war with China, as Australia already is. We must 

also review our relationship with our large neighbours, 

such as Turkey, Russia and the United Kingdom, and also 

with the Middle East and Africa. Migration, for example, 

does not present itself in the same terms for the United

States; it is not their problem but ours when conflicts or 

wars close to our borders lead to major migratory flows.

Does the European Union have the will and capacity to 

become «a power among powers»? 

The difficulty with these concepts is that we do not 

sufficiently separate the military aspect in the strict sense 

from everything else, the ambitions in the field of defence 

from those in the field of security in the broad sense. It 

is very easy to make fun of European military ambitions, 

because it is obvious that we will not be autonomous 

tomorrow, or even in ten years’ time, and capable of 

defending ourselves militarily. However, there is a whole 

industrial aspect on which the European Union is already 

working and taking concrete decisions, for example in the 

field of rare raw materials, chips and semi-conductors. 

This also involves our strategic autonomy, of being able 

to produce or secure our supply chains. Amalgams must

 States; it is not their problem but ours when conflicts or 

wars close to our borders lead to major migratory flows.

Does the European Union have the will and capacity to 

become «a power among powers»? 

The difficulty with these concepts is that we do not 

sufficiently separate the military aspect in the strict sense from everything else, the ambitions in the field of defence 

from those in the field of security in the broad sense. It 

is very easy to make fun of European military ambitions, 

because it is obvious that we will not be autonomous 

tomorrow, or even in ten years’ time, and capable of 

defending ourselves militarily. However, there is a whole 

industrial aspect on which the European Union is already 

working and taking concrete decisions, for example in the 

field of rare raw materials, chips and semi-conductors. 

This also involves our strategic autonomy, of being able 

to produce or secure our supply chains. Amalgams must 

be avoided because this is detrimental to the quality of 

public debate. I must say that if in 2024 there is another 

Trump presidency, which cannot be totally ruled out if 

you listen to the Washington establishment, and if this 

time Trump does decide to withdraw the US from NATO, 

all these discussions will go much faster; when there is 

an emergency – as the pandemic also showed –, many 

things that seemed unthinkable and impossible suddenly 

become thinkable and possible, necessary even. We had 

better think ahead and prepare for it!

Luuk van Middelaar

Writer, philosopher and historian, 

former adviser to Herman van Rompuy, 

President of the European Council (2009-2014).

Last published book Pandemonium, Saving Europe, Agenda 

Publishing, October 2021